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THE POLITICAL CAREER OF HENRY, THIRD EARL GREY ( 18 26-5 2) • 
Introduction. 
Henry George, third Earl Grey, was born on 28th December, 
1802. His life· was to span pract·ically the whole of the ninete!!'nth 
+ 
century, his death not occur)ng till October, 1894· E''or mucl1. of 
his life he was interested in politics, and it is mainly for his 
-
work as a politician that his name has, in some degree, come down 
to posterity. His pol·i tical life was by no means over in 1852, 
for many years later he"was still actively concerned in his 
country's affairs; for example, he strongly opposed Gladstone's 
Home Rule policy of 1885-6. N~vertheless there are reasons for 
concluding this study in 1852. Entering Parliament in 1826, he 
served his apprenticeship in politics first as a humble member of 
the House of Gbmmons, then as a junior member of his father's 
Ministry (holding the posts of Under-Secretary to the Colonial 
and the Horne Offices). His next step was a Cabinet post, the 
office of Secretary at War. Finally came the apex of his political 
career, when he held the Colonial Office from 1846 to 1852. So 
far he had ascended the path to political eninence in a regular 
progression, but after 1852 there is a sense of anti-climax, for 
he was never to hold a post within a government again. 
In those vital, formulative years of youth Henry Grey was 
very fortunate. Good fortune smiled upon him in that he benefited 
from a happy family atmosphere at Howick HQ.ll_, his father's seat 
in Northumberland. His father was one of the most emine.n"tt 
figures in politics, and as a result of the Reform Act was to 
become a readily remembered ninetee~th century Prime Minister. 
Not only was Charles, second Earl Grey, a noted politici~, a 
friend of Charles Fox; he was also a large landowner in the 
county of Northumberland. ~us he possessed the requi~ite· 
_qualificati·ons for an important position in . society; he was 
aristocratic by birth, his wealth came from large estates, and 
he was talented. The assets of the father, and his influence 
in society, were of enormous advantage to the son. 
Unlike many of ~~s well-known contemporaries, Henry Grey 
never went to a public school; instead, he was tutored at home, 
his father having vowed never to send any of his ·children to such 
institutions, being convinced from his o·v-m sojourn at Eton that 
nothing was to be learnt there that could not be acquired in a 
better atmosphere elsewhere. In due course, H~nry Grey, 
usually knoWn by his courtesy title of Wiscount Howick, proceeded 
to Cambridge, where tie entered his father's old col]ege,.Trinity. 
His contemporaries at Cambridge include.d Macaulay (one year 
senior to him), Charles Villiers (the advocate in later life 
of the repeal of the Corn Laws), and Charles Austin (the 
brilliant debater and the exponent of Utilitarian theories). 
It was doubtless at Cambridge that Howick became acquainted· 
with what were to become the dominant ideas of the nineteenth 
century, in particular economic theories (with special reference 
to free trade), and a new concept of the rule of the Mother 
Country "vis a vis" her colonies. One glimpse of this early 
period confirms this; in a letter of February, 1823, to his 
father, he describes a Union debate in which Macaulay, Aus.t:in 
and every other speaker united to condemn the colonial policy 
of the country. 
·After Cambridge, came another important phase in the 
education of a peer's son, foreign travel. By July, 1823, 
Howick had taken up his residence in Switzerland, moving ~o 
Paris in December. At Paris, so he informed his father, no 
evening passed.without being invited out to dinner or to a 
party. In a. more serious vein.:we find him hoping to hear some 
of the debates in the Chamber of Deputies, and failing in an 
attempt to procure information requested by Earl Grey on the 
state of the French navy. It was while he was abrQad that 
there began the series of events which were to lead to the 
commencement of his political career • 
. \ 
.QHAPTER 1. 
The NQ~thumberlar~d Election of 1826, and h'-s ea~lY 
apprenticeship in Parliament ( 18~6-la30 ). 
In the early nineteenth century, as in its predecessor, 
the most honourable way of entering Parliament was by coming in 
as the representative of a county, the choice of the Landed 
]nterest (still regarded as the most potent and respectable 
section of the community). At the opposite end of the scale 
there were of course the pocket boroughs in the gift of an 
individual, a less praiseworthy, but often a less expensive 
means of entrance, which had been utilized by some of the 
Country's most famous statesmen. 
1 • 
At the beginning of 1823 Northumberland had as her 
representatives C.J. Brandling of Gosforth House and T.W. Beaumont 
of Bywell Hllll. Brandling was a Tory; Beaumont, from being a 
one time president of the Pitt. Club, represented the Whig 
interest, though he was more of a Radical than an orthodox Whig. 
Relations between Earl Grey and Beaumont had once been 
very cordial, so much so, that the former had contemplated the 
latter as a possible pusband for one of his daughters. (l) 
Whatever cordiali-ty remained :iln 1823 was shattered by a letter of 
I' ( 2) August 29th, written by Beaumont to Grey. ~his letter, 
subsequently published by Grey in 1826 as proof of his assertion 
(1) Monck to Earl Grey, Sept. 29th, 1825. 
(2) Printed in 'Northumberland Election Papers for Summer 
1826' V·oil:. III. 
2. 
that Beaumont was an unfit person to represent the county -
accused Grey Jr having had an adul teroos connection with Lady 
Swinbu~e (mother of the girl Beaumont was hoping to marry). It 
is indeed a strange letter, and seems to justify Grey's conclusion 
that at the time of writing Beaumont was labouring under some 
form of mental delusion. Grey denied the charge, and when 
Beaumont offered an apology the incident was temporarily closed. 
Apart from arousii!g the enmity of Earl Grey towards 
Beaumont, this episode had another result. Sir Matthew White 
Ridley, M.P. for Newcastle informed Earl Grey that Beaumont, 
overwhelmed by private worries (his engagement to Miss Swinburne 
was off), was likely to apply for the Chiltern Hundreds. Ridley 
suggested that Hawick would be a sui table candidate to filll. 
the vacancy. Earl Grey's reaction was favourabl~, and Hawick-
then in Switzerland- was informed of what was afoot. ( 3) 
One Whig w~o would have a better claim to represent the 
· county than the young inexperienced Hawick was Sir Charles Monck 
of Belsay, a former choice of the county,. and a man of great 
political exp~rience. He had retired from po1i tics in order to 
attend to his private affairs. If Monck were to come forward 
to replace Beaumont, then any idea of Hawick's candidature would 
have to be abandoned, as Monck would command the allegiance of 
the Whig families in the co.unty and the support of some of their 
(3) Ridley to Grey. August 25, 1823. 
political opponents, Earl Grey was on close.terms of friend-
ship with Monck and wrote to en.qui.re whether the latter would 
come forward should Beaumont vacate his seat. Monck replied 
that private considerations prevented him from contesting the 
county, and offered to support Howick in the event of a vacancy. 
The only other possible -candidate vias Bigge, a .Wh-ig but disqualified 
as a county representative in Monck's eyes because he was not 
.free from commercial taint, being a partner in a Newcastle Bank. 
Howick on the other hand was the son of a great landowner. (4) 
However, there was to be no election at this time. 
Beaumont decided against resigning. 1824 witnessed a further 
deterioration in the relations between Earl G.rey and Beaumont; 
the former was threatened with a legal action for expressing the 
opinion that Beaumont was mad. · .Again it seemed as though 
Beaumont was about to· resign his seat. It was now known ·that 
if' ~~nck's private affairs improved he would have no objection 
-
to his name being considered as a candidate in an election; 
therefore, the leading Whigs were not ea~er to provoke a contest 
at this stage, but t~ postpone it until Monck was ready to come 
forward. Perhaps they had s9mething to do with Beaumont's 
final decision against resigning in 1824 •. It is not difficult to 
see why the Northumbrian Whigs preferred Monck to Howick; the 
former was an experienced parliamentarian, the latter had merely 
his father's name as a recommendation. In addli tion it was not 
(4) Monck to Grey. October 20, 1823. 
known how far Earl Grey would commit himself financially should 
there be a disputed election, and the Whigs were loath to 
contribute amongst themselves to return a totally inexperienced 
person to Parliament. 
T:owards the close of 1825 it was obvious that the time 
was approaching for a General Election. For this Earl Grey 
was determined to bring l]:.;Ls-·-·a·on forward as a candidate for the 
county. Howick was now. in Northumberland and was in receipt of 
a regular correspondence from his father at Devenport, who 
advised him as to the steps to be taken to forward his 
candidatur.e. 
F'or a variety of considerations Earl Grey would have 
preferred to have his son brought in for a pocket borough. A 
county election would be uncertain as to its outcome; indeed 
from what he knew of the disposition of some of the Whig gentry 
his son's election did not seem probable. The attitude of Monck 
gave cause for alarm; not only was there the possibility that 
he might himself stand, but he was also objecting to any attempt 
made by Grey to make use of the services of Lord Lambton, Howick's 
brother-in-law, who was in Monck's eyes a 'foreigner' who had 
no business· to interfere in a Northumbrian election, Lambton 
being primarily a Durham landowner. Then there was the question 
of expense. Therefore, he encouraged Hawick to cultivate the 
acquaintance of those with boroughs at their diaposal. 
s. 
mD February 1st, 1826, the totally unexpected happened. 
C.J. Brand.ling of Gosforth Hall, member of parliament for 
Northumberland, died. Now the county was :faced with two 
elections, a by-election, with the General Election a mere matter 
of months behind it. Howick, on receipt of the news of 
Brandling' s death, acted promptly; he decided to put an 
advertisement. in the· Newcastle papers announcing his intention 
of coming forward as a candidate. First, however, he paid a 
visit to the Duke of Northumberland, the county's richest 
landowner and a Tory in politics; to Howick's satisfaction he 
. 
learnt that. the Duke intended to remain neutral in the present 
contest. ~e ducal purse would not be employed against the 
Greys. 
A second candidate :for the vacancy, this time in the Tory 
interest, was .H. T. Liddell of Eslington. Liddell's :father, 
Lord Ravensworth, had the. reputation :for-being closely attached 
to the interests of the Court. The bulk of Lord Ravenworth's 
lands lay in Durham, so that Liddell was open to a charge of 
being an intruder in Northumbrian affairs. 
Earl Grey was pleased by Hawick's prompt action, but the 
latter soon committed a grave error of judgment. Qn 'February 
4th, he entered into an agmeement with Liddell; that sort of 
compromise between two candidates which when known had led to 
cries of depriving the electors of their free choice, and had 
6.· 
often lost a c'andidate _more votes than he gained by it. Ho~_ick 
undertook to withdraw before the day of the election, provided 
Liddell would not be hostile to him at the General Election. 
By the final agreement both stated that they wogld not be hostile 
to each other at th:e General Election, and where electors were 
inclined :to divide their votes between them they would n.ot ask 
for plumpers (a plumper being where an elector's second vote 
is unused, instead of being given to anot~er candidate). (5) 
Earl Grey immediately saw the folly of making such an 
agreement.· If Howick withdrew from the present contest and 
Liddell triumphed, the independent freeholders would immediately 
conclude that an agreement had been reached by two peers for 
dictating the choice of the county. This could cause a great 
outcry, and lose Howick much support; the accusation would 
benefit such people as Monck or Beaumont. 
. ' 
At the same time 
Earl Grey once more referred to the subject. of expense:-
'•••• I could not, with justice to my family, commit 
myself to a greater extent than £5,000 at the utmost.' (G) 
Howick' s reason for deciding to withdraw from the 
. 
contest was the fact that Liddell had reacted even more swiftly 
to the news of Brandling' s death than he had himself. Liddell 
had been four hours in Alnwick before Howick arrived to canvass, 
(5) Howick to Earl Grey, Februa~y 4th, 1826. 
(6) Earl Grey to Howick. February 6th, 1826. 
and hac?- sent off' agents all over the neighbourhood. In·· addition 
there was a general feeling amongst the elect·ors against having 
two Whig members f'or the county; Northumberland would be more 
fairly represented by.having a member of each political party 
in Parliament. · Howick had also not wished to antogoniSe the 
Tories, who would he thought, as a result of' his action, be 
willing to split their votes with him at the General. Election. 
Nevertheless the rumours of a coalition worked harm amongst 
Howick's Whig supp9rters. Taking the most favourable view of' 
the situation it seemed to the Whigs merely to confirm their 
views as to Howick's great inexperience. 
Fortunately f'or Howick's relations with the leading Whigs, 
the prospect of Liddell's return wa~ diminished when anuther ~bry 
entered the field. Matthew Bell of Woolsington was a nephew 
of the late member; his candidature was ·~ecided upon by those 
Tory gentlemen who disliked the idea of having as a membe·r a 
person they conceived to be a Durham man. As Bell was wealthy, 
a relative of Brandling, and a native of' Northumberland, it now 
seemed as though Liddell would lose the contest. Howick 1 s· 
supporters became slightly more ardent in his support. 
Howick's withdrawal from the by-election contest was 
QA~OUA'~~ . 
aseeeeea by a ver~ose and vague handbill, which did not give any 
definite reasons as to why he decided to retire, and which merely 
appealed to the general character of' his family as a ground f'or 
voting f'or him at the General Election. For the moment he ceased 
~a. 
to canvass. · Thei'e still I'emained the p!'oblem of ~ appeai'ance 
on the hustings on the day of the nomination of candidates. An 
avowal of his political se~timents would be expected, and this 
was all the more necessai'y, he informed Ea!'l Grey "as people 
choose to say _I am a Toryu. Anxiously he sought advice from 
his father, to whom he stated:-
" • • • 
thei'e are so few questions of any importance on which 
one can cornmi t oneself without inconven ience 9 I fear it is 
impossible to express an.opinion in favour of pai'liamentary refol'm 
in however guarded a manner. The Catholick question it would 
also I think be· dangerous to touch- upon. I have seen in 
canvassing very strong indications of.a general feeling that 
something should be done for the slaves in the West Indian 
islands, would th~re be any objections to my avowing a similar 
opinion ? I think I might also say something in favoui' of the 
commercial policy which-ministers seem inclined to adopt, though 
17\lolst" 
this ~1gRt also be done with caution not to alarm the farmers 
and landlords about the corn laws". (7) 
Ea!'l GI'ey gave his appi'oval to the topic~ suggested by 
Howick, only cautioning him as to what he said about_fi'ee trade. 
Even at this period thei'e was a diffei'ence of opinion between 
fathei' and son 4n the subject of the Co!'D Laws. Free ti'ade was 
in GI'ey's view a 'ticklish subjec~'; economy, I'etrenchment- the 
. . 
two stock cries of all politicians out of office -and the question 
(7) Howick to Earl Grey,·February 14th, 1826. 
of negro s.lavery would be the most popular subjects with the 
.electorate. 
February 21st was the day of the nomination at Alnwick. 
Following his father's outline of a speech, Howick duly stated 
the reasons for his withdrawal from the present contest; lack 
of advice from friends caused-him to hesitate, he found many 
votes already pledged to his rival, and he believed it was the 
feeling of the electorate that the person to succeed Brandling 
should be a Tory. Rigid economy in public expendi tu·re, a 
g. 
lightening of ~axation, Catholic emancipation, parliamentary 
reform (though not along lines proposed by 'a certain class of 
modern reformers', i.e. the Radicals), and the abolition of 
slavery 'provided only, that due regard be .paid to the sacred 
rights of property, and to the interests of the slaves themselves, 
who would probably be the greatest s~fferers by any rash or 
ignorant attempt for-their relief,' were his declared political 
principles. He seems to.have made a favourable impression upon 
his audience. (8) 
T.he only incident that occured on nomination day was when 
Liddell was accused by Bell's supporters of attempting to secure 
the support and influence of Mrs. Beaumont9 the mother of the 
Whig member. The Greys regarded this charge as true, and believed 
it was a dishonourable act on Liddell's part.to seek support from 
Howick's enemies after the agreement between the·two was concluded. 
(8) Northumberland Election Papers for the Spring 
of 1826, Vol. 1. 
10. 
Liddell was now fi~ly added to Earl Grey's pet aversions. 
According to. Earl Grey, Hawick was now absolved from all 
allegiance to neutrality in the present con test, and he desired 
to see his son using his influence to obtain votes for Bell. 
Of the two Tories it is interesting to note that L_iddell 
was the more liberal. Despite some initial eq~ivocation he came 
forward as a supporter of Catholic Emancipation, of which Bell 
was a decided·opponent. Therefore, in theory it would be 
thought that Liddell would have been more palatable to the Whigs, 
but the fact is that in both elections political principles took 
second place to private friendships and animosities. Many of 
the leading Whigs were on terms of personal friendship with Bell. 
After th;e ·day of nominat.ion Monck ceased to count as 
a factor in the situation. He decided to content himself with 
~oting for his friend Bell in both elections. He refused to 
vote for Howick; either he was mortified at not being brought 
forward as a Whig candidate, or rumours of the coalition with 
Liddell had offended his susceptibilities as an independent 
freeholder. Further offence was to be given him \"/hen Lambton 
canvassed for his brother-in-law. 
On March 7th the by-election ended, when Liddell - after 
polling 1,150 votes to Bell's 1,186 ~ declined further contest. 
. -
One contest was over; a far more important one was just beginning. 
As soon-as he received notification that the by-election 
11. 
was ove~, Howick resumed his canvass. He soon heard that the 
contest was not likely to be a three-cornered one between two 
Whigs and a Tory. Plans were on·foot to bring Liddell forwa~d 
again, some people regarding him as an ill-used person because 
he had pledged himself to a contest before aware of Bell's 
intentions. 
The Greys were concerned to limit expense as much as 
possible .• Some of their opponents were not so particular. 
Beaumont lavishly expended sums on drink for the freeholders. 
Howick informed his father that as a result of Beaumont's action 
people drank to such an excess at Hexham that one man died in 
consequence; in that town Beaumont had given twelve barrels of 
ale to the ~ob and tickets to the freeholders which admitted· 
them to eat and drink at discretion in the public houses. 
Beaumont had also been distributing cockades. Certain of 
Howick's supporters wished to embark on a sirnila~ round of 
distributing cockades and of treating. ( 9) 
By Hawick's letter of March 18th, Earl G~ey learnt that 
Liddell had entered the contest, which would now be a longer, 
harder and more expensive one. Another unfortunate result was 
that Bell's ag~nts were canvassing for plumpers, they had no wish 
to see electors give·their second vote to another candidate until 
Bell's safe retu~ was secured. 
(9) Howick to Earl Grey, March 13, 1826. 
12. 
Howick's opponents had better agents and made a more 
- . 
effective use of' the press. It was not long bef'_ore Beaumont's 
paper, 'The Tyne Mercury', accused Howick and Bell of forming a 
coalition, whilst they counter-attacked with the assertion that 
the coalition that existed was in f'act between Beaumont and 
Liddell. Howick attacked the whole system of opening public 
houses and the giving away of ribbons; he made much of the fact 
that four people (three at Shields and one at Hexham) had. died 
as a result of Beaumont's lavish expenditure on drink - an 
expenditure which the Greys could not af'f'ord. If' the two Whig 
candidates were personally q.ostile to each other, the same was 
true of the two Tories; only such people who hated the Whigs 
sufficiently strongly - and Howick gives the impression that 
these 'party' men were few and far between - would vote for both 
Tories. 
As the day approached f'or the commencement of voting at 
Alnwick, Howick was active in making arrangements for the 
conveyance of voters, the formation of committees, and above all 
the regulation of expense. In these tasks he was aided by 
written adv.ice from his father:-
"• •• take c·a.re that there is a good system established 
with respect to the billeting of voters at Alnwick, and limiting 
the admission up to the Publick Houses to those who have tickets. 
All the engagements for this purpose with the Inn-keepers must be 
made· by some of the gentlemen of-your committee, who must take 
13. 
upon themselves the responsibility of' the orders that are given. 
If' they could be f'ixed on you· or your agents, you would lose 
your seat on a petition f'or treating. 11 (10) On May 14th 
Howick learnt the amount of' expense so f'ar incurred. The bills 
of' inn-keepers and tradesmen came to £800 and the attornies 
employed by Howick were also demanding exaggerated f'ees which 
would come to the same-amount; the sum Howick thought 'quite 
enormous', whilst Earl Grey expressed himself' as 'really astounded.' 
Considering that it had been a complaint of' many of' the free-
holders that "nothing had been given" bills to the amotm t of' 
£1,600 were q~ite fantastic, and af'f'orded 'a f'rightf'ul prospect 
f'or the election'. (11) 
On June 2nd, Earl Grey informed his son that his supporters 
had started a requisition f'or a nomination, a step which would 
be of'. ~reat advantage to Howick provided that he could make a 
good speech f'or the occasion. Earl Grey had never abandoned 
his attempts to secure a borough in the gif't of' one of' his 
acquaintances (preferably of' the same political principles) f'or 
his son; even though he had now thoroughly embarked upon a 
contest f'or the county, with all the expense that implied, there 
was still a di.stinct possibility that Howick would be unsuccessful 
in which case it would be convenient if' he could re_present a 
borough in Parliament, a poorer alternative certainly, but 
better than no seat at all. On June 5th, Earl Grey informed 
( 10) Earl Grey to Howick, May 12th, 1826. 
( 11) Earl Grey to Howick, May 17th, 1826. 
Howick that his efforts ip this direction had finally borne 
fruit; on June 3rd, Lord Darlington had written to him offering 
to bring Howick in for Winchelsea should he fail to win the 
. 
county (according to Creevey, the borough of Winchelsea which 
returned two members to Parliament had at that time the princely 
number of eleven electors). (12) 
June 13th was the day of the county meeting at Morpeth, 
held. for. the purpose of nominating candidates for the county 
at the ensuing election • T~e business of the me~ting was 
.. 
opened with ~he reading of·the requisition. Howick was duly 
proposed by Ridley, M.P. for Newcastle and seconded by Ord, M.P. 
for Morpeth. In his speech Howick gave ~ number of r~asons as 
to why on public grounds he thought Beaumont an unfit person to 
. . . 
represent the county. Matthew Clay, Esq., who in the absence 
of the High Sheriff was presiding over the meeting, declared the 
show .of hands to favour Liddell and Beaumont. (l3) 
Polling began at Alnwick on June 20th; at ten o'clock in 
the morning of that day the High Sheriff took his seat and the 
business of the day commenced. Howick again stated his political 
princ~ples ( whic'Q. n_?w included the reform of civil and criminal 
jurisprudence, and opposition to 'a band of infamous leagued 
despots under the title of the holy alliance'), and in pursuance 
of the Grey vendetta against Beaumont, made a personal attack 
(12) 'The Creevey Papers' (ed. Maxwell) -1912. Vol II 
P• 165. 
. . 
(13) Northumberland Election Papers for ·summer of 1826, 
Vol.. II. 
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aga~nst the latter. The. show of hands favoured Howick and 
Liddell, and a poll was demanded on behalf of Beaumont and Bell. 
At the ·close. of' the first day's poll Howick ·stood third on the 
list of candidates. (l4) 
On the third day of the voting, Howick on the hustings 
exclaimed indignantly agai7;1st means used by some of the other 
candidates to prevent his supporters from going to the poll, 
and hinted at a coalition between Liddell and Beaumont; counter 
assertions were quic~ly made. Assertions and counter-assertions 
on this point contin~ed, becoming more vehement the longer the 
contest lasted and the more exciting it became. On the sixth 
day of the poll there was tumult. To a mixed reception from 
the crowd around the hustings, Howick in a bitter speech made 
a strong attack on Beaumont, and ~epeated his charges about a 
"is coalitio~ between two of ~ opponents:-
'The ex-istence of this Coalition having been proved, I do 
say, that if I am defeated, ~ am its victim. A more upprincipled 
and a mo~e disgraceful Coalition was never recorded in the annals 
of' ~lectioneering •••• I urge my own_friends, though I· were to 
lose my own Election by it, to split upon Mr. Be~l, in order to 
defeat so unprincipled a_coalition'. ( 15) 
By then, Monday, June 26th, it was obvious that Howick 
was not going to be one of' the successful candidates, and·Earl 
(14) Northumberland Election Papers f'or summer of 1826. 
Wol. III. 
( 15) Ibid. 
Grey for one was not willing to continue a hopeless contest at 
an expense 'of at least £1,000 a day'. Yet there were to be 
more exciting scenes around the hustings. On June 27th, Howick 
again bitterly attacked Liddell and Beaumont, whilst pr&is~ng 
Bell for his 'upright and honourable' conduct. He announced 
a. hope that Bell would win. On June 30th there came the climax 
to these violent proceedings. Howick arraigned Beaumont for 
his 'past conduct'. He ascribed the decision of the County 
Meeting at Morpeth in favour·of Beaumont to 'a band of hired 
miscreants from Shie.lds', who gave the show of hands in favour 
of the latter. Howickis speech obtained a mixed reception of 
hisses, groans and cheers from the crowd. It was at this 
point that Beaumont announc·ed·· that Lambton was his secret enemy, 
and had been prompting Howick all the while he was speaking· 
(Lambton in the later stages of the election had assisted Howick 
in canvassing, and much vituperation had been hurled upon him for, 
as a Durham magnate, interfering in a Northumberland election; 
his land in Northumberland being known derisively by his enemies 
as his 'cabbage patch'). Lambton denied the charge. "I say 
it's false~', retorted-Beaumont, and left the.hustings. That same 
day Lamb ton sent a cha-llenge to· Beaumont. The same evening 
Lamb ton and Beaumont attempted to. settle their quarrel - with 
pistols - on Alnwick Moor, but were prevented by th~ magistrates 
and a crowd which had assembled. Early next morning another 
proposed meeting on the Moor was abandoned because the 
authorities had heard of the plan. Meanwhile Earl Grey had 
galloped unattended through the night from Howick Hall to Alnwick 
to prevent the consummation of the chall.enge, but failed to do. so. 
The duel was fought on July 1st, the parties exc~nging sho.:ts 
on Bamboreugh Sands, below the walls of the Castle, at four 
o'clock in the afternoon. No bodily harm was caused and -
honour satisfied - Lambton and Beaumont went their separate ways~ 16 ) 
On July 3rd _Howick announced publicly that he was declining 
further contest. · In a published letter he requested his 
supporters to vote ·for Bell, or if that were inconsistent with 
their feelings, to abstain altogether. On Ju.ly 6th the election -
perhaps one of the m_ost exciting that Nor:thumberland had . 
witnessed - came to a close. It was from the Tory Party point 
of view, a complete triumph, Liddell obtaining 1,562 votes, Bell 
1,380, Beaumont 1,335 (Howick having retired after polling 976 
votes). But hew many Northumbrians. looked at it from a political 
party vieWpoint ? Certainty -the candidates never, the two 
Tories being the very reverse of allies united in a political 
cause. They_were·not e~en on speaking .terms with each other. 
What are the salient points emerging from the story of 
this election ? The first is that political principles ·gave 
way to private friendships and hates as predominant moti~es · 
for votes cast; ·indeed, so local was yet the nature of politics 
(16) Northumberland Election Papers for summer 1826. 
Vol. III, and 'Life and Letters of Lord Durham' 
Stuart Reid, 1906. Vol. 1. PP• 170-2. 
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that it was believed to be quite .legitimate· to vote for one's 
neighbour and friend if he were a candidate, irrespective of the 
difference there may have been in political beliefs. Most of 
the leading Whigs of the county gave their second votes to Bell, 
the ultra Tory, mainly because he was a Northumbrian proper and 
a relative of the -late respected member, whereas Liddell h.ad 
strong connections with Durham. Splitting votes between a Whig 
.... 
and a Tory was a common occu~ence; indeed the idea was still 
strong that only if both parties could represent the county 
was it possible for it to be fairly represented. It would be 
wrong to state that political principles were of no importance 
in this election, but they were overshadowed by personal issues 
such as the feud between the Greys and Beaumont and that between 
Liddell and Bell. Thus the Whigs prefeDed to vote for an ultra 
T.ory when they had as alternatives a more liberal Tory and a 
Whig inclined to radicalism. Many of the ingredients of 
eighteenth century elections were to be found in this one, such 
as treating, charges of coalitions being.formed amongst the 
candidates, and acc.usations of undue aristocratic influence. 
In essence it was a local struggle for the r·epresentation of the 
county, and those who participated and were not natives of 
Northumberland came in. for a great deal of abuse. 
And what of Howick ? He had fought gamely for the honour 
of representing his native county,- only to fail; but he was 
yet young, and there would be other occasions. Also he was not 
ex~luded from Pa~liament, thanks to Lord Darlington. With 
Brougham he represented the bor~ugh of Winchelsea. That he was 
bitterly disappointed at his failure to win there can be no 
doubt, the violenc~ of his language in the closing stages shows 
this. His youth and inexperience would count against him with 
many voters, the fact that compared to his rivals he was not so 
lavi~h in ·expenditure may have counted with others. He does 
not seem to have been ably or even warmly supported by many of 
the Whig gentry. Perhaps his constant attacks on Beaumont lost 
him more votes than he ga~n.ed by them, and Lambton may have been 
more of a liabfljj_ty than an asset. It had been good experience, 
however, for a budding politician, this game of canvassing, of 
public speaking, of pronouncing opinions on some of the important 
topics of the day - even of roundly abusing opponents. As for 
any difference in electioneering between Hawick and his rivals, 
it was only one of degree; Howi-ck had inns open to his supporters, 
bestowed his ribbons,. and had attempted to come to an 'under-
standing' with Liddell; he does not seem to have formed an 
official coalition with Bell, though the followers of both 
tended to vote the same way, but the charge is not ~efinitely 
proven against his rivals. 
There is a post~cript to this story. On February, 3rd, 
1827, Robert Anderson, an agent of Earl Grey's, presented a 
Statement of Election Accounts. In the second half of this 
Statement the expense was allocated bet·ween the different 
20 •. 
districts of the county; the amount of bills sent in was given, 
.. 
and the amount of bills paid followed. The amount claimed 
totalled £19,213: 14: 8d. The amount actually paid was 
£16,981: 19: Od. In February, 1827, Howick - who had expressed 
surprise at this vast sum - suggested to his:···father that they 
could recoup their losses by selling Ulgham Grange to a certain 
Cresswell Baker for £40,000, but though steps were t~ken to 
this effect, the idea failed to bear fruit •. 
B. Apprenticeship in Parliament. 
On the opening of the new Parliament in November, 1826, 
Viscount Howick took his seat in the House of Commons as the 
member for Winchelsea. It was not long before his f.ather was 
giving him some sound advice as to how to conduct himself there:-
'I hope you are always in the House of Commons. Whether 
there is an expectance of anything of importance or not, you 
always ought to be there at the hour when public business 
commences, and stay until it is over. Discussions often arise, 
and not seldom the most interesting ones, when they are not 
expected, and you ought.to serve a regular apprenticeship, until 
you have made yourself thoroughly the master of all the forms 
and proceedings of the House.' (17) 
( 17) Earl Grey to Howick, December 2nd, 1826. 
Earl Grey also desired him to speak frequently, not only for the 
' purpose of becoming well known, but also for the sake of 
of-
ac·quiring fluency of expression, and an ease of arrangement -a!Hi 
material. He was ever ready with encourage~ent, particularly 
when Howick's efforts disappointed the latte~'s expectations. 
Howick seems to have acted upon his father's advice. His 
attendance at debates was frequent, and often the arguments in 
these were discussed in letters to his father. At first he 
merely listened, but as his familiarity with parliamentary 
'· procedure increased, he began to play a more active part in 
debates, contenting himself first with extremely short speeches, 
then as his confidence. increased, he ventured on more ambitious 
efforts. His maiden speech of which he speaks in a letter of 
February 22nd, 1827, to his father, was against the vote for a 
military college, Howick seeing no necessity for having officers 
educated at the public expense. 
There were times, however, when Hawick's conduct was at 
variance with the views held by his father. For example, in 
November, 1826, he voted for Hume's amendment to the address, 
which was aimed at assuring that there would be no prohibitive 
duties against the importation of foreign corn. In fac·t it was 
over the Corn Laws that the views of father and son were so 
diametrically opposed, Earl Grey supporting the 'status quo' 
and all for retain~ng this bulwark of the lgnded interest, whilst 
Howick at this time wished for a freer trade iri corn, and wanted 
- --~-- ------------------=-==--
only a small fixed duty on foreign corn entering the country. 
Another source of anxiety for Earl Grey was the fact that all 
too frequently, Howick in his votes on vario_us topics was to be 
found alongside Joseph Hume and other Radicals, and of such men 
Earl Grey had an exaggerated horror. He could not appr~ve of' 
his son's first vote in Parliament; on March 30th, 1827, he 
informed Howick:-
" . h H . ' ••• t e frequ~nt association of' your name wi~h ume s •• ~ 
must tend to lessen your credit and influence with the most 
respectable part of the community". 
An earlier letter had.remarked:-
"It is well that you have no longer any views to this 
county, as your votes on that question (i.e. the Corn Laws) 
would have destroyed them". 
. . 
This conflict of views over the Corn Laws between father 
and son was to become more serious in future years. Howick 
did not hesitate to attempt to persuade his father to change 
his views on this question; whilst prepared to accept a_duty 
upon foreign corn 'as will make up to the English cultivators 
for any disadvantage under which they may labour, as compared 
to other classes of the community,' and whilst wishing no 
drastic and sudden change in the:;system, he yet thought such a 
change was absolutely necessary as would save the manufacturing 
and commercial classes, plus the landowners themselves, from 
distress and eradicate the evils of an artificially high price 
23. 
o~ bread. He was annoyed that so much ignorance on the subject 
mani~ested itself in the House of Commons. (lB) 
On most other matters Howick was prepared to follow 
his father's advice. One of Hawick's favourite projects in 
these years was for a moderate property tax to replace the 
vexatious taxes on articles of common use; this, together with 
a well-regulated paper currency would mitigate the distress 
in the country caused, so Hawick believed, by over taxation, 
for which there was no sure remedy, unless the colonies were to 
be given up, with all the administrative and military expenses~ 
they entailed. Thus, when Lord Althorp, endeavouring in March, 
1830, to form a party to press for e~nomy and retrenchment, 
suggested as part of his measures a moderate property tax, Howick 
supported him. Lord Grey was, however, opposed to any such 
scheme, ·looking upon it as yet another attempt to undermine the 
predominance of the landed interest. On receipt of his father's 
arguments against the suggestion Hawick undertook to play no 
further part in the matter, though he was not fully convinced by 
his father's arguments. On the Corn Law question Howick still 
-
continued to pursue his own line of thought, and when there was 
some discussion on including monopolies (of which the Corn Laws 
would be one), within the categories against which Althorp's plans 
for retrenchment were laid, Howick was in favour of the step.(l9) 
(18) Hawick to Earl Grey, January 12th, 1830. 
(19) ~ournal, March 3rd, Oct. 31st, 1830; Hawick to 
Earl Grey, March 3rd and 9th, ·1830. 
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Earl Grey suggested that his son should concentrate on, 
and thus make himself an.. expert on, subjects which would shortly 
acquire importance; Hawick could make an enquiry into colonial 
administration, and attempt to discover the reasons why the 
colonies were such a bother and expense to the Mother Country. 
Hawick was deterred from this particular suggestion by the 
difficulty there would be in obtaining the necessary information, 
and by _a doubt of his ability to embark upon a_ long speech:-
"I have not yet, and I doubt whether I ever shall acquire 
the presence of mind and the power of recollection, when 
speaking." ( 20 ) 
Another of his father's suggested lines of enquiry was into the 
currency problem, and upon this, Bowick did embark, though his 
labours bore no immediate fruit. Apart from the special lines 
of enquiry, Hawick proved to be a diligent reader and student 
of parliamentary papers on a wide r~nge of topics; from 
fragments of an early journal .for the spring of 1830 there are 
allusions to parliamentary papers on India, Sist-a Leone and 
Canada. 
It was in the field of parliamentary reform that Hawick 
made his first independent contribution, in the form of an 
amendment, to the solution of an important question. As early 
as August, 25th, 1829, he had set about drawing up an amendment 
when 'the proposed bill to prevent bribery and corrup.tion in the 
(20) Hawick to Earl Grey, February 15th, 1830. 
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borough of East Ret:f'ord was brought in. In the_:f'ollowing 
February he consulted his brother-in-law, Lambton, on this topic, 
and the latter remodelled the amendment, Howick acknowledging 
that this was a great improvement. The subject came be:f'ore the 
Commons on February ;J.lth, 1830; Tennyson, M.P. for Blatchley, 
:f'orstalled Howick by moving an amendment to the bill, to the 
e:f':f'ect that the two members returned by the borough should be 
trans:f'ered to Birmingham. Howick announced that he would vote 
:f'or this amendment, and if' it were not carried, would bring 
forward-his own; he was convinced that a general remedy should 
be proposed for a general-evil and that the :f'ranchise should 
be extended to the great commercial and manu:f'acturing towns 
without disen:f'ranchising other boroughs. When Tennyson's 
amendment was lost, he brought forward his own, stating that if 
this was success:f'ul, he might move for the appointment of a 
committee which should be empowered to draw up a scheme of 
Parliamentary Reform. The House divided 154 to 54 against the 
motion. The resolution Howick proposed, aimed at finding some 
general measure to put down the well-known· -abuses that occured 
during elections instead of bringing forward part·icular bills to 
meet individual cases. Howick's efforts had the approval of 
his :f'ather, who was, however, anxious lest his son committed 
himself' too much to Parliamentary Reform, which Earl Grey at that 
time regarded as a lost cause. ( 2l) 
(2i) Hansard, Second Series, Vol. 22 pp. 336-9, and 362. 
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More important for Howick's future career was the interest 
he took in the affairs of Canada. In May, 1830, he spoke in 
support of resolutions moved by Labouchere, and accused the 
g·ovetmment of too much delay in cai'rying out tlle recommendations 
of the Canada Committee. On June 14th, 1830, the question of· 
a money vote foi' the Society for PI'opagating the Gospel to be 
applied in certain colonies came befoi'e the House. Howick 
considei'ed such a vote would be highly objectionable, not only 
on the.ground_of economy, but also by the fact that such money 
was being used to maintain an exclusive Church, especially in 
the Canadas where the· land of the Established Church was vastly 
more extensive than the number of its adherents warranted. He, 
therefoi'e, moved that the vote should be reduced by half, but 
cv-e.. 
was defeated by 148 votes to 46. These episodes wePe of inte!'est 
in that they show that Howick's ideas on the course of policy 
to be pursued in Canada were already in the main formulated before 
he became Under-Secretary in the Ca1on.ial Office later that year. ( 22 ) 
Earl Grey and Howick wer_e aware of the disadvantages 
involved in the latter continu_ing to repi'esent Winchelsea. Lord 
' Darlington, or the Marquis of Cleveland as he became, was not a 
close political ally of Grey's and by the opening of 1830 was a 
steady supporter of the then Government. How ·could Howi"ck remain 
as member for a borough whose patron held opposite views fi'om 
(22) Hansard, Second Sei'ies, Vol. 25, P• 341. 
1' his own 'I It was an embarassing dilemma, and Earl Gr~y believed 
... 
that resignation was the only cou.rse. Howick informed Lord 
Cleveland that he would resign his seat if required, but, on 
February 5th, 1830, Lord Cleveland formally assured him that he 
was at liberty to vote as he pleased. Brougham, the other member 
returned for Cleveland's borough, did in fact resign. De~pi te· 
Cleveland's generous assurances, it was obvious that Winchelsea 
was not an ideal seat. In June, 1829, there had been a 
suggestion of bringing Howick fQrward for Cambridge U~iversity, 
but Howick was averse to this believing that even if' he were 
returned he would soon offend his constituents=by the opinions 
he held. A year later there was a scheme to bring him forward 
for Southwark, be.t his father did not favour the idea, considering 
this to be a troublesome seat. In July, 1830, the county of 
Surrey was suggested. Finally', Lord Fitzwilliam, an orthodox 
Whig and friend of Earl Grey, had Howick brought in for his 
borough of Higham Fe~sin the General Election of 1830. 
Apart from politics, what other interests occupied Howick 
at this period ? Firstly, he was still engaged in improving 
his education, and there are references in his early journals 
to him reading Italian and French and translating English prose 
into French. He seems to have spent much time reading; among 
some of the books he lists are a number of Burke's writings, lives 
of Locke and Adam Smith and the works of Henry Hallam. Another 
type of education is by foreign travei, ~d in A:~gust_, 1827, 
Howick set off with his lifelong friend, Charles Wood, who married 
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Hawick's sister in 1829, for a continental tour through France 
to the Pyrenees, thence overland to Southern Italy. Howick's 
impressions of this tour are varied, ranging from a eulogy on the 
view obtained from a certain Pyreneean peak, to disparaging 
comments on the state of some hotels and towns. Rome, Naples, 
Pompeii, Capri, and Vesuvius were among the places visited. 
At Rome Hawick attended a course of lectures on Roman .antiquities 
and history, but was rather glad when it was all over, an.d he 
was left wondering whether his money could have been better spent. 
He also seems to have been rather concerned that he could not 
arouse much enthusiasm for paintings acknowledged by the experts 
as masterpieces. Back in England, when Parliament was not 
sitting, there was always a round of country houses to visit, 
or a variety of game to be shot - shooting was one of Howick's 
relaxations throughout later years. In London at this time 
Howick was a regular visitor t6 The Travellers, where he played 
whist frequently, and where he won or lost a number of pounds 
at the game• his most extravagant incident recorded, occurred 
on June 28th, 1830, when he played till 4 a.m. leaving thirty-six 
pounds the poorer. However, gambling soon ceased to hold any 
-
attraction for him:-
"I have certainly neither the luck nor the temper 
necessary for gambling. I invariably lose, and as invariable, 
however-low I begin playing, I increase my stake." ( 23) 
(23) Journal, December, 18th, 1829. 
29. 
As for that other amusement of his class, horse racing, Howick 
does not seem to have been attracted by it:-
11Went to Ascot •••• was very bored with it, lost seven 
pounds and did not see the race. 11 ( 24)· 
During these years he_must have pondered on what would 
be his position in a government formed by his father, for it was 
only to be expected that Earl Grey would find some place for his 
son. In May, 1830, Earl Grey asked Howick what post he would 
like should the Whigs come to power. Grey suggested a junior 
Lordship of the Treasury. Hawick was agreeable to this, the 
only other position he would prefer would be that of Under-
Secretary to the Home Office. When Earl Grey did form a 
Government in November, 1830, Howick received neither of these 
p~sts; a relative of Melbourne's was Under-Secretary for the 
Home Department. Inste.ad Howick became Parliamentary Under-
Secretary for the Colonial Office. This post gave him his main 
political interest, and henceforth Howick became. an expert in the 
intricacies of colonial policy. 
( 24) Journal, June, 18th, 1829. 
CHAPTF;R 2. 
Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office and the 
Home Office. 
A. The Colonial Office. 
30. 
Hawick in a letter to his father in 1832 gave his opinion 
as to the ideal Colonial Secretary; he "should be a person 
capable of acting f~r himself with energy and determination, and 
who~ has sufficient authority with his colleagues to insist when 
necessary upon their serious attention to the affairs which he 
brings before them". Many colonial questions Hawick contended 
did not seem very important to politicians concerned with a 
multiplicity of business nearer home, but if these were neglected 
.,. 
great embarassment would be caused in the future. To avoid 
1\ 
this perpetual postponement of questions which were not immediately 
pressing an energeti~ Colonial Secretary, willing to take a great 
measure of responsibility upon his own shoulders, was needed. If 
decisions on colonial matters were left to the Government as a 
whole "that decision is often delayed until difficulties which 
might have been avoided become inevitable." It was Hawick's 
contention that his superior, the Secretary for War and Colonies, 
feli far short of these requirements. (l) This post was held 
by Viscount Goderich, later earl of Ripon, an amiable but 
ineffectual figure, whose ineptness is conveyed in.his nickname 
of 'Goody' Goderich. 
(1) Howick to Grey, May, 29th, 1832. 
31. 
Howick was on good terms with his chief; he gave full 
credit .to Godericb:'s uprightness, sense of honour, and kindliness, 
but even some of his virtues unfitted him, in. Howick's. opinion, 
for the positiop he held, for his very kindness induced:-
"him to_ give way in everything to· those who are about him •• 
He may be truly said (except upon one or two points ~n which he 
feels strongly) to have no will or opinion of his own, but to 
follow the direction ••• which is given to him by others 11 .( 2) 
Howick himself was an energetic and a hard-working person, 
with decided - if not dogmatic - views on a range of important 
political topics. In fact, entirely the opposite of Lord Goderich. 
To such a person as Howick, ever ready to take action on various 
problems, and.capable of foreseeing steps to be taken to-obviate 
future causes of discontent, working under a person of Goderich's 
vacillating,, procrastinating disposition must have been in toler-
able. Nevertheless, there was one advantage; under a more 
energetic and abler Colonial Secretary Howick's role would have 
been strictly subordinate, but under Goderich he was often able 
to make his own views prevail, and except_ on a few topics, such 
as the Canadian Cnurch question where Goderic:.ti' s prejudices were 
aroused, the Colonial Office decisions were made according to 
Howick' s views. 
Far different from Goderich was James Stephen, one of the 
ablest of -nineteenth century civil servants. From 1813 he was 
( 2) Howick to Grey, May, 29th, 1832. 
the holder of the post of Counsel to the Colonial Department; 
it was not until 1834, that he acquired the title of Assistant 
Under-Secretary, eventually replacing Hay as Permanent Under-
32. 
S_ecretary in 1836. Howick's debt to Stephen. was great, and he 
was the first to acknowledge it. Stephen initiated him into the 
business of the office, and gave him unreservedly the benefit 
of his vast experience. Writing of Stephen to Earl Grey, 
Howick stated:-
" • • • those questions which he· ( Goderich) ought to decide 
for himself fall upon t·hose beneath him, and they instead of 
acting under his directions are obliged to decide for themselves, 
with the addi tiona~ difficulty of having to p·revail upon him to 
adhere steadily and consistently to that decision. Therefore I 
cannot but feel that questions much too important to be left to 
my unassisted _dis·cret;ion would thus practically have been entirely 
committed to me, had I not hitherto had the advantage of the 
advice of Mr. Stephen ••• the dispute which is now going on with 
the. Assembly of Lower Cariada, and which may lead to the loss of 
that province ••• has never been •••• submitted· to the Cabinet, 
but has been entirely managed •••• by myself and Mr. Stephen ••• 
if Mr. Stephen had not been in the office, or had confine·d himself 
to what are strictly the dut·ies of his sdituation, the very serious 
errors into which I had fallen would have remained uncorrect~d, 
and would have led to more than one practical false step of the 
most serious kind." ( 3) 
(3) Howick to Grey, May, 29th, 1832. 
33· . 
Howick always .. considered himself' as being under a debt of' 
gratitude to Stephen. In June, 1834, when he himself' had left 
the Colonial Office, he attempted to persuade Earl Grey to 
. appoint Stephen as one of the new Poor Law Commissioners:-
" • • • there is nothing I. would not- do to serve him, as 
it is quite impossible I can ever repay him for all the advice 
and assistance he afforded me when I was in the Colonial Office, 
in every difficulty he was the only person to whom I could apply 
and he never refased to do for me all that he could, and I never 
fail~d to find the advantage of following his advice. 11 (4) 
Stephen was not made a Poor Law Commissioner, but Howick never 
ceased in later years to press for other rewards for his 
services, and a cordial and fruitful relationship grew up between 
them. 
Henry Taylor, the author of 'The Statesman', was another 
talented member of the Colonial Office. The Permanent Under-
Secretary, R.W. Hay, and his political opinions were less 
agreeable to Howick, who had this to say of him:-
"his notions are what appear· to me illi'J?era,l and narrow 
in the extreme; he has besides far greater confidence in 
himself than his abilities would warrant •••• a great deal is done 
in the colonies under his management of Which I should strongly 
disapprove, and that a great deal more which it appears to me 
ought to be done, is entirely neglected". 
A conflict of opinion between the two Under-Secretaries could be 
34. 
serio.us when such a person as Lord God.erich was head of the 
department, and the colonies were divided between his two sub-
ordinates; Goderich's lack of control over his subordinates, Howick 
believed to be a matter of public notoriety:-
"since it must be obvious to the Governors and to all who 
. - -have any business to transact with him, that since last November 
(1831) when I _gave up the management of N.s. Wales and Ceylon 
and received that of theN. American Provinces, the whole tone 
of the policy pursued in both sets of ~olonies has been entirely 
changed". ( 5) 
B. Howick and the new theories on colonies and colonization. 
The early years of the nineteenth century saw the old 
conception of colonies and their rule begin to undergo a profound 
change. The idea that coionfes were exclusively for the advantage 
of the Mother Country - that advantage having in. the main a 
strong commercial flavour - was challenged. Colonies under the 
older system of'·a closed commercial empire ·supplied Britain with 
important products, which would otherwise have had to come from 
her rivals, and gave employment to her snips and seamen, thus 
maintaining a strong mercantile force capable of being formed 
into a war machine in times of stress. In return the colonies 
received certain benefits; bounties encqurage_d certain products, 
(5) Howick to Earl Grey, May, 29th, 1832. 
Britain was an assured market for some products, and British. 
forces provided protection where necessary, but these benefits 
were incidental to the main purpose for which colonies wer.e 
fostered. This conception of relations 'vis-a-vis' Mother Country 
·-
and Colony had been shaken but not destroyed by the American 
Revolution. Britain had neglected the colonial demand for more 
. . 
mature.representative institutions, being unable to reconcile 
the prevalent conception of colonies with· this new demand, and 
had lost her most important group of colonies.· How to reconcile 
. -
the idea of Empire with demands for internal. self-government 
became one of the problems bequeathed to the nineteenth century. 
The old mercantilist doctrines no longer held the stage 
in the nineteenth century. Free Trade was to become the current 
commercial gospel, and this in turn destroyed all the theories on 
which a~ Empire had_hitherto b~en defended. A change of attitude 
was perceptible in the early_years of the century; under 
Huskisson 's direction in 1825 the CDlonies to a_ great extend were 
given complete freedom of trade, and instead of a monopoly of 
the colonial markets the Mother Country.riow reserved for itself 
~ preference. (6) 
Various groups of people became more interested in the 
colonies.themselves than the advantages they conferred on the 
Mother Country. . The nineteenth century saw a growth of 
missionary fervour, which concerned itself with the conditions of 
(6) 'Colonial Policy of Peel and Russell' -
W.P. Morrell, 1930; P• 4. 
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the slaves in the West Indian colonies and with primitive races 
el~ewhere; to such primitive peoples the Mother Country had moral 
obligations. Colonial demands for greater autonomy and demands 
that B~itain should cease to transport her law-breakers to her 
dependencies, now received greater support from certain sections 
of the population in Britain. Some men became imbued with the 
miss~on to spread the British race, its institutions and culture, 
to the furthermost corners of the globe, and demanded from the 
British Government moral and material support for colonization 
and emigration schemes. No lopger was there an exclusive emphasis 
on the commercial advantages colonies brought - except by the 
diehards of the older school of thought - but there did arise a 
question, when confronted-by the increased obligations Britain 
was held to have towards her colonies, among some people as to 
why Britain bothered to have co_lonies at ail. 
The new ideas on colonies and colonization are associated 
with the name of Edward Gibbon Wakefield. He believed it w~s 
the mission of Britain to spread her sons far and wide, and to 
ensure that areas like Australia and New Zealand would become 
cradles of the British race and its cherished institutions. This 
could not be done by the then haphazard modes of colonization. 
A theory and a system of colonization was needed, and he set out 
to provide it. Concentrating first on the Australian colonies 
he showed in what a backward state they were. According to 
Wakefie·ld the whole key to the art of colonization lay in the 
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proportions of land and population. The policy of the Imperial 
Government i~ giving away land, or charging armost~ominal price 
A 
. 
for it, was wrong. As nearly every man desires to be his own 
master, the fact that land could be obtained so easily led to 
immigrant-s s·corning to ·labour for another; instead they became 
. . 
proprietors, possessing more· land than they could profitably 
make use of, and from which they could eke out merely a bare 
subsis·tence. In such conditions population remained scattered, 
and there could be no hopes for the growth of fine cities, 
elaborate organs of government, the class system of British 
society, and the luxuries of a truly civilizea·way of life. 
T.he prime essential for the development ·or a community lay in 
a divi~ron of labour. Where a man had to be his own carpenter, 
shoe-maker, architect, etc. little progress could be made. 
Wakefield believed that the sale of Crown Lands should be 
restricted by charging a high price per ac·re. · This would enhance 
the value of land now practically worthless, and ·would ·ensure 
that eve·ry immigrant could not afford to become a p-roprietor -
at least not immediately. Thus immigrants would have to labour 
for others, and the great problem of a labour ·rorc"e would ·be 
solved, the land would become more productive, and cash crops· 
could replace subsistence farm"ing: Thus the beg-innings of settled 
communities would be ·laid, with the certainty of their ul tiniate 
expansion. The money raised by the sale o~ land could.form a 
fund to be used for bringing out fresh im.rnfgran·ts. Gibbon 
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Wakefield believed that such theories possessed universal validity. 
Howick accepted Gibbon Wakefield's theories. As Goderich 
was incapable of formulating policy, his Under-Secretary was able 
to carry some of Wakefield's ideas into practice, the first time 
they had achieved official recognition from a Government. A 
letter from Howick to E.G. Wakefield in September, 1831, ran as 
follows:-
It 
••• It had been mentioned to me that you were the author 
of the pamphlet published by the Colonization Society, and of the 
letter to Sir·G. Murray published in the name of Mr. Tennent ••• 
To the ability displayed in these works and to the importance of 
some of the principles which they are intended to establish I 
am not.insensible; and I should be most happy to receive any 
further information or suggestions from a person who has shewn 
so much knowledge of the subject to which they relate.... I 
think that it would be more convenient if you would have the 
. goedness to submit them in writing for the consideration of Lord 
Goderich and of the Gove~ment. Should you be inclined to adopt 
this cour~e, I assure you that your suggestions shall receive 
the attention to which they are so well entitled and be most 
carefully considered. 11 ( 7) 
It was Howick who persuaded Goderich to give a trial to 
the new theories. The colony chosen. was New South Wales and in 
(7) Howick to E.G. Wakefield, September 7th, 1831. 
Copy. CObnial Office Letter Book. 
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1831 the practice of free land grants there was abandoned, and 
a minimum price of five shillings -an acre was placed upon Crown 
( 8) 
. Land. 
Gibbon Wakefield's theories also played a key part, as 
we shall see, in the measures Howick advocated to ac~ompany the 
emancipation of the slaves in the West Indies. In a Memorandum 
on the po~sibility of making a land tax an accompaniment to 
emanc~~ation, written on July 3rd, 1832, Howick has this to say:-
, .. "I will not •••• attempt to give even a sketch of the 
argument by which it has in my opinion been proved, that the 
tendency of too great a f'acili ty of acquiring Land, is to reduce 
the population of' any country to a state little removed from 
that of' savages; for this I must r~f'er to the Pamphlet published 
by the colonization society, to a letter addressed to Sir G. 
Murray by Mr. Tennent, and to a book called "A Voice from Sidney" ••• 
in these works (all I ·believe written by the same pers-on) it is 
-
shewn not only by reasoning which seems to me conclusive, but 
by an appeal to experience, that if the population of' any country 
be very small in proportion to its extent, and if' no check be 
opposed to the occupation of' land by all who desire it, the 
natural wish to become proprietors will induce ·each individual 
family to establish itself upon its ovm piece of ground, that no 
division of' labour will therefore exist, and that it will be 
(8) 'British Colonial Policy'. Bell and Morrell 1928 • 
. Despatch from Goderich to Darling, January-9th, 
1831, P• 197. 
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impossib~e to carry on any species of industry which requires 
the co"'!'operation of many hands." 
In a later paragraph Howick outlined the principle behind the 
recent change in Australian land policy:-
"It has never been said that Englishmen are incapable 
of continued labour, or deficient in industry and perseverance; 
yet in the Australian colonies it has up to the present time 
. . 
been no less impossible to purchas·e labour than it would be 
in the West Indies;·were emancipation to take place without any 
precaution; and accordingly the landowners of the former 
colonies say, and say justly, that to put a stop to the system 
of transportation without taking some other means to secure 
for them a supply of labour would be no less ruinous to them, 
.e. . 
than the·emancipation of their slaves to the sugar planters. 
The wealth and prosperity of Asutralia has in truth been hitherto·· -
entirely dependent upon what is really a system of slavery; 
felons from this country supplying the place of negroes.... and 
the great object of the change lately effected in the mode of 
disposing of the Crown Lands, is to enable the colonists to 
cultivate their estates by the hands of freemen •••• This it is 
proposed to accomplish by so raising the value of land as to 
prevent every labourer who arrives in the colony from becoming 
at once a proprietor, and by applying the revenue arising from 
the sale of land to the encouragement of emigration. 11 { 9) 
{ 9) Memo.· by Howick, July 3rd, 1832. Slavery Papers. 
. .. 
c. Howick and Canadian Problems. 
The all-important topic whilst Howick was at the Colonial 
Office was the question of the future of the slaves in the 
British West Indies, but before turning to this, two ether 
problems which are of special interest may be mentioned. The 
first has to do with the whole question of the Provinces of 
Upper and Lower Canada, Howick' s attitude to Canadian affairs 
being interesting because of the prominence they acquired in the 
late 1830's and the part he then payed. 
Of the two Provinces, Lower Canada with its mainly French 
population was the more troublesome, but Upper Canada too had 
' its grievances. One of the great bones of contention between 
the Imperial Government and the Assembly of Lower Canada concerned 
certain disputed revenues. Revenue from duties imposed by 
an Act of 14 Gee III, cap. 88 was appropriated to the expense 
of the Civil Government of the Province by authority of the 
Imperial Treasury. A further Act of 1791 had established the 
two Provinces each with the same Consti~ution (Governor,- nominated 
Legislative Council, and elected Assembly); 'this Act expressly 
provided that nothing it contained made any ~hange in the validity 
of any previous Act imposing duties for the regulation of 
. . 
commerce or navigation, but it directed that the ne~ produce of 
all duties which in future were to be imposed for this purpose 
. . 
were to be applied as a law made by the Crown with the· advice 
and consent of the Legislative Council and Assembly of the 
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Province should direct. The Assembly conten.ded that this gave 
them control over the revenue .ra'ised by the earlier Act; the 
Governor, backed by ·legal opinion, maintained that these revenues 
were· beyond the control of the Assembly. 
A further topic of dispute in both -Provinces- was ·the 
c·omposi tion of the Legislative Councils. Nominated Legislative 
Councils had been established ·to serve the same purpose as the 
House of Lords in Britain, that is to act as a check or mediating 
influence between the Executive on the· one hand and the popular 
part of the Constitution on the .other. Pitt had hoped that an 
her-editary aristocracy would arise ~o counter the democracy of 
.the Assemblies~ The Legislative Councils had fallen into 
disrepute in the Colonies, and were regarded as mere tools of 
factions wedded to the support of the Executive, for example the 
so-called Family Compact ~n· Upper Canada. Lower Canada had a 
further grievance in that though the Assembly was predominantly 
French, the Legis~ative Council consisted entirely of English 
members who vetoed all measures regarded favourably by the 
French community.-
· A third dispute concerned the Established Church, which 
only commanded the allegiance of a minority of the population, 
yet was maintained by the Imperial Government. Bound up with 
this question·was.the vexed problem of the Clergy Reserves, 
- ~e. 
waste lands set-aside in ~ewe~ Canada~for the maintenance of 
this alien Church. 
The Canada Committee of 1828 had beep appointed to enquire 
into Canadian problems. Its recommendations were carefully 
studied by Hawick. These included placing the disputed revenues 
at the disposal of the Assembly, a reform of the Legislative 
Councils, and the liquidation of the Clergy Reserves. Howick 
endeavoured to persuade the Government to carry,out all the 
recommendations of the Canadian Committee," but was successful 
in only one problem. 
The Hawick Act of 1831 transferred the disputed revenues 
to the control of the Assembly, the Crown retaining control 
merely of the casual and territorial revenues inherited from the 
French Crown. Accordi~g to Hawick the Bill gave up no real 
authority possessed by the·Crown, which had not for some years 
controlled the disputed revenue except by an open violation 
of the Constitution of Lower Canada. ( lO) · Howick was willing 
to acquiesce in colonial demands in the hope that confidence 
would be engendered, friction would cease, and the reasonable 
requests of the Executive would in such an atmosphere gain ready 
compliance from the Assembly; the most important of these 
requests was for a·fixed Civil List for a number of years to pay 
the salaries of the chief officials and Law Officers of the 
Colony, instead of providing for these by annual estimates. 
I 
Unfortunately the Assembly did not act up'to Hawick's expectations; 
it continued to grant salaries for no more than a year at a 
time, thus keeping a great deal of control over the actions of 
(10-) Memo on Revenue Question, April, 1831, Canada Papers. 
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the Executive. Disputes with the Assembly continued, and the 
Executive had no revenues by the Act of 14 Geo. III. cap 88. 
to pay in part·'· the salaries of its servants. The latter went 
unpaid for three years, and were ultimately paid in full, as 
they had previously been paid in part, out of 'army extraordinar-
ies'. Judged by results the Howick Act was a failure; demands 
arose for its repeal, these demands increasing as the dispute 
with the Lower Canada Assembly became more bitter. Howick, 
however, never wavered in the belief that ·his Act had been the 
only course open in the circumstances. Concession to the 
demands of' the Assembly and trusting to its subsequent goodwill 
was the keynate of' his policy for Canada ·in these years. 
On the question of' Legislative Councils, Howick urged that 
changes were necessary in their composition. At the moment 
~ 
they were f:e:i.ction-ridden and had no hold on public confidence. 
What did the Secretary of State know of the people he nominated 
to seats in the Legislative Council ? H~ had ~o act by the 
advice. of the Gov~rnor, who at the most was only in:::the Province 
for six years; surrounded by official cliques, how could the 
Governor find out how a man stood in the estimation of the public ? 
A strong Governor might find out the truth by himself', but the 
average colonial Governar as then existed, cert~inly would not. 
Howick suggested two ways of choSsing the Legislative Council. 
A list of candidates could be chosen by electors having a high 
qualification (he does not define whether this is solely to be 
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a landed qualification), and from this list the Crown could 
select people to supply vacancies. Howick preferred the 
alternative, which·allowed the Assembly to recommend those 
persons they thought. entitled to the honour of a seat in the 
Legislative Council (he does not consider what effect this might 
have upon the struggle between the French and English in Lower 
Canada). Though a change in the Legislative Council had not 
been formally requested by the Assembly, now, How~ck believed, 
was an opportunity to go beyond what had been demanded, instead 
of making every concession look as though it had been extorted.(lL) 
Whatever may be thought of his plans for reform, Hawick's 
conclusion was sound and statesmanlike. If the policy 9f 
concessions is to work at all, liberal concessions must be made 
at once; piecemeal concession, given after agitation, has --the 
appearance of being extorted from a weak government, and in 
turn encourages further agitation, until there comes a time 
when the government feels it can concede no longer, at which 
point occurs the danger of bloodshed. It was such a course 
th~~ Imperial Governments followed until the la~e 1830's with 
respect to the Danadas. 
The third Canadian problem with which Hawick concerned 
himself was the position· of the Established Church. He ~gued 
that it was wrong to maintain an exclusive Church contrary· to 
(11) Memo. October 27th, 1831. Canada Papers. 
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coloniai wishes, and also to expect the colonists to pay for it 
(one of the Whig measures of economy; hitherto the Established 
Church in Canada had been maintatned mainly by Parliamentary 
grants). In Lower Canada only ~ per cent 9f the population 
were Anglicans, whilst the ma-jority of the Upper Canadians 
were Methodists and Baptists. The only colonial funds at the 
disposal of the Crown were the Territorial Revenues; the 
Assemblies would not grant money towards the. support of the 
Established Church, and the Crown would only lose its Territorial 
Revenues after a struggle with the Assembly if it attempted to 
use them for this purpose. Again Howick urged conciliation:-
"I contend that it is neither desirable in itself nor 
consistent with the character and principles of the present 
Government to attempt on a ques~ion of this kind to overrule the 
popular branch of the legislature". 
Hawick offered dis-establishment as a solution; this wou~d. mean 
the end of the privileged position of the Anglican Church, which 
at that time held the Clergy Reserves, and control of institutes 
for public education, whilst membe.rship of it had become a sort 
of passport to official employment and membership of the 
Legislative Councils. £24,732 was paid annually by Britain 
for the support of the Church in Canada; Howick suggested 
reducing the £16,182 paid to the Society for the Propagation 
of the Gospel by a quarter each year until it ceased to exist 
. . 
on the estimates. The Clergy Reserves he wished to see 
abandoned, and the colonies left to make their own provisions 
for religious instruction. Payment of salaries of the 
Protes.tant clergy of Lower Canada (£5, 250 frem Army Extraordinar-
ies), sums paid to the Bishop and Archdeacon of Nova Scotia, 
and the vote for King's College in the latter province, should 
cease forthwith. If his recommendations were carried out 
Howick was very optimistic as to the future:-
"By yielding at once upon this question every remaining 
subject of serious,. difference Will be got rid of, and there ' 
is every probability that disputes which have so long existed 
between the Executive Government and the Assemblies will be 
satisfacterily adjusted." 
The example of the United States made it inexpedient to neglect 
colonial feelings.< 12) 
Goderich, however, was too good an Anglican to favour 
disestablishment, and for once resisted the schemes-of his Under-
Secretary. The Territorial Revenues in Lower-Canada were used 
to provide for the salary of the clergy, and intensified the 
determination of the Assembly to control them, Whilst though 
both Provinces were invited to legislate on the question of 
Clergy Reserves on lines acceptable to the Imperial Government 
(12) Howick to Earl Grey, November 7th, 1831, 
enclosing a Meme on the Canadian Church 
dated August 19th, 1831. 
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( Goderich favoured selling the Reserves and applying the proceeds 
to building Churches and Parsonages, whilst many Canadians wanted 
to see those same proceeds applied pu~ely to education), they 
failed to do so, partly because of' the failure of' Governors, 
Legislative Councils, and Assemblies to agree on what course to 
pursue. 
Howick also played a part in an important incident which 
took place in Upper Canada. In 1830 Mackenzie, the famous 
Radical agitator was chosen as the member for the County of' 
York in the Assembly; in his writings he abused the body of' 
which he was a member and as a result was expelled on the ground 
that his writings were ~ibellous. In the following year he was 
re-elected, again expelled, and declared ineligible for a seat 
l 
in the Assembly. _In April, 1832, a despatch was sent to the 
Governor, Sir John Colborne - of which there is a rough draft 
in Howick's hand- urging him to prevent further incidents, 
Mackenzie _having been elected by· his con·stituents for a third 
time. Howick's view was that the Assembly should have abstained 
f'rom taking any notice of' the libel, or at mos.t, action should 
have been taken in ·the ordinary tribunals. Mackenzie had been 
able to pose as the vic tim of' i!l justice,. and certainly the 
·expulsion by people at once accusers and judges did have·an 
arbitrary character. There was no legal means of preventing 
Mackenzie from taki~g his seat; the power of the Assembly -
and the House of Commons - did not extend further than the 
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expulsion of a member for an offence subsequent to his election, 
and only by an Act of the whole legislature could a legal 
incapacity to a seat be created. (l3) The Law Officers in 
Upper Canada (Solicitor-General C.A. Hagerman, and 4ttorney-
General, H.J. Boulton) did not agree with this legal argument, 
-
and when Mackenzie was expelled for a third time, these two 
officials voted with the majority. In the summer of 1832 
Mackenzie sailed for England, where he remained till the spring 
of 1833, having two final interviews with Howick in March; in 
that same month Colborne was ordered to dismiss Boulton and 
Hagerman from their posts.(l4) 
When Stanley took over the. Colonial Office· from Goderich, 
and Howick had left, C.A. Hagerman was restored to his former 
position, and Boulton became Chief Ju.stice of Newfoundland (after 
James Stuart, removed from his office of Attorney-General of 
Lower Canada by Goderich after 'impeachment' proceedings in the 
Assembly, had refused the office). Howick was furious with 
Stanley:-
If 
••• Boulton was dismissed ••• because ••• he had acted 
upon principles diametrically opposite to those on which Lord 
Goderich (or rather on which I) desired that the Government of 
( 13) 
(14) 
Draft o~ a Despatch to Sir J. Colborne, April 
2nd, 1832. Canadian Papers. 
'The Colonial Policy of the Whig Ministers' No. 1. 
Helen Taft Manning 'Canadian Historical Review' 
No. 33. PP• 203-37. 
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the colony should be carried on, and because he had resisted 
in the most indecent manner the authority of the Secretary of 
State; ••• Stanley •.•• has expressed as strongly as it was well 
possible, his dissent f~om the views of his predecessors~ and 
. 0 
this measure as shewing that Hay and Tryism have recovered 
- - - "' 
their ascendancy in directing the policy of this country towards 
her ·N.. Am. colonies causes' me· to entertain the most gloomy 
anticipations as to the future." (15) 
Howick contended that Stanley's act-ions in Canada had 
upset all the former's policy in Lower Canada of strengt_hen ing 
the mode!I."ate party which would probably have 11 obtained the 
ascendanc' over the .radicals, even in the Assembly." ( 16 ) '.Dhe 
Howick Act was also threatened, Stanley having promised Lord 
Aylmer, Gove.rnor of Lower Canada, that it would be repealed. In 
1834 a Committee of the Ho-use of Commons enquired into the unrest 
in Lower Canada. At the same time Stanley gave notice of a bill 
for suspending the- operation . 6f the Howick Act. .Duripg the 
sittings of the Committee Howick crossed·swords with Stanley, 
calling the latter's projected bi.ll. a. 1 c.o.&f'c·aon. bill 1 • · For 
this Howick was ~ebuked by Ellice, who ~mphasized the harm he 
was doing to his father's government, and Earl Grey him~elf 
deprecated any further quarrel with Stanley. Nevertheless, 
Howick' s opinions on Canada, as he told Wood, were too strong 
to be sacrificed w1 th honol,lr and once again he contemplated 
( 15) 
(16) 
Journal, June 20th. 1833· 
Journal·, Jun_e 30th, .1833· 
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resigning - he was at this time Under-Secretar·y under Melbourne 
at· the Home Office. Earl Grey urged him to content himself with 
stating his opinions in the Committee without resigning as that 
would only mean that Labouchere, who shared his sentiments, 
would do the same, and that it was Stanley's wish that Howick 
' 
should not be obliged to go out of office again because of 
opposition to colonial policy (he had resigned his previous post 
over the slavery issue). Stanley po.stponed the date for bringing 
in his bill, and shortly afterwards resigned over the question 
of the appropriation of the revenues of the Irish Church. (17) 
The whole of Hawick's Canadian policy thus had the one 
end in view, conciliation of the popular parts of the 
Consti-tution by the removal of grievances or possible causes of 
them, such as the expulsion of Mackenzie. The Act which.bears 
his name was no solution to Lower Canadian problems; indeed in 
the opinion of many it was a retrograde step which had placed 
the executive even more at the financial. mercy of the Assembly 
than hitherto. The core of the problem in Lower Canada lay in 
English-French antagonism. When Hawick next concerned himself 
with Canada it was to find that the situation had worsened. 
D. Howick and Mauritius. 
During Earl Grey's administration the West Indies and 
other slave colonies were in a ferment, which increased with 
(17) Journal, April 18th, May, 5th, lOth, 17th, 19th, 
20th-23rd, 1834; Earl Grey to Howick, May 11th, 1834. 
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every scheme 4manating from the Government for the amelioration 
and final abolition of slavery. On the one hand the planters 
were violently opposed to government interference with their 
'property', and on the other the slaves became excited at the 
prospect of ultimately gaining their freedom, and·became less 
subservien~ in their attitude to their masters. Such a state 
of affairs produced explosive situations in several colonies, 
particularly Jamaica, British Guiana, and Mauritius, and for 
a w~ile the latter engrossed much of the attention of the 
Colonial Office. The whole Mauritius story is interesting in 
that it illustrates the difficulty with which an Imperial 
Govermment had to contend if it brought forward for the colonies 
a policy favouring the slave rather than the master - difficulties 
which were not sufficiently realized by the Anti-Slavery party 
in the country, most of whom simply believed that all the 
Government had to do was to declare emancipation and everything 
would be well. 
The conflict in Mauritius was one as much of personalities 
--~ ~ principles. The principal actors were the French Creole 
owners of slaves, a weak Governor who favoured the pro-slavery 
faction (as did many of the official servants) and an over-
zealous law officer with a strong detestation of slavery. 
The Governor of Mauritius when the Whigs entered office 
was Lt.General Sir Charles.Colville, G.C.B. On April 4t~, 1832, 
a despatch was sent announcing his removal from office, after a 
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long period of frustrating the attempts of his superiors to 
mitigate the situation of the slaves on the island. Among other 
charges he was accused of not having aided the.Protector of 
Slaves in his duties, of having connived at the use by slave 
owners of chains, rings and collars when these had been expressly 
forbidden by Government, and of having suspended a clause in an 
Order in- Council which had prohibited the Judges and certain Law 
Officers from possessing slaves. As soon as his successor was 
-
enabled to proceed to the Colony Colville was to consider himself 
as relieved from his government. Though unpopul~ with the 
Imperial Government (particularly so With Howick, a copy of this 
despatch being amongst his papers) and of course with the slaves, 
Colville was a good Governor in the eyes of the official class, 
and the planters, and no doubt the news of his dismissal hel~·d 
to play it~ part in the riots which were to come. 
In February of that same year the Colonial Office had 
appointed a new procureur-general, or public prosecutor, for the 
island - the main influence in persuading Goderich to that choice 
was Howick. The man chosen was Sir John Jeremie, wh~ for six 
years had been Chief Justice of the island of St. Lucia. It was 
a singularly tactless choice for an island of excitable slave-
owners. Jeremie was an ardent abolitionist who had aroused such 
hostility in St. Lucia from planters and civil servants that he 
had been obliged to withdraw from the office he held. In 1831 
he had."published "Four Essays on Colonial Slavery", which was 
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much disliked by the pro-slavery faction. (lB) 
.. ""J Jeremie arrived at Port Louis on June 2nd was prevented 
1\ 
from l-anding till two days later, so strong was the feeling in 
the island against his appointment. When he did come ashore it 
was under a military escort. Though Jeremie took the oaths 
of office he ~ould not be for~ally installed because of the 
refusal· of V'isieux, one of the Judges, to attend a Supreme 
Court summoned for that purpose, the law requiring the presence 
of three judges on such occasions. Colville, who had connived 
at the armed associations of volunteers - avo~edly for the 
.purpose, of checking insubordination, but which had played a 
prominent part in the anti-Jeremie riots - now called not his 
Executive Council to advise him but a meeting of 'notables', 
a body which had no legal existence and which consisted of 
those very men who were at the head of the resistance to Jeremie's 
appointment; ~hen these advised the removal ~f Jeremie, 
Colville carried out their recommendation, and Jeremie, bearer 
of the Royal Commission, was embarked for England by order of 
His Majesty~ Governor on July 29th; he reached England three 
months later. 
Early in October news of these proceedings reached the 
Colonial Office. Howick called for determined measures to 
vindicate Impe:rial authority. "My opinion", he wrote, "of the 
incapacity, cowardice, or treachery of Sir c. Colvi~le is 
increased... I hope some how or other Colville will be punished." 
(18) D~N.B. 
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He demanded the dismissal of' Visieux and the appointment of a 
( 19) ju·dge of a different tamper. 
Henry Taylor believed that the trouble had originat·ed 
in attempting to combine a liberal policy towards both classes 
of the community, and ·cast the blame opon recent reforms, the 
decisive influence for which had been Howick's. Now Taylor 
wished to see the Government retrace their steps, and to take 
away the recently acquired freedom of' the Press¢ and also to 
diminish the number of' the Legislative Council. Howick laid 
the whole blame for the riots upon a weak Governor who had 
disobeyed his superiors and had sanctioned what amounted to a 
rebellion. Howick refused to blame the reforms he had suggested 
f'or the riots. Here again is seen Howick's essential liberal 
··€atti tude towards colonial wishes; speaking ·of Taylor's 
..... .J 
cibservations, he noted:-
"For manytof his remarks upon the character of the French 
Creoles and their unfitness to make a rational use of free 
·k.;~. 
institutions I concur, but the conclusion I draw ••• is that the 
very trifling approach to freedom we have allowed will be of' the 
greatest service in preparing them f'or the more f'ull enjoyment of 
a constitutional Government when the abolition of' slavery shall 
have removed the objection which now exists to the extension of 
popular influence ••• " ( 20 ) 
(19) Howick to Goderich, October 4th, 1832. 
(20) Howick to G~derich, October 11th, 1832. 
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Three weeks_later the Government had still determined upon 
no course of action. The Cabinet questioned whether Sir Willlam 
Nicolay, deputed Colville's successor, was a fit man for the 
situation. Howick defended Nicolay's appointment; he had been 
chosen mainly for his creditable administration of ~ominica. 
Meanwhile the military au;thorities were clamouring for a 
garrison of ten thousand; at the time of the riots there were 
under two thousand troops on the island. Howick did not see the 
necessity for this, as the armed associations were so ill-equjpped 
and without discipline that the troops present on the island if 
led resolutely could disperse them. How~ck had his way, and 
Nicolay was duly sent, though Earl Grey was somewhat dubious, 
having heard that Nicolay was gouty, infirm and near seventy. 
The Government insisted on despatching an infantry regiment 
after him. 
prder was restored on the island, and Jeremie returned, 
but it was not long before he became involved in bitter quarrels 
with other important public servants, particularly the judges. 
The Governor expressed disapproval of Jeremia's vi~lent language, 
and the latter re~igne~~~:. ··quitting Mauritius in October, 1833 • 
..• :~;!:_··.; •. _·':.:·;. 
Even before this was known, repQrts of Jeremie' s actions, and 
of the Governor's, were arousing anxiety at the Colonial Office, 
and Howick - who was out of office at this time - was sent 
official papE;lrs on Mauritius in order that he might pass an 
opinion on them. Earl Grey had heard reports that Jeremie on 
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the anniversary of the day o.f his expulsion had paraded the 
streets in a carriage decorat:ed with laurels. Howick was 
reluctant to admit that the choice of Jeremie had been a mistake, 
and blame.d the ·latter's faults upon excess of ardour and a 
-
want of command in a right cause. Nevertheless Howick was 
disappointed in· Jeremie and his ungovernable temper, and did 
not look upon the Mauritius episode with satisfaction. He 
himself had.preached a tactful approach towards the slave 
colonies whilst the question of slavery was undecided, yet he 
had urged the appointment of a man who was known to be anything 
but tactful to a tumultuous colony, knowing that the views of 
the settlers plus many of the officials were poles apart from 
Jeremia's, without realizing that sooner or later they would be 
bound to come into conflict and cause concern to a Government 
which was. already overburdened with pressing problems. ( 21) 
E. Howick and Slavery. 
The dominating problem confronting the Colonial Office 
was that of the slave colonies. Since the actual abolition 
of the slave trade the Anti-Slavery party in the country had 
waxed stronger and stronger, and its hold over public opinion 
had increased; the party's aim was aboli~ion of slavery as 
quickly as possible. The Colonial Office also had to consider 
( 21) Earl Grey to Howick·, November 3rd, December 4th,l833. 
H-owick to Earl Grey, December 3rd and 6th, 1833· 
Draft of letter from Howick to G. Levevre, 
December 24th, 1833. 
the colonists' viewpoint; what was to happ-en to the sugar 
plantations in the West Indies once slavery was abolished, 
would they have to be abandoned for lack of labour ? 
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Successive Governments had shied away from immediate 
abolition, and when Hawick entered upon his duties the line 
being pursued was one laid down by Canning in 1823. By a series 
of Resolutions in that year Canning had proclaimed the necessity 
for ameliorating the condition of the slave, thus fitting him 
for his freedom which would be at as early a date as the 
welfare and safety of the colonies permitted. The policy was 
amelioration not em~ncipation, and was to be carried out by Order 
in Council for the Crown Colonies, and in the Chartered Colonies 
by the local legislatd.:Y'es themselves. Lord Goderich cont.inued 
this policy upon his assuming the position of Colonial·Secretary, 
though in the seven ~ears which had elapsed since Canning's 
Resolutions no great improvement in the condition of the slaves 
(22) had been effected. 
In the spring of 1831, whilst the attention of most of 
the public and politicians was engrossed by the st~~ggle for 
Parliamentary Reform, Buxton gave notice of an intention to 
move Resolutions pledging Parliament to the principle of 
immediate emancipation. ~hough his notice of these Resolutions 
was given a month before they were to come up for discussion 
the Government-failed to take steps to decide what their attitude 
(22) 'Emancipation and Apprenticeship in the British 
West Indies'. W.L. Burn 1937, -PP• 80-2. 
,•, 
59· 
would be on the question, and on the very day the motion was due 
Howick had to persuade Buxton to postpone the debate. Howick 
pressed for a definite decision from Goderich before the subject 
came up for discussion again, yet up to the day of debate no 
decision had been reached, and it was only after repeated 
representations by Howick that it was decided to commit the 
G'overnment to the course of policy recommended by Canning, which 
included a threat that fiscal measures would be taken against 
th·ose Chartered Colonies which failed to pass legislation 
ameliorating the condition of the slaves along lines laid down 
by the Orders in Council for the Crown Colonies. ( 23) In 
April, on Althorp pledging the Government to exclude all those 
colonies which did not pass ameliorating legislation from the 
proposed financial relief for the West Indies, Buxton consented 
to withdraw his motion. Howick clearly outlined the Government's 
policy at this time in a letter to Buxton, wri t.ten on April 7th; 
Buxton's ResolUtions, he wrote, would be contrary to the 
Resolutions of 1823, "as they would go t·o the direct liberation 
of the existit:lg race of Slaves or at least of their children", 
whereas according to Canning the "ultimate extinction of Slavery 
was to be attempted, not by any law for the direct liberatias~ 
of the Slaves or their children, but by gradually improving their 
condition, and mitigating the severity with which they are now 
treated, in short by a process similar to that which ••• without 
sudden and violent change, has by degrees converteq the serfs 
and bondsmen of the dark ages, into the free peasantry of modern 
times." (23) Howick to Earl Grey, May 29th, 1832. 
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A new Order in Council had been promised in April fo~ the 
Crown Colonies, with the stipulation t"hat the Chartered Colonies 
if they wished to e~joy financial relief would have to pass 
sim:!.l~r legislation. T~his Order in Council was ready in 
November of that year. Howick urged that as enfo_rcin~ its 
provisions in the Chartered Colonies was the really important 
part of the scheme, the ~esolutions of April should be brought 
f.orward by the Government tC? receive the approbation of · 
Parl~ament, and the decision of Parliament vrlhich would be · 
favourable, could be sent along with the Ord~r in Council to all 
'· 
the Chartered Colonies. These would then have no doubts that 
it was the expressed determination of the Imperial Parliament 
to exclude them from any relief accruing by an alteration of 
the sugar duties should they fail to comply with the Order in 
Council. Goderich could not be brought to take such a decided 
step, and the Order in Council was sent to the Chartered 
Colonies with merely a despatch promising subst~tial relief 
for compliance with its clauses - Howick having s~ggested this 
after failing to secure a~sent for his first suggestion. ( 24) 
Goderich's state of lethargy continued, and though pressed 
by Howick, he failed· to bring forward a detailed scheme f~ 
financial relief as promised. The early-part. of 1832 brought 
news of_a slave uprising in Jamaica which had been b~utally 
(24) Memoranda by Howick, December 6th and 8th, 
1831. Slavery Papers. 
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suppressed (the colonists extending their persecution to dissenting 
missionaries whom they accus~d of inciting the slaves to revolt), 
and also of the indignant reception given by the Chartered 
Colonies to the n_ew Order in Counc_il. ~e latter news led the 
West Indian body in London t_o press for a Committee of t_he lliouse 
of Lords to _investigate the_ whole West Indian problem. On April 
17th, the G'overnment concurred in a Resolution moved by Lord 
Harewood, which stated:-
"That a select ComJni.ttee be appointe.d to enquire into the 
Laws and usages of the several West Indian Colonies in relation 
to the Slave Pop~lation, the actual condition and treatment of 
the. Slaves, ·their habits and disposi tiona, the means which were 
adopted in the several Colonies for their progressive improvement 
and civilization, the degree of improvement and civilization 
which they have at present attained; and also to enquire into 
the distressed condition of' these Colonies. 11 
The result was a Committee of twenty-five, fourteen of whom 
were large slave-holders, whilst six were definitely pledged 
to oppose all the measures of Government. ( 25) Howick had 
been opposed to concurring in the appointment of this Committee, 
and was aghast at the poor showing of G'overnment speakers in 
the debate upon the subject:-
" it was impossible for the most careless observer to f'aiJL 
t·o discover that there was a difference between the tone and 
(25) Memo by Stephen on appointment of Lords' Committee, 
April 23rd, 1832. Slavery Papers. 
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spirit of' Lord Goderich' s speech and that of' his despatches 
-
which could only be accounted f'or by suppos'ing that he had not 
been the real writer of' what was printed in his name; aDd it 
was e-qually clear that no other member of' the Government felt 
himself responsible for, or even knew what had been done on 
this most important subject." At the same time that .Howick 
wrote this he was also u·nging Earl Grey to replace G'oderich by 
Stanley, even though such a step would be disagreeable to 
himself personally, and to ensure that another member of the 
Cabinet - perhaps Lambton - made himself' thoroughly acquainted 
with the West Indian problem:-
"Every day is adding to the mass of unanswered despatches 
which are now waiting and must wait until it is finally 
determined upon what principle the Government intends to act. u( 26 ) 
In fairness to the Government it must be remembered that the 
more important question of the Reform Bill had absorbed much 
of their attention. 
For the Colonial Office the immediate problem was whether 
to suspend the Order in Council in the Cr.own Colonies whilst 
the Committee was sitting. Stephen could see no other alter-
( 27) 
native; among other factors the King was in favour of this course. 
(26) Howick to Earl Grey, May 29th, 1832. 
(27) Draft of Circular Despatch to Governors of Legislative 
Colonies, May 1832. William IV's remarks overleaf. 
Slavery Papers. 
Howick was for maintaining it in force in the Crown Colonies, 
and resisting a call for its suspension on the ground that it 
would be wrong to make a change in the existing law before it 
was proved that such was desirable. Revoking the Order in 
Council, he argued, would lose the Government the confidence 
of the large Anti-Slavery Party in the Commons, and make more 
likely a motion for the abolition of slavery. He agreed that 
it would be a 'gross· inconsistency' to carry the Order in 
- . 
Council into execution whilst the Committee was sitting, and 
that the appointment of the Committee itself was not a very 
intelligible proceeding, but this could be justified in the 
Commons by the difficulty of the Government in resist·ing such 
a motion in the Lords. It was decided to maintain the Order 
in Council in the Crown Colonies. ( 28) 
During the early months of 1832 Howick had begun to feel 
that the whole policy of the Government on the slavery question 
was wrong. ~he inability of the Government to enforce the 
provisions of the Order in Council even in the Crown Colonies 
was one major factor which brought him to this decision. T.he 
news of the Jamaican revolt, plus the reports of t~e Protectors 
of Slaves in the various colonies - especially those of Captain 
Elliot from Guiana - were other factors. It was becoming 
( 28) Memo. ·by Howick April 27, 1832. Memo. by Stephen 
April 23,_ 1832, and Hawick's Remarks on Stephen's 
Paper, April 25, 183_2. 
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increasingly clear tha; the policy of amelioration was a ~ailure. 
The suppression of the Jamaican revolt and the p_ersecution of 
the missionaries excited great indignation in this country, and 
with the struggle for the Reform Bill over, the public began 
to c_oncentrate its attention on the slavery problem. The 
a bali tionists secured increasing support and indeed a Committee 
of the Commons had been established at Buxton's insistence to 
-discuss speedy ways of emancipation. Meanwhile in the colonies 
the planters were determined to resist the policy laid down 
in the Order in Council, whilst the slaves were becoming 
increasingly restive at the news of the efforts being ma.de for 
their relief. ( 29) 
Hawick's mind was moving towards a different solution to 
the problem than that hitherto tried, and the first important 
step towards a new policy was outlined in a memorandum of July 
3rd, 1832, which dealt with the effects of a land tax as an 
accompaniment to emancipation. It had been agreed that should 
emancipation take place it would spell the ruin of the sugar 
indu.stry, the major industry of the West Indies. Sugar planters 
depended upon manual labour, and the only labour force available 
was the slaves. It was expected in the event of emancipation 
that the free negro would have no desi~e to continue a routine 
of daily labour on the st_at:e where he had been a slave, but 
would take to the woods, procure a provision ground, and grow 
(29) Hawick's Memo on Slavery, written in 1884. 
Slavery Pape;r:os. 
·upon it sufficient food f'or the subsistence of' himself' and 
family, spending his time when not so employed in idleness. 
Howick attempted to find a remedy for this problem. 
The main argument of this memorandum. is based ·on the 
Wakefield theory. In the· West Indian colonies ther.e was a vast 
extent of land which with li t'tle labour could yield subsis·tence 
for negro families. Howick agreed that it~ould be the natural 
reaction of' the negro to live in the fashion described above. 
In the West Indies, unlike Australia, it would be impossible 
by immigration to add to the density of population so as to 
give rise to a greater demand for land and so increase the value 
of the latter, but the same result could be achieved by the 
imposition of a land tax; if' this were made sufficiently high 
the negro would not be able to work full-time on his provision 
·ground but would have to find further emplo~ent to raise the 
money to pay the tax. As the demand for any produce he could 
raise f'or purposes of' sale wo.uld be strictly limited, where· 
else could he find the necessary money except by working on the 
sugar plantations? At the same time slave-owners couldbe 
compensated f'or the loss of their slaves by exempting from the 
tax the planta.tions now cultivated by_ slave labour. An efficient 
police force could be established f'or the prevention of vagrancy 
and the i~legal occ-upation of land, and a body of men sent from 
this country to act as ~agistrates to decide differences between 
the ex-slaves and their former masters. It could also be 
arranged that ex-slaves would not be able to leave their 
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Plantations until they had paid their masters some small sum, 
to earn which they would work for wages fixed by a magistrate; 
by the time this small debt was discharged, the negroes might 
see the advantage of regular empl9yment as a means of paying 
rents and purchasing supplies. 
Stephen gave a rather hesitant approval to the scheme. 
The main difficulty he believed would be owing to the fact that 
the object of the legislation would not be understood, a~d the 
plan's advantages not appreciated. ( 30) Taylor declared 
that it was impractical to impose such a tax, or if imposed to 
levy it. ~he imposition of the tax in the Chartered Colonies 
would be the responsibility of the colonial Assemblies, and 
they would never consent to it. Taylor also agreed with the 
demand of the planters that if emancipation took place they 
. \ Cl. 
ought to be compensated before the ~ves were set free, whereas 
Howick' s schemes of compensation rested on too complicated and 
speculative a basis. To the argument·about the tax ·and the 
reaction of the Assemblies, Howick propounded a rather violent 
and startling solution:-
" ••• what is to prevent our treating the charters of 
the w.r. colonies as so much waste paper ? The colonists have 
neither the moral nor the physical force necessary for offering 
the slightest resistance to the wishes of this country." 
( 30) Stephen's Remarks on Hawick's Memo. 
July 6,.1832. Slavery Papers. 
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' 
This was strong language for a man who had hitherto argued that 
amelioration of the condition of the slaves should go hand in 
hand with the conciliation of the planters. As for compensation, 
Howick denied that the planters had a right to expect compensation 
in money from the tax-payers of this country for the abolition 
of slavery, after all their frauds to prove that the conditions 
under which the slaves lived compared favourably to those of 
English labourers. The most that Howick would do for the planters 
would be to guarantee them a supply of labour and to take 
measures which would ultimately increase the value of their 
land. ( 31) 
Whilst the Colonial Office debated the pros and cons of 
a land tax scheme Howick was becoming increasingly concerne.d 
over reports of serious unrest in th~ West Indies. These 
reports finally convinced him that there could be no security, 
no ·safety from the fear of further slave outbreaks, whilst 
slavery itself continued to exist. The only remedy was to 
follow the formula prescribed by Captain Elliot, whose reports 
from Gui~a exercised great influence over Howick:-
"Give all that ought and~ be given, at once." (32) 
The result of Colonial Office deliberations was embodied 
in another important memorandum of Howick' s entitled "Policy 
of the Present Government on Slavery" and dated December 1, 1832. 
(31) Memo by Taylor, August 15, 1832, with pencilled 
remarks by Howick. Slavery Papers. 
(32) Extract from a letter of Captain Elliot, Oct. 9th. 
1832, Slavery Papers. 
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This was sent to all members of the Cabinet. It urged the 
Government to give its fuli attention to the problem before the 
meeting of a new Parliament-. Hawick attempted to show the 
failure of the policy of amelioration, and pointed out that a 
new House of Commons would prefer a scheme of emancipation. The 
G~ernment could leave the matter in the hands of both the 
Committees of Parliament, but this would not be creditable to 
His Majesty's Ministers; alternatively the Government could 
produce its ovm scheme of emancipation which ought not to be 
laid before the Committees because of the delay that would ensue. 
The whole problem could be settled, Hawick at this time believed, 
by requiring regular labour from the working population, paying 
the labourer a fair remuneration for his toil, appointing 
magistrates to decide disputes between empiQyers and employees, 
abolishing punishments inflicted by the former, and by ensuring 
that the right to the services of labourers was no longer 
transfer.able apart from the land they cultivated. These were 
the ideas of C~ptain Elliot and Hawick in a note dated March 29th, 
1833, written on this part of his-memorandum makes the comment:-
"When the paper was written the extreme difficulty 1of 
framing the details of a measure by which the negroes should 
be attached to the soil had not occu~d to-me, and I had adopted 
A 
without sufficient consideration the common notion that there 
should be some gradation from slavery to entire freedom." 
Hawick was convinced that the more reasonable of the West Indians I 
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would not oppose this plan; it was to their advantage to see 
the end of the unrest. The memorandum ends by stating 
categorically that the G:overnment must have some decided scheme 
to present to the new Parliament, and that a repetition of the 
feebleness and irresolution of the last session must be 
avoided. If the present plan were adopted, in later years its 
measures "may be made to appear to all who are not acquainted 
with their real history, the consequence of that mature and 
statesmanlike deliberation from which they ought to have 
proceeded." 
On December 5th, Howick wrote to Lord John Russell, to 
whom he had sent papers on the subject, asking him to press 
fo_r decisive action, and detailing a conversation he had had 
that day with Sir William Struth of St. Vincent, and Colquhoun, 
the Agent for that island; after putting forward the basis of 
his plan, which he was careful to say was his own not the 
Government's opinions on the subject, Howick had convinced 
them that there was at -least a possibility that the drift from 
the plantations after emancipation could be checked or even 
halted. He had also hinted that if the colonists facilitated 
emancipation a considerable loan might be granted to them, and 
the West Indiaa~had attached great importance to this suggestion. 
In reply, Russell stated that it was dangerous to proclaim immed-
iate emancipation, but that the more odious parts of slavery 
should be done away with, and suggesting those very measures 
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which Howick had now decided should form part of a full s.cheme 
of emancipation, not a mere gradual progression from slavery 
to freedom. On January lst, 1833, Howick sent Russell his 
reconsidered scheme for the full~abolition of slavery to take 
place immediately. He showed the weakness of a system of 
mitigated slavery, where the master cannot compel his slaves 
to work from fear. How would a magistrate determine when 
corporal•punishment was deserved? According to Hawick, 
Russell's scheme merely differed from the present one in giving 
the labo~rer money in place of supplies. Using that classical 
economical argument that wages must be ·a;..,.matter. of agreement 
between labourer and employer, and must be regulated by a 
demand for labour and the value of that performed, Hawick showed 
that Russell's plan did not take accoupt of this, and that the 
payment of a fixed rate of wages to the sl_aves would not answer 
the problem. The essential condition for a free man is that 
he is induced to work by motives acting upon his reason, and 
that he can refuse to work for the remuneration offered him. 
This would not apply to the slaves according to Russell's plan 
and they would resist it accordingly, whilst the master's 
control over them would be severely limited by taking away 
the powers of punishment from him. Howick concluded by 
observing that his plan would not probably "enable the planter 
to produce anything like the quantity of sugar he now does, but 
I think it will enable him to raise a smaller quantity at a 
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·les·s expense, and if so of course he need not be any loser." ( 3;3) 
Howick attempted to convince his father and other ministers 
' 
of the virtue of his plan. On January 7th, 1833, he issued a 
second paper giving a full account of his matured plan. The two 
difficulties to be· overcome were the poverty of the planters 
and the fact that the negroes might not, if they could procure 
land easily elsewhere, wish to labour on the plantations. 
Using Gibbon W~efield' s theory of land and population,· he dealt 
first with the latter problem. The condition of Ireland offered 
a clue as to how the fear of negro idleness could be overcome:-
"The Irish peasant is perfectly· contented if he can have 
the shelter of a cabin no degree superior to the hut of the 
Negro; the potatoes and tattered coat of the former are.little 
more expensive and certainly less sufficiept for his comfort 
than the clothing and food of the latter. Yet the Irishman 
will work from morning till night ~or sixpence a day •••• because 
he inhabits a country in which population is so dense and the 
competition for land consequently so excessive, that he cann-ot 
obtain the smallest plot of ground whence he derives his 
. ' 
support without paying for it a price which compels him not 
only to accept employment when offered to him, but to seek for 
it as the greatest blessing he can· obtain. The Jamaica; Negro 
maintains himself like the· Irishman by the produce of an acre 
or two of land; but instead of paying for it a rent of six or 
seven pounds an acre, he· has it for nothing." 
(33) Memo. by Russell Dec. 8th,; Howick to Russell, Dec. 5th, 
1832, and January 1st, 1833. 
-·· 
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The way to -remedy the situation in the West Indies would be to 
impose a tax upon land. Howick proposed that when the slaves 
were free that there should be a uniform tax on land (this 
replaced a more cumbrous and complicated scheme for a graded 
tax wh~ch he had advocated in the earlier plan). The only 
land to be exempt from the tax would be that which for the last 
two years had borne a crop of sugar or other exportable ~reduce. 
A high price should then be placed on all remaining Crown Land. 
Provision grounds and huts should be declared the property of 
the ·planters, and the growing crops should belong to the slaves 
on payment to the masters of half a year's tax. All landowners 
.. 
would have to make a return of their land, with penalties for 
non-compliance, whilst land and crops would be liable for 
seizure for non-payment! of the tax. Illegal occupation of 
land would be punished by forfeiture of crops and other property 
plus three months' hard labour in the P~rish Work House. 
Stipendiary magistrate~ woUld have summary jurisdiction in all 
disputes between employers and employees. The Vestry of each 
Parish was to impose a rate on all land growing provisions to 
defray expense in supporting negro children, and the old and 
infirm, who were without relatives. All other Colonial taxes 
were to be repealed, except those imposed by British Acts of 
Parliament for the regulation of trade, and such importation 
duties as may be required to prevent home produce of the islands 
from being placed in a disadvantageous position by the land tax. 
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The land tax was to make good the revenue lost by the repeal 
pf ,other taxes, to meet the expense involved by a necessary 
increase·of the Surveyor-General's Department, and was to pay 
the sqlaries of the Stipendiary Magistrates, leaving after all 
this a surplus. A loan was to be raised on the credit of 
Great Britain to enable planters to discharge existing encum-
brances on West Indian estates; the loan would bear five per 
cent interest and would be secured on the m~rtgages on estates 
relieved. Each colony would be responsible for the payment of 
I 
interest and the gradual discharge of the principal. The 
security to Britain for the loan would be the sums recovered 
from the mortages' the produce of the parliamentary. du~ies' and 
the surplus of the land tax. 
The exemption from tax o.f land under sugar cultivation, 
plus the repeal o_f the Colonial taxes, \11/ould p·revent the change 
of system from ruining the planter, and would emable him to pay 
wages to the employees. Exemption from the land tax would 
in some measure restore estates to their value before the 
emancipation of the slaves. The loan would also be of great 
benefit to the planters, who usually had tq pay at least ten 
per cent interest on the loans they r~ised. As the loan 
could be effected on the credit of Britain for ~per cent or 
four, whilst the planters could be'charged five per cent, a 
fund would be created as a guarantee against any partia'I 1=. 
As the very existence of slavery d~pended upon the support 
given to the planters by the military power of Britain, it was 
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only fai~ that the latte~ should p~esc~ibe the terms of 
emancipation, but she could not tax the Legislative Colonies 
he~self. Howick p~oposed that an Act of Pa~liament be passed 
decla~ing that f~om a ce~tain date slave~y was to be at an end 
and that all the King's subjects would then be entitled to 
full civil ~ights. As soon as slavery should cease arrangements 
would be made to assist all colonies, by way of loan, which 
would pass acts to secure the repayment of the advance by the 
imposition of the proposed land tax and the other regulations. 
A ~eduction of duties on colonial p~oduce would also take place 
at the same time as the abolition of-slavery, and those colonies 
which carried out the latter before the date prescribed, would 
have the immediate benefit of such reductions. The whole plan 
if adopted should be submitted to the Committee of the previous 
session. The King's Speech should mention the subject, and the 
Government should act before the question was forced upon them. 
Such was Howick's final plan. Its main emphasis, its 
keystone, is the land tax, and one of the things which will be 
first noted about this tax'was the immense productiv:l,ty Howick 
expected from it; indeed this is one of the most st~iking 
featu~es of the plan. The observations of"the Ea~l of Mulgrave, 
Governor of Jamaica, are very interesting and important in this 
respect. Mulg~ave believed that Howick's plan depended for its 
success too much upon the co-operation of the Assembly whose·· 
members, certainly not the most sensible part of the community, 
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were part and parcel of the .sys-tem of slavery, being overseas 
attornies and the like. Such people would not see the advantage 
of a land tax, they would not vote for it, nor would the negro 
pay it. Too many objects were to depend upon the productiveness 
of the tax:-
"••• I have been on horseback, by bridle roads, over all 
parts of the country", Mulgrave informed Goderich, "and I have 
generally seen the Negro provision grounds (not the gardens) 
in the wildest part of the country at some distance from the 
bye path I was travelling and almost inaccessible except to those 
perfectly acquainted with the country, from being situated 
either on the side of a mountain or the foot of a precipice. 
You have read accounts of the Maroon War. The scenery there 
described is not peculiar to that spot, but such is the 
situation of a very great number of the negro Provision grounds ••• 
they would remove thetr residence there the moment emancipat~on 
no longer confined them to the neighbourhood of the -=~ate ••• 
Only think of the expense of the machinery necessary to raise 
e.uch~.:a tax on such a ground, supposing even there was no active 
resistance to its collection ••• But if there was ? How is it 
to be enforced ? The tax gatherer comld find nothing on which 
to levy - the owner would be in the woods. His goods would 
consist of nothing of any more value than a few plantains and 
yams. It would not be like the case of a runaway ••• he is 
known, marked and caught, but With freedom would come impunity 
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in a great measure from the difficulty of identifying when all 
were pe_rmitted to go at large. 11 
M.ulgrave agreed that many negroes would work and pay the tax 
at first, "but I am only anxious to guard against the impression 
that any considerable revenue could ever be derived from a Tax, 
which must I should be afraid be nearly absorbed in t~e expenses 
entailed by the diffiCUlty Of itS COlle-ction. II One objection 
to the whole plan was that there was no official survey of land 
in Jamaica:-
"There is a person with the title of Crown Surveyor; but 
he has no regular appointment as such ••• he has no documents of 
any authority in his office nor does he appear to me to have any 
accurate general information •••• I have found it impossible to 
make out what is still Crown Land. His idea seems to be that 
there is not a great deal w~ich has not already been patented. 
There ought to be Registers in the Secretary's office of all 
grants, but I am told that it is supposed that many have never 
been registered. There are however certainly no diagrams." 
Before a land tax could be levied much time and expense would 
have to be incurred to produce a survey. Mulgrave also 
supported the principle of individual compens-ation for loss of 
the slaves. On the whole he thought Hawick's plan too abrupt, 
••• 
.and himself 'favoured a more gradual ·system for a population 
'pa~t bedlamite' and 'part savages'. Much would depend upon 
- (3 4) 
whether there was to be liberal _compensation for loss of slaves. 
(34) Mulgrave to Goderich, March 2nd, 1833· A copy in 
Slavery Papers. 
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Such were some of Mulgrave' s main ·objections and they constituted 
a formidable argument from an ·authoratative source against 
Hawick's plan. The plan, sound in theory, was being criticized 
by a man with experience of West Indian affairs, and who was not 
a planter but an official servant of the Government. Mulgrave's 
objections did not reach England till Howick was out of office, 
and though the latter believed them capable of answer, as his 
plan was by this time rejected, he never took the trouble to 
answer them ·in detail, beyond stating that it was precisely the 
-
character of the Assembly that made him favour immediate 
emancipation, as he had learnt by expe~t~nce that no schemes 
of amelioration would work without the cordial .co-operation 
of the planters; if the slaves.were declared free they would 
be so, and if the colonists refused to take measures for 
securing their labour after emancipation, it would be the pla~ters' 
own fault and loss. 
In January, 1833, a Committee of the Cabinet considered 
the plan, Howick being present. The Committee comprised . 
Althorp, at whose house the meetings were held, the Buke of 
Richmond, Sir James Graham, and Lord ·John Russell. The plan 
received 'a somewhat hesitant approval after being altered in 
various ways, and the whole question was submitted to the Cabinet. 
-Goderich was authorized by the Cabinet .to communicate 
the substance of the plan to the West Indian body in London.,· A. 
deputation of five, appointed by the Standing Committee of 
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Merchants, and without any power to accept or reject a proposal, 
received the communication. Howick believed this deputation 
represented t'tle violent element in the West Indian body. He 
thought that if the Government had firmly announced its object 
was to adopt the plan, and had promised suf-ficient 9ompensation 
in the shape of a loan, the hostility shown by the deputation 
would have been overcome. (35) 
There was a division of opinion in the Cabinet over the 
whole scheme, the Chancellor, Brougham, was opposed to it; his 
opinion carried great weight with Lord Grey, especially when the 
latter remembered that Brougham was opposed to the continuance 
of slavery. Lord Goderich did not have the necessary ability 
or thrust to defend vigorou~ly the scheme which had after all 
emanated from his office. 
On February 7th, Howick alarmed at the Government's delay 
in corning to a final decision, wrote to his father about the 
whole problem. Only the previous night Althorp had committed 
the Government to bringing forward some measure for the set~le-
ment of the question that session. Three weeks had elapsed 
ee 
since the Cabinet CommittA had met, and they had considered that 
the abolition of slavery had been decided upon; various people 
had been informed to this effect.· Now changes of intention 
were clearly discernible, especially an article in the "Times" 
( 35) Memo. on Slavery, written in 1884, 
. Slavery .Papers. 
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attributed to the Chancellor and denying that emancipation was 
contemplated. Ellice, believed to be in the confidence of 
ministers had declared emancipation 'impossible', and the 
meetings at Lord Althorp's had been suspended. As some definite 
stroke of policy would have to be carried out, and as Howick's 
plan was the only one so far proposed which would have a chance 
of success, Howick believed that the Government ought to 
persevere with it. He emphasized the dangers of delay, and 
referred· his father to Captain Elliot - who had jus_t returned 
tV\. from Gui~a - for a personal account of the .mounting unrest there. 
In personal meetings with his father Howick c·ontinued :to 
press his point of view, but Earl Grey.was very dubious about 
any scheme which would have to be carried against the declared 
opposition of the planters, and feared forcible resistance from 
that body. Howick wrote a further paper on March 18th to 
attempt to convince his father that armed resistance to the 
plan was a mere chimera, and that bloodshed would not result 
from immediate emancipation; certainly the negroes would have 
no desire to commence their freedom in an orgy of rioting: he 
dismissed as unsatisfactory schemes of amelioration and 
apprenticeship. On March 22nd, Howick wrote to Brougham urging 
him to support emancipation in the Cabinet, and enclosing hi~ 
paper of March 18th; to this he received no answer. 
On Saturday, March 23rd, Goderich in:f'orm~d Howick that the 
Cabinet had finally decided to abandon his plan, as it could 
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not be carried into operation against the will of the planters. 
He had been. directed to see the deputation of the Standing 
Committee to inquire whether they had anything further to offer. 
Hawick protested against the weakness and folly of this course, 
• 
an~ attempted to. persuade Goderich to insist on the original 
plan in the Cabinet. The next day Hawick saw both Althorp and 
Earl Grey on the subje.ct of the Cabinet decision. Althorp, who 
was on the whole favourable to Hawick's plan, confirmed the fact 
that the Government had decided not to take any steps without 
the support of a substantial section of the planters, and that 
if this were unobtainable, the Government must break up before 
April 23rd., on which day he had pl~dged himself to bring forward 
some measure which would satisfy the Commons. Earl Grey was 
irremoveable in his objections to his son's scheme, especially 
as the Chancellor - who favoured emancipation - was strongly 
opposed to it. Hawick stated that he felt so strongly on the 
subject ·and was so publicly committed that he must support 
Buxton when the matter came up for discussion and the Government 
had no satisfactory alternative. He, therefore, thought it 
would be better if he resigned immediately, but on his father 
objecting to such a course, Hawick promised that he would only 
resl.gn should the Government publicly commit -itself. to opposing 
emancipation in the present session. 
On March 26th, there was a meeting at Althorp's of the 
former Cabinet Committee plus Earl Grey and Hawick, but this 
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separated without in any way being nearer a decision. Immediately 
after the meeting broke up Howick remained to discuss with· 
Earl Grey and Lord Holland the possible retirement-of Goderich 
from the Cslonial Office. Earl Grey was P.eJturbed·at the 
, ... ,AI'Jc. 
possibility of Stanley resigning; he ~Yeted Stanley as one of 
the most brilliant members of the Government, but his Irish 
policy had made him unpopular with many pe.ople, and he had 
announced that he would not remain in the Cabinet after Easter 
unless he was made one of the Secretaries sf State. Earl 
Grey was convinced that the Government would break up without 
Stanley, and hence the desire to see Goderich give up the 
Colonial Office. Palmerston and Melbourne, the two other 
Secretaries of State, wou~d never have considered the idea of 
the-ir making· way for Stanley. Howick acknowledged that Goderich 
was unfit for his situation, and that it was unlikely that he 
would ever be brought in Cabinet to give a decided opinion 
either in favour of Howick's plan or a modification of it. On 
the following day, March 27th, Howick was informed by his 
brother, Charles, that Goderich had accepted the Privy Seal; 
after the levee, Earl Grey summoned Howick and asked him how he 
stood affected by the change at the Colonial Office. Howick 
replied that he had no wish to remain under Stanley's direction. 
Not only was. his cherished scheme rejected, but under Stanley 
Howick realized that he would play no part in formulating policy, 
he would be restricted in fact not theory to the ro~e of Under-
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Secretary. Writing in 1884 on these events, Howick described 
how Goderich, if .stronger-minded, could have acted in a dignified 
way over this change of office; he could have insisted that he 
had no desire to leave office until the slave~y question had 
been settled by the-acceptance of the plan proposed by the office 
of which he was the head, and.that if this had then been refused, 
Goderich could have resigned with honour, but knowing Goderich's 
character Howick did not suggest this course to him. 
Earl Grey had spoken of making Howick Secretary at War. 
This post was first to be offered to Ell~ce. Howick stated that 
;" 
though he had no wish to be~ office he would accept the offer 
unless something connected with the slavery question rendered 
his acceptance impossible. However, Ellice accepted the position. 
Earl Grey then talked of the-Under-Secretaryship at the Foreign 
Office, then held by Sir George Shee, but Hawick disliked-this 
proposal 'telling him that after having had all the-power and 
authority of a secretary of state I could not become a mere 
clerk.' ( 36 ) On April 3rd, Howick took leave of the 
. 
Colonial Office. 
On March 30th, Howick had written to Stanley urging him 
to save the son from the necessity of opposing the father's 
government. On April 4th, Hawick had the first sight of 
Stanley's proposal when he was shown a rough sketch of it by 
his father. Hawick expressed himself as astonished at the 
(36) Fragment of a Journal, March 16th-June 13th, 1833, 
being mainly a narrative about the slavery question. 
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crudeness-and vagueness of an ill-digested scheme for substituting 
apprenticeship for complete abolition - perhaps the crudeness was 
not surprising, considering the speed with which the plan had 
been drawn up. On May 5th - Buxton having consented to have 
the question postponed until May 15th - Hawick received a fuller 
outline of the plan, and informed his father that he was unable 
to support it. During the next few days Hawick made it clear 
to Stanley and Earl Grey that when the plan was brought before 
the Commons he must oppose it. He maintained that the plan:·; 
retained too many of the elements of slaver~, favoured the 
interests of the masters rather than those of· the slaves, and 
that it could even prove of poor benefit to the masters, for 
with the powers -of punishment veste~ in a magistrate, how was a 
master, without the whip, to compel his a~prentices to work ? 
Buxton, when he heard of Stanley's proposed.Resolutions, 
urged Hawick to move an amendment to them, and Howick favoured 
the idea. Not so Earl Grey, who believed that it would not 
be right should Lord Hawick's amendment turn out Earl Grey's 
Government. Hawick, however, drew up a series of counter 
resolutions to serve as an amendment to Stanley's. Both Wood 
and Hawick's brother, Charles, were against him taking a ' 
prominent part in the matt~r, and were displeased when he ignored 
their advice. Charles Grey, who disliked Stanley's scheme, 
nevertheless decided to vote with the Government; he so informed 
Hawick on May 13th, and at the same time enclosed a letter from 
_Lady Grey:-
"expressing in a manner I thought very unjust her and my 
father's annoyance at my taking so active a part agai~st a 
measure of the Government, and at my "canvassing" for votes 
against it. I wrote back to say that I had not organized 
factious opposition, that on the contrary my communication with 
Buxt·on had had for its object to prevent the possibility of 
those Who for· opposite reasons objected to the Government plan 
voting together; that I had abstained till the very last 
moment from even stating to my friends (with one or two 
exceptions) that I had differed from the Government ••• and had 
resigned in consequence, and that I had been quite ready (great 
as ·that sacrifice would have been) if Stanley would hav~ brought 
forward a complete measure to have given up all claim to be the 
person to bring it forward - · I had an answer to say that I 
had misunder~tood my mother's letter (which was not so)". (37) 
So not only did Howick find himself' deeply involved in disputes 
over emancipation, but he no.w found himself the object of' 
recriminations from his own family and friends. So strong was 
his conviction that he was right and Stanley wrong that these 
personal disputes were of' no effect in causing hi;m to swerve 
from the course he had determined to adopt. 
On May 14th, Stanley outlined his plan in the Commons. 
Howick answered him in a speech lasting·two hours, but he was 
dissatisfied with this, having been rather 'put out' by 'the 
(37) Journal, May 13th, 1833• 
excessive inattention of the house which proceeded partly f'rom 
their being fatigued by the long demand upon their attention of' 
Stanley's three hours speech, partly (as I have since been told) 
from their .disapproving my conduct in .coming forward so 
prominently in opposi ti·on to the Govt.' The following day he 
was told by his father that his action had been against the 
feelings of the House, and that many had expressed their 
disapprobation by walk·ing out; after dinner on that day Lady 
Grey attempted to convince him that he had followed a wrong 
course and that he ought now at least to abandon ~is Qpposition. 
Buxton and his colleagues were reluctant to oppose Stanley's 
pi"" 
~igorous.ly; they believed it to be the best offer they were 
likely to get. Instead they hoped to modify it by making it 
more favourable to the slaves. This was· not Howick's intention. 
The Anti-Slavery party in the Commons, therefore, left to 
Howick the task of entirely opposing the plan. 
Buxton announced on· May 30 that he would support Stanley's 
Resolutions, reserving opposition to parts of' them to a later 
stage. Stanley at the same time announced that the projected 
loan of' £15,000,000 was to be converted into· a gift. Howick 
considered that he had not been fairly treated by Buxton who 
had pressed him to take a prominent part in the question; he 
attempted to convince Buxton that it was necessary to~pose the 
second and third Resolutions which would pledge the House to 
the principle of apprenticeship, but without success. The first 
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'llhe fi rf7,± Resolution, announcing the principle of emancipation, 
was passed unanimously on June 3rd. Four days later the second 
Resolution was passed; Howick, after a twenty-minute speech 
against it, left without voting. Buxton considered moving an 
ame~dment to the third resolution reducing the period of the 
compulsory retention by the master of his negroes' services to 
a year; Howick wanted simple opposition to the Resolution, 
in the hope that all pledges as to the mode in which emancipation 
was to be accomplished would be avoided until Stanley presented 
his Bill. Buxton promised to comply with Howick's suggestio~; 
in the debate on June lOth, Buxton, being urged to withdraw his 
motion, 'got up and said he would do so if Stanley would 
consent to introduce the words "for wages" into it, thus', 
wrote Hawick bitterly, 'he altogether threw me over'. Stanley 
would not agree to the words suggested. Hawick in his Journal 
then states what followed:-
n·: Upon this I got up and said that I perfectly perceived 
the impossibility of his consenting to the introduction of the 
words because as he had just said his object was to keep the 
negroes still in a state of modified slavery, this produced a 
groan in the House upon which I said still more strongly that 
I knew of no more accurate definition of slavery than that 
which St-anley had just given in describing the condition in 
which he proposed to place the apprenticed negroes, and ·that the 
house ought to understand that the question on which we were 
about to decide was whethe~ the ne~oes we~e or we~e not fo~ 
12 yea~s to be 3 pa~ts slaves and only 1 part f~ee. I said 
this I am afraid in an acrimonisus manner which was evidently 
ve~y much disapproved of by the house; Lord Althorp denied 
the justice of my way of putting the question with more asperity 
than I almost ever knew him to shew." 
Buxton declined to press his amendment, which was taken 
up by O-'Connell. Bu~ing the debate Stanley propssed raising 
the money to be paid in compensation to the planters to 
£20,000,000. 
On the 11th, Buxton proposed an amendment stating that 
ten million pounds of the compensation money should be given 
only after the expiration of the period of apprenticeship. 
Howick believed 'this was well imagined and well done, the 
only single thing from the commencement in which he has not 
shewn hims-elf utterly deficient in management.' 
The amendment was rejected by 276 to 142, an.d the Resolutions 
duly passed the Commons. 
The only advantage gained when Stanley's bi-ll was intrs-
duced was the reduction of the period of apprenticeship. Howick's 
part in these proceedings involved him in further disagreeable 
disputes with hi~ family. Lady Grey accused "him of ill behaviour 
towards his father, and of taking part in the House of Commons 
only in those subjec:ts on which they differed, Wh:ilst Ea~l Grey' 
inform·ed his son that his conduct was causing him the deepest 
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regret. ( 38) In a letter of July 30th, Earl Grey spoke of 
the communications he had ha~ from various quarters to show the 
injury which Howick was doing his own character and reputation 
by his opposition to his father's goverhment, and enclosed two 
of them as samples, one from Duncannon, the other from Lord 
E~ington; the latter spoke of 'the deep dissatisfaction and 
disgust which has been excited among our Friends by-Hawick's 
bitter and vexatious opposition to the Slavery Bill.' 
The last· occasion in the passage· of the Bill in which 
Howick played a prominent part was on July 31st. Buxton's 
motion for postponement of half the grant until apprenticeship 
expired was under discussion. Howick, in consequence of his 
father's letter had intended not to take part, but Patrick 
Stewart attacked him personally, quoting an extract from one 
of his speeches in 1831 against immediate emancipation, 'and 
saying that time and place were the most powerful agents in 
changing the opinion· of men and that it was clear mine could 
not· have been changed by the former ••• I expressed in the strongest 
manner my contempt for the insinuation against me, and state~the 
circumstaPces of my resignation. I then went on to argue in 
. . 
avour of :B.uxton' s motion ••• ' ( 39 ) Yet perhaps Patrick 
ewart may ·~e pardoned for his insinuation; for what more 
' .. \ 
-~.....~-.. 
natural ? He~e was a man who had produced a scheme of emancipation 
( 38} Journal, June 20th, 1833· 
(39) ·Journal, August 1st, 1833· 
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which was not accepted by the Government, and who had in addition 
lost his place in a governmental re-shuffle (it was not known that 
he had wished to relin~uish his post when Goderich left, or t~at 
he had decided to resign over the slavery question; in consequence 
of his father's wishes Howick's ioss of office had been made to 
seem part of a general redistribution of places in the Government). 
A disappointed, ambi tior.ts man finds himself and his favourite 
plan discarded by his own father's government; therefore, in 
revenge he leaas·an opposition against his rival; his rival's 
plan and his former colleagues. It was not the truth but it 
sounded plausible, and, even unaware to Howick, there may have 
been an element of personal disappointment which entered into 
his opposition to Stanley's scheme. If Howick had been a tactful 
man, quick to sense political moods - a man of his father's 
stamp- he may have abstained from a course_likely to be mis-
onstrued by friends and foes alike, but tact was never to be 
is strong point, nor was sensitivity to the feelings of the 
Commons. In hls later political career there are many 
of his lack of political sense. Howick was a man of 
xed principles, who once he became persuaded of the soundness 
a particular scheme, clung to it with dogged determination; 
ce h~- was convinced that on the question of slavery he was 
and Stanley wrong, and that it was his duty to show this 
Commons, even at the risk of personal unpopularity. 
Writing in 1884 a memorandum on the slavery question for 
go. 
the benefit of a friend, Howick, then third Earl Grey and of very 
n• 
advanced years, had in one sense altered.his views on the whole 
.1\ . 
question. He pointed out the fact that apprenticeship had been 
a dismal failure, and that the Colonial Legislatures had themselves 
recognized this by ending it a little more than four years after 
it came into operation. Concluding on a typical note, he 
pointed to the disappointing condition of the negroes at present 
( 1884), and concluded roundly that they would have advanced 
greatly in the scale of civilization, 'if even ordinary judgment 
-had been displayed in the mode of effecting a necessary change 
in the state of society ••• ' 
Thus ended Hawick's first connection with· the Colonial 
Office and a very useful apprenticeship it had been. ·He had 
been more fortunate than most Paiiamentary Under-Secretaries 
in that in most cases he had behaved as if Secretary of State 
himself, and had seen some of his own ideas become official 
Government policy. As a result of these years he never lost his 
interest in Colonial affairs; indeed he made them his speciality, 
and even in the years when he held another office, he continued 
to take an active part in colonial measures, and in deciding or 
I attempting to decide the policy of the Colonial Office. 
These years had shown some of Howick's strong points and 
lso some of his foibles. They had revealed him as an energetic 
, dministrator, as a man capable of taking decisive action when 
equired, and with a liberal and open mind towards colonial 
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I 
;Maria certainly did not wish to see her husband at the G::Olonial 
\Office:-
\ "I think H. would fag himself' to death and Canada is in 
such a bad state that the anxiety would be very great." 
Indeed her sentiments went further than this:-
i "I am very unhappy at the necessity there seems to be of' 
Henrys embarking with this mosu crazy Government 
I 
members 
- many of' whose 
differ from him most widely in their principles and 
I 
rant of' principle and when Ld. G. had settled not to have any 
part in it the dearest wish of' my heart was that Henry should I .. -
have not.t'e. ·either. 11 ( 3) I . . 
ren Charles Wood mentioned to Howick Earl Grey's feeling with 
r~gard to the Cblonial Office, Howick 1 s immediate reaction was that 
it was _too important a post to go to one 'who had served such a· 
brief apprenticeship in office, and he repeated this to Lady ~ey:-
l "I said that the place in itself would be a most delightful ne but that I should.not like to go into a Government, knowing 
I 
rhat many of_my colleag~es were justly dissatisfied at my being 
tlaced too hi~h~-" ( 4) 
However·, Lord Melbourne was not the sort of person to be I --~ . 
~ictated to, even by Lord Grey, and the Colonial Office·went to I . 
Clharles Grant, J,ater Lord GlenelJ, like Melbourne a former 
danningite. A very unfortunate choice this, as events were to prove. 
(31 Journal, April 16th and 17th, 1835. 
(4) Journal, April 11th, 1835· 
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0n April 18th, Hawick was sworn in as Secretary at War 
with a seat in the Cabinet; this post he retained till August 
1839. It was certainly, so far as Hawick was concerned, not 
destined to be a period of calm, and many were the times when 
he came to the brink of resignation. He was one individual of 
strong opinions and a desire for decisive action among a far 
from heterogeDeous·group of colleagues, often of more timid-
I 
!or more politic.- views, and ranging through every shade of opinion 
I 
iloosely classifed as 'liberal~. . 
I · Lord Melbourne was diametrically t·P.e opposite of Hawick 
~n ·character. He was at his best in the world of society, where 
I 
. . 
he was in great demand, amusing the company with the latest 
cynical utterance. Hawick certainly never shone in society; he, 
having no inexhaustible fund of 'bon mots' was never in great 
demand. However, finely tempered cynicism and 'bon mots' do 
not necessarily make a Prime Minister, though they may help 
I 
towards it. Lord Melbourne cannot be acc:laimed for the way he 
~ustained the latter role; undoubtedly he had great talents -I . 
when he cared to exercise them - but with these went a constitut-
1 ional disposition to procrastinate, to hold by the adage, 'leave 
lell al.one', and he seldom could bring himself to give a lead 
Jo his colleagues in the cabinet, or when necessary impose his 
Jutherity over them. Such a man was out of his element as 
~eader of a 'liberal' ministry, for he was profound~y sceptical 
Jf anything that scented .of innovation, and could never be br.ought 
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\to advocate anything ;.novel or anything to meet a situation which 
!might arise in the future as opposed to the present.· 
'l!he most talenteQ.member of the·Administration was Lord 
John Russell, Home Secretary and.leader in the Commons. With 
him Howick was usually on very friendly terms, though their 
relationship became strained at times,·particularly in the later 
rears of the ministry. Russell wa~ a man Howick could admire.; 
he was an industrious politician and decisiveness was part of I . . 
lis character. Russell, however, did not fit well into a team, 
rhich is essentially what a.Cabinet should be. When possessea 
of an idea he believed sound, he was apt to announce it to the I -~ . . 
world committing his colleagues even without preliminary I , 
discuss:ion. 
L,ord Palmerston was another prominent member of the 
Cabinet. He carried out the foreign policy of the country in 
Jis o~ cheerful way and according to his own views; he pursued 
Jhis course whatever the doubts and dislikes of his colleagues. 
I M!elbourne' s reluctance to control. his colleagues was ideal from 
P~lmerston's point ~f view. ~onservatives like Lansdowne, to 
pl
1
eople of a more radical temperament, like John CaJIJI Hobhouse, 
_made up the rest of the Ministry. 
Howick himself was not the ideal person for working withl. 
a team .of about a dozen colleagues. He was not apt t.o be 
charitable when it came to other men 1 s failings; he could not -
.. 
s ffer irresolution, procrastination or timorousness gladly. 
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Upon opinions on which he held strong personal views he became 
readily exasperated when those whom he believed to be comparatively 
ignorant of the matter in hand disagreed with him. He was in 
love with bold and imaginative political decisions; for instance 
'when the House of Lords proved· such a graveyard of ·liberal 
i 
measures, whereas most of the Whigs were resolved to abide by 
situation, fearing any attempt to alter the 'status quo', 
d seeing only evils in any attempt to remedy the intolerable 
osition, Howick immediately accepted a reform of the House of 
I 
the only possible so].ution, and wrote a pamphlet on the 
outlining his own scheme of reform. (S) He was at his 
when given a multitude of tasks to set his hand to; 
22nd, 1835, we find him undertaking to write a paper.-
n Corporations, to 'draw up something' on the Irish Church, and 
o look into a particular aspect of the Canadian problem. Where 
e decided there was need for reform in the Government machinery 
e pressed for it vehemently; not only was there the long 
truggle for the overhaul of his own office, but he pressed for 
jhanges in the name of efficiency elsewhere. Trespassing beyondl. he bohds of his own Department into those of another, he A 
~ersistently urged, and eventually secured, the dismissal of 
Hay from the Colonial Office; such actions, plus the pertinacity 
I ~ ~ith which he adhered to his opinions inside aftd Cabinet and 
+tside, would not tend to endear him to his less energetic 
c:olleagues. Well might h!ts colleagues have groaned if they 
I 
(15) Journal, Aug. 18th, 25th, 29th. Sept. 4th. Oct. lst, .1835. 
· January 3rd, 1836. 
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~ould have-seen the first impressions of his ovm office and his 
first Cabinet as expressed in a letter to his father:-
! 
"I -have just returned from our first cabinet and I must 
confess I am not much impressed with the manner_ of conducting; 
our business which I do not think calculated to promote our doing I , - -
things either quickly or w~l-~, perhaps it may be better: hereafter 
! 
but there seemed to me a strange want of method in our proceedings, 
re sat flor about two hours without coming to any very definite 
~onclusions. I I came here (the War Office) today for the lst time and 
eceived from Sullivan an account of the general nature of' the 
qsiness, which from what I can make out must be of the dryest 
d most uninteresting kind, so much of it however is mere matter 
f'.routine that there will be no ocqasion for my inter~ering with 
J.t myself', and I shall have a good deal of' disposable time for 
I · < 6) the general business of' the House of C;ommons." 
I How ominous in the light of events was that last remark ! The 
I 
years of Russell's first Ministry when Grey, as he then was, was 
very busy with C'olonial problems, was a far happier and calmer 
I 
period of office for himself', and perhaps also for his colleagues. 
Further experience of Cabinets and his fellow Ministers 
did nothing but strengthen his first opinions, and as the years 
I p;assed, ·entries like the following, became ever more frequent 
i~:..:t-he Journal he and Maria wrote:-
_,#-
"Henry came home low tot: a degree at the indolence and 
(6) Howick to Earl Grey, April 20th, 1835· · 
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incompetency of some of his colleagues." (7) 
Perhaps the best way of giving a picture of the weakness 
Melbourne Ministry (and of throwing light upon Hawick's 
osition within it, and alsa upon his own character), will be to 
extracts from letters to Earl Grey and from 
ntries in the Journal which illustrate these points. It must 
e emphasized, however, that there were periods when cordial 
armon;r reigned in the C!Iabinet. 
on January 6th, 1836, writing upon the approaching meeting 
of Parliament, to his father, Hawick remarked:-
11 there is a degree of apathy in those with whom I am 
acting and a want of anything like energy and activity in all 
I . 
the departments of the G:overnment which it is inexpressibly 
Jailing to me to find myself utterly powerless to overcome. 
I Both Ld. Melbourne and Ld. Glenelf have received very kindly 
I· 
.different communications which I have made to them, but nothing 
I 
~s done in consequence, and it seems to me that we are sitting 
Jtill with our hands before us in a position in which nothing 
I 
~ut the grea-test activity could enable us to maintain ourselves. 
N[effrly as the time for the commencement of the session is now 
~~preaching our various measures are not in a state of any greater 
I ~orwardness than they were a month ago, and of these not relating 
to Parliamentary business, and which ought to be compleded in this 
(7) Journal, July 8th, 1835· 
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I 
interval of' comparative leis.ure none in spite of' my repeated' 
remonstrances appear to mue ··the slightest progress. 11 
In the Journal for August 8th, 1836, is the f'ollowing:-
"I am much disgusted by the low cowardice and love of' 
place which during the discussion were very apparent in some 
individuals, altogether the argument was conducted in a manner 
which evinced very strikingly how totally unequal to the 
situation in which they are placed most of' the members of' this 
Government are, I never was more impressed with the conviction 
that 1 they are men of' a very common place description, and none 
"'""C:ft ~C) 
so as Hobhouse. 11 
1\. 
In November of' tha·t same year, Howick complained to his 
father that:-
-
"GlenelJ notwithstanding the state of' Canada is still 
in Inverness ••• Palmerston on the contrary is I think as much too 
busy as Gle·ne11 is too inactive ••• he seems de-termined not to 
. 
give up his system of' interfering which I am more and more 
convinced was wrong from the very beginning, and though some 
others in the Cabinet are of the same opinion no one seems 
inclined to object to his going on as he pleases." (8) 
Howick's feelings were not improved in the following year. 
Apart fr.om. the unsatisfactory state of the Canadian question, 
the efficiency of the Government certainly did not improve, and 
(8) Howick to Earl Grey, Novepmber 19th, 1836. 
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in February, Maria could note that Henry was low in spirits, 
being convinced that the Gbvernment would break up "from a want 
""""' of con:didence and cordiality among the Members and f.(IJif' the want 
of an efficient Head ••• the Government goes on as a departmental 
one. 11 
( 9) 
By November, 1838, there were reports in the .. papers of a 
partial change in the administration being imminent. Howick 
was desirous of seeing the Ministry strengthened, for to continue 
their present course, as he informed his father, would mean 
that they could not long survive the opening of the session~, 
'indeed I feel it. to be &o little desirable that we should do so, 
that I am quite resolved to make no further concessions of 
opinion for the purpose of avoiding the danger of breaking up the 
administration.' At the same time he was dissatisfied with his 
personal position within the G·overnment. ( 10) Among the 
impending changes it seemed certain that at last Glene11 would 
leave the Colonial Office, a step which Howick had long advocated. 
Though his post was coveted by Howick his objections to GlenelJ 
had not been personal ones, but had been based on grounds of 
policy; nevertheless he was.determined that no one was to be 
promoted over his head in the Commons to this position •. Ever 
(9) Journal, February 9th, 1837• 
(10) Howick to Earl Grey, November lOth, 1838. 
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since ~he disputes over Canada in 1836 Howick had become-more and 
more dissatisfied, and whether unconsciously or not, seems to 
have been looking for an excuse to resign with honour from the 
Ministry; perhaps t~~~ question of the Colonial Office would 
proyide it. He informed his father:-
"I should have no: objection to being called up to the 
House of Lords if it were proposed to me for the purpose of taking 
the Colonial Office~ but I am quite c~rtain Melbourne will never 
offer this to me, we~differ much too widely in our notions of how 
the business of the office should be carried on, he is entirely 
for a policy of-inaction and-remaining on the defensive while 
I am no less decidely in favour of one of a very opposite 
character. Should GlenelS retire •••• if it should be determined 
to replace him- by Normanby considering the high situation he now 
occ:upies and that he is already in the House of Lords I should 
have no right to object to the arrangement much as I should 
dislike it." (ll) 
The early part of 1839 as well as seeing the retirement of 
-4~·-· .. . . . . 
Glenely saw the resignation of the Government on West ·Indian 
matters, and the incident of the 'Bedchamber Question' which 
obliged them to re-assume their offices. Howick grew increasingly 
dissatisfied with his position - frequently an isolated one ":"' . 
within. the ~overnment, and more particularly within the Cabinet, 
·and continued .to be disgusted with the actions of his colleagues. 
( 11) Howick to Earl G!'ey, November lOth,. 1838. 
A decision of the Cabinet in February, 1839, astounded 
him. A Captain Berkeley, one of the Lords of the Admiralty, 
had written a letter criticizing the Admiralty; Hawick believed 
that he ought to be promptly dismissed, but a majority of the 
Cabinet we.re in favour of acc:epting an apology. "This was 
because", wrote Howick, "Lord Segrave commands 3 or 4 votes· in 
the H. of Commons and the motive which seems to influence too 
many of those with whom I am acting is that of doing nothing 
which they think can offend any powerful party or individual. 
'lfue consequence of course is that all our resolutions are marked 
with the impress of feebleness and timidity and that through our 
desire not to offend we shall view the great contempt of all. 
This is to me perfectly intolerabl~_~pd I have great difficulty 
in restraining myself from expressing my feelings in a manner 
f4o 
which would of course· give i~eparable offence, ••• This state 
of things makes it highly desirable that I should not continue 
in the C.'abinet, but at the same time if I am to continue in 
public life at all I ought not to quarrel with the only party 
with which it will ever be possible for me to act." (l2) So 
disgruntled was he that at the time he thought of applying for 
the Governorship of Canada; if Melbourne refused this application, 
an excuse would be provided for resigning, on ~he ground that 
the Prime Minister had no confidence in him and the course of 
(12) Hawick to Earl Grey, February 14th, 1839. 
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policy he advocated. His father, however, objected strongly 
to' such an idea. 
Resignation was the remedy to which Howick turned wi.th 
increasing frequency. He was a man with an exacting sense of 
duty, and believed in a strict upholding of·a·man's principles; 
thus his frequent threats to resign were not solely dictatea 
-r- -by a personal need to escape from an embarassing situation. The 
" 
trouble was that no ~overnment could be carried on if every 
member of a Cabinet was so pertinacious in adhering to his own 
opinions. This. fault of Howick's was realized by Maria, when, 
writing about one of' her husband's frequent disputes with the 
Treasury, she stated:-
" ••• in point of fact he (Howick) seems to be right; but 
I doubt whether any GJovernment could be carried on if all the 
members were so bent upon having their own way~" ·· ( l3) 
One other example can be given to show how uncomfortable 
and isolated Howick's position often was. This was over the 
question of' giving the franchise to ten pound householders in 
the counties, a move which Russell favoured, but which Howick 
opposed, holding his father's view as to the finality of the 
1832 Reform Bill. In the summer of' 1839, Sir H. Fleetwood was 
intending to make a motion on this very question, and if the 
Government announced their favourable reception of' the idea, 
(13) Journal, January 14th, 1836. 
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Howick was determined to resign.. Russell informed Howick 
tha~·at a Cabinet to which the latter had arriv~d late, it had 
been decided that the motion was to be· resisted· for the present, 
but that the Government were to say that they would consider 
the· matter, and that it was· in conformity with the spirit of 
the Reform Bill. Howick thereupon announced his intention of 
expressing his dissent from this view; Russell protested . 
against being answered from the Treasury Bench, and Howick 
agreed to keep silent, though if he should disapprove of 
Russell's ·speech he would resign the following day. Mar.ia' s 
comment on this was: 'So there we are almost £Y1 again.' 
Howick, however, concluded that this was an unsatisfactory 
arrangement, and begged that he might be able to speak, as he 
had originally proposed. Russell in return reminded him of 
Canning's op·inions on the duties that members owed to their 
leader. As it proved, Howick was quite satisfied with Russell's 
speech - but only because Russell had al.:tered the agreed gist 
of·it to satisfy his colleague. Maria noted the sequel:-
"Mr. Thomson and Sir J. Hobhouse were. very angry and I 
do not wonder for what Lord John said was the very reverse of 
what had been decided in the Cabinet~ They both. said they 
should certainly resign. " 
and the following d.B.y:-
"T.here was a Cabinet and the indignant members were 
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very wrot·h with Henry ••• However there were no resignations." 
In August, 1839, Howick did resign; though he had many 
reasons on public and personal grounds, it is impossible to 
believe that he had not more or less been seeking for an 
opportunity to retire from the Government since 1836, the year 
which saw the rejection of his views on Canada; though he was 
in one way sorry to leave office, he must have had at the same 
(14) 
time a feeling of relief that at last the frustrations, the 
squabbles were over, and that he was no longer going to share 
responsibility for measures of which in reality he disapproved, 
or to work with colleagues with many of whose views he was out 
of sympathy. The ~wo great measures he had set his heart on, 
conciliating Canada and reorganizing thE;' whole system of Army 
administration, had both been frustrated. 
B. The War Office. 
1. The question of administrative reorganization. 
Howick reaction to h~s new office was; as we have seen 
initially unfavourable. 'He is.not much charmed at the prospect 
of the business he has tp do and bored with signing his name 
about 500 times', so wrote Maria, and she .added three days later:-
"Henry is a good deal dis gusted with the business in his 
(14) Journal, May 31st, June 1st-5th, 1839· Howick to 
Russell June 2nd. Russell to Howick, June 4th. 
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office. He says it is .all details and of the most disagree.able 
nature - refusing pens.ions to widows and wounded men and signing 
one's name thousands of times." ( l5) 
On December, 15, 1835, Hawick informed his father that he 
intended to delay taking any definite measures for th,e reorgan-
ization of the Army, ·which was necessary, during the present 
c. 
session, 'in the meantime the chanJes are that I may b' some 
means or other get out of this office which I hate more. and more, 
and for Which I daily feel myself more unfit, the sort of 
business which is to be done here is what I do not at all 
understand and for which I am entirely unqualifie4 by all my 
habits .and tastes,' 
When it became obvious, however, that he was destined not to 
take an early departure :from his new office, Howiclt accepted 
the fact and with his cus~tomary industry and vigour attempted 
a more logical system of administ~ation of the Army; in this, 
as in so many of the important tasks which he set himself (such 
as his plan for the abolition of slavery) he failed, but his 
years at the War Office were not entirely frustrated ones, for 
he was responsible for-initiating a series of reforms to improve 
the health, self-respect and accommodation of the troops, which, 
as Fortescue says, "entitle him to the perpetual honour and 
respect of the Army~" ( 16) 
( 15) 
( 16) 
Journal, April 21st, April 24th, 1835· 
'A History of the British Army'.Fo~tescue 1923. 
Vol. XI. PP• 448-60. 
Nothing· in the whole system of administration in the 
early nineteenth century was less logical or more needlessly 
complicated than the methods in vogue for administering the 
affairs of the Army. Benthamite logic might succeed in 
instilling order into the legal system of the country, might 
introduce a reasoned if not reasonable Poor Law, but the 
affairs of· the Army were a closed book to reformers of adminis-
trative practices. The Sovereign was still regarded as having 
a special interest and influence in Army affairs, and both 
Crown and Horse Guards. (inhabited always by the mosit conservative 
I 
of conservatives) maintained a firm front against any attempt 
at innovation or reorganization. The result was that during 
the long years when we were so fortunate as not to become 
embroiled with one of the major European Powers, the·Army lived 
on its Waterloo reputation; then carne the Crimean War and the 
utter inadequacy of the whole system was exposed. Fortunately 
the Russian Army was in no better a state than that of the 
invaders. After the disasters of the Crimean War some of the· 
necessary reforms in the military machine were made, the task 
of the statesmen responsible for these being made easier by the 
loss of prestige suffered by the military clientele at the Horse 
Guards. The main theme in Howick's administration of Army 
affairs was his attempt to carry some such reform as ultimately 
became necessary. 
A multitude of authorities had a share in administering 
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the Army during the first half of the nineteenth century. The 
Secretary of War and the aolonies was responsible for determining 
the size of the establishll1ent, and theoretically for the ~onduct 
of operations in War; at the Horse G~ards was the Commander-in-
Chief, responsible for discipline; the Treasury had a voice in 
.. 
A:!'rrry affairs, at least in their financial· aspect, and under 
the Treasury was a Commissfl:['iat Bepartment, responsible for the 
provisioning of the troops. An Ordnance Board was in charge 
of munitions, and the Home Office was responsible for the use 
of the·military to restore·order in Great Britain itself, and 
for the organ~zati'on of ~he mili'tia apd ye.omanry. Finally there 
was the Secretary a~ War, mainly, though very vaguely, responsible 
for finance, and for presenting the A:rrny Estimates to the· House 
of Commons. 
The Secretary at War superintended the administration of 
the ordinary expenditure of the_ Army· und~r warrants approved by 
the Treasury, the EiUJ?reme financial authori-ty~ . The sanction 
.of the Treasury had to be. obtained before any new regulation as 
'to matters of expenditure was established, and ·before any 
expense, not covered by Regulations approved by the Treasury, was 
incurred; no existing Regulation could be rescinded or altered' 
by the Secretary at War without Treasury approval. When once 
a Regulation was estab~ished~ the Secretary at War decided 
upon its application to particular circumst~ces and individual 
cases. All the s .. ums vpted for Army Services upon the Estimates 
(the Ordinaries) and their application was determined by such 
Standing Regulations interpreted and applied by the Secretary at 
War. In the sphere of Army Extraordinaries - special 
allowances not provided for by any Stan~ng Regulations, but 
which during the course of a year might be granted to 
individuals or bodies of men - the Secretary at War's powers 
were even more circumscribed; the Treasury decided upon the 
amount of Extraordinary expenditure, consulting as it thought 
fit with the Secretary at War, the Ordnance Board, and other 
authorities; the Secretary at War, with his knowledge, was 
obviously the best adviser upon this matter of Army Extra-
ordinaries, but not all applications on pecuniary matters were 
made to him, so that he could transmit them with hi-s advice to 
the Treasury. Some applications went directly to the Treasury, 
and though that authority might find it expedient to consult 
the Secretary at War on such matters, there was no obligation 
to do so. (l7) 
There were those who disliked the idea of Army adminis-
tration being in the hands of ten different departments of' 
which the main ones have been already mentioned, and in 1833 
a Commission of Enquiry under the presidency of' the Duke of 
Richmond was appointed to investigate the whole business. This 
( 17) Memo_ by Palmerston, January 22nd-, 1839· 
Howick-Melbourne correspondence.1 
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c;·ommission prepared a draft report, but before this could be 
made more definite and presented to·Parliament, the Duke of 
Richmond left the Government. In the winter of 1835 the 
Melbourne Government decided to reconstitute this Commission; 
after the Buke of Richmond had declined, the position of head 
of this Commission was offered to Howick, who, with many mis-
gi vings, accepted. Like its predecessor, the ai·m.:of' this 
C:ommission was to consider the question of the possibility of 
consolidating the departments connected with the civil affairs 
of the Army. Howick was not, rightly as it appeared, very 
confident of a successful outcome; writing to his father in 
December, 1835, he stated:-
"I totally despair of doing ariy good it seems·· to me 
quite obvious that no change would be the slightest use that 
did not take away the independent authority of the Commander 
in Chief and bring the Army as much under the control of the 
Executive Government as the Navy is, but to this I suppose the 
King could never be brought to agree, and even if he could there 
would be many difficulties in the way of it ••• " ( 18) 
The Commission duly heard all the evidence, considered 
the Duke of Richmond's draft Report, and entrusted the writing 
of their own to Howick, who was now determined to make a. 'great, 
struggle' for 'putting the whole thing upon quite a new footing.' 
(18) Howick to Earl Grey, December 15th, 1835• 
In the autumn mf 1836, whilst on holiday at Ryde, Howick 
busied himself with reading over all the evidence placed before 
the Commission, then began t·o write the draft of a Report. This, 
as he reported to his father, he found a hard job, and to his 
great mortification, when presented, this initial draft was 
rejected by his colleagues on the Commission. 
The rejected ~eport proposed a Military Board to perform 
all the duties entrusted to the Secretary at War, the Master 
General of the Ordnance (supreme over artillery and engineers), 
the Board of Ordnance, and the Commissariat branch of the 
Treasury, placing both the civil and military duties of the 
Ordnance under its control~ This Board was to consist of a 
chief and four subordinates, with a Secretary and permanent 
Assistant Secretary. Its Chief Commissioner was to be a 
Cabinet Minister, and preferably not a military officer. Each 
member of the Board was to be charged with the superintendence 
of a particular branch of business, but every act was to be 
done in the name and under the authority of the Board, all 
being responsible. 
~his proposal was rejected because some members of the 
Commission objected to placing such a variety of business under 
a Board, which they contended was the worst possible instrument 
for the transaction of business; other objections included 
one that it would not be right to insist upon uniting the civil 
and military authority of the Artillery and Engineers without 
124. 
applying the same principle to the rest of the Army, that this 
. . 
would involve the position of the Commander-in-Chief, and render 
any attempt to carry such a revolutionary measure impracticable,. 
whilst another was an objection to placing the military business 
of the Ordnance under a Board at the head of Which would be a 
civilian. (l9) 
Thereupon Howick undertook to draw up another draft of a 
proposed Report, taking into account these objections from 
his colleagues. It was a difficult task, but towards the end 
of January, 1837, it was in a finished state, and was this time 
adopted by the remainder of the Commission. 
This second version concentrated upon the anomalies 
connected with Howick's own office, the Secretaryship at War, 
and the division of authority between that and the Colonial 
Office. Though the Secretary at War had much to do with 
presenting Army affairs before the House of Commons, not only 
were his powers in financial matters severely limited, but his 
knowledge of other aspects of Army affairs was so likewise, 
especially if he were out of the Cabinet. All military business 
was supposed to go to the Colonial Office. Howick contended 
that colonial problems were alone sufficient fully to occupy 
the attention of that department. Therefore he proposed that 
all military business, at present assigned to the Colonial Office 
should be transferred to his own; under the proposed new 
(19) Rejected Praft of Report of Commissioners on 
Military Departments, War Office Papers. 
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arrangemen_t the Secretary at War would signify to the C:ommander-
in-C;hief' the King's pleasure on the establishment instead of' the 
Colonial Secretary, would sign the military commissions and 
would be the organ for all communications between the 
Government and the C.'ommander-in-Chief. This would entail 
changing the Secretary at War's Commission, and make it necessary 
that the Secretaryship at War.be in future thought of' as a 
permanent Cabinet post. At present, according to Hawick, the 
largest part of' the civil business connected with the Army was 
transacted by the Ordnance Board; in t~e proposed change, this 
would come under the authority of the Secretary at War, the 
position of the Master-Ge~eral of the Ordnance remaining unchanged. 
The _advantages of these changes would mean greater efficiency 
in administrat-ion, the uniting of' all military expenses in one 
estimate, the reduction in the number of parliamentary officers 
at present employed by the various military .departments, and 
the fact that there would be greater uniformity of practice, 
for whereas now the claims of artillery officers for command, 
money allowances, lodgings and the like, were decided upon 
separately by the Board of' Ordnance, under the new arrangement 
they would be united-with precisely similar business conducted 
by the War Office. ( 20) 
llifficulties were not long in manifesting themselves. On 
February 18th, William IV despatched a letter to Lord Melbourne 
(20) Paper enclosed with the rejected Draft of Report, 
War Office Papers. 
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in consequence of' a report in the newspapers tha~ Howi:ck had 
informed Hume in the Commons that the Report of the Military 
Commission would soon be in the hands of' members. It was a 
strong complaint on the Secretary at War's conduct, "who has 
abstained" said the King, 11 f'rom making the slightest communication 
upon a question in which he cannot be ignorant that the King . 
takes the deepest interest, and may be supposed to hold opinions 
which may not accord with those entertained by himself'". The 
letter announced His Majesty's strong objections "to Propositions 
-
of the-nature and character of' which he appears studiously to 
be kept in ignorance, until they became questions of' public 
notoriety, being brought under discussion and made the objects 
of Resolutions of the H. of' Cbmmons to which His Sanction will 
then be called for as a matter of' course, however objectionable 
they may appear to Him in principle ~d effect. His Majesty 
is not ignorant ••• of' the urgency of' Mr. Hume and others for 
what they call a Reform of' the Military Establishments which 
they wish to destroy, with everything that can give Power and 
Consistency to the Crown and to the Government, and may secure 
the Country and the Constitution against their nefarious and 
destructive designs." Howick hastened to assure William IV 
that no disrespect had been intended, that when the Report was 
finally adopted by all the c:ommission, it would be laid be6EJre 
His Majesty, and that there was no intention of' t~king any action 
upon the recommendations therein until the King had been able 
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to study it. The King announced himself satisfied with Lord 
Howick's explanations, but in his second letter lay phrases 
which rendered it all too likely what would be his reception 
of the Report when presente.d to him, ptwases concerning 'His 
Prerogative', and the necessity of 'resisting the Pressure 
from without and the attempt to encroach upon the just and 
constitutional power and rights of the Crown.' ( 21) 
~he Report having been accepted by the Commission, the 
King received on February 27th a printed copy from Lord John 
Russell. On March 6th, William. IV despatched to Lord Melbourne 
a further letter of remonstrance, complaining that Howick and 
Russell wished the Report to be presented to the House of 
Commons at the same time as the Army Estimates, and that this 
did not leave him with enough time for consideration of the 
question. The King also objected violently to the whole 
tenor of the Report, and pointed out that the evidence of the 
foremost military authorities when given to the Commission had 
been at variance to the changes proposed. The King himself 
agreed with the views of his off~cers. The evidence against 
change he thought to be so conclusive "as to convince all un-
prejudiced and impartial persons of the danger and mischief 
which may arise to the C:ountry to the Public Ser"tice and to the 
efficiency of its various branches from the adoption of 
(21) William TW to Melbourne, February 18th and 21st, 1837; 
Howick to Melbourne, February 19th. 
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Projects produced by Theoretical Speculations and fancy for 
innovation and experiment when opposed to the results of 
experience and the safe, useful, and efficient working of a 
system which is in operatiGm. 11 The King was opposed to · 
increasing the powers of the Secretary at War, and 11 creating 
a new Principal Department in the State, partly on the ruins of 
others and partly from the exclusion or diminution of the 
Authority, the Influence and the Patronage of those which are 
suffered to continue in existence but shorn of some of their 
attributes." He reminded his Go:vernment t~t the post of 
Secretary at War was mei'ely an executive ·orie, and that this 
being so Howick had no I'ight; to complain that the Seci'etai'y at 
War had been little consulted in ·militai'y mattei's. The King 
hoped "that Viscount Melboui'ne will upon fui'thei' consideration 
concur with him in the view he takes of the impropi'iety, the 
inexpediency and the impolicy of the proposed arrangement; and 
of its objectionable character with reference to the general 
interests of the State and the constitution of the Government." 
"Independently of changes," he continued, "in the duties 
of great publick departments and reduction of theii' power and 
authority ••• the King cannot but point out to Viscount Melbourne 
the objection to the enormous accumulation of Patronage and 
influence in the hands of ~ Minister holding an Office which 
had not hitherto given a seat in the Cabinet, a proportion of 
that Pati'onage being taken from the Treasury which has already 
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lost a large Portion by the Reform of other Departments and 
iD which it is nevertheless of the utmost importance to the 
well being and maintenance of the supreme authority of the 
Government and the Crown that this great mass of Patronage 
should be concentrated." 
T.he King did not believe that Howick wanted for per.sonal 
reasons 'an inordinate desire of Patronage or a wish to grasp 
at power;' no minister in the face of the uncertainty of 
official tenure in Britain could desire such an object. He 
concluded by giving a grudging consent to the Report being laid 
before Parliament, but warned Melbourne that he did not and 
would not approve of the changes recommended by it. 
The whole subject seemed now to have reached a deadlock. 
On the one hand the Government would be pressed by a substantial 
section of the House of Commons, especially among its ovm 
supporters, to do something to carry out the recommendations 
of the Report; on the other hand any attempt to do so would 
be opposed by the King and Horse Guards, and of the two the 
latter seemed to provide the most formidable obstacle. The 
King had already asserted his authority in the sphere of 
Canadian policy, and had fallen foul of his Government on other 
matters. Had he not succeeded in dismissing the first Melbourne 
Administration and passing it off as part of his legitimate 
prerogative ? What was to prevent him from doing so again ? 
Gt ven Melbourne's temperament, which was one for avoiding not 
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battling with difficulties, it seemed as though the cause of 
Army r-eform would be postponed indefinitely. Then on June 20th, 
1837, the King died, and was succeeded by the young Queen Victoria. 
If Melbourne was adept at avoiding difficulties, Howick 
had so high a conception of honour and duty that if he conceived 
that he had promised to do a certain thing, great was his 
determination to see that he fulfilled his promise. On this 
question of Army administration he conceived himself to be so 
pledged, both by a promise in the Commons and by his signature 
of the Report. The question was how could he persuade his 
colleagues to take the necessary steps in the matter. The 
beginning of a new reign, plus the fact that a multitude of 
other business awaited the attention o:f G'o~ernment and Commons, 
seemed to make it an unfavourable time for a.complicated bill 
carrying out the recommendations of the Repo~t to be brought 
forward, especially ~s its contents would arouse vehement 
opposition in certain quarters. 
Howick beli-eved that he had the answer to this problem 
when he wrote to Lord John Russell on July 6th. After observing 
that he would never move the Army Estimates again should no 
steps be taken to implement the Report, Howick then detailed the 
great obstacles to bringing forward a bill at the present time. 
Therefore, as much of the Report as could be effected without 
the authority of Parliament seemed the obvious course to take. 
This could be carried out by a Minute in Council, of which he 
enclosed a draft~1 
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The aim of this Minute was to give to the office of 
Secretary at War those powers in Army affairs then residing at· 
the Colonial Office, or most of them. The Secretary at War 
was in future to signify to the Commander in qhief the Royal 
Pleasure on the establishment of the Army, to communicate with 
the Master General and Board of Ordnance on the questions of 
arms and stores, and to countersign military commissions. 
Questions concerning the employment or movement of troops when 
decided by the Secretaries of State should be addressed to the 
·;Secr·etary at War, and be by him communicated to the Commander 
in Chief; in cases of urgency this need not be the case, but 
the Secretary at War was still to be informed as soon as possible 
... 
of orders set on such an occasion. 
1\ 
The Commander in Chief was 
to communicate directly with the Sovereign as before. Finally, 
a new Commission was to be prepared for the Secretary at War 
on account of these proposed changes. 
Russell, like Howick, was eager to carry out .a reorgan-
ization of those departments of State concerned with Army affairs, 
though he differed from Howick as to the best way of accomplishing 
this, and though he was at the same time preoccupied with the 
important business of the Home Office. The greatest obstacle 
was Melbourne; Russell informed Howick in conversation on July 
9th, that Melboul~e did not favour meddling in Army matters for 
the present. Russell's impression was that Melbourne feared 
-being accused of making the young Queen do something which he 
, 
( 22) had not dared to propose to the late King. 
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On July 15th, Howick wrote to Melbourne asking, as time 
was short, dissolution and elections being near, for immediate 
action to be taken on the proposed Minute of which Melbourne 
had already received a copy. The time chosen though in some 
respects inconvenient had one advantage in its favour; as it 
was a time for renewing all appointments, it was perfectly 
natural that the Commission of the Secretary at War should be 
altered to bring it more into line with the recommendations of 
the Report. Howick also endeavoured to combat Melbourne's 
supposed objection to the scheme:-
"To those who might reproach us for doing under the young 
Queen what we should not have attempted to propose to the late 
King we should have an answer that seems to me conclusive. We 
·had brought forward the plan during the life of the late King 
and it was then publicly announced in the House of Commons 
that we meant to act upon it. This being the case when the 
Secretary at War·must have a new Commission it would be obviously 
inexpedient that it should be in the form objected to in the 
report, and the alteration of the form of the Commission 
naturally carries with it the rest of the arrangement." The 
reply was discouraging; Melboljrne:· spoke of the need for 
avoiding 'haste or prec.ipi tat ion' , and thought it best to wait and 
(22) · Journal, July 9th, 1837. 
, 
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see what sort of a House of C.'ommons resulted from the elections 
before taking any decisive steps. ( 23) 
So Howick waited until the beginning of the following session 
of Parliament before again raising the question. In November, 
he sent Russell a modification of the proposed Minute, as a 
result of some suggestions made by Palmerston, plus the ~ddition 
of measures relating to the Ordnance. By the articles of this, 
the charge for maintaining the Royal Corps of Artillery and 
Engin~ers was to be henceforth united with the Army Estimates 
for the rest of the Land Forces; in future the Ordnanc~ 
Estimates w~re only to include charges relating to the repair 
and construction of military works and barracks, the supply of 
arms and munitions, and clothing, plus charges hitherto found 
in the Commissariat Estimates. The rest of the Minute was 
identical with its predecessor, except that the Master-General 
. ;·· 
of the Ordnance was bracketed with the Commander in Chief, 
whenever the latter had b~en_mentioned in the previous Minrite~ 24) 
This attempt at a fuller measure of reorganization encounter-
ed opposition from Sir Hussey Vivian, the military chief of the 
Ordnance. A pen and ink war now insued between him and Howick, 
until Russell was obliged to advise Howick to abandon,those 
heads of the Minute concerning the Ordnance, andSlbmit the rest -
now identical with the one suggested in July - to Lord Melbourne. 
(23) Melbourne to Howick, July 15th, 1837. 
(24) Howick to Russell, November 15th, 1837• 
In a conversation with Lord Melbourne on this very topic, 
the Prime Minister had mentioned how important it would be ir 
a change were to be carried out to produce evidence of the mis-
management Howick asserted to be taking place under the present 
system. As a result of this remark, Howick submitted in 
December, 1837, an overwhelming indictment or the way in which 
Army matters were administered. Along with a letter to Melbourne 
went two Memoranda, one concerning the management of acc:ommodation 
for the troops abroad, the other the administration of the 
Commissiariat Department. ( 2S) 
Looking at the state of the Army since Waterloo, Howick 
remarked:-
"I have the strongest conviction from what I have. observed, 
While in this office, that during the two and ·twenty years of 
grace which we have enjoyed much might have been done to raise 
the character and improve the composition of the Army by taking 
measures to secure a higher standard of education for officers 
and men, that means might have been taken to improve the system 
of discipline, and the modes of punishment in use so as to 
check the growing feelin·g against corporal punishment, that the 
extent to which desertions have prevailed from the troops in 
Canada might have been checked and. that a very gre·at saving of 
public money might have been erfected by adopting a more 
judicious system for the defence of the Colonies." 
(25) Howick to Melbourne~ December 15th, 1837. 
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Concentrating in his letter on one result of the mismanagement 
of Army affairs, he spoke of the frightful waste of life among 
the ~roops stationed in tropical colonies; over the last twenty 
years annually 143 per thousand men had died in Janaica; one 
seventh of the whole force of white troops, 'being about three 
times as great a:~mortali ty as that which was occasioned during 
the peninsular ·wall'- by ba·ttle sickness and other causes.' In 
Jamaica and the Windward and Leeward Islands of the West Indies, 
in twenty years no fewer than 14,000 British soldiers had 
perished, as far as Howick could see only within the last two 
years (the years of his own term of office) had any attempts 
been mad~ to check such an appalling mortality rate. The 
memoranda gave the key to such a sad story; they also 
illustrated how bad was the management of army affairs which 
led to the troops being fed and lodged in such a fashion. 
Howick concluded by urging Melbourne to take some action to 
implement the advice given in the Report, otherwise Howick felt 
himself unable once again to present the Army Estimates to the 
Commons. 
Leaving aside the memorandum on the feeding of the troops, 
which will come into our story at a later stage, some of the 
facts on the acc-ommodation of British troops abroad must be 
mentioned, as they serve to give a point - a human point - to 
what otherwise might seem a dry, tedious wrangle over rival 
schemes for an administrative machine. Confining his attention 
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to the barracks available for British troops in the West Indies 
and Africa, ignoring conditions in other colonies, and the 
problem of siting buildings in healthy areas, Howick gave a 
series of individual reports of medical officers, as being 
typical of the state of life of the British Army in the colonies. 
For example, there were the barracks at Orange Grove, 
Trinidad. In 1822 a medical officer had reported that.as the 
buildings had been condemned the authorities were carrying out 
no repairs on them, 'in consequence of which during the rainy 
season they were in such a miserable and ruinous state, that 
there was hardly a point at which the rains did not penetrate, 
and in some of the Barrack rooms even part of the mud wall of 
which they were constructed had fallen in, and the men were 
exposed to every vicissitude of temperature.' The folloWi!_lg 
year it was reported that 'were the lowest class of negroes in 
the Island so badly lodged, the Protector of Slaves· would 
consider it his duty to prosecute the proprietor of the Estate 
to which they belonged.' By 1827 the floor of one of the 
buildings could not support the iron bedsteads. Eleven years 
after the first complaint the buildings were repaired. 
The same depressing story is found elsewhere. In 1824 
-
the ,Hospital at St. Vincent was condenmed, the foundation for 
a new one laid - and completed nine years later. The same 
thing happened with the hospital at St. Lucial}l.; which .was 
completed seven years after its foundations were laid; meanwhile 
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in the old hospital it was impossible to keep the hospital 
records dry, let alone the patients. One of the worst cases -
with the exception of Fort Charlotte Barracks in the Bahamas -
was at-Fort Wiltshire, on the South African frontier; in 1833 
a medical officer reported of. this building:-
"The Barracks remain in the same dilapidated state nothing 
in the sh~pe of repairs having been attempted. Works were 
commenced in the beginning of the year, .but after taking off 
part of the roof, their further proceedings were stopped. I 
feel called upon in this place to state that the Hospital, owing 
to the badness of the roof is scarcely fit to accomodate the 
patients, every storm or even slight fall of rain drenches them 
in their beds, without any means of avoiding or escaping from 
the descending drops which find their way th~ough the sieve-like 
roof. The Commissariat stores have been, for some years, furnished 
with a Tarpaulin to protect the grain from the weather, and 
surely something of the kind might be supplied to the Hospital to 
protect the sick soldier." 
'1"-In Siera Leone bad barrack accommodation led to the deaths of two-,. 
thirds of a European force sent there within a year, the officers 
of this unfortunate contingent had attempted to live in huts 
which even the natives had abandoned; in a barrack at the 
Gambia in 1825, 87 out of 108 men had died within three months, 
and that average had continued until tQ.e troops were withdravm 
by the authorities. The ironic point was that even if the 
troops in such barracks attempted to effect some temporary 
repairs or their own, they could not do so without the risk or 
being made liable for barrack damages ! 
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Not only were barracks badly built and ill-repaired, they 
were notoriously overcrowded. Prior to 1827 t~e space allotted 
to each man in the Windv11ard and Leeward Command had been 22-23 
inches in breadth, ·which meant that as the space would not admit 
or a bedstead, the soldier had to sleep in a hammock 1 by which 
injurious expedient as many men could be placed in one apartment 
as the breadth of their bodies would admit. ' In a new barracks 
at Tobago, the best or its kind in the whole command, each man 
had on an average about 250 cubic feet of free atmosphere, 'while 
600 is by the best authorities deemed essential to. respiration 
in prisons in this Country.' In 1825 the solitary cells at 
Dominica were said to be unfit even for the sheltering of goats, 
and that in the guard room there, which was 24 feet by 13, 
there were frequently fifteen men off sentry and from 25 to 35 
prisoners; as a result few prisoners or men on duty ever 
escaped a sojourn in Hospital, 'nor is it to be-wondered at, 
seeing that the space each occupied was little more than that of 
the prisoners in the Black Hole at Calcutta.' 
Howick regarded these facts to prove his case that there had 
been and was still 'an extent of mismanagement, and a wanton 
sacrifice of life which it is believed could hardly be paralleled 
in the military history of any nation.' The reason for this 
mismanagement he thought obvious; there were too many 
authorities charged with administering army affairs:-
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11And it is precisely this very circumstance of the 
responsibility being shared by so many which has led to so 
unfortunate a result; errors which any one of the offices 
referred to might properly have interfered to prevent, it has 
been felt to be the spacial duty of no one of them to detect, 
and improvements which could only have been accomplished by the 
joint efforts of all the ••• departments, and of the Treasury, 
have practically been neglected and delayed, because in the 
hurry of pu.blic business it is scarcely possible to secure the 
steady co-operation in matters of this kind of so many 
independent authorities." 
The inference was obvious; the only way to improve the 
efficiency of administration was by consol~dating most of these 
superabundant departments under one body. 
If Hawick had hoped that Lord Melbourne would be stirred 
to action by the series of appalling facts which had been sent 
to him, ~e was doomed to disappointment. Melbourne's first 
reply - before he had read the memorandum - stressed the dangers 
and difficulties of endeavouring to alter the system on which 
the Army was administered; he feared that i~ any steps were 
taken to implement the Report the senior officers of the Army 
would resign, and that they vvould be supported by Wellington, 
who, as the victor of Waterloo, had acquired through the years 
a reputation for infallibility on Army matters. In his second 
letter on the subject, dated December 25, 1837, Meloourne stated 
that he had read Hawick's memorandum that very morning; he 
wished to hear what the Ordnance, the Treasury, and the Duke of 
Wellington had to say on the whole question. As for the 
neglect of barracks, he ascribed that to the fact that the House 
( 26) 
of Commons did not vote enough money in the Estimates. 
On the receipt of this second letter Hawick replied 
immediately. Melbourne had expressed amazement that these cases 
of neglect had not. been brought to the notice of the departments 
concerned by the House of Commons; Hawick replied that the members 
of the Commons knew absolutely nothing of the state of the Army 
abroad. If one man - a Secretary at War - had been in charge 
of the various departments now responsible for the state of the 
army, such gross abuses would scarcely have pas~ed unperceived. 
As for Melbourne's contention that the desire to keep down the 
Ordnance Estimates was the reason for the state of barrack 
accommodation, Hawick acknowledged its truth:-
"but the argument you will find urged in our report is, 
that the motive would operate very differently if the same 
authority were responsible for the whole amount of the military 
estimates. If at the end of the war goo.d barracks had been 
built in the West Indies in good situations, the expense would 
by this time have been saved twice over in the diminished charge 
·-(26) Melbourne to Howick, Becember 16th and 25th, 1837• 
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for hospitals, reliefs, recruiting, etc. and this miserably 
false economy has prevailed because the Ordnance had no concern 
in the amount of' the latter expenses." 
He was very sceptical of the usefulness of laying the case 
before the Ordnance and Treasury, both would only endeavour to 
clear themselves of blame; mismanagement could only be ended 
by giving to one man the powers to exercise an active supervision 
over all aspects of the military machine. Meanwhile the 
whole question pressed urgently for a decision; Howick demanded 
that at least a beginning ought to be made towards carrying 
out the recommendations of the Report; the transfer of the 
Commissariat to· the Ordnance and the adoption of the Minute in 
Council which he had pressed for in the summer should be the 
init"ial steps. Melbourne's reply was to announce that the 
course to be determined upon would have to be decided by the 
Cabinet. ( 27 ) 
Lord Melbourne sought professional military opinion on 
the pr:oposed Minute in Council, and on January 8th, 1838, 
forwarded to Howick the strong objections of the Duke of 
Wellington, Lord Hill (the Commander in Chief), and Sir Hussey 
Vivian (head of the Ordnance Board) to the scheme. Some of the 
points made by these men as Melbourne waa willing to agree were 
unjustifiable; Wellington thought that it was intended to 
( 27) Howick to Melbourne, Dec. 26th, 1837• 
Melbourne to Howick, December 28, 1837• 
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interfere with the position of the Commander-in-Chief, and to 
alter the present mode of the disposal of patronage in the ArmY• 
Yet on the whole Melbourne sided with the army officers; he too 
was averse to seeing military matters brought more under the 
discusston and control of the House of Commons, saw the proposed 
role of,the Secretary at War as the superfluous introduction of 
a third party between the S~cretaries of State and the Commander 
in Chief, and thought that if it were true that the Colonial 
Secretary was overworked, then in that case the military business 
could be transferred to the Horne Office. The reasons for 
Melbourne's dislike of meddl.ing in Army matters were, apart 
from his inherent aversion to innovations, fear of offending 
the professional 'esprit de corps' of the Army, and fear lest 
those officers holding the highest posts should resign rather 
than submit to change. Stressing that the Report bound no one 
to its tenets, that it was merely advice, he asked for at least 
a postponement of a measure of change'until a period of 
comparative ease and safety.' 
The objectiops of the military chiefs were as might have 
been expected those of an exclusive profession which disliked 
the thought of civilians, whether Cabinet Ministers or the 
House of Commons, intruding into the areana of the professional 
soldier. They justified their opposition by old-fashioned 
appeals to the fact that the Royal Prerogative would be 
threatened by a change in organization, that the Commander in 
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Chief alone prevented the application of Army patronage to Party 
purposes, that the Secretary at War would come too much under 
the control of the Commons. Wellington pleaded the tender age 
and inexperience of the new Sovereign as an excuse for doing 
nothing until she could form a mature judgment of her own on 
the subject; this of course readily appealed to Melbourne. 
Lord Hill put their fears of a greater measure of civilian 
interference cogently when he wrote that if the Minute were 
adopted the result "will be to ignore the Royal Prerogative 
and remove the command of the Army and the exercise of the power 
arising from. it, from the hands of the Sovereign and placing 
it in those of a Minister who being necessarily a Member of 
Parliament will feel that his chief responsibility is, not to 
Her Majesty, but to the House of Commons." 
Howick answered Wellington 1 s and Hill's objections in a 
paper he sent to Lord John Russell. He showed the inefficiency 
of the present system by referring to recent events connected 
with the Canadian rebellion:-
"The Duke asks whether advantage has not resulted from 
...e. 
unserved inter~urse between the Secretary of State and the 
1\ 
Commander in Chief in arranging the measures now in progress 
for restoring tranquillity in Lower Canada, and whether anything 
but delay, mistake, and ultimate confusion, could result from 
the intervention of the Secretary at War between them ••• perhaps 
if it had been desired to select an instance which should more 
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strongly than another have shewn the inconvenience of the 
existing arrangements for conducting affairs of this descriJ>tion, 
what has re~ently taken place respecting Canada would have been 
the best example that could have been pitched upon. 
Had the proposed change been previously adopted what would 
have taken place would have been this, the Secretary of State 
in concert with the Cabinet would have determined what amount 
of force should be assembled in Canada in the spring, he would 
have said what in this exigency might be spared from other 
stations, and would then have simply directed the Secretary at 
War and the Admiralty to take the necessary measures for carrying 
this determination into effect, leaving them in concert with 
the military author·i ties to determine the best mode of doing so. 
But according to the existing pr!:i,ctice the Secretary of State 
must not only prescribe the amount of force to be employed but 
the particular measures to be resor.ted to for obtaining it, he 
must signify to the Commander in Chief the Queen's pleasure 
that he should dispatch such and such regiments to specified 
places, and to the Admiralty to convey the troops accordingly • 
. 
What was the consequence ? Why that the Secretary of State not 
having in his own office the slightest means of knowing how 
the required force might be provided with the least expense 
and the smallest disturbance of other arrangements issued orders 
for sending to Canada the regiments .next for foreign· s~rvice,. 
which would have entirely deranged probably for some years to 
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come all that has been settled with regard to the relief of 
regiments serving abroad and would have inevitably led to a 
larger and more expensive augmentation of the Army than is in 
the least necessary. These orders having been given, the 
Secretary at War upon whom all the inconvenience of the proposed 
course would have fallen in the House of Commons naturally 
interfered and after a long discussion carried on personally 
and by private letters the orders originally given were 
recalled and after repeated changes and great delay the mode of 
effecting the proposed augmentation of the force recommended 
to him was at length adopted and ordered. Thus at a time when 
the whole attention of the Secretary of State was urgently 
required in devising the political measures necessary to be 
adopted in Canada without interupting the regular progress of 
business relating to the other colonies, his thoughts were 
distracted and a large portion of his time was occupied by 
questions as to whether Bermuda or Gibraltar should be the 
rendezvous for a part of the force •••• whether a larger or 
smaller proportion of it should consist of Guards or Infantry 
of the line, of additional regiments or drafts ••• The manner 
in which all these questions are determined has the imost 
material influence on the amount of the military expenditure 
both for this and for succeeding ·years. The information too by 
which this decision should be formed is almost exclusively to 
be found in the War Office ••• " 
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As for periods of full-scale war, Howick stated that then the 
colonies were entirely overlooked whilst the Secretary of State 
really became Secretary of State for the War Department. 
Referring to the objections of increased Parliamentary influence 
in Army affairs should any chan·ge be carried out, Howick stated 
~~at military matters ought not to be more out of Parliamentary 
control than any other branch of the public service. ( 28 ) 
.Russell duly forwarded the latest papers he had received 
from Howick to Melbourne, who wrote again on January 15th. 
The letter contained the same themes, stressing the need for 
caution, stating the present time to be inappropriate, expressing 
his fears of the reaction of prominent officers, whilst at the 
same time acknowledging that the present system was open to 
"theoretical objection". The question could not be decided 
without the authority of the Cabinet and Melbourne expressed 
himself as confident that the majority of this body would be 
opposed to considering the subject at the moment. With Melbourne's 
letter he enclosed one addressed to_himself' by Russell on 
January 9th. Russell was in favour of' some sort of change. 
Speaking of the office of Secretary at War, he remarked:-
"Can you then ask any man of Spirit or political character 
to undertake the office without any change in its constitution'?" 
He did, however, a·gree with Melbourne ~hat the present time was 
( 28) ~raft of a Paper on Administration of the Army. 
Jan. 9th-12th, 1838. 
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inapprop~iate for bringing forward any measure, and wished to 
I 
see it postponed either till the end of the session or till the 
summer recess:. 
However, the question was postponed, at the behest of a 
majority of the Cabinet, for a much longer period, and Hawick, 
in order to avoid the imputation of perverse obstinacy, 
reluctantly acquiesced in the decision, until the beginning of 
1839 brought to a head a series of disputes he had been carrying 
on With the Treasury, and led him to revive the subject. 
This particular dispute was ·merely one of many in which 
Hawick had been engaged with the supreme financial department 
of the Government. In 1836 there had been a particularly 
serious one when Howick had at first refused to include the 
sums necessary for the military establishment of the Cinque 
Ports in the Army Estimates; this had drawn forth a strong 
rebuke from Spring Rice, and a lecture upon the superior 
authority of the Treasury, there being no precedent for the 
head of a subordinate department refusing to take a course 
directed by the Treasury, except on conditions of his own choosing. 
On Hawick persisting in his attitude, and talking of his 'honour' 
and 'duty' 'as a Public Man', Spring Rice threatened to resign. 
This sufficiently alarmed Hawick as to cause him to abandon the 
position he had taken up, and come to a compromise with the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. ( 29) 
(29) War Office Papers·and Journal for January, 1836. 
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The latest in this line of disputes arose as an incident 
connected with the Canadian rebellion of 1837• Desertion to 
the United States on the part of troops stationed in Canada was 
a frequent and disturbing phenomenom. The authorities on the 
spot ascribed it partly to the fact that the warm winter clothing 
necessary for men in such a cli~ate ·was only provided for them 
by·making stoppages out of their pay. On January 22nd, 1838, 
Howick wrote to the Treasury proposing that such winter clothing 
be provaded for the troops in Canada at the expense of the public. 
The Treasury in their reply of January 27th, negatived this 
SUggestion, but announced their Willingness to make grants out 
of public funds when peculiar circumstances so warranted it. 
They cited as an example of this their p_ayment out of the 
Extra-ordinaries of the Army of a sum to provide articles of 
necessaries for those troops, who, unprovided with such, were 
~"'• 
called upon~march from New Brunswick to Nova Scotia at an 
inclement season of the year. 
Howick replied to this communication on February 18th. 
He again advocated providing warm clothing for troops stationed 
in Canada without making stoppages of pay for such, and gave a 
large amount of information to support his request. Referring 
to that part of the Treasury's letter which mentioned the grant 
. . 
out of Extraordinaries for those Regiments called upon to march 
from New Brunswick to Nova Scotia, Howick announced his dissent 
from the principle there enunciated:-
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"If it should be admitted that an extraordinary demand upon 
the Troops justifies the grant of an extraordinary remuneration 
the greatest difficulty will be experienced in checking the 
claims whichbwill aris.e. The troops at Home for instance might 
prefer claims for the extra wear of their necessaries, when called 
upon from a disturbed state of the Country to perform an unusual 
amount of marching in a given time, and many other similar 
claims might arise." 
If anything was to be given to the troops, Howick believed that 
it ought to be fixed by Regulations. Apart from this, however, 
he protested that without any previous communication with 
himself, the Treasury had made a grant to troops, the first 
news of which was received at the War Office in the Treasury's 
letter. The Secr~tary at War was, so Howick·stated, 'responsible 
to Parliament for administering with proper _economy the military 
expenditure of the Country, a duty which it is utterly 
impossible that he should perform efficiently, if their 
Lordships should think proper to sanction ~ithout concert or 
communication with him expenses such as that which has nov1 been 
remarked up_on.' Therefore, he requested that in future the 
Treasury should only exercise its authority in such matters 
after prior consultation with the Secretary at War. 
The thunderbolt was long in falling, but when it did so 
it was with a vengeance. On December 21st, 1838 - note the 
date, this being a good example of the slowness with which the 
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Treasury often worked- the-Treasury acceded to Hawick's request 
on the subject of warm clothing, it was willing to defray the 
charge incurred for this previous to March 31st, 1839, from the 
sum of £500,000 voted by Parliament to meet. the expenses 
occasioned by the Canadian insurrection, subsequently· to which 
date provision would have to be made for the expense in the 
Ordinary Estimates. At the same time Hawick's conceptions of 
the role of Secretary at War, and the cours·e the Treasury ought 
to pursue, were strongly refuted. Stressing the subordinate 
nature of the- office of Secretary at War, ·the Treasury 
emphatically stated tha~ the holder of that office was not 
responsible for the amount of expenditure to be ipcurred or 
for the principles which should be followed in regulating that 
expense. Although it may be expedient to consult with the 
Secretary at War on matters not :falling Vii thin the limits of fixed 
Regulations, the Treasury was not bound to do so, and refused 
to admit that it was not justified in the particular case under 
dispute. The l·etter concludes by stating:-
11 ••• as it does not appear to My Lords that any public 
inconvenience has yet arisen or is likely to arise from their 
Lordships' having hitherto followed the course which they have 
usually pursued in administering the Extraordinaries of the Army 
they are not prepared .to introduce the entirely new principle of 
not administering that expenditure except in communication with 
and upon recommendation from the Secretary at War, upon every 
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occasion on which a Claim shall be brought before them; although 
they will readily avail themselves of the advantage which may 
.,.\/ 
be de.i1able therefrom, whenever it shall appear to them to be 
expedient and proper to have recourse to that Department. 11 
Although it was a cruel rebuff to Howick, the Treasury was 
technically correct in its conclusions. (3D) 
On January lOth, 1839, Howick sent Melbourne a letter 
enclosing copies·,;:of his correspondence With the Treasury. If 
the Treasury was correct·in its assertion that the only duties 
of the Secretary at War were "administering in detail and on 
fixed and previously sanctioned rules and principles those 
eve grants which ~ made by Parliament upon the annual estimates 
whi~ have been framed by him in strict conformity with the 
principles, within the limits, and under the regulations to 
which MY Lords have given their approval, and that of taking 
care that no alteration in which any increase of expense is 
involved shall be made in the various regulations as to the 
Rules of Pay, Allowances, Half Pay or Pensions to be assigned 
under different circumstances without the previous sanction of 
this Board," then Howick stated that the office ought to be 
abolished and the clerks in its establishment transferred to the 
Treasury and the Audit Office. Howick believed, however, that 
one member of the Government should be especially charged with 
the duty of attending to the state of the Army, and this ought 
( 30.) War Office Papers. 
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to be the Secretary at War. Rice, as·well as himself, had 
signed tb.e Report, emphasizin·g as it did the lack of unity of 
purpose between departments concerned with military affairs. 
Howick continued:-
"Every day that I continue in this office strengthens my 
conviction that this opinion is well founded and I continually 
see additional proofs of the great injury to the public service 
which results from the want of a more systematic administration 
, 
of the affairs of the Army. I have hitherto out of ·deference 
to the opinion of the rest of the Government (and with great 
doubts whether I was justified in doing so) acquiesced in your 
postponing the consideration of what practical measures ought 
to be·adopted in order to effect an improvement the necessity 
o.f which has been admitted in a published report to which are 
.. offered th~ signatures of five out of the six Cabinet Ministers 
who have seats in t~e House of Commons. But I aslt you whether 
it will be possible for me to abstain longer from calling for 
the positive determination of the Government upon this important 
subject if the interpretation now put by the Treasury on 'the 
existing arrangements is to be received as the correct one and if· 
the want of "unity of purpose." in the management of the Army 
which is condemned in the Report is thus to be rendered even 
worse than I believed it to be when I drew up that report ?" 
He demanded as the pric.e of his acquiescence in further post-
pon.ement of the question, a distinct understanding 'that the 
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principles laid down in the report are to be acted upon so far 
as is possible without a re-organization of the departments 
connected with the administration of the Army.' T.he delay 
from February to December - in granting Howick's request for 
the provision of warm clothing from public expenses, in spite 
of two public and repeated private reminders, was a further 
examp~le of how intolerably inefficient was the management of 
the Army, for the delay involved in acceding to Howick's request 
made the concession useles.s for the greater part of the present 
winter. Howick, therefore, felt it his duty to require the 
formal decision of the Government as to what were for the future 
to be considered the respective duties of the Treasury and 
the Secretary at War. Upon not immediately hearing from Melbourne, 
Howic·k sent a. further letter eight days later reminding the 
Prime Minister that he expected a decision on the question in 
dispute. 
Melbourne replied that he had had no time to consider 
the question. Howick immediately wrote back insisting upon a 
very early decision with the least possible delay. ( 3l) On 
January 26th, 1839, Melbourne sent to Howick a Memorandum on 
the relative duties of the Treasury and the War Office, written 
by Palmerston; this agreed with the Treasury view of the 
question but urged the expediency of the Treasury consulting 
with the Secretary at War upon the disbursement of the Army 
Extraordinaries. Melbourne again announced that the present was 
(31) Melbourne to Howick, Jan. 18, 1839· 
Howick to Melbourne, January 19th. 
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a very inconvenient time for raising the whole question of Army 
administration, and stated that previous Secretaries at War had 
never desired weight and authority for their office, but that it 
had gained weight and power for them, 'from their being also 
Members of the Cabinet and for their general influence in the 
Government and in Parliament. ' 
On January·27th, 1839, Howick repeated his demand for a 
formal decisi.on as to whether in future the Treasury was to 
sanction grants out of the Army Extraordinaries without prior 
consultation with the Secretary at War; all other questions he 
was prepared to postpone in accordance with the consensus of 
opinion of the rest of his colleagues. In reply, Melbourne 
announced that he would see what could be done, but added, 'you 
must not drive us to the wall.' Remarking upon the growing 
disposition for hostile correspondence between the Treasury 
and other departments, Melbourne did not know where to put the 
blame, but spoke of official pride being like the pride of 
Lucifer. His obvious Wish was that Howick would drop the whole 
~ (32) 
embarassing question. 
A. 
Howick announce.d that he had no wish to drive Melbourne 
'to the wall', but continued to insist upon having a minute 
drawn up, which, without mentioning the previous dispute on the 
supply of clothing to Canadian troops, would establish for the 
future the practice to be observed in relations between the 
(32) Melbourne to Howick, January 28th, 1839. 
Treasury and the War Office. As for the growth of disputes 
between the two departments, he did not think that the fault 
lay· ·with himself, but that it had arisen 'from the refusal o:f 
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the Treasury to allow that sort o:f directionary power which •••• 
the person at the head of this office ought to be entrusted with:~ 
"Everything I propose whether it is a trifle such as 
allowing the pay of a higher rank to a medical o:f:ficer, or an 
important measure such as a change in the rations o:f the Troops 
at a particular station, or the grant o:f an allowance for warm 
clothing to the regiments in Canada, is either rejected or 
delayed until after a long correspondence the clerks at the 
Treasury can be made to understand its necessity. It is impossible 
business can be satisfactorily done in this manner, one cannot 
explain in official letters all the little circumstances which 
in the course of the correspondence of this office shew the 
propriety of adopting the sort o:f measures I allude to, and if 
Rice is determined never to act upon confidence in my opinion 
founded as it is upon the information and advice I can obtain 
here, if he.never will sanction any measure until it can be 
:fully considered either by himself or some o:f those immediately 
under him, it must necessarily follow that the refusals and 
delays of his department :from which we seldom get an ansV{el! 
in less than three months, will draw from me· those controversial 
( 33) letters which I agree with you in thinking very mischiev~ous." 
( 33) Howick to Melbourne, January 28th, ·1839. 
.,.'. 
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On February 19th, 1839, Howick again called Melbourne's 
attention to the subject, and suggested Palmerston as a fit 
person to frame a Treasury Minute on the lines he desired; as 
well as settling the previously mention~d dispute, it would also 
solve a further contentious issue, over the auditing of army 
expenditure; as most of this was conducted under the auspices 
of the Secretary at War, Howick thought it only logical that 
the relatively minor sums now dealt with in a different fashion, 
should be audited on uniform lines with the main body of 
expenditure. Melbourne promised to give the matter as early 
a consideration as possible. 
The whole question, however, remained in the same, unsatis-
factory state (from Howick's point of view), until August, 1839, 
when a series of Governmental changes were made to which Howick 
could not be brought to give his agreement. He thereupon 
resigned. Undoubtedly one important factor determining him 
to take this course was his own unsatisfactory position at 
the War Office. 
On August lOth, 1839, he wrote to Russell, asking that 
some change be made in the present system at the War Office, 
otherwise the choice of a new Secretary at War had better form 
part of the contemplated arrangements. He did not require 
that the recommendations of the Report should be carried out; in 
their entirety;~asked merely for two specific changes. These 
were the tr.ansference to the War Office of the management of the 
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supply of provisions to troops serving abroad, and the reference 
of the points in dispute between the War Office and Treasury to 
some ~mpartiai authority, such as Palmerston. He required the 
first change be.cause since his remonstrance against the mis-
management of the Commissariat no improvement had come about, 
and the resul't was not only a waste of money but the sacrifice 
of the lives and the health of soldiers. 
On August 21st, 1839, Howick wrote to Melbourne objecting 
to most of the projected reshuffling of the Government. Speaking 
of his own position in the same he described it as 'exceedingly 
unsatisfactory', this had been rendered more unbearable since 
Lord Normanby had succeed~d Glenelg at the Colonial Office, he 
having consulted the Secretary at War even-less frequently than 
his predecessor. In a further letter written three days later, 
Howick called for a greater step to meet the Report of the 
Commission than he had originally asked for in his letter to 
Russell of lOth; this was prompted by the extent of the changes 
made in the Government, Howick having the feeling that he was 
being unduly neglected whilst less prominent men were either 
going to be placed over his head, or at least on a par with him. 
Melbourne again spoke of the difficulty, which Howick had 
acknowledged to) be present, in making any changes in the 
constitutional position of the War Office, and urged Howick to 
abandon his request, stating his motives to be those of mere 
personal feelings, and a desire of more official influence 
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and dignity. ( 34) Howick in reply refuted this charge and 
went over all the question again, showing how many times. he had 
urged changes in Army affairs.and how many times he had been 
urged to let the subject be postponed until a more convenient 
period. Melbourne had gone to the extent in 1838 of promising 
to introduce a Bill, not wishing to make changes by a Minute 
in Council, which would have made provision for the creation of 
a fourth Secretary of State, which Howick thought injudicious; 
however nothing had come of this because of the occurrence of 
various difficulties in other fields which had pressed more 
urgently for the Government's attention, and because of the 
extreme weakness of the Government in the Parliament elected 
in the summer of 1837• Howick did not now ask for such a Bill; 
r he prefe~ed what he had always believed to be the better plan, 
that in effecting as many improvements as possible by the 
authority of the Crown, without the necessity of a recourse to 
Parliament. He asked that the matter should be decided at that 
present time along with the other new arrangements, because 
'from past experience I cannot doubt that if this opportunity 
is not made use of, there will never be wanting good reasons 
for delay, and a·much needed reform to which I am publicly 
pledged will be indefinitely postponed.' As he was opposed to 
so many of the other arrangements, however, by this same letter 
Howick tendered his resignation. ( 3S) Russell, in a letter of 
(34) Melbourne to Howick, August 25th, 1839. 
(35) Howick to Melbourne, August 26th, 1839. 
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August 27th, making some pungent comments on Hawick's 
resignation remarked that the question of making changes in the 
administration of the Army had been dropped from sheer necessity, 
that the Cabinet had declined to act on the Report of the 
Commission, that if it had acted the measure would have been 
defeated, and that the plan he (Russell) had thought the best, 
that of creating a fourth Secretary of State, had been frustrated 
by Howick: he announced that Malbou~e and Baring were ready 
to consider minor chan.ges. 
resignation. 
Howick 'did not withdraw his 
Out of office his concern over the welfare of the Army 
continued to manifest itself; among his papers is one entitled 
'Facts to be collected from papers relating to the barracks at. 
the Bahamas, ordered to be printed by the House of Commons, 
March 24th, 1840'. This gives some facts of the notorious Fort 
Charlotte Barracks in the Bahamas which was then still in use. 
The moral to be drawn from this woeful tale of mismanagement, 
leading to privation and death for the unfortunate beings 
stationed there, was Howick stated, to b~ found in the system 
of administration; the faults of the system:-
"may be summoned up in a very f.ew words as consisting in 
the fact that the authority to direct and the responsibilit¥ 
for neglecting the measures which are required for the active 
and economical conduct of military business are divided amongst 
. (36~ 
too many offices totally separate and independent of each other. ' 
(36) War Office Papers. 
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So the weary and sterile question drew to its close. It 
marked the second great failure of Hawick's career. A reorgan-
ization and consolidation of Army departments had met Melbourne's 
indifference, pressure of other business, timidity of the 
I 
Cabinet generally to advocate change, and obstinacy from the 
Horse Guards and His Infallibility the Duke of ~ellington, and 
had failed to overcome them. It required the Crimean War and 
its disasters - does it not always require a disaster ? - to 
shake the complacepcy of the Horse Guards and arouse sufficient 
public· attention and indignation on the subject. In 1854 -
that is, previous to the War - a beginning had been made by 
separating the Secretaryship for War from the colonies and 
placing under it a Board of General OfficJ; plus the Commissariat, 
"' 
the control of the yeomanry and militia; in the following year 
the Board of Ordnance was dissolved and its f~nctions divided 
between the Secretary for War and the Commander in Chief. In 1863 
the Secretaryship at War was abolished and its duties merged 
with those of the Secretary of State for War, thus at last ridding 
the system of that embarassing duality of offices, though the 
position of Commander in Chief yet remained to complicate the 
issue. By Cardwell's War.Office_Act of 1870 the Secretary of 
State assumed an undivided responsibility, the Commander in Chief 
being definitely subordinated to him, and being responsible for 
t~e raising, training and discipline of the forces, military 
education and intelligence. Finally, in 1904 the Esher Committee 
recommended the suppression o~ the long obsolete o~~ice o~ 
Commander in Chie~. ( 37) 
c. Howick and the Health and Wel~are o~ the Army. 
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The battle ~or re~orm o~ the Army ~organization consumed 
much effort, much ink and much paper. The results were entirely 
barren. We now turn to fields in which Hawick's tenure of the 
War Office did produce mu~h positive good, though . it was not 
without a series of struggles that Howick made his views prevail. 
Shortly a~ter taking o~fice, Howick, concerned with the 
health o~ troops serving abroad, directed Lieutenant Tulloch 
and Dr. Marshall, to make a complete digest of the information 
J 
contained in the returns and reports o~ the me~ical officers 
of the Army from the peace to the present day. In 1836 these 
two gentlemen furnished a report on conditions in the West Indian 
colonies. Howick was appalled at tbe high mortality rate among 
troops there, and made himself responsible for two measures 
aimed at reducing this. 
One of these concerned the system of reliefs. Of 103 
battalions of the Line, 82 were constantly abroad.; most of these 
were stationed in unhealthy climates. It had been. the practice 
to keep regiments in the West Indies for ten consecutive years; 
though even the authorities at the Horse Guards agreed that the 
knowledge that they had to spend so long a period of time in such 
an unhealthy climate had the worst possible effects upon the 
( 37) 'The Constitutional History of Modern Britain' 
D.L. Keir, 1950. PP• 418-19. 
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health and spirits of officers and men, no means could be 
suggested of sending direct reliefs at shorter notice; for this 
an augmentation of the Army would be needed, and Parliament would 
not be.likely to accept its necessity. Howick, therefore, 
proposed a regular rota of reliefs among the troops serving 
abroad for the purposes of cutting down the length of time spent· 
by certain regiments in unhealthy climates, and improving the 
health of the troops, the first. of these having an influence on 
the second. Troops who were to perform their period of service 
abroad were to be sent first to the Mediterranean stations -
Malta, Gibraltar, the Ionian Islands - the most healthy regions, 
apart from the temperate climatic regions where troops were 
stationed, inhabited by British troops whilst overseas; the 
climate of these stations was hot and dry. It was hoped that 
be.fore they moved to the West Indies, next on the new rota, 
troops would at least have become acclimatized to heat, though 
of course ·in the West Indies there was the deadlier combination 
of heat with damp. After a fixed period of service in the 
West Indies, troops were to proceed to Canada, a cool healthy 
climate, for their final portion of service abroad. The new 
system would ensure that each regiment sent abroad - of course 
this measure did not apply to British India - had an experience 
of healthy and unhealthy stations, and that no longer would 
.,. 
cha~ges of favouritism be made against the authorities for 
keeping a certain regiment for ten years in an unhealthy West 
Indian climate, whilst luckier regiments spent the same amount 
of time in healthier areas in Canada and the Mediterranean.C38) 
Howick suggested this system of reliefs in a letter to the 
Commander in Chief, Lord Hill, on December 20th, 1836, and on 
January 21st, 1837, Hill replied, agreeing to give it a trial. 
Fortunately, as Howick believed, he had announced the system of 
reliefs to the House of Commons, before the intervention of the 
King, who might otherwise have put a stop to it. On May 2nd, 
e.r-
Sir H~bert Taylor, Secretary to the monarch, wrote to Lord Fitzroy 
Somerset, stating that William IV strongly objected to sending 
regiments from the Mediterranean to relieve those in the West 
Indies; his objections were based on the belief that regiments 
proceeding to tropical climates from the Mediterranean s.uffered 
from sickness to a greater degree than those which went directly 
from Britain, whilst delays, inconveniences, and expenses were 
greater. William IV, however, gave his permission for the new 
~,.. 
system to be given a fair trial. Howick replied to Sir ·H~bert 
Taylor, giving his reasons for the steps taken to improve the 
health of the troops. Taylor replied saying that the King 
doubted whether sickness could be traced to the use of salt meat 
in rations, especially where there was an abundance of fresh 
fruit and vegetables, nor did he believe that there was a great 
dispiriting effect upon a Regiment when it knew that a protracted 
period of service had to be spent in the West Indies. His 
Majesty ascribed the high mortality rate to the enervating effects 
(38) War Office Papers and Fortescue, Vol. XI. PP• 448-60. 
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of the climate, to the diseases this caused,. and to the habits 
of less exertion, greater luxury and dissipation to which the 
troops succumbed, especially the immoderate use of 'promiscuous 
liquors such as Rum'. (39) 
The other step taken by Howick to lessen the high mortality 
among troops serving in tropical climates was to alter, as far 
as possible, their staple diet, and with the Treasury he had a 
protracted tussle on this point. 
Among the War Office papers to be found in Howick's 
collection of private papers are a group of memoranda devoted 
to the question of the rationing system in vogue abroad, with 
details on the financial cost of such, and also its effect upon 
the health of the troops. As we have seen a memorandum on this 
very subject had been sent by Howick to Melbou~e as proof of 
the· gross mismanagement of the Commissariat Department. 
Some of the facts revealed by these investigations, which 
had been carried out at Howick's orders, a~e very interesting. 
For example, there ·was the memo ran dum by Tulloch on the ration.ing 
system in the Mediterranean stations. This revealed that there· 
was a great discrepancy between the price of bread at Malta 
and some of the Ionian Islands, and Gibraltar. This was to be 
explained by the fact that Gibraltar did not obtain its flour 
from Malta, 1,200 miles away and with ready facilities of 
transit between the two, but from America, a distance of four 
( 39) Taylor to Somerset, May 2nd, 1837· Howick to Taylor, 
May 3rd, Taylor to Howick,·May 6th. 
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thousand miles, which was the dearest and most distant market : 
This meant an unnecessary expense of £3.281 per annum in the 
provisioning of the Gibraltar garrison. A large quantity of 
"' s&at meat was issued in the Gibraltar rations, though it cost 
nearly double that of fresh (of which there was abundant supplies), ,, 
and which was far less nourishing and healthy. S~t meat was 
issued four days per week in winter, two days per week in 
summer, whereas if its issue was restricted to one day a week 
as was the case at other Mediterranean stations, not only would 
the soldier enjoy a more nutritive diet, but there would be a 
saving in expense of upwards of £3,000 per annum. If the savings 
of public money in these respects. were applied to the benefit 
of the soldier, he could- be supplied with a ration of Cocoa and 
sugar for an evening meal. There was apparently less illogic-
ality to be found in the rations issued at Malta and the Ionian 
Islands, but biscuit, inferior both in quantity and quality to 
bread, but far more expensive, was supplied in lieu of bread 
for one day in the week. 
rt·was with the situation in the West Indies, however, 
that Howick was most concerned. The meat served out to the 
troops in these stations was mostly salt meat; all the medical 
authorities were agreed that this had an unhealthy effect, 
causing diseases of the bowels, and it was from such complaints 
that the majority of deaths occurred. Not only did such food 
influence the health of the soldier, but it harmed him in another 
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way by its 'tendency to excite thirst and encourage intemperance, 
the bane of the British Army, especially in the Colonies.' Until 
Howick's representations were successful, salt meat was issued 
in the Windward and Leeward Command on five days out of seven. 
Not even from the economic as opposed to the human angle 
was there any justification for the issue of such an excessive 
amount of salted meat. Fresh meat, besides being more wholesome, 
was cheaper to obtain in these regions. 
Hawick, when he had digested the information presented to 
him on this subject, drew the Treasury's attention on April 30th, 
1836, to the mischBvlou~ effects of issuing five days' rations 
of salted meat to the troops in the West Indies. Not until after 
a lengthy correspondence between the two departments, and with 
reference by the Treasury to the Auditors of public accounts, and 
by the War Office to Doctor Marshall, the Deputy Inspector:.:;.General 
of Army Hospitals, was a satisfactory solution arrived at. On 
January 28th, 1837, the Treasury;acc:epted Howick's demand for 
a change of rations for the West Indian command. Troops in the 
Windward and Leeward Islands' were to receive fresh provisions in 
future on fice days of the week, and salted meat only on two, 
whilst in Jamaica, where there was an exceptionally high mortality 
rate, no salt victuals were to be issued at all. HoWdck also 
campaigned for the issue of similar rations to troops serving 
in the Bermudas. Si~ilarly Howick secured a greater diet of 
fresh provision for the troops in Mauritius, fresh meat was issued 
from December 23rd,· 1836, on twenty days per month, whereas ft had 
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previously been confined to sixteen. 
Among Hawick 1 s papers is a .letter from Lieut~_nan t-'Gei)eral 
Sir Samuel \fhittingham, from Barbad~, dated June lOth, 1839, 
A . 
giving his· personal opinion of the result of the change in rations 
advocated by Hawick, along with other improvements for which he 
had striven:-
"the ameliorating measures so wisely adopted within the 
last three years, in all of which Your Lordship has been mainly 
instrumental, and some of which I have strenuously exerted 
myself to carry out, Your Lordship will rejoice to hear a~e 
already, in my opinion, producing good effects on the general 
health and comfort of the Soldier. I allude principally to the 
change from five days salt meat in the week to five days fresh, 
the improvement in coolness and general wholesomeness of the 
water by the introduction of Drip stones in the Barrack Rooms, 
at the rate of two per Company, the increase in the establishment 
of the Black Corps (1st West India Regiment) and its consequent 
more general diffusion throughout the Command, relieving thereby 
the White Troops from distant night duties more inimical to 
health and more productive perhaps of Fever than any other to 
which the White Soldier is liable - and the general introduction 
of a hot evening meal of Cocoa or Coffee, which I have urged upon 
the attention of Regimental Commanding Officers, have all 
contributed to produce good effects." 
Testifying to the good effects of the new rotation system for 
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regiments serving abroad, Whitting~am brought to Hawick's 
attention the soldier's want of amusements. "I am aware", he 
wrote, "of Your Lordship's good intentions for the soldier's 
mind, by the introducti~n of approved literary works into the 
several Barracks, and I hope to live to witness the construction 
of Racket and Fives Courts and other arrangements, to encourage 
manly games tending to amuse and promote health". On August 
25th, 1839, Howick wrote to inform Whittingham that he had. 
strongly pressed on the consideration of the Ordnance Department 
the erection of Racket and Fives Courts for the recreation of 
the troops. 
As for the good effects produced by the change in diet, a 
medical report, after a year's working of the new system, from 
the Windward and Leeward Command, showed that the rate of 
mortality through diseases of the bowels had fallen from an 
annual average of 20.7 per thousand to 11.3 per thousand. 
As had been previously mentioned Howick addressed a 
menor·andum on this whole question of rationing the troops to 
Melbourne as part of his campaign for the reorganization of 
the Army departments. This showed both on grounds of humanity 
and economy the deficiencies of. the system then in vogue. 
Incorporated in it were details.not only of the situation in 
the West Indies but also statistics and facts concerning the 
Mediterranean stations, which, as we have seen, Tu.lloch had 
been employed in gathering. Referring to the startling fact 
that Gibraltar obtained its flour from America, Howick gave an 
example of how ludicrous could be the result of departmental 
inefficiency:-
"Large shipments of wheat are generally made to. this country 
from the Mediterranean and Black Sea, but last year the·re being 
little demand for it here and the price being high in America 
much of it was taken out of bond and sent there; it was then 
ground into flour and shipped for Gibraitar where it was ultimately 
sold at the very place past which it had been carried some 
months before, after a tour of 8 or 9,000 lJliles an.d affording 
three profits to the Merchants of as many. different countries." 
Howick observed that such examples had come to light casually 
in the course of statistical enquiries concerned with the health 
of the troops. Nothing was known of the manner in which other 
articles furnished by the Commissariat had been managed; equally 
startling examples of the waste of public money might be waiting 
to be uncovered. The memorandum ends with the now very familiar 
theme of calling for the erection of a Department with powers 
to exe.rcise an effective supervision over all branches of Army 
administration. 
A third most important reform carried out by Howick was one 
1 
aimed at encouraging good behaviour among the troops and rendering 
recourse to various punishments less necessary. It was embodied 
in a Royal Warrant issued in 183$. This increased the advantages 
enjoyed in respect of pay and pensions by 'deserving soldiers', 
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that is by well-behaved ones. It was based on a recommendation 
of a Commission upon Military Punishments which had urged that 
greater encouragement should be afforded to soldiers to conduct 
themselves in an examplary fashion. As a substitution for the 
additional p~y granted to soldiers who had served a certain 
number of years, irrespective of the merits of the individuals 
concerned, from September 1st, 1836, Good Conduc·:t Pay was to be 
granted. Those who had completed seven years' service were 
to be entitled to an extra penny a day and the right to wear a 
ring of lace round. the; ri~t arm, provided that their names had· 
not been entered in the Regimental Defaulters Book for at 
least two years prior tq their claim. After fourteen years' 
service the soldier could claim a further penny a day and the 
right to wear two rings, provided he already possessed an extra 
penny per day for at least two years prece~ding a further claim. 
,.r . 
There was ~ to be a further penny and ring for those who 
A 
completed twenty-one years' service, provided the applicants 
had enjoyed possession of their extra pennies for at least two 
years before the claim w~s made. Soldiers who had one or more 
rings were entitled to have the full rate of the Good Conduct 
Pay they had been in possession of for five years preceding their 
discharge, added to the rate of the Pension, whether temporary 
or permanent, which they had a right to uncler existing 
Regulations. (40) 
Another much needed reform with which Howick had much .to do, 
(40) War Office P apers. 
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though the question was not settled finally until Macaulay had 
replaced him at the War Office, concerned the differing rates 9f 
pay among Crown as opposed to East India Company troops in British 
India. This subject had been raised in the time of his pre-
decessor, but nothing had been done about it. Therefore, on 
December 13th, 1836, Howick wrote the first letter in a long 
series of correspondence, pressing on Sir John Hobhouse, head 
of the Board of Contr.ol, the necessity of taking some action on 
the question. 
His demands were as usual backed by weighty evidence, mainly 
in the form of a paper on the subject drawn up by A.M. Tulloch, 
Lieutenant of 45th Regiment, and a Minute by the Governor 
General of India (Belltinck) on the whole matt:er, dating from 
August, 1834. (41) 
The point was that in the three Presidencies, Madras, 
Bombay and Bengal, ·the soldiers' Eriglish pay was converted into 
rupees at an arbitrary and fixed rate of exchange - this differing 
in Madras from the other two areas - much above that which the 
rupee bore in the Market, much above its intrinsic value, and 
much above the rate adopted betv:reen the Government and the East 
India Company for the settlement of their accounts at such rates 
of conversion the soldier did not receive the amount of pay for 
which he contracted at his enlistment. There were also a whole 
series of anomalies in other respects. In Ben gal, where 
provisions were cheap, the East India Company supplied the 
(41) Minute by Be»tinck, Aug. 7th, 1834. War Office Papers. 
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soldier with a bread and meat ration, for which they deducted 
3id per .. day from his pay; the Company made a considerable prof'i t 
in this way, by supplying the soldier with meat of an inferior 
quality at a lesser price than the amount taken from the soldier's 
pay. In the other areas the soldier purchased his own provisions. 
The soldier in Bombay and Madras, where the price of provisions 
was higher, only spent on an average the same amount as was 
dedu~ted by the East In-dia Company from the pay of troops at 
Bengal, yet they were able to provide-themselves with food of 
superior quality. There were also di.fferent allowances for 
wives and children in the three presidencies. The result was 
that there was no uniform rate of pay in practice, as there was 
supposed to. be in theory, throughout the three presidencies. 
Howick campaigned for uniformity of practice throughout 
the three presidencies, and the issue of the rupee at its real 
value. This matter had not been settled when Howick was 
obliged to resign his office, but he continued to press the 
matter in Parliament, and his persistence was rewarded in the 
summer of 1840, when orders were issued that the pay and 
allowances of the European troops in the ~everal presidencies 
were to be equalized, taking the allowances fixed for the 
Bengal Army as the standard for the whole of India. 
These improvements in the situation of the British army 
abroad reflect very creditably upon Howick's tenure of the 
War Office, small as they may seem with the projected reorgan-
' 
ization of military administration for which he campaigned. 
The two taken together - actual and projected improvements -
show that Howie~ was a conscientious Secretary at War, who 
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though·:·not part~cularly liking the duties of the of~ice which he 
held, strove to make administration more efficient, yet above 
all kept in the forefront of his mind the needs of human beings, 
whether these were connected with their ·accommodation or the 
need to provide Fives Courts for their amusement. It is this 
concern for the small (but to the troops concerned, important) 
details, which marks off a good administrator from his opposite, 
and one who is concerned with humanity from one engaged solely 
in running a machine as. efficiently and as economically as 
possible. 
D. Howli:ck and Canada. ( 1835-9). 
We now come to what would no doubt be considered by 
Hawick as the mo-st- important problem which confronted the 
M£lbourne Administration, and also their greatest failure. This 
was the problem of Canada, which, as we have seen, occupied 
' 
much of Hawick's time when Colonial Under-Secretary, under Lord 
Goderich, and which came only behind the West Indian problem 
in importance then. The period as Under-Secret~ry to the 
Colonial Department had determined Hawick's main political 
interest; therefore, from the start, he took a great interest 
in the Canadian problem, when it made its appearance in a new 
form. 
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The Howick Act of 1831 had by no means brought an end 
to the series of disputes which disturbed-the state of Lower 
Canada. By Papi~eau, the leader of most of the hostile French 
party, it was seen as a half-hearted ·concession wrung from a 
Government in reality hostile to Canadian aspirations. Apart 
from the wrangle over financial matters between Executive and 
"",.. Legislat~e,other grievances, such as the Clergy Reserves and 
the composition of the Legislative Council, yet remained 
unsolved. Above all there was the fundamental antipathy between 
the minority of Englishmen, very comm-ercially-conscious, who 
controlled the Legislative Co~ncil, and the majority of French 
Canadians, who predominated in the Assembly. The rift had 
widened in the session.¢ of 1834, when, under __ :. ·Papi:neau 's 
guidance, a majority of the Assembly had passed the 92 . 
Resolutions, which among other demands called for an elective 
Legislative Council, the unrestricted control of public finances 
by the Assembly, and the establishment of a High Court to try 
cases of impeachment laid against the judges and other publiy 
servants. 
Peel's Government decided upon a commission of enquiry 
to consider Canadian grievances - though there were still some 
of the recommendations of the Canada Committee o_f 1828 which 
had not been acted upon. As has been mentioned Lord Aberdeen 
had desired that Howick should be one of the Commissioners. 
The Conservatives fell from power before they could carry out 
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this scheme, and it fe~l to M'elbourne' s G:overnment to implement 
it;. The Conservatives had preferred to send one High Commiss-
ioner; Melbourne's Cabinet decided upon three, the· chief of 
whom, Lord Gosford (who was to replace Lord Aylmer as Governor 
of the Lower Province), was an Irishman with a reputation for 
liberal principles. His two companions were Sir Charles Grey 
and Sir George G~ipps. Howick had suggested Lord Durham as a 
sui table C:ommissioner, but Melbourne said that the King would 
never acc:ept such a proposal. (42) . 
Howick was quite clear about what ought to be the policy 
adopted towards Canada; the demands of the.Assembly should be 
met, and the policy of conciliation, put into practice under 
Goderich, but discontinued when Stanley headed the C'olonial 
Office, ought to be resumed. He saw this device for sending 
i 
_out Commissioners merely as a delaying one, but his views were 
overruled by the Cabinet. The only value of C.ommissioners, he 
believed, would be if they were allowed to act as negotiators 
with the various parties in the province under the guise of 
enquiring into Canadian grievances. The grievances of the 
popular party in Lower Canada were already known; what was 
needed was a settlement of such grievances along lines that 
would satisfy the main factions in the Province. Therefore, 
he ple~ded with his aileagues for some indication to be given 
to the Commissioners that their real role was to be that of 
negotiators for a settlement, instead of a mere Commission of 
(42) Journal, May 15th, 1835· 
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Enquiry; but all was of no avail, and only their formal 
I t t . . t th c . . (43) ns rue ~ons were g~ven o e omm~ss~oners. 
One difficulty_ that the Melbourne Government had to deal 
with upon Canadian questions was the attitude of William IV·~ 
This worthy, when confronted with Lord Gosford, is_ reported to 
have said:-
."Mind what you are about in Canada. By God, I will never 
consent to alienate the Crown Lands, nor to make the Council 
elective. Mind me, my Lord, the Cabinet is not my Cabinet; they 
had better take care, or, by God, I will have them impeached. 11 ( 44) 
He had previously spoken to Sir Charles Grey in a similar vein. 
v After the departure of the Commissions in the summer of 
"' 
1835, nothing further occurred in connection w"ith Canada, until 
' 
November of that year, when a new Governor of Upper Canada was 
required to succeed Sir John Colborne, who had been recalled. 
At a Cabinet Dinner at Lord Melbourne's on November 18th, Howick 
supported the claim of Sir Francis Head for this post, Who~ 
Lord Glenelg favoured but would not decidedly propose. Sir 
Francis Bond Head had been an Assistant Poor Law Commissioner, 
was known by reputation to James Stephen, and had a reput~tion 
for being an able civil servant of liberal principles, a 
traveller and a writer. These seemed sound qualifications, but 
Head was to prove within a short while an extremely unsound 
choice. Howick must bear much of the responsibility for his 
(43) Memo by Howick, June 17th, 1835· Canadian Papers. 
(44) 'Lord Melbourne's Papers,' edited Lloyd £ Sanders, 1889. 
p. 349, Note 1. 
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appointment. He noted in his Journal on that evening of 18th:-
" ••• it was with very considerable.difficulty that after 
we went upstairs ·I g9t Ld Melbourne to give a grumbling consent 
to Sir F. Head's being chosen." 
.... 
The next day, Howiclc .. stimulated Glenelg into sending immediately 
an offer of the post to Head. After no more than one interview 
with Glenelg, whom he had never seen before, and two with James 
Stephen, Head'set said-for the u.s.A. en route for Toronto, 
where he arrived in January 1836. · Nothing was said about his 
relations with the Commissioners. 
It was in ~pril, 1836, that Howick received from Stephen 
a box full of despa.tches from Canada, plus a preliminary report 
from the Commissioners. The Assembly of Lower Canada was still 
pursuing a provocativ~ course; it had refused the arrears of 
pay to public servants brought about by its refusal to vote a 
Civil List while some of its demands were not yet met, had 
voted the supplies for only six months, and had voted a violent 
address to the King. As for the Commissioners, they had 
recommended a course of policy which was entirely opposed to 
Howick's; all advocated the suspension of the Howick Act of 
1831. 
Sunday, April 17th, was spent by Howick in making abstracts 
from all these papers, which task he finished the following day. 
On the Monday he wrote a long letter to Glenelg showing the 
mistaken Canadian policy that had been pursued in the past, but 
I_ - ---
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fearing that it was rather too strongly worded, showed it to 
his father first, who recommended first obtaining the 
acquiescence of Melbourne; this was obtained, and the letter 
eventually forwarded. 
On April 20th there was a long and, from Howick's view-
point, unsatisfactory discussion on C~nadian affairs in the 
Cabinet:-
"none of those present knew anything at all of the real 
state of the colony and Glenelg stated his case so ill that it 
was not likely they should have understood it any better than 
before, the consequence was that the wildest propositions were 
broached and I thought they were going headlong into a-
determination to propose the suspension of the Act of 1831, I 
remonstrated against this loudly." (45) 
Later that day Howick had a talk with his two close friends at 
the Colonial Office, James Stephen and Sir George Grey, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary to that office, and Howick' s 
cousin; they agreed to recommend to Glenelg a course suggested 
by Stephen, the appointment of a Cabinet Committee of two or 
three to examine the problem, and to submit proposals for a 
solution of it to the Cabinet. This would lessen the influence 
of those in the Cabinet who were entirely ignorant of Canadian 
affairs, yet who persisted in voicing opinions on them. 
This idea of a Cabinet Committee was rejected the following 
(45) Journal, April 20th, 1836. 
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day at a further meeting_ of the Cabinet, which was otherwise 
more satisfactory-, so far as Hawick was concerned, than its 
predecessor. Instead of a Cabinet Committee, Glenelg was asked 
to recommend some definite policy, and was empowered to obtain 
the assistance of such colleagues as he chose. Hawick outlined 
a scheme of his ovm concerning a reform of the Legislative 
Council, and gave- reasons for his objection to the suspension 
of the Hawick Act, on both of which topics he thought his 
utterances had some effect on his colleagues, who were in 
agreement that matters should not be brought to such a head 
where an armed contest would become inevitable. 
On April 25th, 1836, Hawick drew up a paper on Canada, 
which expressed some of his personal ideas on the problem. The 
main theme was that Canada could only governed by de~erring to 
public opinion in the Provinces; Canada's wealth, population, 
and her proximity to the United States made this absolutely 
necessary. Bringing matters to a point where they-could only 
be resolved by force would lose Canada. Public opinion in 
Canada wo.uld'~be alienated by the suspension of the Hawick Act, 
.,. 
and by an exclusive concentration on the embarassment of the 
~ . 
Executive Government in Lower Canada. The only solution that 
was in the long run practical was to satisfy the demands of 
the Assembly, for most of these demands were backed by public 
opinion in the Province. There were .two ma;in demands; one 
that the Legislative Council should be elective, and the other 
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that the Executive should be directly responsible to the Assembly. 
It was necessary to give the L~gislative Council more of a hold 
upon public opinion, and to make it more sympathetic to the 
majority of the Assembly; at the same time the Legislative 
Council would have to contain so large a proportion of those 
with opposite sentiments that the defection of a few from the 
opposing faction would ensure the rejection of a measure. The 
second demand was a recent one, and might be met by rendering 
the members of the Executive liable to impeachment before the 
Legislative Council, ·whilst the numbers of the Executive might 
Sc'«. be increased, and the governor be given ~i~tionary·power of 
summoning to its meetings only those people whose advice would 
most likely be of service. It would probably be necessary to 
give some of the leaders of the Popular Party offices in the 
public service. Hawick suggested that the Commissioners should 
be authorized to sound the different parties in the Province on 
such lines. 
On April 26th, Hawick participate.d in a discussion at the 
9olonial Office with Glenelg, Stephen, George Grey, Lansdo~me, 
an~ Spring Rice; it was decided that Stephen should prepare two 
papers, one a statement of recent events in all the North l 
American colonies, the other a report on the policy which ~ught 
·to be pursued towards them. 
Hawick believed that some reform of the Legislative Council 
was unavoidable. Had he not urged Goderich to make some changes 
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in its composition ? There were two main obstacles in the way of 
such a change; the King and the remainder of the Cabinet. Howick 
was not at this stage without hope .ot bringing most of his 
colleagues round to his views, and by the spring of 1836 he had 
some positive ideas on how a reform in that body could be made. 
He suggested a Legislative Council of about thirty-five members, 
which would be 'so far as possible a representation of what· may 
be termed the intellectual aristocracy of the Province.' The 
qualification for voters for members of the ·Legislative Council 
should be based upon their having filled such situations.as are 
usually only given to men of education and influence. Such 
voters were to send in lists of candidates favoured; these lists 
should only contain three names for every five councillors to 
be chosen, by this means Howick hoped to prevent one party in 
the Province from choosing the whole body. Councillors should be 
chosen for life, but on receiving an Address on the part of at 
.. 
_. 
least two-thirds of the Assembly, the Crown could dissolve both 
Houses. (46) 
A Colonial Office Minute drawn up· by Stephen at the close 
of April 1836, laid the alternative lines of policy before his 
superiors. The Government could repea~ or suspend the Howick Act; 
it could apply to Parliament for money to defray existing arrears 
of pay for the public servants of the Colony, it could raise such 
funds.by the sale or mortgage of Crown. Lands in Lower Canada, or 
( 46) Memo. April 26th, 1836. Canadian Papers. 
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it need take no steps for raising such money immediately; it 
could make changes in the constitution of the Legislative 
Assembly, and if necessary, change the mode of election to the 
Assembly to lessen French preponderance therein; finally the 
Government could alter the constitution of the Executive Council. 
·On May 14th, Glenelg, no doubt influenced by Stephen's 
views on the subject, came out decidedly in favour of one more 
attempt at reconciliation with the Assembly, before there was 
an application to the Commons to pay the salaries of public 
officers. H~ recommended that the.advice of the Commissioners 
as to the suspension of the Howick Act ought not to be followed. 
Only Howick supported Glenelg's view in the Cabinet at all 
heartily, but the remainder of their colleagues acquiesced in it. 
Howick desired that in the despatches which were to be 
sent to Lord Gosford the necessity of some change in the 
Legislative Council should be shown, and the Governor clearly 
instructed that this was the settled policy of the Government, 
and that his task would be to find out from the various parties 
in the Province how this could be accomplished. The remainder 
of the Cabinet were not in favour of such a definite policy, 
but agreed to leave the whole matter of the Legislative Council 
as an open question into which the Governor should be instructed 
to enquire; drafts of despatches were made embodyin~- this 
determination, and then sent to the King for his approval. 
William IV refused to agree to the drafts, he was against any 
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alteration in the constitution of the Legislative Council. The 
drafts of the despatches were modified to satisfy the King's 
prejudices; they then failed to convince Hawick, who felt 
strongly on the whole subject of conciliating the Assembly. On 
May 29th, Maria wrote in the Journal:-
"H. only just to·ld me before dinner that he was almost 
out of office -upon this-Canadian business •••• When Henry 
came to bed he told me that in consequence of the King's determined 
opposition to any change in the L. Council -all the Cabinet had 
receded from their opinion - which at least went so far as to 
leave it an open question - and that the despatches as altered 
and with all their brains struck out were what he could not 
consent to have sent without being accompanied by some additional 
instructions giving the Governor a clue to the course of policy 
the Government at home had resolved on. From not attaching 
sufficient importance to C~nadian affairs, from fear of offending 
' 
the K.ing by adopting a line of policy against which he is so 
prejudiced, and from fear of losing their places which governs 
a good many, there was literally not one but Henry who stood 
fast for the measure they had more than ~ determined on some 
time back." 
Hawick was at work before breakfast on-May 30th, writing a 
paper to prove the necessity of' Lord Gosford being empowered to 
make a settlement on the basis of a change in the Legislative 
Council and the Assembly (a sop to the English party). This 
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paper was not finished before the Cabinet of that day, in which 
Glen~lg informed his colleagues that the King was determined to 
oppose any change in the Legislative Council. Once away from the 
Cabinet Hawick finished his paper to prove that such a change 
was in fact necessary; this paper he sent to Lord Melbourne -
the recipient of a sizeable collection of papers from Hawick -
together with a letter stating that he would not consent to the 
drafts of the despatches as now altered, unless they were 
acc:ompanied by· more explanatory instructions, giving the Governor 
more information as to the course he was expected to pursue. 
This paper of May 30th emphasized that the Cabinet had 
recently decided to make one attempt more at conciliation before 
going to Parliament for the wherewithal to pay the arrears of 
salaries. How could such an attempt at conciliation be successful 
unless the Goverment were prepared in some way to satisfy the 
demand of the Assembly as to some change in the composition of 
the Legislative Council ? If the Government were sincere, on 
the other hand, in their desire for conciliation, then the only 
way to achieve this was to give more definite instructions to 
the Governor and Commissioners on satisfying the Assembly's 
chief demand; this could be done by means of a confidential 
communication to the Governor, stating that the Commissioners 
were to make it their duty to ascertain whether they could 
obtain the assent of both parties to some change in the 
constitution of the L~gislative and Executive Councils, Other-
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wise, throw this last chance of conciliation away, and the contest 
would become an armed one. Vfuen the Governor met the Assembly 
he would probably be pressed to say whether a change in the 
Legislative Council was to be expected; if he stated that the 
question had been referred to the home Government, the Assembly 
might take this as tantamount to a refusal and refuse all attempts 
at co-operation on their part; alternatively, the Assembly 
might await the decision of' the British Government, which would 
be forced to decide on the question without knowing how their 
solution would be received in the Province. There would be 
little chance of' a measure being accepted if the Province were 
not consulted, and the assent of the various parties secured. 
Here we see another key to Howick's Canadian policy; not only 
was conciliation of public opinion as expressed by the Province's 
elected representatives the only just and safe policy to be 
followed, but any measure in pursuance of that aim haa first to 
have the consent of those primarily interested, that is the 
colonists themselves, not the British Government, no matter how 
disinterested that latter might be. 
On the same day, Howick wrote to Melbourne sending him 
a copy of his paper; aware that his persistence over this matter, 
with no support in the Cabinet, seemed like mere obstinacy, he 
attempted to assure Melbourne that such was not the case. 
Stressing that he had always hitherto given in to the majority 
opinion of the Cabinet, and had even acquiesced in a course of 
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indecision over Canada which he had never considered to be wise, 
he made it clear that he could no longer be a party to such 
indecisiveness. If Melbourne had pursued Stanley's policy there 
might have been the chance of success, if he was still to embark 
upon a policy of concession there may yet be hopes of a 
successful outcome, but to remain irresolute would result in 
nothing but disgrace. If Howick' s arguments were successful, 
he hoped that such a despatch as he desired would be prepared 
with the minimum of delay, containing· as many arguments as 
possible as would be likely to recommend it to the King, and 
that Lord Melbourne himself should submit it to the latter, 
Howick being persuaded that the Pl .. ime Minister would succeed 
where Glenelg would fail. 
Melbourne's reply to this letter, written on June 1st 
before the meeting of the Cabinet, asked Howick to reconsider 
this determination to resign ef this question was not settled 
to his satisfaction. He la.id stress upon 'the worst results' 
that might follow from known disunion in· the Cabinet. As for 
himself, Melbourne considered that to him were committed ~he 
succ~ss of many important measures, plus 'the whole interests 
of the liberal party throughout the Empire.' Was it worthwhile 
to hazard these for the sake of a policy which was doubtful in 
itself, and 'little known and little interes~ing to the bulk 
of the community?' The awful events which Hawick predicted 
. . 
WQUld be the result of vacillation by the Government might never 
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occur; no human being could rely upon his own anticipation of 
future events, and, therefore, there was no justification for 
Hawick risking the downfall of the Government and liberal 
principles merely so that his views might prevail. 
At the Cabinet, Hawick read his paper to his colleagues. 
There was not a single supporter for his suggestions. He then 
informed them he could not continue in the Government unless 
more explicit instructions were given to Lord Gosford. He 
prevailed upon them to suspend a decision on the mat·ter for a 
day or two whilst he de_yoted himself to drafting a confidential 
despatch for Lord Gosford, on which he hoped that all the Cabinet 
would be brought to agree. 
Most of his colleagues were unable to understand Hawick'~ 
vehemence on the subject; they, no doubt, put it down to typical 
Howiclc obstinacy. Yet Hawick was the only one who had made a 
thorough study of colonial affairs; as was natural, his 
colleagues attached more importance to the numerous difficulties 
which faced them at home; compared to these the affairs of a 
colonial Province upon the other side of the Atlantic seemed 
very unimportant. They certainly did not believe that matters 
were so grave that there was a danger of rebellion. Lord John 
Russell reflected all these attitudes - exasperation at Hawick's 
conduct, disgust at the actions of th~ Assembly, and a view of 
the problem that looked only to t~e need for providing funds for 
carrying on the Executive Government - in a letter of June 1st, 
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asking whether Howick was pursuing a sensible course:-
"There was a measure recommended by the Commissioners 
whi-ch some of the Cabinet thought necessary - they yielded -
there was another which Melbourne, Lansdowne and I thought due 
t~ our Servants in Canada - we yielded. And after so much 
compliance you seem to insist upon an instruction which Glenelg 
declares is already understood, and upon which if there is any 
difference, it can only be in the turn of a-phrase, or the 
development of an argument on which we are all agreed." 
On June 2nd, HovviGk sent a reply to tjle Prime Minister's 
letter, stating how reluctant he was to separate himself from 
Office and his friends in the Government on this .matter:-
"I am very far from feeling that presumptuous confidence 
in my own judgment as to what policy should be pursued towards 
Canada which I f~ar you attribute to me. Had you been all agreed 
upon a clear and definite course different from that which I 
suggested I should have probably acquiesced in it but I really 
do feel that on such a subject we have no right to avoid the 
difficulty of a decision, by leaving everything to chance, and 
that if as I fear do what we will the issue is unfortunate, our 
character in the country would be gone fgr ever should it be 
shewn when all the correspondence is brought before Parliament 
that after a delay of seven weeks we had returned to Ld Gosford 
dispatches in fact saying nothing." 
He had, however, prepared a draft of a confidential despatch, 
which though very different from one he would have composed if 
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his judgment had had free play, was yet better than nothing; in 
it he had as far as possible adopted the views of his colleagues, 
and would be glad to assent to further modifications not 
altogether inconsistent with what he held to be necessary. 
On June 3rd, Howick read the draft of his confidential 
despatch to his colleagues, and upon the ~nderstanding that it 
should be sent as a private despatch to Gosford, and with a few 
minor changes, the Cabinet gave its assent to it. This draft 
despatch states, with regard to the Legislative Council, that 
the propriety of making a change in that body is a subject 
perfectly open to Lord Gosford' s enquiry. 
Even if the Commissioners were to· recommend changes in the 
Legislative Council, there was still the opposition of the King 
to consider. Would most of the Government think it worthwhile 
to jeopardize their positions.for the sake of a squabble in a 
remote colony ? On June 7th, William IV wrote personally to 
Lord Melbourne, announcing his fixed resolution never to permit 
any alterations to be made in the mode of making appointments 
to colonial Councils. This was reinforced two days later by a 
letter to the Prime Minister from Sir Herbert Taylor, the King's 
private Secretary; referring to the King's attitu~e, he wrote:-
"· •• his objection ••• is founded on conviction and on 
principle which he cannot abandon ••• he is satisfied that he is 
fulfilling the obl'igations of his high station by resisting the 
attempt to introduce what he views as organic changes." (47) 
(47) Wi.lliam IV to Melbourne, June 7th, Taylor to Melbourne 
June 9th. 'Lord Mel bourne's Papers' , pp. 34CJ-50. 
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Glenelg took Howick's draft of a confidential despatch to 
Windsor, where, as might have been expected, it did not receive 
the I'oyal assent. Glenelg then promised Howick that he would 
in a purely personal and private letter to Gosford, as opposed 
to a private yet official communication from Government to 
Governor, mention the subject of an alt~ration in the composition 
of the Legislative Council as one worthy his attention. Of 
course this was much less satisfactory. Howick had first wanted 
a public despatch on the subject, then when royal opposition 
made this impossible, he had consented to a private confidential 
despatch from the Colonial Secretary to the Governor; this too 
had now been thwarted, and Howick had to content himself with 
hints on the subject dropped in a private letter from Lord 
Glenelg to Lord Gosford, a lettei' which could never be produced 
as evidence, should the worst happen, that the Government had 
at least attempted to satisfy the Assembl¥ on this point, and 
that they had not ordered the Commissioners not to consider the 
subject. 
Howick nearly came to the point of resigning over this 
question, but even though he decided not to, he was far from 
convinced that he was acting ·rightly in remaining in the 
Government:-
"I do not know that I am right in acquiescing in the 
adoption of such a miserable expedient for getting out of a 
difficulty with the King, as that which is to be adopted by 
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throwing upon Lord Gosford and the Commissioners the whole 
responsibility of determining what ought to be done on the most 
difficult questions of Colonial Policy. n (48) 
One of his reasons for remaining with his colleagues was that 
Sir Francis Head was meeting with success, all opposition in 
the Upper Province, which Howick hoped woQld have a good effect 
in the Lower. Most of his bitter feelings of mortification 
were unleashed against Glenelg, although the King had been the 
main obstacle in this instance:-
11 to say what an utter contempt I have for Glenelg's mode 
of executing the duties of his important office is utterly 
impossible, he is many degrees worse than Lord Goderich, and yet 
""' he is undoubtedly an a~able well meaning man and of considerable 
. ' 
talents, but his extreme indolence and total want of resolution 
render him in all important affairs u"tterly useless. 11 (49) 
Hawick was disgusted with the despatches which were 
eventually sent to Lord Gosford, and wrote to Lord Melbourne to 
put on record his protests against them; he believed that the 
indecision and weakness ef the Government would see the loss of 
the colony. He was aware that so long as no catastrophe occurred, 
the public would be indifferent to Canadian affairs, but if by 
chance the Government's policy lost or came near to losing 
Canada, this would no longer. hold true. 
u· 
••• i.f things go wrong we shall be exhibited to the 
(48) Journal, June 9th, 1836. 
(49) Ibid. 
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world as men who from indecision of character and fear of 
responsibility have left to chance those important affairs of 
which it was our duty to have assumed the guidancr·" 
T·urning to Melbourne's fear - shared by many of the Cabinet -
of a rupture with the King, and its possible consequences, Howick 
believed that indecision and weakness on the part of the 
Goverpment were more likely to bring this about than firmness. 
If Melbourne had chosen to insist upon the original despatches, 
the K.in·g, so Howick believed, would have give~ way, especially 
with the House of Commons yet sitting. Now, if Lord Gosford did 
suggest an alteration in the Legislative Council, Melbourne would 
have to propose it in the recess, when he could count on no 
support from the Commons or a substantial section of it. The 
question whether the King would have given way on this point is 
doubtful, certainly his letter to Melbourne indicated that he 
would not have done so; as to Gosford proposing an alteration 
in the Legislative Council, this never materialized. Melbourne 
thanked Howick for his sacrifice of his views, re.marked that he 
did not believe that Canada was near to catastrophe, and that 
even if it were, the course to prevent it was by no means as 
clear as Howick made it out to be. (50) 
Towards the end of 1836 Lord Glenelg received the final 
(50) Howick to Melbourne, June 15th. 
Melbourne to Howick, June 17th. 
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report from the Commissioners. Whilst he was having printed 
copies of it, Howick wrote to his father on December 17th, in 
the following vein:-
"I acquiesce the less unwillingly in this inaction because 
in the state to which things have now been brought I see no 
course open to us which would be liltely to lead to any good 
result, and as I am very much afraid that that which will be 
ultimately determined upon will be one to which I cannot agree 
I am not sorry to take the chances which the delay gives me of 
the Government going out upon something else, so as to save me 
from the painful necessity of giving it the first shake by 
Withdrawing from it." 
Obviously he was afraid that the Government would prefer to 
suspend or repeal the Howick Act, and go to Parliament for the 
money to pay the arrears of salaries, rather than tackle the 
question of the Legislative Council, in face of the King's 
· opposition. 
Shortly before Christmas, Howick received from the Coloniil 
Office a Minute outli~ing a suggested plan of action with respect 
to Lower Canada. T.his first recited the demands of the Assembly, 
the most important of which were for an elective Legislative 
Council and an Executive Council responsible to the Assembly. 
If the latter were granted, 'Canada would cease to be a Colony 
of the British Empire, protected by British Arms, but exempt 
from authority of King and Parliament.' As for changes in the 
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Legislative Council, the Commissioners had rejected any schemes 
for an elected one; they had also opposed any change in the 
composition of the Assembly, as this would be an act of injustice 
so far as the French were concerned. It was the belief of the 
Commissioners that the administration of Lower Canada could be 
carried on if a Parliamentary grant were to pay off the existing 
arrears, and if the Territorial Revenues were reserved as a 
Civil List; the Colonial Office believed this to be an im-
pr~ctical suggestion. The Commissioners had also outlined an 
alternative scheme for securing the interposition of Parliament, 
which would then suspend the Constitution of Lower Canada, 
restore the revenues granted to the Assembly by the Hawick Act 
to the Executive, and enact a law by which existing debts were 
to be paid from funds accumulated in the Colonial Treasury; 
the Colonial Office rejected this as too violent, and as a cmurse 
which would surely lead to rebellion. It similarly rejected 
a scheme of Sir Charles Grey's for subdividing Lower Canada into 
five separate Colonies, which would send representatives to 
a Central Body. 
In place of all these suggestions, the Colonial Office 
came forward with a plan o·f its own. Parliament was to be 
applied to for a loan to pay_ the arrears of salaries; the Oi vil 
List in future was to be met by funds from the Territorial 
Reven.ues, still under Grown control; if the Assembly decided to 
substitute other funds for ·a Civil List, then it could 
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appropriate the net proceeds of the Terri t.orial Revenue. Quebec 
and Montreal were to be detached from Lower Canada and made Free 
Cities. The Commissioners who assembled at Montreal to 
apportion between Upper and Lower Canada, the important duties 
levied in the latter, were to be increased in number; Lower 
and Upper Canada were to supply three each, Quebec and Montreal 
two each, _and the Crown one; the duties of these Commissioners 
were to be extended, being given powers over communications, 
and the postal and monetary systems in both Provinces. A 
Common Court was to be established for the trial of appeals and 
impeachments. Lower Canada would be divided into districts 
(Ridings), with institutions in these empowered to deliberate 
on all questions of local concern; this and the detachment of 
the commercial centres from the Province were intended to con-
ciliate the minority of English people in Lower Canada, by 
preventing their concerns from being interfered with and 
pronounced upon, by the hostile French majority of the Assembly. 
Finally the North-West Boundary of the two Canadas was to be 
defined, leaving room for a further Province. 
Howick, after carefully considering this plan, sent a 
series of queries on which he desired fuller information to 
Stephen,- who answered them on January 2nd. One important point 
on which Howick had doubts was whether the money at the disposal 
of the Crown in the colony was sufficient, without the repeal 
of the Howick Act, to pay the interest on the proposed loan, 
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and also to provide for a Civil List; Stephen answered him that 
it was. Then, how would this plan be receive~ in the Province ? 
Its acceptance, Stephen admitted, was a matter of conjecture; 
the merchants in London who were concerned in Canadian affairs, 
especially the North American Land Company (one of the main 
h..J-,~.Js 
hots&Q& of the Assembly), were sure to accept it; the English 
inhabitants of Quebec and Montreal, the Upper Province, and the 
inhabitants of the proposed English Ridings, it seemed certain 
would also accept it. 
Howick's considered opinion upon the whole scheme was 
sent to Glenelg on January 4th. He had no•aiternative to offer, 
now his ow.n ideas on Canada had not been accepted by his colleagues 
or recommended by the Commissioners. In the circumstances he 
thought it the only possible plan, not that he was very sanguine 
as to its success. He remarked at-some length upon the most 
-important conclusion to be drawn from the scheme:-
"Had this or some similar plan been proposed a year and a 
half a year, or even six months ago, we might by means of the 
Commissioners have ascertained what the feelings of the French 
Canadians would have been upon the sUbject and I believe had 
communications with them been judiciously managed it would not 
have been impossible to-have their assent to some mode of adjusting 
the differences which have prevailed • •.• I cannot regard that 
measure as otherwise than one of very gre~t severity towards the 
French Canadians, to separate from the Province its two chief 
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towns and a large tract of country hitherto considered as 
belonging to it and to do this with the certainty (if not the 
express purpose) of giving the r1val nation an ascendanClY in the 
old-Capitals of the French Colony, cannot possibly be otherwise 
than most deeply mortifying to the descendants of the original 
Colonists. Now, however blameable may have been the conduct 
of the leaders of the Assembly, it wogld in my opinion have been 
highly satisfactory if before proceeding to this extremity 
against them ••• a judicious attempt to avert its necessity 
had been made. I have always thought that the manner in which 
the power of England could be asserted most beneficially both 
for herself and for the Colony was by mediating between the two 
hostile races ••• and it is therefore with very great reluctance 
indeed that I shall agree to the adoption of a measure which is 
founded on the a~sumption that the differences between the two 
races are irreconcilable and which. will necessarily be felt as 
a deep injury by the one." 
What would be the reactions of the French Canadians to this 
measure, would they submit ? Finally, Howick regretted that the 
last opportunities for negotiations had been thrown away:-
" it is no longer possible by holding firm and conciliatory 
language to both parties, by shewing to each that by insisting 
on unreasonable demands they·would throw the power of this 
country into the scale of their opponents, to attempt an 
amicable adjustment of the existing differences ••• " 
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The Colonial Office plan - its author being James Stephen -
was a move in the direction of what was eventually recommended 
by Lord Durham; whereas Durham recommended an English ascendancy 
by the amalgamation of the two Provinces, this plan attempted 
to pare the powers o~ the French in Lower Canada with the least 
possible injust~ce to them, consistent with giving to the 
English communities therein full control over their own laws, 
customs and institutions. 
Yet the i-n just ice was still great; the Assembly was 
losing powers, the Province its finest cities (including its 
historic capital), for the sake of conciliating a minority of 
the population. Bowick throughout consistently favoured 
concession to the Assembly, which represented the French majority; 
he was, therefore, more in favour of conciliating the French 
Canadians than any of his colleagues, yet at the_ same time hoped 
to do so in such a way as not to alienate the English minority; 
how this could have been done is not clear. Any further 
concessions to the Assembly, especially the great one of a change 
in the Legislative Council, would have further increased their 
powers to interfere in the affairs of the English community. 
The fundamental antagonisms between the two communities seemed 
too great; French lawl French conservatism, French suspicions 
of commercialism on the one hand, English law and an active 
commercial enterprise on the other. One group had to triumph; 
Howick' s policy, at·tempting to conciliate both,- would almost 
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certainly never have satisfied the English community, and would 
qave ended up by giving increase~ concession to the French alone -
which in strict justice may have been the correct course. Yet 
strict justice has at times to bow to political expediency; the 
remainder of Brit ish North America was British in race, the 
French community in Lower Canada was an anomaly, and if the 
·colonies in North America were to develop as a whole, it would 
have to ·be absorbed by the predominant racial group, with as 
much regard for its customs and interests as possible, but 
absorbed none the less. Otherwise the Canadas would remain as 
two antagonistic communities, ·with a vociferous minority group_ 
in the one, with which Upper Canada sympathized, and being 
bordered by the growing might of the United States made it 
dangerous for the Canadas to remain in their relatively backward 
condition. 
Earl Grey was duly informed as to the lat~st steps in 
the Canada question; Howick mentioned that he was rather relieved 
that Glenelg had adopted Stephen's plan, fearing that instead 
he would have proposed a course to which Howick could never have 
agree "d. Yet the whole plan, if it were to succeed, would 
require a degree of energy in maturing its details, which Howick 
was sure that Glenelg did not possess; Glenelg ought to have 
his bill ready when Parliament met, but knowing Glenelg, Howick 
was sure that this would not be so. (51) 
(51) Howick to Earl Grey, January 6th, 1837. 
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Meanwhile Howick was exasperated by the half-hearted way 
in which Glenelg presented the plan before the Cabinet. Perhaps 
because of its ill presentation, only Howick- who was much 
struck at the ignorance of Canadian affairs exhibited by his 
colleagues - gave it his firm support. ·On January 23rd, Maria 
noted that the subject was again brought before the Cabinet, 
and that Glenelg again presented the plan (which was now some-
what modified from the original):-
"So feebly so ill stated that those who were not 'au fait' 
already could make neither head or tail of it and upon meeting 
with a few objections he was going to relinJuish it altogether. 
However Lord John took it up and owing to him it was adopted." 
However, on January 30th, Lord Glenelg's plan was finally 
abandoned by the Cabinet. The reasons for this step are nowhere 
explicitly given; Howick reported to his father on 26th that 
an entire paragraph of the King's Speech promised that the re-
ports of the Commissioners would be laid before Parliament, 
and that measures relating to that colony would be proposed; 
these, Howick believed, would have a very miscbev}ous result. 
Speaking of Glenelg's scheme, he stated:-
" further inform~tion (which ought to have been obtained 
long ago) has been received which shews that there are difficulties 
in. the way of this scheme which I am afraid will be insurmountable'~ 
Unfortunately he does not enlarge on thes~, and they must remain 
matter of conjecture. Perhaps one reason was a belief that not 
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sufficient parliamentary support would be forthcoming for the 
plan; many might object to it as a departure from the 
recommendations of the Commissioners, and enquire what was the 
point of sending out _such if their advice was then to>be ignored; 
others might think the Government measures did not go far enough, 
others that they went too far. Perhaps the fact that there had 
been no time to sound public opinion in the Provinces, even 
the opinion of the English party, was another reason, or the 
scheme of detaching Quebec and Montreal"from the rest of the 
Province may have been considered too drastic. At all events, 
most of the Cabinet, as vve have se·en, were not wholeheartedly 
in favour of the plan; the fact that it had emanated from 
Stephen.may have something to do with this, for he was by no 
means popular· with many in the Cabinet, including ~elbourne; no 
doubt they wished for something more in conformity with the 
report of the Commissioners, so that they would not be met by 
embara~·sing questions as to why the Government had seen fit to 
ignore the latter's advice. 
Whatever the reason, the Government had abandoned its 
plan and had no other to sub~ti tute in its stead. January 31st, 
saw the opening of Parliament, and tQ.e K.:i.ng's Speech was to 
promise· measures on Canadian affairs. 
On February 3rd, Hawick wrote a paper on Canada. This 
advocates the milder of the two measures recommended to the 
Commissioners; Parliament was to be asked for a grant to pay 
the arrears, certain resolutions \!Vere to be submitted to the 
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Commons on the points in dispute, and certain concessions re-
commended by the C:'ommissioners (such as the repeal of' the Tenures 
Act, safeguarding existing titles, and provisions for·the 
resignation and dismissal in certain cases of members of' the 
Legislative Council), were to be carried at once. This paper 
made it clear that such measures did not render it possible to 
carry on the government of the Province satisfactorily in the 
face of continued oppo~ition from the Assembly; these measures 
merely removed an existing emba:ra.ssment, in the hope that an 
~ 
accommodation was not impracticable. Howick was still clinging 
to hopes of an agreement with the Assembly, but such hopes were 
steadily fading. True to his policy of attempting to conciliate 
both parties, instead of choosing between them, Howick advocated 
the off'er of a central authority at Montreal to which should be 
committed the power of legfslating on all commercial matters as a 
concession to the English, whilst for the French some improvement 
in the Legislative Council, short of making it elective, could 
be recommended. At the same time, to counter the intransigence 
of the predominant party in the Assembly, that headed by 
Papi'tleau, the constitutional powers of the Cr.own could be used 
in such a way as to convince this party and their electors of the 
inconvenience of' the present 'impasse'; the royal assent to the 
appropriation of money for objects which the Assembly favoured 
might be refused, if the revenues left to the Crown could not pay 
the expenses of the gaols, these could be opened and the 
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prisoners turned out of doors. His paper ends by offering the 
only real clue as to the main reason why the original plan had 
been abandoned:-
"By now communicating to Ld Gosford and to Sir Francis 
Head the measures to which in the case of necessity we propose 
ultimately to resort, we may learn from them how far these 
measures are calculated to answer the-ir intended object,_ and thus 
before another year we shall obviate the great obstacle which it 
has now been felt to be impossible to overcome in carrying into 
execution tpe project which Ld Glenelg originally proposed." 
This paper shows Hawick, whil~t still hoping for a 
compromise and a reconciliation with the Assembly, beginning to 
realize that the intransigence of the French party was to some 
extent to blame for the situation, and to think hesitantly of 
some form of coercion ~ in constitutional form - to make them 
moderate their demands. 
Lord John Russell's Ten Resolutions, introduced in the 
Commons on March 4, 1837, advocated substantially the same course; 
they stated that the creation of an elective Legislative Council 
was inopportune, but promised to make it more popular; rejected 
the proposal of an Executive Council responsible to the Assembly; 
refused to agree to the disbandment of the British American 
Land Company and the loss of their lands in the Colony; offered 
hope of a revocation of the Tenure Act; authorized the Governor 
to take funds from the Colonial Treasury for payment of those 
204. 
expenses for which the Assembly refused to make a grant; offered 
the c·ession of the Territorial Revenues of. the Crown should a 
permanent Civil List be granted; and urged the legislatures of 
Upper and Lower C?nada to settle matters of common interest to 
the two Provinces. 
The danger of constitutional deadlock leading to armed 
conflict, the fear that when the French Canadians saw that their 
demands were not satisfied, they would rise, led Glenelg to 
propose in the Cabinet on March 18th that two regiments be sent 
to Canada. This was firmly opposed by Howick, as only likely 
to be a further measure of provocation, and to lessen the chances 
of a settlement still further. 
It·:was about th~s time that Howick had a conversation with 
Ellice and Roebuck in the House of Commons, as a result. of which 
he appointed the latter to come and see him. John Arthur Roebuck, 
who had been born in Madras, but brought up chiefly in Canada, 
was a Radical M.P. , who in 1835 had been appointed by the 
Assembly of Lower Canada as their agent in England. At the 
War Office, Howick and Roebuck had 'a long and amiable discussion' 
on Canadian affairs, as a result of which the·'· latter promised 
to put down on paper his views as to how an accom6dation with 
A 
the Assembly might yet be effected. This he did, and gave the 
finished product to Howick on the evenin~ of March 20th. 
Roebuck's plan dealt first with the Legislative Council. 
He stated that every party agreed that as constituted at 
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present the Legislative Council was a failure. Even if its 
composition were reformed, and it was rendered ident-ical in 
feeling with the Assembly, this would not satisfy the Assembly 
in their present temper. The most satisfactory course was to 
abolish it altogether. 
The great objection to a single chamber legislature was 
that it did not provide for a body to amend and revise its acts, 
a power which was of great advantage, providing it was used 
wisely. Roebuck, therefore, having abolished· the second chamber, 
proposed to place its powers into the hands of the Governor in 
Council. The Executive Council was to be chosen by the 
Governor, and membership was to be 'during pleasure'; no laws 
need limit the numbers of this Council or debar the Governor 
from choosing any particular class of persons. Roebuck gave an 
illustration of how this part of his plan would work; a bill 
' from the Assembly would be sent to the Governor-in Council, it 
would there receive various amendments and would be sent back 
to the Assembly for their acceptance or rejection; the Assembly 
would do as it saw fit, and would then send the bill not to the 
Governor in Council, but to the Governor alone. T.he G:overn or 
could approve, veto, or reserve the King''s assent to the bill; 
he alone could not revise or amend it. 
Roebuck's third proposal was for a federative ~ssembly to 
be chosen by the Assemblies of all the North American Provinces, 
with clearly defined powers, which could determine all disputes 
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existing among the various colonies, and wh:J,.ch could serve as a 
tribunal before which judges could be tried. 
After all these measures were carried out, the Crown ought 
to surrender its Casual and Territorial Revenues to the Assembly. 
The Assembly would then provide a Civil Li~t (consisting of the 
Governor, His Secretary, the twelve senior Executive Councillors 
and the Judges); the term of the Civil List woul·d be for·~- about 
seven years. 
This new ~overnment ought to be established before any 
decision was taken on a new boundary line for the Canadas, other-
wise it would be said that attempts were being made to render the 
French Canadians less formidable. The North American Land Company 
which was detested by the French Canadians, could be provided 
with lands in the new Province it was proposed to create, and 
its lands in Lower Canada could be sold. If all these points 
were granted, Roebuck concluded, 'England might consider that 
she had gained a new lease of her present precarious property 
in North America.' · 
The following day, Howick sent to Roebuck his observations 
on the latter's proposals, stressing that these were his own 
private opinions. 
He had no objections to the suggested changes in the 
Legislative and Executive Councils, but there was an attitude 
in the country which would oppose any changes in these two organs:-
"It is a fact which cannot be overlooked that there is 
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not only in the House of Lords but also in the House of Commons 
a very strong and general feeling of irritation against the leaders 
of' the Assembly of L0 wer Canada, and an indisposition t-o make any 
further concession-s to them and hence it _would be impracticable 
to carry such a plan as has been brought forward unless accompanied 
by some concession on the other side, and unless proposed with 
the greatest caution". 
Therefore, he suggested that the change should come into operation 
only ~if the terms offered for the adjustment of the existing 
differences be adopted by the Assembly as a whole, and more 
particularly if a Civil List should be granted for 10 years." 
He suggested limiting the judicial functions of the proposed 
federal assembly to the trial of impeachments; a Court of Appeal 
cou~d be constituted for other judicial matters. Each of the 
North American colonies could become subject to the authority of 
the federal assembly. upon a vote of its legisl~ture appointing 
representatives for it. One great difficulty arose as to 
whether the gross or net revenue of the Casual and Territorial 
Revenue was to be given up:-
"Much importance is justly attached to preserving to the 
Executive Government the unfettered power of managing the Crown 
property, and it is to be hoped that the Assembly would accept. 
as a sufficient security against any possible abuse of this 
di~tionary-power a provision that a report should be annually 
made to them of all the proceedings of the G~vernment in the 
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management of' the property, with detailed acco·unts of' the 
receipts and expenditure. This would practically render it 
quite impossible for the Executive Governm~nt to misapply any 
part· of' the sums deducted from the gross receipts for the 
expenses of' management. Of course the surrender of' the Casual 
and Territorial Revenue would be for the same period only with 
the grant of the Civil List." 
Howick advocated add~ng the salaries of the attorney ~nd Solicitor 
General to the Civil List. The whole question of 4he Land 
.,... . Company was a very emba~ass~ng one:-
"i t is very doubtful whether any Government in this 
Country would have the power of depriving the Co. of' the 
Privilege it h~s acquired unless with the assent of the proprietors~ 
0n March 22nd, Roebuck replied to these observations, 
writing from Hampshire, where he was staying •. The reply was 
encouraging; Roebuck thought that the differences between the 
two points of view were not very great; the two main ones were 
the terms upon which the Crown was to give up its revenues, 
and the question of the Land Company. Howick' s ·plan for giving 
to the Assembly a full account of the management of the Crown 
property would greatly obviate the first difficulty. 
~owick 1 s proviso that the proposed changes should not 
take place unless a Civil List were granted, would tend to 
facilitate matters, 'as an option would thus be left to the 
Assembly gratifying rather to their pride - the change would 
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not seem forced upon them whether they would or no.' Roebuck 
preferred a seven year Civil List; he had no objection to 
including the Attorney and Solicitor General in this in place 
of two of the senior Executive Councillors. T.he whole measure 
ought, he believed, to be offered to the Assembly if the Civil 
List were granted; any prior attempt_ to settle all existing 
disputes would only prove embal1'assing, and might cause the plan 
to fail. The Land Company was one main cause of disunion; 
the Assembly would never _yield on this subject., nor would they 
pay an indemnity to the Company for the loss of its l.ands; 
before the creation of the Company the Asse~bly had protest.ed 
against such interference with the colony's internal affairs~ 
and if there was to be any indemnification it would have to 
come by England granting the equivalent of the Company's lands 
in Lower Canada to them in the proposed new colony north of the 
St. Lawrence, or in Australia. 
Roebuck's plan was a courageous and bold attempt to 
adjust the differences amicably between the G~vernment and its 
public servants in the Colony and the French majority in the 
Assembly. From the start, however, it had no hope of success; 
how could Howick, having failed previously.to bring ~he Cabinet 
round to his own point of view, have expected them to adopt a 
plan which was strongly suspect for a variety of reasons. First 
it uame from the accredited Agent of the Assembly, and as might 
have been expected was rather pro-French. Secondly, Roebuck 
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was a Radical, a member of a suspect group disliked by many 
Whigs and all Conservatives; Hawick himself was an opponent of 
Radicalism, but he had conquered hi~ prejudices against an 
individual's tenets because he valued his specialist opinion 
on one topic; how many of Hawick's colleagues could, however, 
so easily shelve their prejudices ? The chance of a plan 
succeeding which was based on the recommendation of a Radical 
and the_Assembly's agent was remote; the_majority of the 
Commons, even those of 'liberal' opinions, were growing hostile 
to the French party in Lower Canada. Besides, Roebuck's plan 
was not at all in conformity with the recommendation of the 
Commissioners. Resolutions based on these recommendations 
were already before the House; could the Government be expected 
to change its course so drastically on the assertions of such 
a man ? Then there was the difficulty of the Legislative 
Council; if the K~ng was so obstinate when it came to urging 
.. ~lnor reforms in that body, what would be it.h.e reaction of the/(;..,, 
AEnglish_party in Lower Canada, and all who supported them in the 
Commons, to such a proposal? What would public opinion in the 
Province think of the plan as a whole ? These were all weighty 
objections, too weighty for ~oebuck's plan to have a chance of 
success. 
It was a forlorn hope, but Hawick did his best to convince. 
his colleagues as to the virtues of the plan. On March 23rd, 
the day when Hawick received his last letter from Roebuck, he had 
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copies made o~ all the papers in the correspondence, and sent 
them to Glenelg, begging to see him the ~ollowing .day. He did 
see Glenelg, who proved to be less un~avourable to the scheme 
than Howick had.expected, but he was 'as usual ~ull of doubts 
and obviously inclined to do nothing.' On March 25th, he sent 
copies o~ these papers to Russell; on April 3rd, when Howick 
returned to town, he ~ound a paper ~rom Russell outlining his 
ovm views. on Canada, which were very di~~erent ·~rom vvhat Howick 
had hoped, and seemed to him very unsatis~actory. 
Under the date, April 4th, Maria noted. in the Journal what 
the latest developments in C~nada were, when the members of the 
Government had re-assembled in the capital:-
"There was a Cabinet today upon Canada in which I fancy 
Henry stood quite alone and I ~ear h~s no chance o~ carrying his 
views into ef~ect. He was not very communicative about it but 
he said that Ld Melbourne took much part a~ainst him - and more 
than he usually does in the discussions. He passed the whole 
Evening in writing on the subject - I wish I understood it 
better and then I daresay I should agree with him - but at 
present I ~eel much prejudice against anything urged by Roebuck 
and a·great horror of H's breaking .up the Govt by resigning 
when so little is necessary to upset it and bring much 90n~usion 
besides the personal unpopularity which would annoy ~ much. 
If some others held the same opinions I should not •••• so much 
mind, I daresay." 
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If even his own wife were doubtful about ·his activities on 
behalf of Roebuck's plan, how much stronger were the objections 
of his colleagues : 
On April 5th, Hawick feeling in need of advice, turne~ 
to the source which he trusted best with this commodity. He 
sent some papers on Canadian affairs to his father, the last 
of which was one which he proposed to send to Lord John Russell; 
he was very anxious to have Earl Grey's opinion on the latter, 
because it could conceivably lead to him resigning from the 
G,overnment. Earl Grey's reply was, however, unsatisfactory; 
he refused to give an opinion on Canadian problems because 
since he had quitted office he had lost all touch with them, 
and had no information on which to base a judgment. Earl Grey, 
however, was the last person to favour a plan which had been 
suggested by a Radical, and he informed his son that he dis-
trusted Roebuck. 
Maria was anxious that Hawick should not send his paper 
to Russell and sever himself from his colleagues over this 
question. At lunch, on April 6th, she talked earnestly to him 
on the subject; Howick stated that he had gone too far. Maria's 
pleas did h~ve ~orne effect, for Hawick sent his paper to Sir 
George Grey, and requested him and Stephen to give their opinions 
on it. The result was that Sir George Grey came and convinced 
Hawick that he would not be justified in making a stand on this 
question; to a certain extent it was contrary to policy on 
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which Howick had previously agreed. Tib Maria's relief, Howick 
allowed himself to be convinced, and he did not send his paper 
to Lord John. 
Qn April 14th, the Canada Resolutions were again brought 
forward. Roebuck explained to the Commons his plan of 
"" accomodation; Russell replied by .stating that it was impossible ,. 
to accept the plan upon Roebuck's unauthorized proposal, but 
expressed no indisposition to it should it be accepted by both 
parties in the Province. After these speeches were over, Howick 
had ~ long conversation with Roebuck in the passage leading to 
the Lords. Howick expressed his opinion that he thought Roebuck's 
plan was a very good one, but he had been obliged to agree that 
it could not be accepted merely upon his proposal. Howick 
agreed that Roebuck would have to oppose the Resolutions, but 
hoped that once they were passed, the latter would still do his 
best to promote an accomodation with the Assembly. Both agree~ 
that a good Governor would have settled all disputes long berore 
now - indeed when Howiclc was Under-Secretary under Lord Goderich, 
he had urged the recall of Lord Aylmer - and that it was not 
impossible that a future Governor could still effect that: 
desired end. After this amicable discussion, both had tea 
together. Roebuck, however, was mortified by the rejection of 
his plan, and later that night he bitterly denounced the 
Government's measure and their rejection of his overtures. 
In ·the summer of 1837 the Government proceeded to draw 
up a Canada Bill, based on Russell's Resolutions. Again they 
had to meet objections from the King; William IV was opposed 
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to the clause in the proposed Bill which made future appointments 
to the Legislative Counc.il for the duration of the Parliament, 
instead of for life. When the Cabinet debated this objection 
on June lOth, Lord Glenelg was in favour of giving up the clause, 
but to Howick's delight, Russell insisted on maintaining it. 
Probably this was the King's last active intervention in politics; 
ten days later came the news of his death, with the result that 
almost a~l bills had to be abandoned and the session finished 
as soon as possible. So the Canada Bill never matured. 
The autumn and winter of that year brought serious news 
from Canada. By the end of October, word had been received in 
England that the French party, furious at th~ action of Parliament, 
were drilling and practising openly with ball cartridges. The 
Governor was alarmed, and seemed to desire to be relieved; no 
progress had been made by the Governme.nt in finding a person 
to succeed him, or even to decide upon a course of policy. The 
situation in Upper Canada was also causing the home authorities 
some concern; there Sir Francis Head had been braving the 
Colonial Office, refusing to obey orders, and writing outrageous 
despatches, and even Howick was convinced that his recall was 
necessary. 
In the crisis to which Canadian affairs were rapidly 
moving, there was one man who seemed to command the necessary 
prestige and popularity to succeed as a Governor of Lower Canada. 
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Lord Du-rham, Hawick's brother-in-law, was that ·man. As an idol 
of the Radicals his appointment as Governor of Lower Canada 
might. be interpreted by the Assembly as a conciliatory gesture, 
and stop the drift towards rebellion; and there was hope that 
a man of Durham's talents might solve the Canadian imbroglio. 
Who first suggested Durham's appointment. as Governor is uncertain, 
it may have been Hawick; Melbourne, the Prime Minister, disliked 
Durham intensely so it is unlikely to have emanated from him. 
As early as July 22nd, an offer of Canada had been made to 
Durham, who had refused; this refusal was riot taken as final 
by the Cabinet, and on November 7th, they commissioned Lord 
Dunca•~on to sound him again on the subject; at nearly the 
same time the Cabinet gave orders for the recall of Sir Francis 
Head. 
At the end of November, Hawick was exasperated by Glenelg's 
slowness in deciding upon sending a regiment to Canada; no 
longer did Hawick object to any armed forces being sent there, 
ap indication of how far the situation had deteriorated. At 
the same time Roebuck was alarming Melbourne with reports as 
to the probable.effect a Canadian revolt would have on United 
States' opinion, particularly in the border areas. Nothing had 
been settled as to the line of policy the Government was to 
adopt; the march of events was making the Canada Resolutions 
hardly adequate to meet the situation. .In early December a 
project was mooted of constructing all the North American 
Provinces into a federation. At about the same date, Burham 
expressed himself in favour of going to Canada; he discussed 
the offer with Hovlick, and both agreed that he ·sh9uld demand. 
extensive powers for acting on his own initiative. 
On December 22nd, the expected news came from Lower 
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Canada; a rebellion had broken out. It_appears to have been 
triggered off acc:identa).ly. In November, Papi~eau, on the 
advice of friends who co~sidered his continued presence in 
Montreal would create disturbances, decided to withdraw from 
Montreal; his withdrawal was interpreted by the authorities 
as a prelude to rebellion, and this caused them to issue 
warrants for the arrest of the French leaders; at two villages, 
the attempts at arrest were resisted, and this marked the 
begi~ning of the rebellion. Roebuck later told Hawick that the 
French leaders would have submitted to being arrested, but 
that the Jury law having been a temporary act had lately expired, 
and left in force an old law by which the Sheriff would have 
had the complete power of picking a jury of the English party, 
the members of which had been openly boasting that t~e only 
course to adopt was that of "cutting off the heads of the tallest 
poppies". (52) The explosive situation in the _Province had 
led to the rebellion, of which the arrests were the occasion, 
not the cause, and this situation was brought about by the 
intransigence of both parties in the. ~rovince, plus the 
(52) Journal, December 29th, 1837. 
217. 
vacillation of the British Gqvernment. 
On December 14th, Howick sent his father the latest 
Canadian news, and informed him that preparations were on foot 
for sending a large force to Canada in the Spring. Howick's 
one hope no'IIV was that Durham should succeed in conciliating the 
hostile elements of the population. "I very much reproach 
myself, 11 Howick added, "for having entirely against my own 
judgment agreed to remain in the Government in 1836 when out 
of fear of the king my proposal of sending out specific 
instructions to Lord Gosford was over-ruled. 11 Some days later, 
he wrote:-
" ••• the whole poli~y of the Glovernment will necessarily 
be closely scr.lltinized tt will be found to have been contemptibly 
and childishly weak and I shall neither have one word to say in 
1-.r-
its defence nor the right of dec~ing that I have all along dis-
approved of it, and done all· I could to resist it. 11 (53) 
A decision was reached at the Cabinet on December 23rd as 
to the number of troops whi.ch were to be sent to Canada as soon 
as the St. Lawrence could be navigated; the force then was to 
consist of ten thousand men plus artillery. At the same time, 
there was some discussion as to what measures were to be proposed 
to Parliament. Only Howick supported a plan which had been 
suggested by Ellice, for allowing the local legislatures to amend 
(53) Howick to Earl Grey, December, 18th, 1837. 
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the Act of 1791 so far as it related to the Councils. Many of 
the Cabinet, according to Howick, were set on nothing but coercion. 
Hawick's position in the Cabinet was very uncomfortable; all 
along he had been the advocate of conciliation, but had bowed 
to the decision of his colleagues when they had objected to his 
proposals. Now, whether from the reasons he claimed to have 
caused it or not, a rebellion had occurred as he had predicted, 
and still the majority of the Cabinet were not prepared to 
attempt a settlement by concessions Which Howick thought necessary. 
Writing to his father on December 23rd, Howick announced that 
he would not consent to be a party to a policy of negative coercion:-
"unless something is done also to conciliate the inhabitants 
of the colony and from symptoms which appeared today in the 
cabinet of the opinions of others I do riot anticipate that this 
will be done. If not I have made up my mind that the time is 
come when I can no further join in measures of which I have never 
approved and there is therefore every probability that bef.·ore 
Parliament meets again on the 16th, I shall be out of office ••• 
there is no safety in going on with so inefficient a person as 
Glenelg in his important office, and also ••• it will be a great 
relief to me to be in a situation in which I shall have the 
right of expressing my real opinions about all that has been done 
in Canada." 
<.< 
On December 26th, the ~abinet agreed, though Howick did 
not form one of the majority, that the chief heads of a Canada 
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bill should be drawn. up to include the suspension of the habeas 
corpus act for a year, the grant of £50,000 a year out of the 
coloni.al revenues for the public service by the authority of 
Parliament for three years, the changes in the Legislative 
Council as proposed in the Canada Resolutions, and a power to the 
Governor to continue expiring acts. 
It was at this time that Hawick's exasperation at Glenelg's 
mishandling of col·onial affairs came to such a head that he 
sent a letter to Melbourne suggesting that Russell should be given 
the Colonial Office, Duncannon the Home Office, and Glenelg 
perhaps the Privy Seal. Melbourne replied that such a switch 
of offices was impossible, that it would·m~~e Glenelg the scape-
goat for the errors of the whole Government, and that it would 
incriminate the rest of the Cabinet for having kept an incompetent 
so long in that office. Melbourne himself, $0 he told Lady 
Hawick when they met at Holland House, cast most of the blame 
for the Canadian problem upon the Hawick Act of 1831, and asked 
if her husband would aonsent to its repeal; Maria replied that 
if such a step were taken Melbourne would have to find himself 
a new Secretary at War. (54) 
On Decembe~ 28th, there was produced yet another plan 
for Canada; its author was James Stephen. This advocated the 
establishment of a Convention from all the British North American 
~J 
Provinces to advise~ assist the Crown. Such a mark of 
confidence, Stephen believ~ would go far towards retaining the 
(54) Journal, December 28th, 1837. 
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loyalty of the other Provinces. On the advice of this body, the 
Government could concede or resist with· a knowledge of a great 
accession of moral and physical force to back it; at the same 
time such a mark of unity would act as a check against United 
States' ambitions. A Convention would be a rallying point for 
'loyal French Canadians, and would provide the insurgents with· 
an apology for laying down their arms should they so wish. A 
Convention could determine all the controversial questions of 
government and finance, without the further intervention of the 
British Barliament, which would only nee~ to give its sanction 
to a settlement. 
This was very like a plan devised by Howick, and when 
Glenelg outlined Stephen's proposals to the Cabinet on ·December 
29th, Howick supported them. He was the only one. On that same 
day he had a conversat·ion with Roebuck, who expressed his desire 
to do the utmost in his power to end the civil war, and who 
stated his preference for the continuance of the Canadian 
connection with this country rather than with the United States. 
Roebuck·suggested that his s~heme of the earlier part of the 
year should be attempted, but Howick pointed out the impossibility 
of carryVking this through the Commons, plus the bad effect it 
would have in Canada, being considered as simply a surrender to 
illegal rebellion. Howick outlined his own plan, which as has 
been stated, was alm0st identical with Stephen's. Roebuck 
disliked the idea of the suspension of the Assembly's powers 
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which such a plan would involve, but if all disputed questions 
were to be referred to a Convention, he promised to do all he 
could to promote the success of the measure. 
On that same evening Howick wrote a paper on Canada, and 
the following day sent a copy of this to Lord John Russell. 
This first recited the measures which the Government contemplated 
with respect to Canada. These-were: the Habeas Corpus Act to 
be suspended in Lower Canada for a year, the Governor to be 
authorized to continue in force for a year expiring acts, the 
repayment from the Colonial Treasury of the vote of credit 
which had been advanced last Session, and the application by 
the Governor of £50,000 per annum from that same 5ourse, for 
three years, to the public service, without the consent of the 
Colonial Legislature. The constitution of the Legislative 
Council was to be altered by enabling members to resign 
voluntarily and providing for their removal for misconduct, by 
making seats tenable in that Council for the duration of 
Parliament only, and not for life, and by authorizing the 
"',.. Provincial LegislatN'es to lay do'llvn rules for the choice of 
Councillors from particular classes and descriptions of persons. 
The Governor was to call together delegates chosen by the 
Assemblies of all British North America to deliberate on all 
subjects of common interest and to prepare bills for the 
"',.. 
consent of the several legislat~es. 
Hawick objected that these measures did not give the 
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Governor sufficient legislative authority; again it was his argu-
ment that it was far better for the man on the spot to legislate 
for Canada than for a Parliament on the other side of the ocean. 
to do so. He also objected to the arbitrary appropriation of 
colonial revenues by Parliament; he stated that the feeling 
in other North American provinces would be strongly against 
this. As for the Legislative Council, the proposed changes 
would satisfy neither party; for the French the changes would 
not go far enough, whilst the English would regard them as a 
timid concession to rebels. Altering the conSitution of the 
Legislative Council without the consent of the French party 
and without consulting them would be merely a further insult 
to them. It would be impossible to give the proposed federal 
body sufficient authority without the invasion of the privileges~ 
of the several legislat~es. 
Having outlined his objections, Howick proposed his own 
solution. He suggested limiting the intervention of Parliament 
to two objects.· The first of these was to suspend the meetings 
of the Parliament of Lower Canada for one year, for all purposes 
but that of choosing delegates to a Convention; the second 
was to give the Governor power to summon a convention of 
delegates from all British North America, six of which delegates 
would be chosen by each Assembly, two by each Council. This 
Convention would consider what alterations might be necessary 
in the Act of 1791 or· in the Constitution of Provinces in which 
that Act did not apply. It would also devise means for 
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constituting a federal body which could legislate upon all 
subjects of common interest to the Provinces. Laws for such 
purposes, after being sent from Convention to Governor and 
being assented to by the latter, would be transmitted home, to 
come into force, if not disallowed by Her Majesty in Council, 
after having been for one month laid on the Table of each House. 
The advantages of this course were many. It would 
greatly abridge time spent in passing a C~nadian measure 
through Parliament; all that would be required would be a 
short and simple bill. The more ample powers residing in the 
Governor would be an advantage. It would be taken by British 
North America to be a mark of confidence, and would tend to 
strengthen the tie between colonies and Mother Country. If the 
Legislative Council's constitution were altered by such a body,-
-it would have more chance of acceptance than if altered by 
.. 
the British Parliament. Howick was confident that a Convention 
would grant a permanent Civil List for Lower Canada. In addition, 
he restated the arguments advanced by Stephen ~ support for 
the creation of such a body. 
Referring to the North American colonies generally, 
Howick wrote:-
"Their advance in wealth and population has been so rapid 
that they have outgrown the system of Government which has 
hitherto prevailed. Two millions of people, a large proportion 
of them well-educated and intelligent, occupying an immense 
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terri tory at the other side of' the Atlantic will never submit 
to that sort of control which in the infancy of the Colonies was 
proper and useful; they can only be retained. under the authority 
of' the Mother Country by taking care that this authority shall 
sit lightly upon them. The _creation of the proposed federal 
body would supply that bond of' connection between the different 
provinces which has hitherto been found only _in their subjection 
to the dominion of' the Parent State, and would thus enable the 
Home Government gradually to relax the reins of' its authority 
and to substitute a system of' ruling by influence f'or one of' 
direct control. Such a change would be equally f'or the 
interest of' all parties." 
On the very day that Howick sent this paper to Russell, 
h~ had a further talk with Durham about Canada. Durham wished 
to go to C.anad.a, but he wanted to be entrusted with a sufficiently 
wide range of' powers, ·and he desired that the Government measure 
on Canada would be one which he could approve. At the same 
time he suggested various things which were new to Howick and 
whic.h the latter believed were well worthy of' consideration. 
Finally, Durham stated that the business of' the Colonial Of'f'ice 
had never been carried out satisf'act.orily since Howick left as 
Colo~ial Under-S~cret~ry. 
Hawick's latest suggestion did not win favour from his 
colleagues. On the last day of' December he received a 
remonstrance from Duncannon, urging him to give way to the 
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majority of the Cabinet. The next day came an unfavourable 
response from Lord John; Maria describes his letter as "rather 
cross and sneering". On January 2nd, Howick received a letter 
from Melbourne which destroyed what few hopes remained of his 
views prevailing! this stated that the proposed Convention 
would be 'at once giving to these provinces the Constitution of 
the United States.' Melbourne concluded by saying:-
"Dent make pictures in your own mind. Don t fall in love 
with the beautiful creation of Mr Stephen's fancy." 
Howick was nothing if not persistent; he still refused 
to give up hope of convincing his colleagues. On January 2nd, 
he sent a further paper to Lord John arguing against the repeal 
of the Howick Act, with which idea the: latter was toying. He 
was also at odds with Lord John over the nature of a proposed 
Convention; if there were to be a Convention, Russell wanted it 
to be merely an advisory body, whilst Howick wished to give it 
legislative powers. At the same time Howick sent a letter to 
the Prime Minister, endeavouring·to convince him of the difficulties 
of legislating in this country on the constitution of the 
Canadas; and how much better all the disputed points (alterations 
in the constitution of the Legislative Council, the question of 
the revenue, the provision of a Civil List), could be decided 
by a 9onvention than by Parliament. 
All was to no avail. On January 3rd, the Cabinet rejected 
the idea of a Convention, but did accept the changes Howick 
proposed in the coercive part of the olan. Instead of Parliament 
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suspending the Habeas Corpus Act, appropriating colonial revenue, 
and continuing expiring acts, it was decided to create a 
legislative power in the colony. Howick wanted this power to 
be given to the Governor in Council, the Council being ~ small 
;_ 
one, but it was decided to revive the act ·of 1774~ which 
stipulated that there must not be less than seventeen members 
in the Council. Howick noted in his Journal:-
'I thought myself definitely out of office when it was 
over'. 
Melbourne had simply favoured coercion, whilst T.homson had 
disgusted Howick by his mode of expressing himself about the 
punishment of the rebels. 
The day previous to the crucial Cabinet of the 5th, Maria 
writes:-
'Strange to say I think Henry would not· dislike going out. 
He does not approve of the whole colonial policy and would be 
glad to get ria of his share of the responsibility for Lord 
Glenelg's proceedings.' 
Maria was worried by the fact that if Howick resigned he would 
have no supporters for his course, except George Grey, and she 
was worried by the fact that people might class him with ·Roebuck 
and other 'desperate politicians'. 
On the 5th came news of a disturbance in Upper Canada led 
by Mackenzie. Howick follnd at the Cabinet that his colleagues 
had consented to a modification of his plan, which, though he 
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did not like it, he felt left no grounds for resigning. ln fact 
he was convinced that except perhaps for Russell no one liked it. 
Instead of delegates from all the North American colonies, they 
were to be from the two Canadas only, and instead of constituting 
a body with legislative powers, they were only to be an advisory 
body for the Governor, to concert measures to be laid before 
Parliament. It was not a very s&tisfactory compromise from 
Hawick's point of view. 'His scheme for a Convention representing 
the whole of British North America, with powers to legislate 
on all disputed topics, had shrunk to the scale of an advisory 
committee representing merely the two Canadas. This had only 
been achieved after a struggle, for most of the Cabinet preferred 
mainly confining the Canadian measure to the suspension of the 
constitution, leaving any changes until peace was firmly restored. 
As for Howick, Maria noted:-
'He would rather have been out and that they should have 
pursued the course they thought fit - but he said that as they 
gave u~ so much to meet his views he also was obliged to consent 
to sacrifice some of his.' 
On January 9th, Earl Grey wrote to Hawick about his 
decision to remain in the Government. ·Grey was not in favour 
of a body with legislative powers such as Hawick's Convention; 
. it' 
he believed that ~ would not be safe for a Governor to conclude 
a settlement without prior reference to the Government at horne. 
He was ~lad that Howick had decided to rerna~n in the Governrnent:-
'as, I do not think any ground on which you could have 
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placed your resignation, would have been satisfactory to the 
Publick; and the mere fact of your going out unsupported by 
any one of your Colleagues would tell against you ••• If things 
turn out well in the suppression of the Insurrection you will 
then be enabled to insist with indisputable propriety, on 
measures being taken for a sati·sfactory settlement, and then, 
if these are refused, will be the time for you to withdraw 
yourself from the Government. ' 
On the lOth Melbourne informed Howick that Durham was 
opposed to having to deal with a Council of seventeen members, 
and that he had given his approval to the idea of a Convention, 
'saying it is the first suggestion he has seen which gives him 
a hope of tranquillizing the colony - but he wants legislative 
powers as proposed by me'. As a result Melbourne and Glenelg 
were inclining towards adopting Howick's measure for giving 
legislative power to the committee, which was all that remained 
of Howick's conception of a Convention •. Singularly enough 
Howick and his supporter, George Grey, were no longer keen to 
give the proposed committee legislative powers, unless its 
constitution were enlarged. Howick probably believed that the 
committee was not sufficiently representative as now envisaged 
to justify the grant of legislative powersJ whereas the proposed 
Convention was; he may also have been influenced by his. father's 
views. Whatever the reason, Howick no longer favoured giving 
legislative powers to the committee, instead it was to be an 
advisory body. On January 13th, the Cabinet modified their 
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decision on the Governor's Council to meet Durham's wishes; 
no longer would he be restricted by the necessity of consulting 
a council of seventeen. The Cabinet decided to adhere to their 
original decision not to grant legislative powers to the committee 
of the two Provinces. On January 15th, 1838, Lord Durham 
accepted the Government of Canada. 
The whole subject of Canada, the difficulties involved, 
and the division between Howick and the remainder of his colleagues, 
were beginning to fray nerves. On Jan~ary 20th, the Cabinet met 
to consider the proposed instructions to Durham. There then 
occurred'a most vehement and angry debate' when it was found 
that part of the proposed instructions had been altered without 
the agreement of the Cabinet. According to Howick, what had 
happened was that LabDuchere had objected to the mode of choosing 
the delegates from Upper Canada to the proposed Committee; he 
thought that they ought not to be chosen by the existing Assembly 
from their own body; therefore, he wrote to Lord John, who 
admitted the justice of this; and who thereupon directed 
Howick, who was drafting the instructions to Durham, to alter 
. the draft so as to leave Durham the power of determining upon 
this particular point. When this part of the instructions was 
read in the Cabinet, Thomson and Palmerston made a vehement 
objection to the change, which they imputed entirely to Howick, 
and insisted on returning to what had been originally accepted 
_by the Cabinet. For the effect this had on Howick, we are 
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again indebted to a note made by Maria in· the Journal:-
"There was a most stormy Cabinet this day and Henry was 
much annoyed and disgusted. He had almost a quarrel with Mr ~. 
Thomson with whose opinions he never particularly differed ••• 
Henry wished himself out of the Cabinet twenty times. In the 
evening he got a remonstrating letter from Ld Melbourne which 
annoyed him exceedingly and he wrote a very sharp answer ending 
by rather throwing his place at his head. I begged he would 
not send it without sleeping upon it but H was in a tantrum 
and would not heed me •••• " 
In this letter, Hawick advised Melbourne, 'that if his (Thomson's) 
views are shared by a majority of the Cabinet, your best course 
would be at once to tell me that I am not fit to continue in it.' 
Melbourne, in his reply, pointed out just how material a change 
had been'made:-
'It takes away the certainty that the representatives 
(55) 
of Upper Ca~ada will be attached to the Connection with England.' 
The Cabinet on the 21st, was very unsatisfactory. 'Henry 
said that he had said some very unpleasant things·'. Hawick's 
draft instructions were rejected, and Glenelg asked to produce 
others; these were presented the next day, and adopted by the 
Cabinet. Howick thought Glenelg's instructions were 'very ill 
expressed and clumsily d.one.' 
On January 22nd_, the Canada Bill was debated in the 
Commons. Peel gave ·notice of his intention of moving and 
(55) Melbourne to Howick, January 21st, 1838. 
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dividing upon two amendments; the result o'f the first of these 
would be to omit the worqs in the preamble referring to the 
proposed committee of advice, and the second would omit the 
clause giving the Crow.n power by Order in Council to repeal the 
Act. 
In the Cabinet three days later, most of the members were 
eager to agree to Peel's amendment to the preamble. Hawick was 
violently opposed to such a course; he stated that he had only 
agreed to the introduction of the bill on condition that 
Parliament should sanction the conciliatory as well as the 
coercive part of the policy. He refused to agree to abandon 
the preamble:-
'unless upon the distinct understanding that in some 
other way either by a resolution or an address to the Queen, 
the House should be called upon to sanction the proposed 
committee. They tried hard to induce me to abandon this 
determination but I was obstinate, I fear partly from ill humour 
in consequence of the manner in which they had thrown over my 
proposed instructions,.and it was consequently determined to 
stand by the preamble.' 
That same evening in the Commons, Ellice urged the 
adoption of Peel's amendments, and Peel made a speech which was 
favourably received by the House. Charles Buller, a Radical, 
and one of the group closely concerned xn colonial affairs, 
favoured the committee of advice but urge~ Russell to give it 
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up and assume the approbation of the House to the instructions 
unless a vote of censure were carried; the obvious fear of the 
Radicals was that in trying to carry a conciliatory gesture like 
the committee of advice through the House, which was unfavourable 
to the idea, the whole Government plan would be lost, with the 
result that Durham (from whom the Radicals hoped great things) 
would not be able to proceed as Governor to Canada. Russell 
undertook to consult his colleagues on the matter. 
The Cabinet again considered the matter; Howick announced 
on his part a change of heart:-
'I said I was very sorry that my having yesterday insisted 
upon adhering to the preamble of the bill had increased so much 
the difficulties of our position, but that having very 
reluctantly agreed in the necessity of the coercive part of the 
bill I had from the first been most anxious that Parliament 
should sanction the other portion of our policy also, but that 
after Ellice's speech and the feeling shewn by the house 
generally I could not but perceive the impossibility of maintaining 
the preamble and was ready to acquiesce in whatever they might 
determine. It was very soon settled upon this that we should 
give way altogether.' 
So Russell abandoned the committee of advice that very night 
in the Commons. 
In the spring of 1838, Durham set said for Canada, which 
he reached towards the end of May. With him went Gibbon 
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Wakefield, a fact which aroused apprehension among Government 
and non-Government supporters; on his staff was another man 
who had bee~ formerly guilty of abducti_on, Turton. Durham 
created a special Council for Lower Canada, consisting of his 
three secretaries, the commissioner general, and the provincial 
secretary, purposely excluding politicians of the local parties. 
He and his Council issued an Ordinance procla-iming a general 
amnesty, except for those rebels who had left the country, such 
as Papi'11eau (who was in the United States), and for eight men 
!, 
of acknowledged treasonable.views, whom he had decided to send 
to Bermuda, to be restrained from re-entering the province by 
the threat of capital punishment; transporting the eight to 
Bermuda was the most merciful way of dealing with them, if they 
had remained in Canada they would have suffered the deatg 
penalty, or escaped without any punishment, ha~ing been acquitted 
by a partisan jury. Durham's first measures won him much 
support in Canada, but unfortunately for him, in this particular 
Ordinance, he had overstepped his powers. Bermuda was outside 
his jurisdiction; he had no powers to send prisoners to the 
penal settlement there. 
The obvious thing for the Government to have done was to 
have defended the whole Ordinance, brought in a bi~l of indemnity 
to protect those who had participated in this illegality of 
sending prisoners to Bermuda, and then proceeded to grant Durham 
such powers. Durham had a right to expect the whole-hearted 
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support of the men V'lho had sent him to ·canada, and to expect 
that they would not disown him merely because in the interests 
of the public peace in the colony he had gone beyond his powers 
in one particular. . But the whole episode was to furnish one 
more example of the lamentable weakness of the Melbourne 
Government. The Ordinance was assailed by Brougham, who 
personally hated Durham, in the Lords, and. ~vho brought in a bil]. 
against the whole Ordinance. 
On August 9th, Glenelg showed Howick Brougham's. bill 
which was due for its second reading that night. Howick 
recommended opposition to the second readin~, defending Durham 1 s 
policy as lenient, but announcing an intention of bringing in 
a bill to idemnify the parties who had participated in the 
detention of the eight persons sent to Bermuda, and to legalize 
the latters' custody there. Howick suggested this course to 
Glenelg at the palace, and the lati;er had then seemed inclined ... 
to it; however, ·later that day, after discussing the subject 
with the Chancellor, John Russell and George Grey, Glenelg 
favoured objecting to Brougham's bill, but to admit the illegality 
of the Bermuda part of the Ordinance, to state that an indemnity 
for this might hereafter be necessary, but to object to it bow 
as premature, stating that orders would be sent to Bermuda to 
the Governor not to subject the prisoners there to any coercion. 
Howick objected to this shuffling course; it would endanger 
Brougham 1 s bill being carried., as the Duke of Wellington for one 
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had already implied that he VDUld not be satisfied without an 
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Act of Parliament~set right the acknowledged irregularity. In 
addition, Hawick added, such a course would. weaken Durham's 
authority, and give just discontent to the English party in 
the province. Melbourne, Rice and Glenelg agreed that Howick 1 s 
course would be better, but would not decide without speaking 
to Russell and the Chancellor. Russell and George Grey both 
opposed Hawick's suggestion, because, as it seemed to him, they 
dreaded fresh debates in the House of Commons. Russell went 
to see.Melbourne in the House of Lords, and Hawick later heard 
they had decided against his proposal, and for the other. In 
.the evening Charles Wood informed Hawick that the second reading 
of Brougham's bill had been carried by a majority of eighteen. 
Hawick was disgusted When he carne to read the reports of 
the debate in the Lords:-
"Anything so weak, so miserable and so wretched as the 
defence on our side there never was and to add to the difficulty 
Melbourne by a most inj·udicious quotation of the D. of Wellington's 
previous conduct (which he erroneously understood as an intended 
attack) provoked him into making a very hostile speech and 
voting against us. There was much in the debate to convince me 
that had the line I recommended been taken and maintained with 
spirit this most fatal defeat would have been avoided. I must 
say however that this was not the impression of many others 
particularly Ld H (Holland) and the Chancellor." (56) 
(56) Journal, August lOth, 1838. 
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At the Cabinet the following day it was determined to disallow 
the Ordinance becau-se of the illegality of the B@rmuda part. 
of it, and to endeavour to amend Brougham's bill to make it as 
unobjectionable as possible. This Howick believed to be the 
only course now left open to them:-
"but it provokes r:ne to hear it quietly assumed by_ Glenelg 
and others that the difficulty and discredit br·ought upon the 
G'overnment by this affair is entirely attributable to Durham 
when in my opinion much more than half of it is to be ascribed 
to the lamentable inefficiency of Glenelg both in his office 
and in the House of Lords, and ot Melbourne's carelessness and 
in dol en ce. " 
Brougham'_s bill ·was amended, but not in a manner entirely 
satisfactory to the Government. Howick believed that though 
Durham's measures had been irregular in point of form, they 
were right as political measures and well calculated to maintain 
the peace of the Province. 
~Vhen news reached Canada how Durham's employers had 
thwarted one of his most important measures, the Govern-or 
decided to resign, as it was a mark that he did not possess the 
Government's confidence, and as it had lowered his prestige in 
the colony. Therefore, he notified the Government of his 
immediate resignation. Where he did not act so wisely, for it 
lost him much sympathy in Britain, was when he published a 
Proclamation of October 9th, protesting bitterly against the 
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Min is try and the Imperial Parliament; this Proclamation also 
pointedly stated that there was ~ow no bar to the return .to 
Lower Canada of the transported men or of others who had been 
forbidden to return by Durha~. 
Hawick, when pondering over his own conduct in the matter, 
regretted that he had not resigned when his own opinion was over-
ruled. He regarded the course pursued by the Government as 
1 disgraceful'. His only excuse for remaining in the Government 
was the very little time that was given him for deliberation:-
"owing to which, I lost before I was aware of it the 
proper opportunity for withdrawing myself from measures of which 
I disapproved so much. 11 (57) 
Nevertheless, Hawick was one of those who strongly disapproved 
of Burham's conduct in publishing his Proclamation, as he 
believed this was calculated to excite unrest in the Province. 
On November 30th, Lord Durham landed in Brit~in. He 
refused to see any members of the Government. VVhen on December 
8th,·Hawick endeavoured to see him at his house in Cleveland 
Row, he was rebuffed. On December 14th, Louisa, Hawick's 
sister and Durham's wife, wrote to say that she hoped that when 
her husband· was less angry Hawick 'would meet him half-way'. 
On January 14th, 1839, Duncann1on informed Hawick that Durham. 
would now gladly see him. Maria who intensely disliked Durham, 
noted:-
'Henry at once said he would go which I must say I think 
(57) Journal, October 21st, 1838. 
beautiful of him. Why did not Ld Durham after behaving so 
uncivilly say he should like to call upon Henry if H. would 
receive him.' 
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On the 15th, after Hawick's meeting with Durham had passed off 
well, Louisa invited the Howicks to dinner for the next day. 
However, Maria persuaded her husband not to go:-
'I at once thought we ought to decline and not to be 
ordered out at 24 hours notice after being proscribed for 6 
weeks - and Henry eventually was of the same opinion.' 
Melbourne had advised her to go, but later told her she had 
done right in refusing; when asked why he had previously said 
the reverse, he replied that:-
'I think so ill of him I am afraid of giving an opinion 
agains;t·him.' (58) 
Meanwhile the Canada problem still remained unresolved. 
Howick outlined his oW:n tentative views in a letter to ·;~his 
father:-
' 
•
L "I .... h k ,, in . . . that we should make English the only official 
language and take.all possible means by encouraging emigration,· 
etc. to give a complete ascendancy to t_he English population, 
but a union of the Provinces I· think would be fatal, the strong 
American and Republican party in the Upper Province who as it is 
have frequently had the .ascendancy in the Assembly there and 
are still a formidable minority would certainly act with the 
(58) Journal, January 19th, 1839. 
French in the Lower Province ••• in opposing the British 
Government and we should thus have a majority of the United 
Assembly against us." (59) 
He believed the only course was to continue the act of the 
preceding year, and by a use of the powers conferred by that, 
effect ~speedy a change in the state of the Province as possible, 
in order to render it safe to return to representative government. 
There ought also to be some project for a federal union among 
all the Provinces. Melbourne's opinion also inclined towards 
the further suspension of the constitution of Lower Canada; he 
took it as generally agreed that the French were to be prevented 
from returning· to power in that Province, and that could only be 
done by continuing to suspend the Constitution; if plans were 
made for giving to Lower Canada a new constitution,fbr uniting 
Upper and Lower Canada or for forming a federation of all the 
provinces, he thought that due w-eight woulq_ have to be given 
to the French population according to its numbers. ( 60) Yet 
continued suspension of the Lower Canadian constitution was 
just delaying not solving the problem. 
Howick gave an amplification of his views in a letter to 
Lord Melbourne, dated January 3rd. He was rather pessimistic 
in outlook, believing that the best policy would be 'voluntarily 
(59) Howick to Earl Grey, December 8th, 1838. 
(60) 'Lord Melbourne; s Papers'. Melbourne to 
Russell, December 23rd, 1838, P• 444. 
to abandon possessions which we can no longer retain with 
advantage'; he recited the burdens of maintaining regular 
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troops, militia and volunteer forces in these colonies, e~d the 
perpetual danger of war with the United States over some frontier 
dispute; yet he realized that it was impossible to give up 
the North American colonies. The next best policy was to find 
a way of diminishing some of the evils in the Canadian body 
politic. Why was the United States so far ahead of the Canadas 
in wealth and improvements, when Canada seemed to have similar 
natural advantages as those enjoyed by her neighbour ? Howick 
answered this by stating that a 'system of jobbing and mismanage-
ment' had been allowed to become prevalent in the British colonies. 
The only way to break up the old abuses was to appoint 'an 
active and intelligent Governor'. In Upper Canada his function 
ought to be to stimulate the people to activity, 'interfering 
by his authority as little as possible, and allowing them to 
manage their own affairs their ovm way even when that way may 
not be the best'. He also thought it essential to open 'a 
career for men of ambitious dispositions. Nothing has so much 
contributed to weaken the foundations of our power as the 
circumstance that all the aspirants for political influence and 
importance have had no way of gratifying their wishes but by 
opposing the Government; the authority of the Mother Country 
in the Colonies like the royal authority at home in modern times 
should if possible be kept aloof from those party struggles 
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which will always prevail in free ciountri.es and power and place 
should reward those who succeed in these struggles without its 
being considered that the Home Government was concerned in the. 
success: or defeat of any'. S.o was foreshadowed Howick' e. grant 
to Canada of responsible government when he was Colonial 
Secretary in Lord John Russell's first administration. 
As for Lower Canada, it was impossible as'yet tore-
establish constitutional Government because of the hostility of 
most of the population. Therefore, for some years the only 
form of government in that Province was the one now existing. 
A Governor should be appointed well acquainted with the principles 
of legislation, and who would set about reorganizing the whole 
state of society, and 'of rendering the colony what it now 
must be an English one'. The English language should be the 
only one used in all public acts, laws regulati;ng the tenure 
of landed property should be amended, communications improved, 
. . 
and improved municipal institutions shou·ld prepare the way 
for the ultimate restoration of representative government. 
In February, Durham presented the final version of his 
Report to the Cabinet. By all authorities it is now acknowledged 
to be a masterly document. It recommended the legislative union 
of the two Canadas as the best way o'f solving the quest.ion of 
the French in Lower Canada; in a union they would be a minority 
of the population. It also advocated the grant of responsible 
government to Canada. Howick thought that it was a very able 
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document, which coincided remarkably with his views in 1833 and 
1834. (6l) He was not so pleased with the expense accounts 
submitted by Durham, these ranging ~rom £2,200 spent on wine 
to such i terns as "given to a blind man £l", 11 dona1)ions at 
Church £1. 10. 11 • (62) 
It was in February, 1839, as has already been mentioned, 
that Howick, disgusted with proceedings in the Cabinet, thought 
seriously o~ asking ~or the Governorship o~ Canada, He asked 
his ~ather's advice about this •. He believed that in that 
country there was 'an opportunity o~ doing a great deal o~ good':-
"and ~rom the attention I have given to the subject now 
~or a good many years I think I know more o~ what is required 
there than any other person that could be sent." 
He was convinced that the Government would pass a satis~actory 
measure on Canada through Parliament, based largely on Durham's 
Report. It was doubt~ul, even if he asked for it, whether 
Melbourne would give him the Governorship, because o~ the 
divergence of their views on colonial policy, but a re~usal 
would be a mark o~ no con~idence, and on such Howick would be 
justified in resigning. (63) 
Earl Grey was strongly opposed to the idea; it would imply 
to the public that Howick having ~ailed to succeed to the Colonial 
(61) Jour~al, January 31st, 1839· 
(62) Journal, May 14th, 1839. 
(63) Howick to Earl Grey, February 14th, 1839· 
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Office- Glenelg had been replaced by-Lord Normanby on February 
8th - had had his disappointment gilded by being made Governor 
of Canada. There was also another, even better reason, for 
-refusing to consider the ·matter any further:-
"I feel too little confidence in tqe present Ministers 
to wish to see you placed in a situation of great responsibility, 
the difficulties of which are much increased by the late events, 
where if any new emba~ssment should arise, you could not 
depend upon· a fair support at home. There is indeed too much 
probability, even if more confidence be placed, than I can feel 
in the fair dealing of the Ministers, from what has already 
appeared as to the feelings and views by which you are respect-
ively influenced, that differe.nces wou~d arise which might 
lead to your return under circumstances not very different 
from Lambton's." (64) 
Howick, therefore, abandoned the whole idea of asking for the 
Governorship. 
Howick played his part in drafting the Canada Bill which 
enacted the union of the two Provinces, and Which had its third 
reading on July 18th. In August of that year, however, he 
resigned, and Russell took ovel' the Colonial Office; Poulett; 
Thomson was sent as Governor to Canada, with instructions to 
resist any demand for respons~ble Government, but to be otherwise 
conciliatory. Howick had nothing furthel' to do with Canadian 
affairs until 1846. 
(64) Earl Grey to Howick, February 16th, 1839. 
Once again Hawick had failed to carry measures which he 
strongly desired. and deemed necessaryr;: and for which he had put 
up a hard fight even at the risk of personal unpopularity. It 
may have been better f_or his peace of mind if he had resigned 
over one of the many disputes on Canadian measures which he 
had found himself in a minority; certainly after every such 
incident he bitterly regretted not having done so. He was 
usually a lone dissident voice in the Cabinet, his ideas on the 
best way to solve the Canadian problem being poles apart from 
those of his colleagues; yet the latter, to keep Hawick in 
the Cabinet, and preserve an appearance of unity, frequently 
modified their ow.n measures on Canada, until no one was 
satisfied with, but all accepted, the compromise which resulted. 
Yet it is not fair to ignore the very human feelings which 
stopped Hawick from penning a letter of resignation. By family 
tradition, by his own political philosophy, he was Hound to 
the Whig party; if he separated himself from that party he 
would be reduced to a lone voice in Parliament, to all intents 
and purposes a political outcast, with no more power to have 
an influence in politics; Hawick did not wish to divorce 
himself from politics;. a sense of duty told him that he was 
fulfilling the task for which his talents and class fitted him, 
and that playing a part in the government of the nation was the 
most honourable and important way of using what powers God had 
given him. His resignation over the Slavery Question had been 
greeted with storms of abuse from fellow Whigs. What if he 
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resigned over Canada ? Either his resignation would command 
no support, and would be merely used as a further example of 
his ineptness, or it might bring in i t.s train the downfall of 
the Government, in which case there would be a storm of abuse 
from people of the same political philosophy as himself. When 
a further Whig Government carne to be formed, his party might 
decide to have nothing further to do with him, to reject him 
as an unreliable liability, and all hope of a further spell of 
office (which after all is the most constructive part of a 
politician's career) would disappear. Of course he did 
eventually feel bound to resign, but by August 1839 he felt 
his position in the Cabinet coming to be unendurable, what with 
disputes with his colleagues and with no change in the constitution 
of his own office, and he did have strong objections to the 
changes in public offices which were then made. 
Howick had read Burke's speeches ori the necessity of a 
policy of conciliation towards the American colonies, and he 
applied, as he himself states, Burke's dictums to Canada, Stanley 
and the Tory regime taking the place of Grenville. Just as 
Burke had emphasized the population and wealth of the American 
colonies as sufficient reasons why a war against them or an 
attempt to thwart their aspirations towards internal self-
government, was an act of idiocy, so Howick applied the same 
arguments to Canada. Both agreed that connections with the 
colonies could only be maintained by conciliating public opinion 
in· them, and of governing in accordance with·the wishes of 
colonial opinion. There was one striking difference between 
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the two colonial problems; Burke had not had his theories 
complicated by the existence of two racial groups, both 
antipathetic towards each other; there were no French 9anadians 
in the thirteen American colonies. Hawick attempted to concil.-
"iate the French party in Lower Canada, without losing the 
loyalty of the strong English minority in that province; this 
was an impossible task. · In Upper Canada, he similarly supported 
the aspirations of the progressive party in the Assembly,which 
this time was English. Yet the existence of two colonies, 
not isolated but neighbours, and to a certain extent inter-
dependent on each other, one of which was predominantly French, 
with its own laws, tenures, and language, and the other English, 
was bound to create friction, especially when ,they both wanted 
changes in their Government but for different reasons; the 
French wished to achieve as much control of the exec.utive 
government of Lower Canada a~ ppssible, in order to ensure the 
oftl.c.ar ,.., .. C.I&.SI'W~~ 
survival and predominance A over the English commercial minority 
in the P rovince, with whom Upper Canada, dependent on commercial 
agreements with its neighbour, was sympathetic. Led by 
Papifieau the demands of the French party became more exorbitant 
(seen from the English point of view); Roebuck's plan, given 
goodwill and a conciliatory spirit, among the leaders of the 
colonial politicians, may have restored harmony for a while by 
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its concessions to the French popular party, but it had never 
a chance of success in Britain, and it did not tackle the 
fundamental antagonisms between the two races. Durham's Report 
did just this, Hawick by that time being convinced that the 
English party had to prevail in a united Canada, which since the 
the battle of the Heights of Abraham had been fated to become 
an English colony; the French had to be stripped of much of 
their political power and reduced to a minor role. After that 
it was the task of wise statesmen to treat them considerately, 
give them their fair share of power in a united Canada, and 
trust to time to restore harmony between the two communities, 
and to reconcile the French to the loss of a representative 
government dominated by them. This is what happened, thanks 
to a succession of wise Governor-Generals, and by the time 
Hawick assumed the burdens of the Colonial Office, both French 
and English were well on their way to becoming one community, 
a Canadian community. 
E. Hawick, Glenelg, and Colonial Policy generally. 
Before leaving the colonial field a brief review of 
certain other topics in which Hawick was interested is necessary, 
plus an account of the downfall of Glenelg. To most members 
of the Cabinet what did the affairs of a colony so remote as 
New South Wales, or the course of events in New Zealand, matter ? 
Were not these very unimportant when compared to topics nearer 
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home, such as the feud-with the Lords, the Government's Irish 
legislation, the Government's standing with the Court ? Perhaps 
they were; but they were of vital concern to the inhabitants 
of such colonies, and to the men -in Britain who were especially 
interested in colonial affairs, of Which Howick was one. After 
all the passing of one Bill by the Government, its act~on or 
inaction in one matter, might alter the whole course of the 
development of some remote colony, either to its benefit or its 
disadvantage. It was all the more exasperating to Howick then 
to find that the Colonial Office was saddled with a man of 
Glenelg's character, a man who was not forceful enough to bring 
the importance of colonial questions home to inattentive 
colleagues, was not sufficiently decisive to act alone, and 
who was· above all a procrastinator. 
but a very poor Colonial Secretary. 
An amicable, likeable man, 
He vas another Lord Goderich, 
without a Howick as Under-Secretary to prod him into action, or 
to make decisions for him. This was at -a time when colonial 
affairs were assuming increasing importance, and was thus all 
the more· unfortunate. 
Towards the close of the year 1835 we find Howick 
complaining about Glenelg's inaction over the state of affairs 
on the eastern frontier. of the Cape of Good Hope. Ever since 
the migratory Bantu hordes pushing southwards had met the whites 
moving north in eastern South Africa there had been a frontier 
problem, marked by Kaffir Wars, punitive expeditions, uneasy 
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periods of peace - in short the usual state of affairs when an 
acquisitive, advanced people confront~d more primitive ones 
along an ill-defined frontier. As had been the case in North 
America it was official Government policy to discourage a policy 
of expansion by the white colonists; this only brought in its 
train troublesome native wars and heavy expenses; but of course 
it was never possible to call a halt to expansion, there was 
always the lure of fertile, half-empty land to tempt the 
adventurer onward. Once bands of the colonists crossed the 
frontiers, the Government found itself following with laws and 
troops; on the one hand it had to protect its ovm people, on 
the other it had to see that the natives were not exploited by 
the newcome·rs. The frontier was gra<;lually moving northward, 
despite all attempts to halt it; one such attempt was made by 
Lord Somerset in 1819; by this, all the land between the rivers 
Fish and Keiskarnma was declared neutral territory, and military 
patrols were t~ ensure that both sides kept it empty. This· 
treaty proved ineffective; the whites began to term the neutral 
land the Ceded Terri tory, and meanwhile small bands of Boers 
and British had pushed well to the north of the official frontier; 
at the same time, the nearest Bantu clans, the Xosas, were 
allowed to move back into the neutral land. North of them the 
ci'G ilL 
military power of the Zulus was ~ting havoc, and pushing weaker 
tribes southwards towards the frontiers of the colony. Soon the 
inevitable. happened; an expedition sent by the commander of the 
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frontier troops to recover stolen catt.le. from the Xosas, led to 
the Kaffir War of 1834· Peace was not made by the new Governor, 
D'Urban, until September, 1835; D'Urban advanced the frontier 
to the next great river no:Dth of the Keiskamma, the Kei, and 
announced that all the land between the two rivers was henceforth 
British; he named it Queen Adelaide Province; as for the C.eded: 
Territ9ry, it was to be given out as farms to European colonists. 
The Kaf'fir War was more expensive in more ways than one; about 
a hundred Europeans and Hottentots had been slain, over 450 
farms burnt, ana. thousands of' head of' livestock taken, retaken 
and eaten. The cost to the British taxpayer was £154,000, over 
and above the usual sum of £96,000 for the expenses of' the 
garrison. And the line to be defended as a result of the war 
was fully as long as previously, and more. distant from the 
colony and the seat of government. ( 65) 
The first mention made by Howick of the war was in his 
Journal on November 27, 1835· He tells how Stephen had given 
him a terrible account of the Kaffir War. 'I am not a little 
alarmed at the bill there will be to pay. I fear Ld Glenelg 
is n·ot acting ·with reference to it with the energy and decision 
which are so much required ••• ' That very day Howick endeavoured 
to stimulate the Colonial Secretary into taking active measures, 
but did not succeed. On Decernbe1 .. ·15th, Glenelg and the Kaf.fir 
. 
(65) 'A History of Southern Africa', E.A. Walker, 
1957, PP• 1&4-8. 
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War were prominent topics in a letter Hawick wrote to his father:-
'I am every day getting more and more alarmed at the 
remissness and total want of decision which Ld Glenelg shews 
about every thing •••• you would hardly believe it but the last 
instructions sent to the Governor of th,e Cape about his war with 
the Caffres were signed by Ld Aberdeen, yet there is anything 
but reason to feel satisfied with what is going on, and I fear 
that a most formidable expense has been incurred Which the H. of 
Comm-ons may very reasonably ask why we have left so long 
altogether unchecked.' 
In this case, however, Glenelg and Hawick were agreed as 
to the general lines of policy to be followed in South Africa. 
Both Glenelg and Stephen were inclined to the views of the 
missionaries on the questio:n, and they" and Hawick believed the 
Kaffir War had been an unjust one; therefore Queen Adelaide 
Province had to be abandoned, on grounds of justice, of expense, 
and of the principle of not extending the colonial frontier 
northward to embrace fresh lands. The main difficulty so far 
as Hawick was concerned was to encourage Glenelg to act 
decisively in accordance with his own views. Glenelg prepared 
a despatch ordering D'Urban to surrender the new territory, 
and this was discussed in the Cabinet of December 23rd. There 
Hawick learnt that the King had made a vigorous protest against 
any such surrender;_ Glenelg thought that it would be wrong to 
give in to the King, and Spring Rice supported him, though the 
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others 'had very little opinion one way or the other'. Howick, 
describing this episode, then adds:-
"yet I have no doubt that if I had not been there they 
would all have agreed to yield the point, and I was obliged to 
say in the strongest terms that I would not be a consenting party 
to the despatch being sent out thus deprived of its most essential 
part., but that on the contrary I would join Buxton in denouncing 
such a proceeding. I said that I was willing for the sake of 
soothing His Majesty to consent to the Governors being allowed 
some latitude as to the time and mode of surrendering the 
territory, but that nothing should induce me to agree to the 
despatch being delayed or to the orders for the surrender of the 
territory so unjustly acquired being rendered even a degree less 
peremptory." (66) 
Glenel~"s despatch was du'ty sent, and the matter was at an end. 
Howick, however, had not heard the last of Kaffir Wars; the 
subject recurred during his spell at the Colonial Office in 
Russell's Government. 
The opening month of the following year saw Howick succeed 
in one of his cherished schemes. This was the dismissal of 
Hay from the Colonial Office, Hay the last relic of the Tory 
regime in the department. Information from~eorge Grey in 
November 1835, as to the want of harmony between Hay and Stephen 
led Howick to redouble hie efforts to secure the dismissal of 
the former. Hay was an anomaly in the department; his views 
were not in sympathy with those of his colleagues, and he was 
(66) Journal, December 23rd, 1835. 
253· 
rarely consul ted about an-ything. On January 8th, Hawick 
discussed with Paulett Thomson and Stephen the best means to rid 
the Colonial Office of Hay:-
"it is really too bad that he should be kept there and yet 
allowed to know nothing of what is going on with a pension 
illegally granted him by the late Treasury on wh~ch he would 
retire the moment his friends came into office. ' 
According to Maria, Glenelg was reluctant to dismiss Hay for fear 
that when the Tories came in they would dismiss his brother-in-1m~, 
Philips, from the Home Office. ( 67) Pressure was, however, 
brought to bear, and Hay was dismissed on January 28th, leaving 
Step~en and George Grey in the most important departmental posts. 
1836 found Hawick much concerned with New South Wales, 
the act for the governing of which was due to expire at the end 
of the year. 
The Act under which New South Wales was then governed was 
the 9 Gee. I\t, cap. 83; this had enlarged the nominated 
Legislative Council, had required the Governor to publish drafts 
of Bills eight days before their introduction, and had depriv~d 
him of the power of passing laws without the assent of a majority 
of the Council. There was a strong feeling in the colony that.: 
this act did not go far enough. As early as 1833, Governor Bourke 
L had written to Stan~ly urging that gradual changes might be made 
A 
(67) Journal, January 20th, 1836. 
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in favour of more liberal institutions. He reported that the 
colony was so rapidly increasing in wealth and population that 
soon the demand for a Legislative ASsembly would be made. He 
suggested enlarging by Act of Parliament the Legislative Council, 
making two thirds of it elective, and giving the right to vote 
to all persons qualified to serve as jurors. (68) 
One factor deterred the Home Government from granting more 
liberal institutions to the colony. This was the fact that a 
substantial portion of the colony consisted of ex-convicts; 
New South Wales in fact could not shake off the slur of being 
a convict colony. It was known that in the colony there were 
two parties, the Emigrants and the Emancipists. Bourke hastened 
to assure the home authorities that the opposing bodies were 
not confined to those respective classes of persons, and that 
in the Emancipist party were a large number of free emigrants 
of liberal principles; he also stated that the Government was 
in the entire control of the Emigrant party, and that this was 
in itself an evil. But he failed to overcome the fears of the 
Home Government. 
In 1835 one of iurke's despatches again dealt with the 
A 
same subject, proposing the creation of an Assembly, two thirds 
of which would be elected, and which would sit for four years; 
persons convicted of any~.transpoJ?table crime in any part of the 
'· 
King's dominions would be disqualified from being electors, 
(68) Bell and Morrell, Bourke to Stanley, Dec. 25th, 
1833, p. 12. 
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'with an exception in favour of Convicts who have served their 
time, or been pardoned.' Felons and 'persons convicted of any 
infamous offence in any part of the King's Dominions' could not 
be members of the Assembly. The electors were, as a further 
safeguard, to possess freehold prop~rty of a yearly value of . 
. (6 ) 
£10 in the Counties, of ·£30 in Sydney, or £10 in any other town: 
On June 25th, 1836, the subject of New South Wales. was 
brought up in the 6abinet. The unsatisfactory result of the 
discussion was noted in Hawick's Journal; once again he had 
complaints to make of Glenelg's handling of colonial affairs:-
"Lord Glenelg as usual wishes to postpone deciding upon 
any subject of difficulty and therefore wants merely to continue 
the existing act for one year; I objected to this most vehementl~ 
but of course to no purpose and in the evening before going to 
bed at Eas~combe I wrote to Melbourne telling him that the 
question of the kind of Govt to be given to New s. Wales had been 
under consideration ever since the middle of the winter, that 
Ld Glenelg had then been· informed of the opinions entertained 
upon it both by Thomson and myself, and had been constantly urged 
to bring the subject under·;, disucssion and to have a meeting upon 
it at the Colonial Office to prepare some scheme to be submitted 
to the Cabinet, but that all our endeavours had been in vain 
and no attempt had been made to do anything; I said I was 
(69) Copy, of a Despatch by Bourke. December 26th, 
1835· Colonial Papers. 
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convinced that all conside~ation of the question_would if we 
remained in office be again put off from week to week and from 
month to month until next session had been as nearly wasted as 
this one and that we should then be forced to come to hurried 
dec is ions under the immediate pressure of' necessity and wlilthout 
any real deliberation, but. that I know it was in vain to contend 
with such resolute. indecision and should not therefore again 
worry·myself by a fruitless attempt to do so, that I only wrote 
to him to protest against this postponement of a difficulty 
which will only in consequence be increased and that if he 
chose to allow things to go on in this mariner, and thought it 
creditable to his Government he might, I should interfere no 
further. ' 
Needless to say the subject was postponed. On the 13th 
of December, 1837, Howick was again considering New Sout~ W~les. 
For once he was not on the liberal side; like m~ny of his 
contemporaries he had grave doubts as to whether i.t was wise 
to grant anything like representative institutions to a colony 
which had been founded as a penal_settlement, and which, 
despite the inflow of free immigrants, had still a substantial 
convic·t or ex-convict element amongst its population. Instead 
., 
I 
of the Assembly sugg~sted by Bourke, Howick proposed to leave · 
all power in the hands of a Governor in Council, from which 
authority all laws and the project of the annual budge·t were 
to 'emanate. The propositions of the qovernor were to be 
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discussed in Council but the decision was to rest with him. 
As a concession to popular opinion,. and as a means for making 
the population eventually fit for some form of central represent-
ative government, Howi~k proposed a form of local government; 
this was a favourite topic with him, it appears in his pr9posed 
constitution for New Zealand, drawn up when he was Colonial 
Secretary. All intended laws were to be submitted to these 
elected councils, which could then address the Governor in 
Council praying for their alteration or rejection; in addition 
members -from all the Councils were to meet once a year in Sydney 
to discuss the proposed Budget; no new taxes or items of 
expenditure to which this body dissented could be adopted 
without reference to the Secretary of State. The councils 
would be elected by householders of three years' residence, who 
paid all rates and taxes. Persons who had been convicted of 
felony were not to have the rl,~ht of voting until after the 
expiration of their punishment, and witheut an express restoration 
of their rights. Hawick strongly objected to giving the colon-
ists more control over the Government than he proposed. (70) 
Another year passed by, and still the Colonial Secretary 
was no ne~rer producing an Act to establish. a new. system of 
government in New South.males. In February, 1838, Charles Buller, 
one of the Colonial Reformers, submitted his ovm ideas as to the 
course which ought to be followed; here again we have an example 
of how willingly Howick could work with Radical M p ' 
.... • • s. Buller 
(70) Colonial P apers. New South Wales. 
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put for\vard some very: .. sound objections to Howick' s ingenious 
scheme. He described the municipal councils proposed by Howick 
to be an 'anomalous and cumbrous substitute' for a representative 
body, and to be something for which no one asked; the ideas 
put forward by Howick were wholly alien to the notions of 
Englishmen, nor would they satisfy c~J-lonial pride and colonial 
politicians. There was no effective means in Howick's plan 
for making the will of the Representatives prevail; there was 
also the danger that like the Paris parlement, the Sydney 
municipal council would take the lead and give the tone to the 
other provincial councils. 
i .. \~.;. ,.~· ~ 
Buller suggested continuing the present Legislative 
Council up to August 1839~ it could then be repiaced by a 
colonial Assembly; the elections to this Assembly, as a safe-
guard against too demoncratic a form of government, would be 
indirect, the Assembly itself being elected by municipal 
district courts... Emancipists were not to be excluded from the 
elect.orate, provided they had all the qualifications for 
electors:-
"The emancipists are a fast sinking class and every one. 
agrees that it is not probable that any suffrage would bring 
one of them into the Legislative Council or 3 or 4 into all 
the municipal councils together." 
T.he· colonial Assembly was to consist of nominated and elected 
members, with.twice as many .of the latter. He proposed annual 
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elections, as the people in the remot~districts would probably 
have to choose Sydney residents, eeQ of whom they may know very 
little and over whom they ought therefore to have a very strong 
control; none of the objectjions to annual parliaments would 
apply, as the annual elections would only concern small, select 
and respectable councils. The colonial assembly was to be 
allowed to do what it liked except pass laws repugnant to Imperial 
Statutes specifically binding the Colony or Colonies in general, 
impose duties on external trade, conduct foreign policy, and 
interfere with appropriation of waste lands and their revenues. 
There was to be a permanent Civil List. (71) 
]n May of that same year Hawick produced a memorandum on 
the proposed new constitution for New South Wales. Referring 
to the example of Canada he stated how dangerous it would be to 
give a popular Assembly the control of the public purse; such 
an Assembly would become the supreme power in New South Wales:-
"The great distance of t'b.e Australian Colonies from this 
country and the consequent impossibility of affording effective 
support to the local executive authorities would practically 
contribute very materially to increase the real power which 
will be wielded by representative bodies. What resources 
would a Governor of N.s.w. possess against any possible en-
croachments by a representative body having the power of _with-
holding the pecuniary means of carrying on the ~overnment ? 
( 71) Colonial Papers, New South Wales. 
260. 
He cannot in the most pressing emergency rec·eive an answer to a 
despatch requiring advice or assistance from the authorities at 
home in less than nine months and during that period he would be 
absolutely at the mercy of the Assembly which might extort from 
him his sanction to any law or the adoption of any measure which 
might be demanded. 11 
Howick stated tharo he did not believe that New South Wales was 
yet in a position where she could be granted such powers of self 
government with advantage. 
Nevertheless he was now prepared to accept a colonial 
assembly, but not with such extensive powers as Buller env-isaged. 
The Legislative Assembly, as Howick envisaged it, was to be 
elected by Municipal Councils, and part of it nominated by the 
Governor; it was to sit for four years at a time. The numbers 
nominated by the Governor were to be small; they were not to be 
chosen for their votes but for their judgment and advice, and 
their powers those of explaining and d~fending the Governor's 
measures. The Assembly was to have no power of ·granting money; 
all revenue was to be appropriated by the Governor, who would 
annually lay before the Assembly a statement of the receipts 
and expenditure of the past year and an ~stimate for the ensuing 
year. The Assembly was to have the right of objecting to new 
expenses in the Budget, and such expenses were to be suspended 
until the decision of the Home Government was known; if the 
objections to the new taxes were overruled, they would be intro-
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duced into the following Budget and classed as old taxes. Bills 
were to be sent dovm to the_A8 sembly by the Governor, or leave 
would be given by the Assembly to an individual member to bring 
in a bill; the Governor was to have the supreme power of assenting 
or refusing his assent to bills, reserving them for Her Majesty's 
ple~sure, or returning them to the Assembly with amendments. 
Bills to which the Gove:rnor assented were to be transmitted to 
the Secretary of State, and if not disallowed within two years 
of being received were to become law. Though the Governor was 
to have undivided responsibility, he was to have an Executive 
Council to assist him in his deliberations. This was the repres-
entative body Howick desired, based largely on disillusioning 
experiences with such organs in the Canadian and West Indian 
Colonies. 
Howick still believed that local government bodies were the 
most important provision in any Act for the future government of 
New South Wales. He proposed a series of elected Councils which 
would have all the powers granted to the English Councils by the 
Municipal CorporatiomAct, plus the powers of levying rates for 
the purpos~ of building and maintaining schools, hospitals and 
workhouses, and for making and improving roads and bridges. 'I 
think', he noted, 'the best training for the exercise of political 
power by the Colonists will be the management of their own local 
affairs, I should therefore wish to give as much business and as 
much importance as possible to the Councils. 1 
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Councillors were to be elected by all holders of £10 
tenements who had been resident for one year in the district. As 
for ex-convicts, they would not exercise the right of voting until 
:f'ive years after they became free by pardon or expiration of 
sentence, not having in the interval been convicted of any o:f'fence. 
T.his seemed to Howick to be the best way of dealing with the 
problem o:r the Emancipista; they were too large a body to be 
excluded from the-franchise, yet it was impossible to admit them 
to it indiscriminately. (72) 
Finally he dealt with the question of waste lands, a very 
important question - in a memorandum of that very month he 
advocated raising the price of such lands to a pound per acre, 
the five shillings an acre imposed when he was Under-Secretary 
being merely an initial advance towards a higher figure. The 
proposed Act of Parliament ought to provide that the revenue 
raised by the sale of land should be used for two objects only, 
carrying out emigrants and executing public works of permanent 
utility such as roads, bridges, schools and the like; this last 
· was Howick' s ovcm extension of the G:ibbon Wakefield theory which 
had proposed devoting the entire land fund to bringing out 
emigrants; i~ some correspondence with the New Zealand assoc-
iation in the previous year Howick had advocated using the land 
fund for this dual purpose. ( 73) 
( 72) Memo by Howiclt, May 1st, 1838. Colonial Papers, New 
South Wales. 
( 73) Memo by Howick, May 11th, 1838. Colonial Papers~ New 
South Wales. 
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Hawick's sketch of a Constitutio~ for New South Wales was 
duly sent to Sir Richard Bourke, who sent back some remarks upon 
it. After stating that it would no longer be just or politic to 
resist the demand for British institutions in the colony of which 
he had lately relinJUished the Government, he pointed out that 
there were colonies inferior in every respect to New South Wales 
which had yet representative institutions of their own. He saw 
no reason not to trust the proposed Assembly with financial 
powers, though the Governor.could be given authority to approp-
riate certain revenues for a Civil List. As for the municipal 
councils, ~e believed that a system of direct election to the 
Assembly as in this country would be more readily workable; many 
countjies were so thinly inhabited that they would be unequal 
to the taslt of furnishing a municipal council composed of the 
intelligence and reputation required to deal with such a 
multitu~e of subjects as Howick proposed. With regard to the 
Emancipists he noted:-
'I am not aware that the previous moral character of an 
Elector has anywhere been regarded as a necessary qualification. 
Property is usually considered as giving to the Possessor a 
paramount interest in maintaining the tranquillity and improving 
the condition of the Country in which it is placed. l'iior is there 
the least well-founded apprehension that the Emancipists as a 
Body can possess any considerable in~luence in N.S. Wales; nor 
if they did could it be injuriously exercised whilst as is 
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proposed by the scheme transmitted from the Colony, they are 
declared incapable of being chosen Representatives." ( 74) 
As it happened the Malbourne Government passed no Act for 
the better government of New South Wales. The old act was 
continually renewed until in 1842 Lord St~nley passed his Act 
for t_he Government of New South Wales and Van Diemen' s Land. 
This contained no conces.sion of a Legislative Assembly.; the 
Legislative Counc~l was increased to thirty-six, a third of which 
were to be nominated, the rest elected by householders possessing 
a dwelling of a clear annual value of £20; ex-convicts were 
allowed to vote. 
Once again the Colonial Office had postponed an issue 
which did not seem of vital pressing importance. The various 
proposals from Howick on the subject are interesting in that they 
show his fear.s about the nature of a large part of the population 
·of New South Wales,. and his disillusionment over Legislative 
Assemblies, as a result of the Canadian troubles and as a result 
of the long series of disputes with various West Indian legislat-
ures, particularly Jamaica. T.he constitutional question as it 
concerned Australia was one of the important subjects with which 
he had to deal during his period as Colonial Secretary. 
New Zealand was another_ region which was assuming increasing· 
importance in the late 1830's, and again the Melbourne Government 
postponed taking any measures to decide on its future, until 
(74) Memo by Bourke' July 17th, 1838. Colonial Papers, 
New South W~les. 
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events forced their hand. 
In the early part of the nineteenth century the only white 
men in New Zealand were missionaries, and small numbers of 
whalers:; sealers, traders and men who fi ~ted into no category. 
Most of the land was the preserve, in North Island, of the Maori 
tribes. The British authorities in New South Wales claimed to 
exercise a vague jurisdiction over the whites in tht;~ islands. 
Yet reports of the fertile, thinly-populated lands in New 
Zealand had attracted the attention of the Colonial Reformers, 
the believers in the doctrine of systematic colonization, men 
imbued with the urge to spread the British race and its institut-
ions as far as possible throughout the world; here was an ideal 
place for Gibbon Wakefield and his associates to put into·practice 
their theories. Unfortunately for the would-be colonizers, the 
missionaries - the most important section of the .whites in the 
islands - were opposed to any colonizing ventures; they too 
were ·imbued with zeal, the zeal to convert heathen savages into 
civilized Christians. They feared that colonists woul.d only 
succeed in corrupting their converts, as had happened elsewhere; 
to a certain extent this had already happened, the warlike Maori 
having secured possession of muskets by which they could inflict 
greater devastation upon one another. For many years the 
missionary societies had more influence with successive govern-
ments than any prospective colonizers; furthermore successive 
governments had expressed wishes that no further colonies ought 
to be acquired. 
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Yet the British aut'hori ties slowly and reluctantly moved-
towards incorporating New Zealand within the Empire. In 1832 
Goderich had sent Mr James Busby to the Bay of Is~ands as 
Resident, but with few powers; his most ambitious projec.t had 
been to draw up a federal constitution, for the Maori tribes, an 
(75) 
attempt 'to federate man..;.eaters under parliamentary institutions •. ' 
Meanwhile the French wePe becoming increasingly in teres ted in the 
area, whil~_t "land-sharks" from Sycmey were buying up large 
tracts of land, having come to the conclusio:rj that colonization 
would not long be delayed. In such conditions even the mission-
aries were beginning to realize that colonization was becoming 
inevitable. 
In 1837 "The New Zealand Association" was formed; the · 
man behind the.scenes was Gibbon Wakefield, whilst its members 
included such prominent people as the Earl of Durham, Francis 
Baring, and Sir William Molesworth. The Association attempted 
to get a bill or" constitution through Parliament but failed; 
the year 1837 saw them attempting -to secure Government support 
for any such bill which they introduced. 
One man in the Government who was knovm to be deeply 
interested in colonial affairs and the new doctrines of colon-
ization and who was less under the influence of the missional"'ies 
than Glenelg~ was Howick. Therefore when Melbourne, to whom 
they first applied, told members of the Association to refer the 
topic to Howick, the Association had cause for optimism. 
(75) ·'The Long White Cloud' W.Pember Reeves, 1924. P• 133. 
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On June 27th, Hawick wrote to H.G. Ward, M·.P. a member of 
the Ass·ociation, encl_osing two papers of remarks upon the draft 
of a bill for authorizing the formatiop of settlements in New 
Zealand which had been sent to him. After being careful to state 
that the remarks only represented his OVIIIl individual opinions, 
Hawick stated that the first paper contained a statement of the 
conditions which he thought it would be necessary for the 
Government to insist upon before they gave no opposition to the 
bill, whilst the secon~ contained some modifications of their 
plan, made by Hawick because he took 'a great interest' in the 
matter, and thought that they would tend more to ensure its 
success. 
This second paper contained his extension of the Gibbon 
Wakefield theory to which reference has already been made. He 
believed that about a quarter of the receipts from the sale of 
land should be appli·ed in making r.oads and bridges, 'and perhaps 
even in bu·ilding churches, schools and markets in the district 
where the sale takes place.' He went on to justify the need for 
such an extension of the theory of land sales in an undeveloped 
colony:-
"The principl·e upon which it is recommended that land in 
new ·settlements should only be disposed of' by sale·, the price 
being used in carrying o.ut Emigrants is this, that the effect of 
such a system is to make it the interest of all those who acquire 
land to improve. it, and at the same time to afford them. the 
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means of doing so by providing a due supply of labour. The 
means of communication and transport from one place to another 
are no less essential to the profitable ocoupation of land than 
such a supply of labour, and although less indispensable there 
can be no doubt that the erection of churches, schools, etc. in 
. the districts occupied contribute materially to keep the population 
together in the condition of a civilized community, which it is' 
the great object of the new as distinguished from all former 
systems of colonization to accomplish. With respect to roads 
unless we trust to the ·old, most clumsy, and inefficient method 
of imposing upon each settler the duty of maki_ng them through 
his own property, they can only be obtained by requiring the 
occupiers of land to furnish the funds necessary for their format-
ion and when the difficulty of levying rates in a new settlement 
is taken into consideration there seems little reason to doubt 
that by far the best mo~e of making them contribute to this 
expense would be by an addition to the·upset price for wh~ch 
land would otherwise be sold." 
On 28th June, Ward replied, stating that Hawick's letter 
had given great satisfaction to the Association, and that they 
were ready to remodel their bill :to meet Hawick's sugge-stioJ?s, 
even as to that one. concerning the land fund ·on .. c];Jhich they were 
dubious. He called for a _definitive answer from Hawick, 
either by writing or by allowing a deputation to wait upon him 
the next day. Francis 8aring, Chairman of the Association, wrote 
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to the same effect. In reply, Howick was obliged to state that 
the Association seemed to be labouring under the delusion that 
he could on behalf of the Government give official approval to 
their bill; this was not true, he had merely expressed his ·own 
opinions, and for anything more official they would ~ave to 
approach Melbourne and Glenelg; he had merely suggested alter-
ations which he personally believed would facilitate the bill's 
passage through Parliament. He suggested that they should trans-
mit their altered bill to Melbourne or Glenelg, requesting from 
them the definitive answer that Howick had no authority to give. 
There seems to have been a misunde.rstanding between the 
Association and Howick as to the latter's role. The Association 
believed that when Melbourne advised them to bring the subject 
before Howick, that he h~d given the latter power to decide 
on what foem afbill would meet Go-vernmen:t approval; whilst 
Howick believed that he had no other authority than to give them 
his own personal advice on the subject. The result was that 
two angry letters passed froin Ward to Howick, stating how m·uch 
precious time had been wasted in eliciting a purely personal 
opinion, and how much further time would be consumed in referring 
the subject elsewhere. (76) 
In fact it was not till 1839, when to satisfy the Government 
the Association turned itself into the New Zealand Land Company, 
a joint-stock company, that it won recognition. As for the 
(76) Colonial Papers. New Zealand. 
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colonization of New Zealand it gave the-appearance of forcing the 
Government's hand by sending first an agent, c-olonel Wakefield, 
to buy land, then towards the end of the year sending off the 
first batch of settlers. In June 1839 the G:overnment ordered 
Captain Hobson to annex New Zealand to the Crown, he being 
Lieutenant Governor with the Governor of New South Wales as his 
superior. In May, 1840, came his Treaty of Waitaagi with the 
Maori, which proclnmed the formal annexation of New Zealand. 
We shall hear more of New Zealand during Hawick's period as 
Colonial Secretary. 
1838 saw an increasingly large amount of colonial business 
brought to the attention of Government and Parliament. For one, 
it brought to an end the system of apprenticeship in the West 
Indies against which Hawick had campaigned in 1833-4, two years 
before its allotted time. Singularly enough the leader of the 
widespread agitation for the end of the apprenticeship system 
was Lord Brougham, the main influence in rejecting Hawick's 
scheme for immediate emancipation. 
The Government had to do something to s ilenc·e the clamour 
for the end of the ~pprenticeship system, which public opinion-
believed to be oppressive, so they brought in a bill the purpose 
of which was to provide for the better protection of the 
apprentices, but this failed in ~ts effect. It was gradually 
realized that the Government would have to bow.to public opinion. 
On March 25th, Hawick was busy drafting some resolutions Which 
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he hoped would be adopted by ·the West· India body in London. 
These recommended the abolition of apprenticeship on 1st August, 
the day on which the apprenticeship of the non-praedia.l. 
apprentices (those not .bound up with field labour) was due to end. 
On the following day Howick's resolutions were proposed by one 
of his friends at the meeting of the West Indian body, but were 
rejected. (77) 
On March 29th, in the Commons, -Sir George Strickland .moved 
for all slaves to receive their freedom on August 1st,; Sir 
George Grey on be'Q,alf of the Government ans\:vered, and moved as 
an amendment the second reading of Glenelg's bill.. The following 
day Howick spoke in the adjourned debate; whilst in his inner 
self he desired to see the system of apprenticeship, of which 
he had never approved, ended as speedily as possible, of course 
as a member of the Gove~ment, whose official policy was to end 
the system in 1840 as agreed upon in 1834, he c·ould not reveal· 
this. He spoke of his own course of action in· 1833 and the 
p.art that Brougham had played in the final rejection of his 
~cheme; but he considered that as the apprenticeship system 
had been adopted by Parliament and passed by such large majorities, 
th~ country had bound itself to keep faith with the planters. He 
did, however, express the hope that the colonial legislatures 
would see the expediency of a more immedia.te emancipation. 
Though Howick had tried to be cautious in his speech, he was the 
next day, in low spirits about it·; according to Maria, 'he said 
(77) Journal, March 25th-26th, 1838~ 
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at the Cabinet they.all looked rather black at him.' (78) 
On May 22nd, Russell was beaten on Sir· E. Wilmot's motion 
for immediate emancipation by 96 to 93. On May 28th, Sir George 
Grey had to move another resolution stat·ing that the House of 
Commons would not act on its former one; this the Government 
succeeqed in carrying. 
The West Indian legislatures saw that public opinion in 
Britain was determined to secure the speedy end of apprenticeship; 
furthermore Glenelg's ne~ bill might have the effect· of rendering 
apprenticeship more difficult to work. Therefore, one by one, 
in the course of 1838, they of their ow.n aQcord abolished the 
apprenticeship system. 
There still remained the same problem which had confronted 
the Gove.rnment ·in .1833, when immediate emancipation was mooted. 
Would the negroes once they were no longer bound to the plantations 
leave them, seek to earn a living by cultivating grounds of t~eir 
own, .and thus leave the plantations short of labour '? 
. On Apri:~ 9th, Howick wrote to Russell, saying· that 1 t was 
essential to have any change in the condition of apprentices~ip 
followed up by further measures; after stating that he believed 
the best policy would be to persuade the colonial legislatives 
to abolish apprenticeship 'at the conclusion of next crop' -
news did not reach Britain of the first acts of the colonial 
legislatures to abolish apprenticeship (ill towards the end of 
June ·- Howick returned to his arguments on land and a land tax 
(78) Journal, March 30th, 1838. 
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which he had brought forward in 1833-34. He stated that :he had 
learnt that if' apprenticeship was allowed to continue till 1840, 
the Anti-Slavery body would oppose any measures for restricting 
the facilities for obtaining and occupying land. But:-
" if' no such measures are adopted, I am convinced that it 
is utterly in vain to hmpe that in colonies where there is a 
vast extent of fertile and unoccupied land (as Guiana, Tran~dad 
and Jamaica) it will be possible to keep up the existing system 
of cultivation, you will have the negroes becoming almost 
universally squatters like the American backwoodsmen, and you 
will ,consequently have society in its rudest state." 
'~ow the more experience we have of Gibbon Wakef'ield's· 
theory about the occupation of' land, the stronger is the evidence 
of its truth, and I am quite convinced that if' proper pains were 
taken both with the West Indians here and through the Governors 
with the Members of' Assemblies in the Colonies, they might.be 
made to see how strong an interest they have in at once adopting 
measures founded upon this theory and in putting the earli~st 
possi~le end to the system of apprenticeship. I still think 
that the easiest and simplest mode of applying the principle 
established by Gibbon Wakefield in the peculiar circumstances of' 
the West. Indian Colonies, would be that p~oposed by me in 1833, 
I 
namely the imposition of a land tax upon provision grounds in 
lieu of the existing taxes ••• the great advantage of' adopting 
. ' 
this measure now would be that it would afford the means of 
making provision for the old and infirm negroes, and of giving 
compensation to the Masters for ·~osing two years' service of·· 
their predial apprentices. The provision for the destitute negroes 
I need hardly say should in my opinion be the same with that 
_which we propose for the destitute Irish- reception in a well 
ordered workhouse." 
He su~gested that a despatch should be sant out with Glenelg'·s 
Act when it had received the Royal Assent, pointing out the . 
r.easons why apprenticeship ought to end as soon as possible,' :and 
indicating measures by which its abolition could prove satisfactory 
to all parties. 
On June 21st, 1838, Sir George Grey told Hawick how it 
seemed that the West Indian Legisl~tures woul~ abolish the 
apprenticeship system on August 1st of that very year. On the 
22nd, no doubt as a result of this news, Howick wrote a letter to 
Glenelg on the subject. On the following day, Glenelg replied 
and asked for Hawick's heads of measures to be adopted on the 
termination of apprenticeship in the Crown Colonies. Hawick 
spent part of that day in the library of the House of Commons .. 
rewriting a sketch of measures to accompany th~ end of apprentice-
ship; on the 25th he· sent this paper to Glenelg. ( 79) 
The proposals in this paper were substantially those which 
Ho.W.i9.lt had advocated together wi.th Emancipation in ~833-4. All 
the duties on eXports or imports imposed by colonial laws, 'except 
any duties on th~ importation of flour or other provisions,' 
(79) Journal, June 22nd-23rd, 1838. 
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were to be repealed; the deficiency of revenue because of their 
repeal was to be met by a land tax, which was to be assessed at 
various rates per acre depending upon the way in which.the lan~ 
was used; all land cultivated solely for the purpose of raising 
exportable produce was to be exempt from the tax; all land on 
which the land tax was not paid was to revert to the Crown, and 
in future no further land was to be alienated for a smaller 
price than two pound an acre. In additiqn there were provision~ 
made for workhouses, schools, elected local committees, a polic~ 
force, and special magistrates. The·object of repealing the 
duties on imports was to encourage the negroes to acquire a 
liking for article's more than mere necessaries, a liking for 
luxuries being one of' the steps towards civilization; such 
desire would encourage greater work from them, whils~ a land 
tax would compel them to more exertions. The planter would pay· 
the land tax in the first instance, and would be re-imbursed by 
charging it as a rent against the wages of' his labourers. ( 80) 
·However, Glenelg chose not to act upon Howick' s recommend-
ations. On June 30th, the Colonial Secretary showed Howick his 
intended despatches dealing with the end of' apprenticeship in 
Jamaica and the Crown Colonies. Howick noted in his Jou~al 
that these were:-
. "right as far as they go but miserably defective, ~xplain;ng 
nothing, suggesting nothing, and in spite of my ea~est recommend-
ation no allusion to the land question, the key to the whole. 
(80) Draft of Heads of Measures proposed to accompany the 
abolition of apprenticeship in the Crown Colonies, 
June 23rd, 1838. Slavery Papers. 
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I remarked upon this, he said the w. Indies would not hear of' 
the land tax ••• " 
Another topic which concerned certai_n colon·ies arose in 
1838; this was the question of transportation; in some colonies. 
to which criminals were transported there was growing dissatis-
faction at their being made a dumping ground for undesirables 
from the Mother Country; the only advantage of the system was 
that convicts supplemented a scanty supply of' labour. In 
Britain too there was a growing body, especially amongst those 
who held by the new colonizing.theories, opposed to the system. 
In 1837-8 a Committee of' the House of' Commons under Sir William 
Molesworth, himself a Colonial Reformer, conducted an enquiry 
into the whole system. Its Report· concluded that transportation 
was not efficient in deterring people from crime, and that the 
forms of punishment in the colonies where convicts were sent 
only succeeded further in corrupting the criminal. It recommended 
that transportation to New South Wales and the settled districts 
of Van· Diemen's Land should end as soon as possible~ that crimes 
punishable by transportation should in future be punished by 
confinment with hard labour, either at home or abroad; places 
of punishment abroad should be as far as possible limited to 
areas -where there were no free settlers; and that the rules by 
which periods of punishment were abridged :f'or good conduct should 
be made less vague and arbitrary. 
Hov11ick was in agreement with the principles outlined in 
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the Report, in fact he was one of the main people responsible 
for drawing it ·Up. Amongst his .papers there are some proposed 
Resolutions dated May 31st_, which he had drawn up for the 
Committee, and though differing in some respects from the final 
Report, with this he was very satisfied; on July 30th, he 
noted in the· Journal:-
"I was for about two hours in the smoking room with Moles-
worth going over with him for the last time the draft· report of' 
the :Transportation committee which is· at length in a shape that 
I upon the whole thing very much approve." 
In November of that year Howick wrote a memorandum on the 
question of transportation. In conformity with the recommendat-
ions .of the Committee he suggested that steps should be taken for 
the erection of penitentiaries at home for those guilty of the 
less ... heinous crimes, but which nevertheless had the penalty of' 
transportation attached to them. In the meantime people convicted 
of this category of' crimes should be as far as possible sent to 
the hulks or Bermuda. It was also necessary to decide where 
those sentenced for more serious crimes we.re t.o be detained, so 
that permanent prison buildings could be erected or enlarged 
there ~s well; Norfolk Island, the Ionian Islands, St. Helena, 
and the Falkland Islands were all possibles. Howick favoured 
Norfolk Island but before convicts could be sent there, _the whole 
system of discipline and punishment at present pursued ~here had 
'to be changed; he suggested that this should be done in conformity 
wi-th the recommen d.ations of' the Report, which was in this respect 
mainly·based upon the recommendations of a certain Captain 
Maconochie, who had carried out a thorough investigation ·of prison 
discipline in force in Britain's convict establishments in 
Australasia. Howick proposed the appointment of Maconochie as 
Lieutenant Governor of Norfolk Island. He suggested that at 
the end of a year no convicts sentenced to fourteen years. trans-
portation or more were to be sent to New South Wales or Van 
Diemen's Land, and those sentenced for shorter periods were to 
be sent only when it was impossible to dispo~e of them at home. 
Instructions, he advised, should be sent to the Governors of 
New South. Wales and Van Diemen's Land ordering them to discontinue 
the practice of assigning convicts as far as possible, and to 
introduce the new recommended systems of discipline for road and 
chain gangs. ( 8l) Again the whole question of transportation 
was one of the pressing problems, which Hawick had to face when 
he became Colonial Secretary. 
1838 saw mounting dissatisfaction with Glenelg's conduct 
of Colonial affairs. On March 6th: .. 1838, Sir William Molesworth 
moved in the Commons that Lord Glenelg did not enjoy the confidence 
of the-House; Palmerston on behalf of the Government-opposed the 
mot.ion. 'In his speech,' wrote Maria, 'he· stated ~ case a 
little too high as he put Ld Glenelg forward as the individual 
. . 
(81) Memo. November 23rd, 1838. Colonial Papers. 
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on whom we most prided ourselves - the brightest jewel of the 
Cabinet'. ( 82 ) 
Molesworth's motion was defeated by 316 votes to 287. 
T.he management of colonial affairs was in no ways improved 
after this vindication of Glenelg's competence. On July 14~h, 
Hawick told Maria that:-
~ ••• Mr Stephen had been to him in a state of despair 
about the business of the Colonial Office and saying that it was , 
a time of peculiar emergency and that nothing would be done· if 
Lord Glenelg was left to himself during the recess - so he 
modestly proposed that Henry should stay. H. however said that 
was quite impossible but he promised to attend as much as possible 
at a distance to all that should be sent to him. ' 
On August 11th, Howick found himself riding with Lord John 
Russell and discussing other members of their Government. After 
Lord .. John had remarked upon the singularity of a person with 
Lord Melbourne's opinions and habits being at the head of a 
reforming ministry, the conversation turned to Glenelg. Howick 
suggested that the only way in which colonial affairs could be 
dealt V!li th efficiently would be for Lord John and Glenelg to , 
switch .offices. Russell said that he had thought· of this but 
had be~n prevented from suggesting it by· the fear t.hat he sh,ould 
not like the business of the Colonial Office, and that if Glenelg 
were at the Home Office the Irish poor law ~auld fail. 
(82) Journal, ·March 6th, 1838. 
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]n November, 1838, there.were reports in the papers of ' . 
intended changes in the Ministry. Earl Grey in a letter to his 
son on November lOth, mentioned these reports; he thought tha.t 
Hobhouse and Glenelg would be the easiest persons to remove. The 
only way to gain increased strength in the Government would be . 
to give Howick'a more efficient situation,' which would entail 
. -
as Earl Grey had already hinted when his son was in the north,, 
him being called to the House o·f Lords. He hoped that Hawick . 
would.not suffer anyone to be placed over his head in the 
Commons; 'you could not gtve way to anyone without pers:on.ldis~ 
credit.' In the House of L_ords Grey could s-ee no one 'whose 
promot~on to a high office could be of any use'. The inference 
w~s ob~ious; Howick ought to be in the.Lords as Colonial Secretary. 
On November 26th, Howiclt replied t·o his father's letter. 
He stated that he could not be .the one to propose changes in the 
Government, it might appear as though he wished to leave a sinking 
ship, and 'it might seem that my object was to obtain a better 
office for myself.' Evidently Hawick had more scrup1es on 
this point than his father:-
"With respect to measures I shall have no scruple in 
pressing for those which I think necessary, but unfortunately it 
is not very easy to point out specific measures upon which one 
can insist although it may be very obvious that the-re is neglect· 
and a want of energy which ought to be corrected. Th4s is 
particularly the case in the colonial office, what is required at 
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this moment is not so much any one or two measures which can be 
proposed in the cabinet, but the adoption of a number of minor 
ones which no individual member of the-government can ask for 
without taking the business of the Secretary of State out of his 
hands. The mere absence of vigour in the conduct of affairs 
although the most fatal fault is one which only gives ground 
for a· personal objection which I can not make. 11 
However, a crisis soon arose over cqlonial policy, on .tn.e 
differences in this respect between Howick and the remainder of 
his colleagues, and on Glenelg's fitness for his post, which wa~ 
to see the downfall of the Colonial Secretary. It concerned 
the situation in the West lndies. 
On January 23rd, 1839, Hovtick wrote to his father complaining 
that though it was less than a fortnight to the meeting of 
Parliament 'many of the most important measures which ought to 
be brought in at once not only not decided -upon, but not even 
discussed in the Cabinet.' This censure particularly applied 
to colonial measures:-
"As to Canada Glenelg has some excuse in not having yet 
receive.d Lambton 's report, but there is no such excuse and the 
most. pressing necessity for decided action with regard to the 
West Indies, and though they are less important the Australian 
bill which has been now regularly promised for 3 sessions, and 
' 
another respecting New Zealand cannot be neglected without great 
disgrace ••• I am in the gr~atest doubt about what I ought to do. 
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On the one hand I have the strongest objection to continuing a 
party to.such a system of neglect of most important interests, 
and on the other it is difficult when I have only inaction to 
complain of, and inaction Which would be less serious if it did 
not exist with reference to so many different subje~ts, for me 
to take any steps for relieving myself without it appearing as 
if I had a wish to turn out Glenelg for the purpose of obtaining 
his situation." 
Within a few days a specific difference did arise between 
Hawick ··and Glenelg, and the former seized upon this as a chance 
of resi1gning and being no longer .a party to a colonial policy 
of. which he:_.d.isapproved. The Assembly in Jamaica had long been 
a .troublesome body to successive Governors of. the island and to 
the·Home Government, particularly at the time when the emancipation 
of the slaves had taken place; composed mainly of people connected 
with. th.e plantations, not o\mers but over~eers, attornies and the 
like, and who were, therefore, deeply interested in a. cheap 
supply of labour, it had long endeavoured to obs~ruct any measures 
which seemed to favour the negroes, and to make them less 
amenable to the plantation officers. Reluctantly the Assembly 
I 
had realized in 1838 that the apprenticeship system was doomed, 
and that rather than be forced to abolish it, the members of 
that bo.dy had decided to proceed to its abolition of their QW!l 
accord. Once the question of the status of the negro had been 
settled, . the Assembly believed that the Imperial Government 
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would leave it free to manage its own internal affairs. The 
Imperial Government, .as a result of previous exPeriences of the 
Assembly, distrusted that body, and in its concern to do every-
thing possible to see that no further cruelties befell the negro, 
and to see him advance upon the path toward a more civilized 
and higher standard of life, was not prepared to leave matters 
regulating his welfare to the colonial representative body. 
In October, 1838, there arrived in Jamaica a copy of a British 
Act, 1 and 2 Vidt, cap 67, for the Better Government of Prisons 
in the West Indies., which empowered the Privy Council o.r the 
Governor in Council to make regulations for the government o~ 
all prisons and workhouses in each colony. The Jamaican Ass~mbly 
believed that this was an interference in their inte~al affairs, 
a sphere in which they believed themselves alone to have any 
powers; they protested violently against the Act, stated it was. 
a violation of their 'inherent rights' as British subjects, and 
refuse.d to do any further business. The Governor, Sir Lionel 
Smith, first prorogued, then dissolved the Assembly. The general 
election which followed resulted in the return of most of the old 
members. On December 4th, Smith prorogued the new House to 
February 5th. Writing to his superiors at the Colonial·Office, 
he observed:-
"If the Assembly is let alone as it hopes, the bulk of' the 
people will again be placed in slavery." 
He suggested that Jamaica should be governed by an Order in 
I 
- ' 
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Council in future. A despatch in reply assured him th~t a 
measure would soon be introduced in Parliament 'with a view to 
applying an effectual· remedy for the state of affairs which has 
unfortunately arisen in Jamaica. ' (83) 
On January 28th, 1839, the British Government held its 
first Cabinet to consider the latest West Indian problem. 
' According to Howick the need for strong Parliamentary inte~fer.ence 
in the affairs of' all the Chartered colonies - note, not only 
Jamaica - in the West Indies had been evident from the very 
beginning of the session• Yet Glenelg had given no guidance 
1 
as to what he believed ought to be done until January 19th; on 
that date he had forwarded to each member of the Cabinet a 
printed memorandum, which Howick states was:-
'very ably written indeed (of course not by himself) 
stating what.the present situation of' these colonies ~sand what 
are the various laws and reforms which are required in them in 
consequence of the recent changes in the state of society.•< 84) 
This memorandum had not recommended a particular mode of 
proceed~ng, it had merely pointed out the necessity of legislating 
for Jamaica and the remainder of the Chartered Colonies. Howick 
believed that if the Government wished to ensure 'the real 
success of the great experiement of emancipation' vigorous action 
(83) 'Emancipation and Apprenticeship in the British West 
Indies.' W.L. Burn. p. 361. 
(84) Howick to Earl Grey, January 31st, 1839. 
would have to be taken against obstructive assemblies in all 
the chartered colonies. 
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On January 28th, ho\¥ever, Glenelg brought to the attent·ion 
of his colleagues his proposed bill, which intended simply to 
suspend the sittings of the Assembly of Jamaica, and to give its 
powers for a period of about five years into the hands of the 
Governor and Legislative Council. As for the Windward and Lee-
ward Islands he proposed to do nothing, in direct contradiction 
to. the reasoning of the paper sent from his own office, 1 ho~ding 
out some vague expectation that he would propose some measure 
later in the session.' In his Journal Howick described the bill 
as 'a most paltry measure'; in the Cabinet his expressions 
may have been equally forthright, for he protested strongly 
against Glenelg's proposal, and suggested a far wider measure. 
He was supported only by Thomson. A very unsatisfactory dis-
cussion ensued, which showed, according to Howick, that the 
Cabinet 'had very little knowledge indeed of the subject, apd 
that the timid and unsatisfactory course recommended by Glenelg 
would certainly have their general support.• 
for ·the moment was deferred. 
A final decision 
After· the Cabinet was over, Hawick accompanied Lord John 
Russell back to the Home Office. He attempted to show to Russell 
the unfairness of deferring subjects of such importance, which 
. . 
might h~ve been considered six months earlier, to within a few 
days of the meeting of Parliament; at such a time a decision 
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could no longer be deferred, so the matter was decided without 
due consideration. Howick then turned to the question of the 
gulf of opinion on colonial. questions bet\Veen himself and t~e 
rest of the Cabinet. He thought that \'lith respect to coloni,al 
problems there was a general disposition 'to follow the most 
timid and hesitating policy'. He concluded by informing Russell 
that the best course would be for him to attend the next Cabinet 
on West .. Indian affairs and to resign if this proved unsatisfactory. 
T~at same evening Howick passed in writing a paper on the 
i 
course· which ought to be adopted on this question. The next 
morning .. he sent this· paper to Lord H~lland, who had been absent 
fr.om the Cabinet, and on January 30th, he sent the paper to 
Russell.- The remainder of January 29th, he passed in writing 
'a long.paper for Glenelg about New Zealand.' 
The second Cabinet on West· Indian affairs took place on 
January 30th. Hawick's paper was read at this meeting, but it 
was decided to adopt Glenelg's proposal. ·Again after the 
Cabinet was over he accompanied Russell back to the Home Off~ce. 
Howick stated that his previous opinions had been confirmed. 
Russell said that the decision of the Cabinet was not final, 
and that from the discussion there had emerged a fact of which 
previously he had not been aware; this was the necessity of 
compelling the smaller islands to pay for the establishment of 
improved courts·of justice. Russell believed that there was no 
immediate necessity for interfering with the legislatures of 
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the smaller islands, and that there were many advantages in d~al­
ing in· the first place only with Jamaica; these advantages would 
not·exist if on one· particular point the Government was compelled 
to over-rule the other Assemblies; in such a case a complete .. 
measure applying to all the Chartered colonies might well be 
more expedient. Howick believed that he had already mentioned 
Russell's 'new' fact in the discussion, and that it had had 
great weight in deciding his own opinion. Howick observed that 
he did not consider himself of any real use in the Government, 
and that he thought that his retirement would not in any way 
weaken it. Russell did not agree with this; the previous year 
Howick had dissented from other members of the Cabinet over the 
Irish Church (Howick having been loath to abandon the appropriation 
clause, though.no measure would have passed the Lords in which 
this formed a part), and now his resignation might encourage 
the discontented to say that the Government was not sufficiently 
liberal. He asked Howick to defer sending in his resignation f'or 
at least a day; to this Howick agreed. 
· · On that same day, the 30th, Howick wrote a letter of 
resignation to Melbourne, but in deference to Russell's request 
did not send it. This mentioned the differences between himself 
and the rest of his colleagues on colonial affairs. Only 
I 
Hawick's wish to avoid separating himself from these·colleagues 
had.kept him in the Cabinet, and had induced him to go further 
than perhaps was wise in· sacrificing his opinions, but:-
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'I feel in duty bound to decline any further to be a party 
to measures of which I cannot conscientiously approve. I regard 
the present state of the w. Indian Colonies as most critical, 
and so affording an opportunity upon the right use of which it 
depends whether these Colonies are speedily to rise into a 
state of civilization and prosperity, or are to sink into yet 
deeper barbarism. ' 
He pointed out that the memorandum of the 19th from Glenelg's 
office had shown the necessity of the interposition of the 
lA,.. , 
Imperial legislat~, and had revealed the glaring defects of 
the system of government and the laws in all the Chartered 
Colonie~. Yet Glenelg had decided to defer any complete measure: 
to apply to all the Chartered Colonies, and that even with 
regard to Jamaica, judging from the tone of the Cabinet discussion, 
a less vigorous measure t.han Hawick wished to see adopted, would 
be passed. 
'I am so deeply convinced that the final success of the 
great experim~nt of the abolition of Slavery, for the acc·omplish-
ment of.which this Country has sacrificed so much, will thus be 
greatly endangered, that •••• I feel obliged to declare that I 
cannot take upon myself any part of the responsibility for the 
course which it has been determined to adopt.' 
He ~equested Melbourne to lay his resignation before the Queen. 
On January 31st, Hawick sent this letter to Russell, 'that 
you may take the most convenient time for forwarding it unless 
you see some strong reason for further delay. ' It crossed a 
letter from Russell. 
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In th±s letter, Russell stated that he had told Lord 
Melbourne on Tuesday, 29th, that if Howick persisted in resigning, 
then he would probably follow his example. He had now decided 
that though he would continue in office until after the debate 
on the Address, he would resign shortly afterwards. Not that 
Russell agreed with Hawick on this West Indian_question, nor 
that he thought that the Ministry would be shattered by the loss 
of Hawick's services, but Russell agreed in the 'dissatisfied 
feeling as to the conduct of Colonial Affairs which has led to 
your resolution'. When Russell. dwelt on the prospect of new 
measures with respect to Canada and the West Indies, and on 
Hawick's retirement, he believed:-
'! cannot but be sensible that I must either take my line 
now or acquiesce _in a future management of our Colonies which 
gives me no confidence and imposes a responsibility I do not 
choose to incur.' 
He left Howick at liberty to act as his judgment and honour 
directed• 
Here was a quandry for Howick. One thing he had always 
dreaded·, that his resignation would in some way bring about the 
break up of the Government; had not earlier considerations of 
the possibility of resignation been. put aside for fear of this 
very outcome ? And now her.e was Russell, the leader of the 
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party in the Commons, and the ablest man in the Cabinet, stating 
that he intended to follow Hawick's example and resign; and 
how could the Government continue to exist without Russell ? 
Therefore, on receipt of Russell's letter, Howick immediately. 
replied, hinting that on certain conditions he might withdraw 
his resignation in order to keep Russell in the Government:-
"I feel however that your .leaving the Home Office would 
be such a misfortune to this_country and more especially to 
Ireland, that if I could see that my remaining in the Government 
would enable you more effectively to advocate such a system of 
Colonial Policy as would be satisfactory to us both and if you 
could hold out any reasonable prospect that such a system would 
be adopted, I should be ready to sacrifice any personal feeling 
of my own to prevent your resignation." 
It seems a mistaken move on Hawick's part. He differed as 
widely from Russell on colonial questions as from any other member 
of the Cabinet. The only thing that Russell and he were agreed 
upon was that Glenelg was not a fit person to h~~dle the affairs 
of·the colonies. Therefore, the only way that Russell could act 
in a manner agreeable to Howick would be by removing Glenelg, 
certainly not taking Howick's side in the West Indian disputeo 
His fear of Russell's resignation and its possible effects had 
led Hawick to shift the emphasis from a question of principle 
_(the West Indian measure) to a question of personality (the 
removal of Glenelg), which was the very thing that he had wanted 
to avoid. 
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On Friday, February 1st, Hawick had an interview with Lord 
Melbourne; no further advance was made than the last letter from 
Hawick to Russell had announced the former was willing to make:-
"i;f' they could propose any satisfactory arr·angement I was 
willing to continue in office to prevent J.R.'s resignation, but 
if no arrangement couldLbe suggested I must adhere to my 
resolution. 11 
Lor.d Melbourne believed that it was .impossible at that moment 
to •make a change in the Colonial Office; he was also anxious 
that the same thing should not happen that had led to the famous 
duel between Castlereagh and Canning, that is agreeing on a time 
when Glenelg could be turned out of office, and meanwhile allowing 
him to continue in it, being unaware of this decision. Lord 
Glenelg's voluntary retirement was aleo out of the q.uestion; 
when Melbourne had offered him in the autumn a less strenuous 
' lu.s. 
and important place, Glenelg had replied that he had no thoughts 
A 
of leaving public life, particularly at a time of such danger. 
Melbourne stated that Glenelg was quite unconscious of his own 
inadequacy. In the afternoon of that same day, Hawick had a 
talk with Thomson, who believed that the only solution of the 
prol:>l~rn would be for Russell to insist. on a change in the Colon-ial 
Office once the debates on the Address were over. 
On the Saturday at Lord Melbourne's desire, P.al:rilei!stoljecame. 
to see Howick, and suggested that Russell should ha~e a sQper-
intending authority over G~enelg. Hawick rejected this as 
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impossible, ~s did Russell when it was proposed to him. Later 
that day Howick had another conversation with Russell, who stated 
that he had more than once told Melbourne that a change was 
necessary at the Colonial Office, but that Melb_ourne had always 
replied that the present was peculiarly inconvenient. Russell 
said that he would now propose that the Marquis of' Normanby 
sh·ould replace Glenelg when the debates on the Address were over; 
otherwise Russell was determined to resign. Howick stated that 
he feared that Normanby's appointment would not relieve hi~ 
altogether from the difficulty in which he was placed. This 
difficulty had not arisen solely because of Glenelg's mismanage-
ment-, but because of' a real difference on colonial policy between 
himself and the rest of the Cabinet. His ow.n resignation would 
also remove. the dif'ficul ty over the Army and the ques.tion as to 
whether the recommendations of' the Commission's Report were to 
be carried out or not. Russell left the problem of' Howick's 
resignation to be settled between Howick and Melbourne. 
From seeing Russell Howick returned to the War Office. 
There he penned a note to Lord Melbourne saying he had better 
act upon Howick's letter, which Russell had now forwarded to him. 
Before he could send this he received a message from Sir George 
Grey, who wished to see him. Grey wanted to speak about a 
proposed alteration 1n the part of' the Queen's Speech referring 
to the West Indies; Howick told him that he was no longer con~ 
cerned, and that he had resigned. Grey urged him not to persevere 
in his intention of' resigning, and said that if' Howick did so, 
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he too would resign. 
· Thus far, Howick had in his conversation with Russell 
attempted to swing the question back to the point that there 
were differences of principle between himself and his colleagues 
on colonial affairs. He was obviously still inclined towards 
resignation as a solution of this problem, and also a solution 
of the unsatisfactory nature of his tenure of the War Office. 
-' 
Now he was threatened by a further member of the Government, 
one of their best debaters in the Commons, resigning if he 
himself persevered in his intention. At this point, Melbourne 
sent him a note saying that he had seen Palmerston and Russell 
after their in.terviews with Howick, and begging the latter to 
call on him. At this meeting Melbourne asked him whether it 
would satisfy him if Glenelg were to resign as soon as the 
session had fairly begun, say when the debates upon the Address 
were over. Everyone was satisfied that it would be inconvenient 
for Glenelg to resign immediately before the meeting of Parlia-
ment• Lord Lansdowne it appeared·also desired a change at the 
Colonial Office. Howick said that he could have no objection to 
this course being taken, but stipulated that the odium of the 
personal objection, was not to be thrown upon himself:-
"! had never made such an objection but had put my resign-
ation upon the distinct ground of my differing from the majority 
of the Cabinet, it was J.R. who had stated the perso~al objection 
the justice of which I had not been able to deny." 
Melbourne said·that G~enelg would at once lay the blame for his 
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dismissal upon Howick, and then what could the Prime Minister 
answer· ? Howick replied that Melbourne should clearly tell 
Glenelg that the personal objection had been made by Russell; 
he further added that the best course for all parties would be 
the acceptance of his resignation, as he feared that a new 
·;;. 
Colonial Secretary would make no difference to the real gulf 
which existed between himself and the Cabinet over colonial policy. 
Melbourne announced his anxiety to keep the Government .together, 
and his fear that if any of the Cabinet resigned, the Government 
would collapse. Howick left to Melbourne the decision as to 
whether to accept or rej·ect his own resignation. Melbourne 
promised to show him his letter to Glenelg before it was sent. 
On. Su~day, as Howick and Maria came out of Chur·ch, there 
was an unusual incident:-
'we were stopped~ a Messenger with a box from Lord John 
which must have looked very odd to the people who were crowding 
out of Church and H. said he feared it would make a story in 
the papers.' 
Enclosed in the box was a letter from Melbourne to Russell, plus 
the draft of Melbourne's letter to Glenelg. Howick could find 
no objection to the latter and so returned it to Russell. 
And what of the West Indian question which had precipitated 
this crisis ? The only further reference to this is at the con-
clusion of a letter Howick wrote to his father on February 4th:-
'It is just post time so I must conclude without stating 
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why this concession has induced me to waive my difference upon 
the particular point respecting the West Indie~. I can only. 
mention that the postponement of a measure becomes a very 
different thing when Glenelg is not to be the judge when it 
should be brought forward again and that G. Grey has stated to 
me reasons for some delay which Glenelg in the discussions never 
explained.' 
Unfortunately Hawick never elaborated upon this point. 
Yet Hawick in this letter to his father never mentioned 
his r.eal feelings on that particular day. It was left to Maria 
to note these in the Journal:-
"Henry is become very unhappy at having acc.eded to the 
arrangement which has been made. to piece up the Government and 
get Ld Normanby into the Col. Office. He thinks it never having 
occurred to any one, that he should have the Col. Seals is a 
proof that they disapprove of his Co!L. Policy and if so he differs 
from theirs and that he ought therefore to have gone out of 
office. He made that impossible by that second letter to Ld 
John in which he stated his extreme anxiety not to break up the 
Govt on account of Ireland and t:~at, he would acc:ede to any 
arrangement that satisfded Ld John and himself about Col policy 
for the great object of' retaining Ld John in office." 
On February 5th,. Hawick received a letter from his father 
approving what had been done, but s:aying that Hawick ought to 
have succeeded Glenelg, not Normanby. On the same day Glenelg 
296. 
received the fateful letter. Reports said that he was ·greatly 
affected by it; he compl~ined most of the time that had been 
chosen, in that it made it appear as though he was running away 
·from the discussion on his own measures. He refused to go to 
the Colonial Office or append his signature to anything, and 
resigned at once. Maria observed that reports said that Glenelg 
was very embarrassed in his circumstances, and that the loss-of 
his salary would be keenly felt. (B4) 
On February 18th, Hawick wrote to Earl Grey the following:-
'! most deeply regret having been induced to withdraw my 
resignation. I see now that I. acted very foolishly, but having 
been under the necessity of deciding viThat I was to dow i th very 
little time for consideration I shrank from the responsibility 
which was I think very unfai~ly thrown upon me of breaking up 
the Govt. at such a moment.' 
The fate of the eventual Government measure on the West 
Indies is well kno\m. It suspended the constitution of· Jamaica, 
and wa.s thus objectionable to many of the Government's Radical 
supperters. On May 6th, there was a division of 294 to· 289 on 
the Jamaica bill, ten Radicals voting with the Tories,_ and 
several others staying away, whilst five Tories voted with the 
Government. The Cabinet decided to resign. Maria commented:--
'! think Henry·was decidedly glad to be out of office I ••• 
principally lamented the great improbability I felt there was of 
any Govt being ever formed with which.Henry would ever be able 
to act.' 
(84) For this crisis see Howick's letter to Earl Grey Jan 31st. 
(P.T.O. back of page) 
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Howick 1 s gladness was short-lived; there occurred the Bedchamber 
Question ~nd the return of the ~bigs to power. They could no~. 
·go on with the Jamaica Bill, and a less efficient measure had 
to take its place.. This fact made Howick ·more than ever regret 
being forced back into office. 
The years 1835 to 1839 saw Howick increasingly out of 
sympathy with the colonial policy of the Cabinet. ·They· were for 
him very frustrating years; when his colleagues did not adopt 
colonial measures of Which he disapproved, they postponed taking 
any decisions at all-. This was mainly because the Colonial 
Secretary was very remiss in bringing colonial questions to their 
attention, and because he failed to convince himself or his 
colleagues of their importance.. This frustration must have been 
increased by the knowledge that instead of an incompetent .in the· 
Colonial Office, Howick ought, because of his specialist·knowle~ 
and grasp of colonial problems, to be there himself'• These 
reasons sufficiently explain his ever growing desire to-escape 
from office, and to resign on some difference of principle. 
This anxiety to resign was only tempered by the fear that he 
might bring down the Government in the process., that he would 
incur the odium of all good Whigs, and that his colleagues when 
they returned to power would no longer have any desire to act 
with him. 
F. Howick's Resignation, August 1839. 
We have seen that by the summer of 1839 Howick was very . 
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dissatisfied with his personal position in the Government; his 
scheme ~or administrative reform in Army affairs was thwarted, 
he had seen his suggestions on aspects of colonial policy over-
ruled, and he had quarrelled at one time or·another with many 
of his Cabinet colleagues. At the same time he could not but 
realize that the position of the Government was deplorably weak, 
this being reflected i~ its measures. For a combination of all 
these reasons, as we have seen he had come to the point of 
resignation several times, but each time had withdrawn from 
taking such a step, chiefly from the desire not to be held 
responsible for the downfall of the Government, and from the fear 
that such action would bring about an unpleasant rift between 
himself and his present colleagues. 
If Howick felt uncomfortable at his position, no doubt his 
colleagues felt so likewise. They were becoming tired of seeing 
· Howick in a minority over many questions, tired of his protest-~; 
ations and of his perseverance or obstinacy. \Vhile he was a 
very industrious and energetic person, all alike recogni.zing his 
good qualities, there is ~o doubt that he was a very difficult 
person· to work \vi th, particularly if he did not get his own way. 
Perhaps this· explains the r~ther startling offer that Russell 
made to him in a letter written on August 4th. 
In this Russell made Howick an offer of the Post Office. 
Howick was tq leave the War Office, and replace the Earl of 
c. 
Lichfield as Postmaster-General, and mov~ to the Lords, where 
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his 'energy and attention to measures' would 'be most beneficial'. 
The excuse for this was that there was difficulty in carrying 
into operation the Penny Post plan. The Postmaster-General did 
not even have a seat in the Cabinet, so it seems obvious that 
this was an attempt to remove Howick to a position where he 
could no longer be a difficult colleague who was perpetually 
irritating his associates; under the guise of a change of 
offi.ces, this was really demotion and a 'kick upstairs' to the 
Lords. Russell seems to have realized that the offer could not 
be satisfactorily explained unless upon such grounds, for at the 
end of his letter, he adds:-
'I am quite aware that in ordinary circumstances it is 
not a proposition to be made, but the popularity of our present 
plan entirely depends on a good arrangement at the G.P.O.' 
The arrival of.the letter at Howick's home the following 
day coincided ~vith a report in the 'Morning Chronicle', saying 
that changes in the Administration were imminent, and citing as 
examples the fact that Spring Rice was to be made a peer and 
to be succeeded at the Exchequer by Francis Baring, Thomson to 
be sent as Governor to Canada, and Charles Wood, Howick's brother-
in-law, to hold some higher office (at present he was Secretary 
to the Admiralty). Howick at first did not think that Russell's 
offer was objectionable; he even had thoughts of accepting it, 
chiefly through his disgust with the House of Commons and the 
amount of labour it imposed on the members of the Government who 
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sat in that House. After further consideration he changed his 
mind. He replied to Russell stating that his first impression 
of the offer was unfavourable, but that·he was not disposed 
for the present to reject it outright; only a 'very strong 
reason' would make him willing to leave the Commons. Referring 
to the news in the 'Morning Chronicle', Howick wished to know 
what other arrangements were being made, before he determined 
whether to be a member of What would in fact be a new adminis-
tration. Finally as a further reason for delay he pleaded the 
need of consulting his father. (85) 
On that same day Howick wrote to inform Earl Grey of the 
offer, enclosing with his letter a copy of Russell's. He 
coupled this offer with the news in the 'Morning Chronicle' of 
extensive changes in the Administration, not all of which he 
believed would be improvements. Mentio~ing the fact that 
Francis Baring would probably succeed Spring Rice as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Howick remarked:-
'Of Francis Baring's character I have the highest opinion 
but I do not rate his abilities equally high, and upon t~e 
important subject of banking and the currency which must very 
soon come under consideration I know him to be very superficially 
informed. I am convinced that he is utterly unable to deal 
with the difficulties which the present condition of the Bank of 
England will most likely produce.' 
(85) Journal, August 5tij, 1839· ~\4SS-e.l/ Howick to Sari GPey. 
August 5th. 
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Another objection that Hawick had to make to the reported 
arrangement was that it left an incompetent Normanby in charge 
of the Colonial Office. Finally he wished to have his father's 
advice on Russell's offer t~ough he did not believe that the 
reconstructed Ministry would be one in which he could play a 
part:-
I cannot but be sensible that the manner in which I have 
been treated does not give either J. Russell or Melbourne any 
very great claims upon· me and that I may therefore well hesitate, 
whether upon a reconstruction·of the Govt I ought to continue 
in it if as I am aware would be the case I am to have little or 
no political influence.' 
On the morning of Friday, August 9th, not yet having heard 
from his father, but convinced that Earl Grey would be against 
him accepting the Post Office, Hawick had an interview with 
Russell for the pu~pose of rejecting his offer. He stated that 
he was not· prepared to leave the Common~ merely for the purpose 
of becoming Postmaster-General; as there were a variety of 
changes to be made in Ministry, Hawick demanded that some of 
these changes should concern the War Office; in particular. he 
wished to see the management of' the Commissariat busines·a trans-
ferred from the· Treasury to the War Office, and the reference 
of' disputed questions between the two departments to Palmers·ton. 
Russell did not appear to think these demands unreasonable, but 
requested them to be stated in writing. (86) 
(86) Journal, August 9th. Hawick to Earl Grey, August i2th. 
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On August lOth, Howick received the expected letter from 
his father. As he had anticipated· Earl Grey was opposed t·o his 
acceptance; indeed when we consider previous advice given to 
Howick, and Earl Grey's opinion of the Ministry, it can come as 
no surprise that he took the line that he did:-
'I have long observed the appearance of a great wqnt of 
confidence in you, in the leading Ministers, but more especially 
in John Russell; it appeared to me also that there was a great 
disposition to keep you back, and to raise others above you. 
But I confess it never entered my head that such a proposition 
as the present could have been made to you, and in such a manner. 
The manner indeed appears to me to be as offensive as the proposal 
itself •••• God forgive me if I am too suspicious, but my firm 
persuasion is that it was a scheme to get you out of the way, and 
to have you fixed in an office of inferior importance, when other 
more important situations are to be disposed of.' 
He believed that the proposition ought never to have been made 
to Howick:-
"this is a proposal which you cannot accept without lowering 
yourself in publick estimation. I confess I should not be sorry 
to see you removed from the fatigue of the House of Commons, 
where you cannot in any case remain many years, by an appointment 
connected with the more important branches of the administration 
which would give you a lead in the House of Lords and add to your 
political character and influence. But the Post Office : An 
office of inferior rank and consequence, involving none of the 
higher duties of Govt. and for the purpose of carrying into 
effect a new arrangement, merely of details, which any Clerk, 
with official habits and knowledge, would manage as well or 
better; to succeed Lord Lichfield, and to go into the House of 
Lords hand in hand with Mr Spring Rice ! The contemplation of 
such a measure·{may I not call it degradation?) is revolting to 
me ••• ' {87) 
Fortified by his father's opinions, to which he always 
paid great respect, Howick wrote to Russell that same day 
definitely refusing the Post Office, and also outlining his 
demands for the· changes necessary to be made in t~e War Office. 
There ie no need to go into the details of the latter as they 
have already been mentioned in another connection. 
Earl Grey was always concerned for his son's welfare and 
his standing in public estimation. He always believed that 
Howick merited by his abilities to be in a more important position 
in the Government than he actually found himself; the fact that 
he was not in such a position was to be ascribed to the malice 
of secret enemies, especially Lord John Russell. Perhaps Earl 
Grey's continual prodding of his son to advance himself in office 
can be excused on the grounds of parental partiality and family 
feeling. This time, however, the offer of the Post Office had 
seriously alarmed Earl Grey. No doubt reflecting that Hawick 
if left to his own devices would not be sufficiently vigorous 
{87) Earl Grey to Howick, August 8th, 1839. 
in nefence of his own interests, Earl Grey, in a letter of August 
12uh, gave him some further advice:-
'it seems to me necessary that you should have a distinct 
expl~ation with Melbourne, stating to him your expectation that 
no material changes should be made without your being previously 
apprized of them, and yol:Jr claim in the event of s·uch changes, 
to be placed in a more important office than that which you now 
hold. At all events that nobody should be put over your head; 
in which case what you owe to your own character will make it 
necessary for you to retire from ·the Government.' 
Howick was reluctant to follow this advice, and in fact 
decided not to do so. He believed that ministerial changes 
could only be settled between two or three of the principal members 
of the Government, more especially the Prime Minister and the 
Leader of the House of Commons. If every member of the Cabinet 
were to be consulted then no new arrangements would ever get made. 
Therefore Howick did not feel that he had a claim to be a party 
to preliminary consultations on the p~osed arrangements, more 
especial~y as his own position would be discussed. Howick 
believed that he ought to wait and see what the new arrangements 
were; if he found that people had then been placed over h~s head 
he would have a right not to acquiesce in the arrangements. So 
far he only definitely knew of Baring's and Thomson's appointments. 
Though he had expressed his doubts about Baring's ability, he was 
aware that Melbourne could not be expected to give the Chancellor-
ship of the Exchequer to a person having no experience in 
financial and commercial business. He himself certainly did not 
feel qualified enough to accept it, even if it were offered to 
him. Moreover if he did interfere and a Government could not be 
formed, as seemed likely, then the whole blame for the failure 
would be thrust upon him. (88) 
EaaGrey wrote a further letter on the 16th, reinforcing 
.-
his arguments as expressed in the previous one. He regretted 
that Hawick had made his demands regarding a change in the 
War Office:-
'You are right, I h~ve nm doubt, as to the particular 
change in the duti·es of the War Office which you demand. But 
it is after all a mere matter of detail, to which they may or 
may not object·. If they acquiesce, it seems almost impossible 
for you to make any other demand. This being the only one on 
which you insist, and if this is granted, your willingness to 
remain in the War Office, whatever other changes may be made 
seems to be implied. If they refuse, .the point is so small that 
the Publick would not understand it as a just cause for resig-
nation; if they did not, which is more probable, think it an 
unjustifiabl~ attempt to relieve yourself from the control of 
the .Treasury, in a matter of expense, which has hitherto been, 
and which many may think ought to continue under their superintend-
ence.' 
Earl Grey would prefer to see him Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
(88) Hawick to Earl Grey;· August 14th, 1839. 
--- - --
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were it not that Spring Rice had leff the financial affairs of 
the country in an embarrassed state·; this. office~ the Presidency 
of the Board of Trade, the Admiralty, the Board of Control, were 
all. places to which Hawick had superior pretensions, and all 
were more important than the War_Office. 
On August 20th, when Hawick returned to town from his villa 
of Datchet, he found a note from Melbourne expressing a desire 
to see him. After the Cabinet was over, Hawick stayed behind 
talking to Melbourne. The Prime Minister then gave him an out-
line of the intended changes. He then learnt for the first time 
of Lord John's intention of taking the Colonial Office himself. 
Lord Minto, First Lord of the Admiralty, had refused an offer 
of the Horne Office, and it was now proposed that Norman by and 
Russell should simply change offices. Hawick objected to 
Normanby going to the Home Office; for one thing he believed 
him too much disposed to conciliate the Radicals. He also 
pointed out the impossibility of Russell performing both the 
duties of Colonial Secretary and the Leader of the House of 
Commons; the burden was too great. Melbourne also informed him 
that the Under-Secretaryship of the Colonial Office was- also 
causing difficulties; La~uchere had declined to remain in that 
post if Normanby remained as Colonial Secretary, whilst the 
latter was attempting to secure that post for H.G. Ward,MP. for 
St. Albans, a Radical and a man who had exchanged harsh letters 
with Howicl.c over the New Zealand business. Hawick objected 
' 
strongly to Ward's appointment; he thought it would give too 
much of a Radical character to the Government; moreover Howick 
had a poor opinion of Ward's judgment and ability. Other 
proposed appointments were Clarendon at the Board of Trade and 
Francis Baring at the Exchequer. Melbourne also contemplated 
bringing George Grey and Lab~chere into the Cabinet, holding 
1\ 
their present offices of Judge Advocate and Master of the Mint. 
Howick objected to a further increase in the number of the 
Cabinet; he pointed out that its present size was too large, 
and that it was inconvenient having so many Cabinet members in 
the Commons:-
' ,. 
"this renders it impossible for the lelider there to consult 
as much as he ought to do his colleagues upon the various matters 
which arise and which require immediate decisions, because there 
is not time to communicate with so many and he cannot do so wit~ .. 
one or two and not with others, the consequence is that those 
who have not the highest offices find that alt~ough they are · 
in the cabinet-they have practically little more knowledge of 
what is going on and little more influence upon affairs than if 
they did not belong to the Govt at all ••• I had felt very much 
·that I had practically much less influence upon public affairs 
in my present position than I might hope to exercise as an 
independent member of the House of Commons supporting the Govt.' 
The discussion then switched· to Howick' s position at the War 
Office. There did not seem any insurmountable difficulty in 
acceding to the requests on changes in his office which Howick 
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had sent to Russell. Howick expressed a wish to be removed 
from the War Office altogether, 'if it is to be considered ione 
merely occupied with details. 1 (89) 
Later that day Howick decided that, to avoid the risk· of 
any misunderstandings if he resigned, he woul.d WI'i te a letter to 
Melbourne, stating clearly to him the objections he had made to 
the proposed·changes, in their conversation. He also wishe~ to 
advert to several other points, which he had not brought up·in 
discussion because he had wanted more time to reflect upon ~hem. 
One was the unfairness of putting La~uchere so distinctly above ,. 
Charles Wood, 'when undoubtedly Wood has done far more than the 
other for the party both since we have been in Govt and befo.re. 1 
He was strongly opposed to giving the Government a more 
Radical complexion than it at pres.ent possessed. 
person was appointed, Howick hoped that:-
If any new 
1there shall be a clear understanding that he is to vote 
with the Government upon all those questions which have not 
already been made open ones, upo~ which we are at issue with. 
the radicals: I think that we, who have a decided objection to 
further concessions to this party, have a right to expect that 
a person shall not be brought into office who, upon the first 
occasion of a motion for the extension of the suffrage or for 
short Parliaments, will say that if required to support the 
course taken by the Gvt he must resign thus rendering it difficult 
if not impossible for other persons in office who upon these 
(89) Howick to Earl Grey, August 20th, 1839. 
particular points may entertain similar opinions to take a 
different course. We must not be .. thus driven into making more 
open questions, or taking upon ourselves the responsibility of 
breaking up the Government at perhaps an inconvenient moment.' 
He again repeated his objections to increasing the. 
Cabinet. George Grey certainly had first claim for a Cabinet. 
office, but that of Judge Advocate was not usually regarded as 
such, and Hawick believed that it was a very unwise policy to 
extend the number of· offices that could be held with the Cabine~; 
as for LabDuchere's office of Master of the Mint, as it was so 
.r 
newly a sinecure, the practice of former years should be followed, 
and it should be united with the Presidency or Vice-Presidency 
of the Board of Trade. He then began to show that Wood had.more 
claims to the Cabinet than Labouchere:-
'Since this Govt has been established I believe you are 
aware that he has had the real conduct of one of its most 
important departments, and one of those which has been best 
administered; you cannot have forgotten how great an effect was 
produced up.on publick opinion by the exposition he was able to 
make this year of the manner in which our naval affairs have 
been managed; it was one of the few satisfactory evenings we have 
had during the session. Now with every disposition to give his 
due share of credit to Labauchere I must say that he has no such 
services to show •••• This is I know an invidious topic, and I 
have had many scruples to overcome in thus putting forward the 
comparative claims of so near a connection and so intimate a 
-
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friend .of my own as Wood. ••• ' 
He also again alluded to the unsatisfactory nature of his own 
position at the War Office. 
This letter was sho~m to Charles Wood the following morning, 
and upon meeting with his approval, was sent very late that same 
day to Melbourne. 
The list of Howick's· objections to the proposed arrange-
ments - both on public and personal grounds - was formidable, 
but if he hoped that Melbourne would meet them, he was disappointed 
at the Cabinet on August 24th, when Melbourne announced the 
changes. Baring was to be Chancellor of the Exchequer, LabDuchere 
was to succeed Thomson· at· the Board of Trade, and George Grey 
was to be in the Cabinet holding his present office. Howick 
thereupon stated his objections to these changes. He said that 
if he were in Wood's place he would probably resign; he said 
that he would not advise Wood to resign but that if he chose to 
do. so, Howick would ·follow him out. Some attempted to throw 
doubt upon Howick's statement that Wood would feel ill-used, but 
Howick referred Melbourne to his letter and announced that it 
had Wood's full approval. Thomson and others stated that the 
exclusion of the President of the Board of Trade from the Cabinet 
would give great dissatisfaction, whilst "it was Russell's opinion 
that as LabdUchere had held a Privy Councillor's office-he stood 
before Wood for the ·cabinet. Coming away from t~e Cabinet 
Howick asked Melbourne one question, as to whether·: all that he 
had objected to was to be done; Melbourne replied in the 
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affirmative. Howkck then went straight to the Admiralty. There 
he, Charles Wood and his wife, and Frederick, Howick's younger 
brother \"lho acted as his secretary, held a discussion as to what 
was to be done. It was decided that Howick was to write and ask 
for further·.:explanations. Later Wood rejoined him at the .:War 
Office to announce that Melbourne had sent for him. Wood had 
determined what to say; he would state that he had been very 
ill-used, but would go to the place they had earmarked for him 
at the Treasury, but that he would not feel bound by any 
consideration whatsoever to continue in the Government for one 
h'our longer than he found convenient. If Howick decided to 
resign, then he would do the same. Wood returned and reported 
the result of the interview; Melbourne had been disposed to make 
light of the whole business. Thereupon Howick sent his second 
letter to Melbourne. (90) 
Passing over his objections to Normanby, the 'slight' to 
Wood, the increase of the Cabinet to fifteen, Howick now wished 
to know:-
'who are the new persons to be introduced into' the 
Government to fill up the subordinate offices which will be 
vacated, and upon what terms they are to come in,, as the future 
character of the Administration will greatly depend upon the 
manner in which this settled.' 
(90) Journal, August 24th, 1839· 
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He also demanded more extensive changes in-.:his own office, since 
so many who had hitherto been in subordinate offices were to be 
promoted. ( 91) 
On Sunday August 25th, one of Melbourne's messengers 
arrived with an answer to Hawick's letter of the day before. 
This Hawick found very unsatisfactory.-- It gave some information 
as to how Melbourne intended to dispose of the subordinate 
of~ices - Ward had been suggested as one of the Secretaries of 
the India Board - and that new persons would come into office 
on exactly the same terms as the present office holders, it not 
being intended to increase the number of open questions. 
Melbourne further remarked upon the imposs:ibili ty of adjusting 
promotions 1 upon principles of exact equality and j\lstice' , that 
personal questions were ones upon which_ ;every one must distrust 
his own judgment, which was 'warped by personal predilection 
and partiality',·and that Howick ought to give up his contention 
about Wood. He offered no hope of extensive changes being 
made in Hawick's office for the present. ( 92) Hawick - who 
was staying at Datchet Lawn - merely replied that he would be in · 
town the following day, and aske~lfor clarification as to whether 
! 
Ward and others were to vote against any motions for the 
extension- of the suffrase and for shortening the durat-ion of 
Parliaments. 
( 91) Hawick to· Mel_bourn·e, August 24th, 1839· 
.( 92) "Melbourne to Howick, Au gus 25th, 1839, No. 1. 
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The next morning Howick and Frederick Grey arrived in town 
and went to Wood's house, where they found two letters from 
Melbourne, one written before the one Howick had received the 
previous-day. This letter contained little of interest. The 
second letter was in answer to Hawick's last. It stated that 
Ward and other such persons would vote against those type of 
motions which Howick had mentione_d. Melbourne, however, announced 
that he.was unwilling to pledge himself decisively against any 
extension of the suffrage. ( 93) T.o Howick' s dismay there was 
no letter from his father to point out to him the best course to 
pursue. 
After reading the letters, Howick, Frederick Grey, and Wood 
had a diec:ussion as to the next steps to be taken. Both the Greys 
were in favour of immediate resignation. Before any decision was 
taken they all decided to c'onsult Francis Baring at the Treasury:-
'I told him upon what grounds I proposed to resign not 
· concealing from him that the personal grounds of complaint which 
I conceived myself to have had influenced in some degree my views 
as to the publ:i,c· grounds on which I proposed to resign. He said 
he thought I was wrong and we discussed the subject at some length 
but I remained of the same opinion.' 
The trio then went to the War Office and had a further lengthy 
discussion. Howick, backed by his brother, decided to pen a letter 
of decided resignation, to which Charles Wood rather reluctantly 
(93) Melbourne to Howick, Augu~t 25th, 1839, No. 2. 
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acquiesced.(94) 
Therefore, a letter was sent to Melbourne saying that the 
new arrangements - apart from the fact that the War Office and its 
reorganization had not yet been settled - were such that Howick 
felt it impossible to continue as a member of the Government. 
He stated that he had hoped that if any changes 'liVere made:-
'they would be of such a character as to remove what I 
believe to be the original cause of its weakness, namely the 
growing distrust and want of confidence in it as felt by tha.t 
numerous and respectable class of pei•sons who, while they desire 
to see a generally liberal system of policy pursued, entertain 
a strong apprehension of entering upon a new and indefinite 
course of further constitutional changes. I have observed for 
the last two years a gradual and constant falling off in this 
class of our supporters, and in my opinion it was therefore 
necessary, in any changes which were attempted·, to endeavour to 
give to the Govt a character more calculated to regain their 
confidence. ' 
Such a course had not been followed. Lord Normanby, a man of 
Radical sympathies, had been removed from an office which from 
the nature of its business and its patronage enabled its possessor 
to exercise little influence on domestic policy, to one of 
precisely the opposite character; perhaps the Home Office was 
the most important place in the Government next to the office 
of Prime Minister. T_his together \dth the appointment of .Ward 
(94) Journal, August 26th, 1839· 
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to a subordinate office would create the impression that encourage-
ment was to be given by the Government to the advocates of 
change. Howick was anxious to stress that these were not 
questions of personality:-
'my objection to your arrangements is founded upon my 
belief that by encreasing the alienation of men of moderate 
views they will render still weaker than before a Government 
already destitute of the strength necessary to conduct the 
affairs of the country with advantage, and that they-will encour-
age a desire for further changes in our institutions which it 
may hereafter be almost equally dangerous to yield to or to 
resist. ' 
The letter concluded by saying that Howick' s resignation might 
not have occurred, if .he had been treated with greater confidence 
by Melbourne and Russell, and if they had sooner communicated to 
him the proposed arrangements. It seems as though·:;Earl Grey's 
insinuations were beginning to have an effect.(95) 
Howick dined that evening at Wood's house. At eleven he 
returned home to find a letter awaiting him from Melbourne. The 
facts upon which Howick based his resignation seemed to Melbourne 
to be not sufficient to justify it. For one, Melbourne yet had 
made no offer to Ward; he thought, however, that it was not very 
prudent to exclude such people of Radical opinions. He hoped that 
Howick would not press his resignation, until Melbourne had had 
(95) Howick to Melbourne, August 26th. 
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time to communicate with Lord Lansdo\me as to who was to. replace 
Hawick at the War Office. Melbourne concluded by hoping that 
Hawick would reconsider his determination. Hawick, after 
consultation with Wood and Frederick Grey, wrote another letter 
in reply, which the latter took up to Melbourne's house in 
·south Street. This letter asked Melbourne to act on Hawick's 
former one. Hawick was not prepared to remain in the G:overnment 
as the single and kno~m obstacle to measures which would be 
acceptable to a large group of the Government's supporters. He 
repeated the charge of a want of confidence having been shown 
him both by Melbourne and Russell. 
On August 27th, Hawick wrote a letter to his father inform-
ing him of the latest developments. There is no doubt that Earl 
Grey's influence with his son had played an important part in 
shaping Hawick's decision. He had for months been repeating in: 
his letters the fact that Hawick ought for a variety of reasons 
to hold a more important office in the GoveUnment, that he was 
excluded from such not because he had not sufficient talent or 
experience, but because various.members of the Government, 
particularly Melbourne and Russell
1 
were jealous of him. In 
addition Hawick had imbibed his father's prejudices with regard 
to the· Radicals and the doctrine of the finality 0f the Reform 
Bill of 1832. N~w the results of his father's influence were 
shown in this letter:-
'The more I consider what has passed .... the more convinced 
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I am that there has been a settled determination for a consider-
able time back to exclude me from all real power and influence 
in the Govt, this has been shewn ••• most strongly by the total 
want of confidence in me in the arrangement of the recent changes; 
Some of the most important of these were actually known to 
Lambton at Cowes long before I heard of them. You had detected 
and warned me of the existence of this design long ago ••• Ld 
Melbourne I only blame for the indifference and carelessness 
which he has shewn ••• but the case is different as regards Ld 
John. I am persuaded now that the real explanation of what has 
happened is to be found in his determination to engross the 
whole power of the Govt to himself and to get about him as much 
as he could those who would as he believed be content to act as 
mere machines at his bidding, hence his determination to bring 
George Grey and Labruchere into the cabinet ••• and hence also 
his determination to keep back Wood. I believe that neither he 
nor myself have been forgiven for our successful resistance to 
the determination which was come to of supporting Fleetwood's 
motion for giving the right of voting to 10 £ occupiers in 
countjies.' 
On the morning of that same day, Howick had a letter from 
Melbourne saying that he was giving up arguing the matter, and 
that he accepted the resignation. In the afternoon he received 
a further letter from Melbourne,. enclosing one from Russell 
which Howick thought 'very foolish and very offensive'. Russell's 
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letter spoke of the charge of a want of confidence shown towards 
Howick:-
'Lord Grey thought fit to place Graham in the Cabinet and 
leave me out of it, and I submitted at once to his decision.' 
He refuted all of Hawick's charges. Howick wrote back and 
answered Russell's criticisms, but by then the issue was settled 
and nothing was left but the recriminations.(96) 
T.he following day for a moment it seemed as though J\·ielbourne 
was going to make a. last effort to keep Howick in office. He 
sent a letter saying that he was taking no further steps in the 
matter until he heard again from Russell. On August 29th, Howick 
received a note from Russell saying that he regretted his 
resignation. Howick was·anxiously waiting for the formal notific-
ation of his resignation, and finally went round to see Melbourne, 
who told him· that there was no longer any reason for not making 
known what had happened. During the conversation, it appeared 
that another Radical, Charles Buller, had been offered a post, 
and that Melbourne could see no harm in him, though Howick 
thought otherwise having had experience of him in the Commons 
( thH~- of the man Howick vias later to desire to have as his Under-
Secretary ! ) The interview passed off favourably:-
'I wish it was possible to give the slightest idea of the 
frank,_ good humoured, manner singularly joined with a shrewd 
(96) Melbourne to Howick, Aug. 27th. ~ou1~al, Aug. 27th. 
Russell to Howick, Aug. 27th, and Howick to 
Russell, Aug. 27th. 
.and amusing. but cynical tone of observation which makes it 
impossible to have a conversation with him even upon a disagree-
able subject without coming away pleased with him.' 
Earlier in that day George Grey had informed Howick. of his 
determination not to accept a Cabinet post which would probably 
bring him into collison with Howick in the Commons; fortunately 
an objection had been made to the Judge Advocate being in the 
Cabinet, and Melbourne was no longer enthusiastic about the idea. 
In the afternoon, Howick took leave of the War Office and its 
staff, not without a great deal of regret, and that evening he 
left the capital by train. In a letter dated August 29th, 
Melbourne informed Howiclc that Her Majesty had accepted his 
resignation. ( 97) 
I"f Howick' s mind v1as a turmoil of relief and regret, Earl 
Grey was definitely pleased. Howick received a letter from his 
father approving of the course he had taken, and full of personal 
abuse of John Russell such as the following:-
'I knew he was much discontented at not being placed in 
.the -Cabinet, on the first formation of my Government; and it now 
appears that this old grievance is still rankling in his breast. 
The only cause for self-reproach which I now feel is for having 
put him too forward, and particularly for having given him the 
management of the Reform Bill. He is a little animal engrossed 
by an inordinate ambition' of the most narrow and selfish kind.' ( 9B) 
(97) Journal, August 29th. 
(98) Earl Grey to Howick, August 29th. 
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T.he newspapers much to Hovdclc' s relief v1e1 .. e not too abusive 
over his resignation. 'They only say,' wrote Maria, 'that his 
good qualities are overshadowed by others which make his 
secession from the cabinet no source of wealcness. T.he Times 
abuses him with its usual bitterness and says he is the most ill 
conditioned man in the House of c·ommons. ' ( 99) Perhaps before 
leaving the subject of the various opinions that were expressed 
about Bowick's resignation, it will be only fair to give Russell's, 
which was given to Ellice in a letter which the latter showed· 
Howick. This said that Howick had taken the offer of the Post 
Office in so different a manner to what Melbourne and Russell. 
had intended that they had got tired of trying to please him; 
Russell praised Howick's abilities, industry and integrity but 
said that unfortunately he had a way of pressing his opinions 
which was hard to bear - this as we have seen was a true 
characteristic of Eowick' s. Russell also referred to the complaint 
he had when Earl Grey put him below Graham when he formed his 
Government.(lOO) 
So Howick was finally out of office. A mixture of personal 
and public reasons had led to this, wit~ perhaps the former pre-
dominating. An unsatisfactory position at the War Office, an 
isolated position in the Cabinet, many of his most important 
schemes thwarted, quarrels and a ·reeling that his talents were 
(99) 
(100) 
Jou1~al, September 1st, 1839. 
Journal, October 18th, 1839. 
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being ignored, his father's insinuations, all these combined to 
produce a feeling of deep dissatisfaction, which seized upon the 
changes being made as a good and public reason for resignation. 
Not that this intends to convey that Howick was insincere when he 
objected to Normanby at the Home Office or to giving the Government 
a more Radical flavour, but these objections may have been over-
ruled or at any r~te some solution may have been found for them, 
if so many personal motives had not urged Howick to persevere 
in resign in g. 
These years of office had not entirely been years of quarrels 
and frustration, or else Howick would have felt no regrets at 
leaving the War Office. For long periods he had worked amicably 
with his colleagues, helping to take decisions on subjects out-
side the range of his special interests. Nor had his tenure of 
the War Office been an entirely frustrated one; he had trans-
lated various constructive reforms affecting the soldier into 
practice, and had been a very conscientious administrator. He 
had found the tasks of a politician in office a satisfying 
vocation, a vocation to which he gave long hours of thought and 
toil (in contrast to some of his colleagues), to the exclusioni 
of much else, notably the round of society. In fact it was one 
of Maria's laments that her husband was far less popular than he 
ought to be, because in his concern for work he neglected social 
functions such as dinners and balls. Yet with the virtues he 
possessed and with his talents, there went cert~in failings of 
personality which exasperated his colleagues and caused much of 
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the ill will between them. He did not work well as a member of 
a team, he fought and protested too much when his opinions were 
overruled by the majority; a high sense of honour and duty led 
him to perseverance in a scheme long after it had ceased to be · 
practical. He could never decide when or when not a measure was 
expedient, but always placed his support or opposition on the 
higher and often· impracticable ground of principle. Compromise· 
is often a. political ·necessity; Hawick had too little of it in 
his make-up, and with him compromise was the very last resort 
after he could fight for a measure no longer and after he had 
annoyed all his colleagues. He tended to be too critical of 
the abilities and the actions of his colleagues, and he allowed 
his opinions to be revealed to them. Not that he did not have 
at times much to exasperate him, but eventually he had to 
realize that a Secretary at War could not always lead a Cabinet 
in the direction he himself desired. It is evident of the high 
opinions held of his abilities, sincerity and-industry by his 
colleagues that they so often attempted to meet his views, even 
when he was an isolated individual in the various discussions. 
But there is a limit to the patience of all men, and that limit 
was reached when Howiclc was offered the Post Office. 
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Chapter 4. 
Out of Office. 
A. The Irish Registration Bill. 
By political affiliation and private friendship, Hawick 
was a Whig. A resignation from a Whig Government and a near · 
estrangement from Lord John Russell could not alter that fact. 
Therefore, it was to Hawick's interest to minimise as far as 
possible the breach between himself and his former colleages. 
Unfortunately Earl Grey did not take the same view of the matter. 
Since his resignation in 1834, Earl Grey had become increasingly 
conservative in his views - though he had never really been 
liberal. Virtues he caul~ see in Peel. and Stan ley, but none in 
Melbourne's Ministry. Having been an influence in his son's 
decision to resign, he believed that Hawick should not any longer. 
have any dealings with those who remained in office, least of 
all Lord John Russell, but should take an 'independent' line .in 
the House of Commons, perhaps with a view to him joining the 
T.bries. At all events he so wanted Hawick to regulate his. con-
duct in a manner which was-bound to lead him to attacking the 
Government. He wished, for example, that Hawick would v~ite a 
letter to his constituents justifying his resignation and explain-
irg the grounds for it; Hawick refused, having no wish to prolong 
discussions on the pros and cons of his action, which would cause 
further arguments between himself and his former colleagues.(l) 
In February 1840, Earl Grey wrote to say how pleased he had been 
(1) Hawick to Earl Grey, September 2nd, 1839. 
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by seeing a letter from T.ory headquarters greatly praising 
Hawick's conduct in resigning.( 2) In March, 1842 he expressed 
his opinions ·more definitely, now that the Conservatives were 
in power:-
'I am very sorry that you attended the meeting at 
Melbourne's as I must be for anything that marks your connection 
with a Party agai~st the Govt, which ••• seems t.o me entitled 
to the support of every man, on all occasions where he can 
conscientiously give it, who does not prefer personal feelings, 
or particular interests to the general good. With these feelings 
my proxy, after I have taken my seat, will probably be given 
to them.-' ( 3) 
Hawick· had, however, no intention of being influenced by 
his father in this respect. As early as S~ptember 12th, 1839, 
he was once more discussing public affairs with Russell, what-
ever his private opinion of the latter might have been, and 
throughout the short period of office which remained to the 
Melbourne Administration sporadic contact was maintained between 
them; Russell valued Hawick's specialist knowledge on colonial 
affairs, an·d s·ometimes consul ted him upon them, for example, in 
October 1839, he sent him a paper on transportation to read, 
whilst in 1840 Hawick was suggesting the best form a bill dealing 
( 2) Earl Grey to Hawick, February 4th, 1840. 
( 3) Earl Grey to HO\'Vick, March 19th, 1842.-
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with the Canadia~ Clergy Reserves ought to take. Howick had 
some unpleasant moments trying to justify this reQe~d amity 
with Russell to his.father.( 4) Earl Grey believed that Russell 
had destroyed his o~v.n Ministry - by his statement as to the 
appropriation of the revenues of the' Irish Church, which .had led 
to Stanley's resignation, Earl Grey having a high regard for 
Stanley - and now he had ousted his son from office, after 
retaining him for many years in an office of inferior dignity 
to that to which he was entitled. Fortunately Charles Wood, 
Howick's firmest friend, and who had resigned with him, saw in 
what direction Earl Grey's prejudices were attempting to lead 
them, and used his influence with his brother-in-law to counter-
act them. Charles Wood, who had a successful political career 
in front of him, was just the sort of friend that Howick needed. 
He was the man who always received Howick's drafts of letters 
to others with whom he was in dispute, who corrected the inte~ 
perances and tactlessness of these, and made them suitable for 
sending to the particular per~ons involved. He was essentially 
conciliatory by nature, and knew how to 'get on' with people 
far more than did Howick. He also realized where his brother-
in-law's faults lay, and carefully attempted to point them out 
to him and correct them. All in all Charles Wood was the more 
conventional type of politician, at ease with almost every 
situation; he lacked Howick's forceful temperament, was more 
(4) Wood to Howick, October 12th, 1839. 
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'diplomatic', and would never have resigned in 1839 but from 
loyalty to his brother-in-law and friend. Lady Howick too had 
no desire to see her husband isolated from the main people in 
their social circle; the fact that she was nearly always at odds 
with the rest of her husband's family was a further reason for 
using her influence in a direct opposite sense to their's. 
Nevertheless there were moments in the years which 
remained to the Melbourne Government when it seemed as though 
the rift between Hawick and his late colleagues was fated to 
widen. For one Hawick continued to take an active interest in 
military matters, and continued to press for action to be taken 
on such subjects as the state of barracks in the West Indies, 
the administrative machine of the Army, and the rupee question 
as it affected British troops serving in India. O.n March lOth, 
1840, Hawick, who the day before had made inquiries as to the· 
steps taken to .. remedy the evils pertaining to the last s-ubject -
noted in his Journal:-
'Maria's sleep last night was interfered with by her 
working herself up· into a state of great annoyance about my 
attacking the Govt on the rupee question.' 
It was on the subject, however, of the registration of voters in 
Ireland that the differences between Hawick and the Whig ~overn­
\ 
ment were most noticeable. 
The system for the registration of voters introduced into 
the English Reform Act by Sir James Graham in 1832 had many 
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drawback.s, despite the fact that with certain mocUf'ica:tion~ in 
~detail it was to continue throughout the nineteenth century.(5) 
In Ireland there were even more obstacles to the smooth working 
of the system, and the whole question of registration was apt 
to be associated with that of the Irish franchise. 
In the session of 1840 Stanley brought in a bill to simplify 
somewhat the registration system as then existed in Ireland, 
and to bring it more into line with English practice. The right 
of voting was to depend upon annual registration, certificates 
giving the right of voting were to be abolished, appeals could 
be made from assistant barristers to assize judges, and there 
would be appeals against admission to the electoral list, vi ters 
being awarded costs against frivolous objectors. Stanley refused 
to consider the question of the franchise along:.with registration. 
The Government opposed Stanley's Bill. Hawick believ.ed 
that the Bill was a measure of improvement upon the old system 
of registration, and that as the Government did not propose to 
deal with the question itself it was not justified in such 
opposition. Hawick and Wood supported the Registration Bill, 
and in a crucial debate of May 20th, it was their support which 
alone enabled the measure to survive, 301 being for the.Bill, 
298 against. it, only two other Whigs being in the majority.(6) 
All this of course met wi~h Earl Grey's entire approval. 
The case was different with regard to Hawick's constituents. 
Here was a man who had just resigned from a Whig Government, who 
(5) 'The system of Registration and the Development of Party 
Organi.zation, 1832-70'. J. Alum Thomas 'History' vol XXXV 
(6) Journal, ,ay 20th, 1840. PP• 81-93. 
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had done so ostensibly because of its Radical complexion - and 
many of Howick's supporters approved of that - and now he was 
to be found voting with the ·rories against his own party. '!~here 
were grumblers against Howick among the Northumbrian Whigs.(7) 
Charles Wood also found himself censured, even by his ovm father, 
and this made him regret the isolation in which he and Howick 
stood; the latter remarked about Wood's attitude:-
'I was sorry to find that he is not prepared to take the 
bold and independent course which my father recommends and 
which I am most strongly persuaded would be the right one. At 
first I know it would not be either an easy or a popular course 
to follow but I am persuaded that ultimately there is enough 
good sense and honesty in the country to appreciate such a system 
of public conduct, and if I am mistaken in this opinion I can 
only say I had rather· retire from public life than consent to 
give up my ovm judgment and become the mere follower of a party 
for nothing but the miserable inte~ests of a party.' 
In short, at this period Howick was under the influence of Earl 
·Grey, andca9cepted the latter's ideas of pursuing an independent. 
course of action in the Commons, having regard to no party but 
the public good; if that attitude of mind persisted; Howick 
would condemn himself to political ineffectiveness. 
The Government's delaying tactics caused Stanley to 
abandon his bill on July 7th, but he announced his intention of 
re-introducing it the following year. Early in February, 1841, 
(7) Earl Grey to Howick, July 15th, 1840. 
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Stanley duly asked for leave to bring in his bill. This time 
the Government decided to fore~tall him by bringing forward a 
-
bill of their own, and giving it precedence. The Whig bill did 
not only deal with the registration question - Howick believed 
the machinery of registration was far worse in their bill than 
in Stanley's - but with that of the franchise; perhaps this 
was a move on the Government's part to ensure support from the 
Radicals, more particulaPly from 0 'Connell and his Irish followe·rs. 
On the other hand, Stanley seems now to have considered the 
question as a pawn in the game of politiqs, and something which: 
could be used to sow disunity amongs·t the Whigs. 
The Irish Reform Act had made the right of voting in 
Ireland much the same as in England, with two significant except-
ions. The forty shilling freeholders disfranchised in 1829 had 
never been given back the right to vote, and in addition to 
rights arising from occupancy the Irish Reform Act had given the 
right of voting to tenants having a leasehold of not less than 
fourteen years, and who had a 'beneficial interest' of ten 
pounds in their holdings. A great number of the Irish voters 
fell into this last category. There was, however, a dispute 
between the two parties as to what was the meaning of the term 
'beneficial interest'. The Whigs contended that the term meant 
whatever profit a tenant might make from his holding, including 
in this the produce of his ow.n labour and that of his family. 
T.he Conservatives argued that even in Ireland with its lo~v wages 
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a man 1 s labour for a year was worth more than ten pounds, con seq-
uently the smallest amount of land would convey the right to vote. 
According to their interpretation of the phrase 'beneficial 
interest' it meant that a holder of land ought to be able to let 
that land to a solvent tenant at the yearly rent of ten pounds. 
According to Howick 'such a definition as that of the solvent 
tenant test would narrow and restrict the franchise of that 
country in a manner wholly inconsistent with the principles of 
popular liberty. ,(S) Howick believed that the objections of both 
parties had much of validity in them, and that the fault lay in 
the fact that the term 'beneficial interest' had never been 
accurately defined, and was now 'not susceptible of any construe~ 
ion not involving an extreme absurdity.' ( 9 ) If one interpret-
ation were accepted the franchise would be narrowed down to too 
small a number of people, ·whilst if th.i9 other were accepted too 
many people Vo!'ould be in possession of t.he right. As it was the 
Act of Parliament was invariably construed according to the 
politics of those v!Tho interpreted it, whether these were barr is-
~ 
ters of Committees of the House of Commons. The problem was 
also complicated by the fact that the Irish landowners were 
unwilling to grant leases, with the result that the constituen-
cies of Irish counties were becoming dangerously small. 
When Morpeth, the Irish Secretary, therefore suggested 
(8) Hansard Third Series, Vol. LVI. p. 299. 
(9) Howick to Earl Grey, February 5th, 1841. 
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making the county franchise depend not upon 'beneficial interest' 
but upon the rate at which the land was valued for as·sessment 
under the Poor Law, Hawick announced his intention of supporting 
the Government's measure. The Government fixed the amount of 
valuation giving the right to vote at five pounds; at the tim~ 
when this was announced Hawick was undecided, because of lack of 
information, whether this was a suitable amount to choose, but 
he agreed with the Government's aim of conferring the right to 
vote upon roughly the same number of people as had held it in 
previous years. Stanley opposed what he termed 'the new reform 
bill'. Hawick was thanked by Lord John and other Whigs for 
his speech. 
Would the Government in its weak condition be able to carry 
such a measure ? Hawick was still anxious to assume the role of 
the enlightened independent statesman solely concerned for the 
public good, so on February 5th, he wrote a long letter to Stanley 
in an attempt to secure his. agreement to the principle upon which 
Morpeth' s proposed franchise was founded. Stanley merely acknow-
ledged this by informing Hawick through Lady Stanley and Maria 
that he could not agree with his views. 
February 22nd saw the opening of the debate on Morpeth' s 
Bill. The first two days of the debate went against the Govern-
ment, and when a division was taken on February 25th, the Govern-
ment only had a majoli!i ty of five, including Hov!Tick and Wood. 
It seemed to be obvious that the Government would- be .obliged to 
give up its bill. On February 24th, Hawick discussed with Lord 
Fitzwilliam and Wood the possibility or devising such a county 
rranchise as would be acceptable to both parties; conversations 
with many Whigs during the debate had sho?m him that there was 
much disapproval or Morpeth's proposed franchise.(lO) He 
himselr now believed that the measure of a five pound rating was 
one 'or an extremely democratic charac.ter,' ·which did not have 
the least chance of passing. He blamed the Government greatly 
ror this, and ror the actual form or the bill, which he·" declared 
to ... -be~:'~ene or the most clumsy and illdigested measures ever 
submitted to Parliament by any G.oyernment'. He· belie.ved that 
if' the Government tool<: its bill into Committee in ·its present 
shape there would be a majority of two to one against it.(ll) 
On the morning of February 27th, Hawick busied himself in 
writing a sketch or a plan f'oi' the regulation of the Irish 
rranchise which he hoped would be acceptable to both parties. 
Wood rather discouraged him rrom attempting to persuade both 
sides to compromise; evidently Wood had ~o desires ror the virtues 
or being an independent watching over the public good, which 
might rurther estl"'ange him rrom the W~igs and prevent his return 
to ofrice.< 12) Nevertheless, Hawick persevered in his intention, 
the ract that the Committee on Morpeth' s Bill was postponed until 
( 10) Journal, February 24th, 1841. 
(11) Journal,- Febr.aary 25th, 1841, and I-Iowick to Earl Grey 
February 24th. 
( 12) JoLu•nal, February 27th. 
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April 2)rd, giving him the necessary time to consult others and 
to decide upon a measure. 
On March 2nd, he had a conversation with -s-. Young, M.P. f'or 
Cavan, an Irish supporter of the Conservatives. Young objected· 
to the rating proposed by Morpeth because it was too low and 
because it did not have any regard to the profit of the tenant, 
the old idea of the beneficial interest. A difference of ten 
pounds between rent and rating was too high, but a smaller sum 
would ensure that the tenant would have an. 1 interest 1 which would 
qualify him to vote. Here is to be seen the concern so common 
among politicians of that age to enfranchise only thos.e who had 
a 'stake' in the country, in this case the wealthier tenantry. 
·Young did not. believe that such a qualification would cause a 
great diminution in the number of electors; what was more likely 
to bring this about was the reluctance of Irish landlords to 
grant leases. He, therefore; suggested that in addition to this 
franchise, a further one should be created, this one to be by 
virtue of simple occupancy, that is that tenants held their land 
'at will' not be lease (i.e. as the £50 tenants at will enfranchise( 
du."'Jo"!o by the Cbo'JPe'Res Clause in the Reform Bill of 1832 had the right 
to vote"). He had already communicated these sentiments to Peel, 
who seemed favourably inclined to them. Young's views coincided 
with Hawick's, and the latter authorized him to communicate his 
views to Peel also.(l3) 
On March 4th, Howick had a conversation with Stanley, who 
( 13) Journal March 2nd. Howick to Earl Grey, March 3~d,·,· 
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for once seemed to the former to be reasonable. · Stanley insisted 
on retaining the beneficial interest in some form, but agreed 
that this could be provided for by an excess of rating over rent, 
and he did not oppose an occupation franchi~e under certain res-
trictions. Having heard Tory opinion, Hawick proceeded to pay 
a visit to Lord Duncannon, and was surprised to find the_ latter 
unaware of the dislike of the £5 clause among some of the Whigs. 
Hawick urged upon him the changes which would probably enable 
the bill to pass. (l4) Wood, his doubts as to the practicabili~ 
of being intermediaries between the two parties seemingly over-
ruled, was in communication with Russell, suggesting that only 
proposals such as those Hawick recommended could save the bill; 
he also had a satisfactory conversation with Morpeth on the 
subject.(lS) 
By March 16th, Wood had communicated Hawick's ideas to 
two Conservatives, Eliot and William Lascelles, who had proved 
receptive and had promised to find out from Peel whether he was 
disposed to settle the question along these lines. At least one 
Whig, Benjamin Hawes, was in favour of Hawick's proposal. Encour-
aged by the support the proposals had received from such widely 
different quarters, Hawick and Wood decided upon drafting an 
amendment to the Government's bill, which would ensure a bene-
ficial interest in the form both Hawick and Young had desired · 
that it would take, and which would also enfranchise a certain 
( 14) Journal, March 4th. Hawick to Earl Grey March ~A. 
( 15) Journal, March lOth. 
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number of tenants at will. ·sir George Grey, whom Howick con-
sulted on the 19th, approved of the idea, believed that it would 
have more chance of acceptance if not proposed by the Government, 
and eventually helped his cousin to draft the·arnendment. Towards 
the end of March Peel expressed a desire to William Lascelles 
to see Hawick's proposed means of settling the franchise question; 
Howick and Wood, therefore, set about drafting a paper for the 
Opposition leader's perusal.(l6) At this stage, Howick had 
reason to feel satisfied; an important problem, which he believe~ 
played its part in Irish unrest, seemed as though it would be 
settled, with himself having the chief credit for that settlement. 
An amendment from the Opposition on similar lines would be 
resisted by the Government, and a Government proposal would not 
be listened to by the Opposition, but Howick and Wood were in a 
'neutral' position, and if proposed by them all parties might 
be relieved to accept the measure.(l7) 
His elation, however, was soon jolted. On March 30th, he 
had reported to his father that Peel, ever cautious, was at the 
moment unwilling to commit himself, but that at least two more 
supporters for his proposed amendment had been gained, the 
Speaker and Sir W. Somerville, a moderate Irishman in the Whig 
ranks. 'Altogether. I think things look very well for our carry-
ing what we mean to propose. ' Yet on April 1st, Wood received 
a letter from Morpeth which intimated that the Government were 
(16) Journal, March 30th-31st. 
( 17) Howick to Earl Grey, March 23rd. 
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unwilling to stand aside and see him and Hawick extricate them 
from_their difficulty. Morpeth stated that the Government had 
decided that if there was to be any modification to the bill it 
ought to be left to them; at the same time the note gave no 
indication as to whether the Government was prepared to accept 
and propose Hawick's scheme. Perhaps suspicions of Hawick's real 
intentions had something to do with this decision; perhaps 
Russell and his colleagues believed that Hawick was aiming to 
attract to himself a group of followers from the \~ig ranks, 
or was simply aiding and abetting the Tories. HOJ!l iclc was annoyed 
by the tone of this letter. He suspected that if the Government 
had a different scheme to propose it would be something more 
likely to attract Radical support, and would, therefore, be 
something to which he could not agree; in any case the Govern-
&.c 
ment were sure toAbeaten on any such proposal. Therefore, he 
decided to go ahead with his amendment without further reference 
to the Government.(l8) 
In the House of Commons on April 2nd, Russell outlined to 
Wood the Government's new plan. This was to adopt part of Hawick's 
proposal by having a high occupation franchise, and was to intro-
duce a modification of their ovm, by enfranchising those whose 
land was rated at ten pou11ds per annum and vvho held leaseholds 
of fourteen years or more. Hawick believed this was not so good 
a measure as his ovm, and stood less likelihood of success. He 
resolved to persevere in framing and presenting his own amendment; 
(18) Journal April 1st. Hawick to Earl Grey April 2nd. 
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in this .he was urged on by his father, who wished him to give 
notice of it as soon as possible in case the Government itself 
adopted Howick's suggestions and took all the dredit from him. 
Wood was more hesitant as to the line to be adopted; no doubt 
remembering the previous year and how he had been censured by 
his ovm father, he did not ~elish the thought that perhaps he 
and his brother-in-law would be in lone opposition to a Whig 
Government:-
'Both you and he (Earl Grey) have a sort of notion of 
chivalrous or heroic times', he wrote to Howick, 'when one man 
decided the fate of a battle. I have imbibed more modern notions, 
and think that to carry weight we must wear a tail and I arn very 
much against committing ourselves to any line in action (not in 
speaking) which will leave us alone with the Tories ••• The 
Government and people in it cannot help commi~ting themselves, 
for they are bound to make propositions. People in like manner, 
with a tail, may make propositions for they are sure of support: 
but people who have not a tail should confine themselves very 
much to debate, find fault, suggest amendments and shew better 
sense, and better skill than others, without displaying their 
weakness !t divisions.' (l9) 
On April 20th, Howick in the Commons gave notice of his 
amendment in general terms. Two days later Morpeth announced 
he would raise the amount of rating in counties from his previous 
figure of five to that of eight pounds. On the 26th Howick 
(19) Wood to Howick,. April 9th. 
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proposed his amendment on the first clause of the Government 
bill; he did not state a particular figure of the difference 
between rating and rent which would give the right to vote. He 
claimed that the purpose of his amendment was to define the real 
'interest' that would-be voters had in their holdings. He 
announced his intention in a later amendment of proposing an 
occupation franchise at a higher amount of rating. Morpeth 
opposed·the amendment; he claimed it would be a measure of dis-
franchisement. Stanley and Peel announced that they would 
support Hawick's first amendment, but ·would only vote for an 
occupation franchise if brought forward by the Government. 
Hawick's amendment was carried by 291 votes to 270; only.four 
Whigs, excluding Wood, voted with him, both Hawes and Acheson 
who had expressed themselves as favourable towards it, deserted 
him when it came to the division. 
Howick, at the urgings of Wood and after consulting his 
father, agl"eed to give up his second amendment, as it would 
receive no support from either side of the House. On April 28th, 
·Russell announced that he did not consider the amendment to the 
Government bill as fatal to that measure, and announced his 
intention of persevering with it; however, the next day - after 
a further unfavourable division in which Howick and Wood again 
voted with the Tories -he announced his intention of withdrawing 
the bill. 
Thus Howiclt and ·wood, despite their intention of helping 
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the Government to modify their measure so as to give it a chance 
of being accepted by the House, had as a result of' their independent 
action ended by achieving the same result as t~ey feared the 
original proposal would encounter, a defeat and a withdrawal of' 
the bill. They had believed their proposals to be far better than 
the Government's, but apart from a few Whigs, had only gained the 
support of' the opposit~on. To many Vfuigs, in the constituencies 
and in Parliament, their _conduct must have appeared f-.c.f'"~ o u. ~ 
two Whigs hal'"assing the Government so as to cause the· latter to 
take them back into its ranks, an old poli ti~_al game. Though the 
members of' the Government might feel bitter against their two .former 
colleagues, and for all that these had not detache·d from th~ Whig 
ranks a tail of' followers to make their bargaining position and 
influence stronger - at this time there was a joke about the party 
of two, of Crusoe ·and Man Friday _( 2o) it was impolitic in the weak 
state of the Government to break all connections with the dissidents, 
both of' whom were able men and who were responsible for Northumber-
land and Halifax being Whig constituencies. Therefore, despite 
differences of opinion both groups were anxious to remain on 
friendly terms with one another. In May 1841, Wood was offered 
the Secretaryship of the Treasury, and was informed that Hawick 
would be brought back into the Government as soon as possible; 
this offer was declined, but it showed a desire on the Government's 
part to soothe differences past and present. After all Wood and 
Howick did support the ~overnment's financial policy and there was 
(20) Journal, June 26th, 1840. 
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going to be an election in the summer of 1841.( 2l) 
B. The Corn ·Laws and the Election of 1841. 
On April 30, 1841, Francis Baring made his financial statement; 
to raise much needed revenue he proposed to diminish various pro-
tective duties, those on timber, sugar and corn. In the debate 
which followed Russell re·fused to declare what form an alteration 
of the Corn Laws would take. Howick was a convinced Free Trader, 
and as we shall see was within the next fevv years to be a prom-
inent advocate for the adoption of Free Trade principles. He had 
always supported any proposals for altering the Corn Laws; to 
avoid clamour and to give just a modicum of protection to agricul-
ture, which compared to industry was more dependent up·on uncertain-
. h-.e. 
ties such as the weather, he was up to this willing to see a small 
A. 
·fixed duty on corn, but nothing more, certainly not the elaborate 
system of protection which then prevailed. Therefore, he gave 
his hearty support to the proposed financial measures of the 
f" .. ""'c. ,. s 
Government. In doing so he brought down upon himself his fellewe-ro"'' 
wrath:-
'I must regret, most deeply regret, that on a question which 
as to its expediency must depend at least as much on the time, the 
manner, and the circumstance in which it is proposed, as _on ~bstract 
right, that you should have committed yourself,. give me leave to 
say_prematurely and unnecessarily, to support the Govt in a course 
( 21) Journal, May 3rd, 1841. 
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of proceeding of which if my enfeebled powers do not prevent my 
doing my duty, I must express my utter reprobation. ,( 22 ) 
It was obvious that the Government was not strong enough to 
carry such fundamental changes in the commercial policy of the 
country. It was soon realized that the Government upon being 
defeated on their proposals, meant to have a dissolution. Hawick 
regarded this as unwise, he was sure that increased strength would 
not be gained by it, whilst Earl Grey was strongly opposed to the 
whole course the G.overnment was pursuing. Hawick feared that to 
gain support an offer would be made to him to rejoin the Government; 
his father's views would make it impossible for him to do so and 
the result would be a further estrangement from the Vfuigs; there-
fore, he was relieved when no offer was in fact made.( 23) 
If his voting on the Irish Registration Bills had annoyed 
certain of his constituents, his approbat.ion of the Government's 
intention to alter the Corn Laws probably annoyed more. The whole 
of Northumberland - Hawick represented the Northern Division of 
the county- was much concerned with agricultural issues. His 
election, therefore, would have been difficult enough, but it was 
,. 
further complicated by a thunderbolt from an entirely unexpected 
quarter. On Tuesday, May 25th, Maria heard that Hawick's brother, 
George - the only one of his brothers then available - had been 
forbidden by Earl Grey to go to Northumberland to assist in can-
vassing. So strong was Earl Grey's devotion to the Corn Laws and 
(22) Earl Grey to H owick, May 1841 (no precise date). 
( 23) Journal, May 22nd, 1841. 
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so strong his hatred of the Government, that he was even prepared 
to make known his disapprobation of his son's politics, the result 
of which fact could scarcely be doubted. 
Hawick was not only surprised but justifiably annoyed. The 
subject of the Corn Laws had been one of the few consistent 
differences on politics bet11veen father and son, but he had never 
expected that it would reach such a stage that his father would 
ever set about hindering his own election. On May 26th, he s.ent 
for George Grey, who confirmed what Maria had heard. Thereupon 
Hawick went to his father's house in Berkeley Square, where he 
had 'a long and very disagreeable conversation' with him. Hawick 
announced that he could not stand for election if thus publicly 
discountenanced by his ovm family; he thought it would in the 
circumstances be better if he informed his adherents that he 
intended to retire. He pointed out how far he had endeavoured to 
meet his father's political views in the past, and how his father's 
opinions had le:d h.:im to take a firmer line both over his resig-
. ·:: . 
·\ 
nation and recentl-y over Morpeth' s bill than he might have done 
.-, 
L 
if left to his own:. d.ev~~es. He, however, coul.d not compromise 
·.,:r!f .; 
over the question of comme~~ial reform, and could not do otherwise 
than support the Gpvernm~nt·. · Earl Grey complained that in his 
recent speech in the Commons he had not only approved the measures, 
but also ·seemed to approve the time and the manner in which they 
had ·been brought forward. Hawick denied this last charge:-
'but that it did not appear to me that under all circumstances 
I \~las at all called upon to express this opinion ••• that in the H. 
' 
··_( 
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of c. no man standing alone or not acting in concert with others 
could be of t·he slightest use or exercise any real power and 
influence, and that therefore as it was impossible I should ever 
act with Peel and his friends I thought it of great importance 
to do nothing to widen the separation already created by circum-
stances between myself and the members of the present Govt and 
the party of which they are the leaders. Now if in supporting 
their measures I had joined in the censure which has been throvm 
upon them for the time and manner of bringing them forward, the 
result would have been that I should have added to the force of 
the attacks they are most sensible of, and if they fail in the 
elections ••• that failure would in some degree at least be 
attributed to me.~.' 
Earl Grey voiced his strong disapproval of the Government, said 
that he could not look without horror at the possibility of his 
son ever acting again with Russell, and endeavoured to. show how 
ill-used Hawick had been by the Whig leader in the Commons. Hawick 
defended Russell as best he could, saying that he had not intended 
what had actually happened. He then retur~ned to the question of 
the Northumb.erland election; as it Vias probable that a second 
Tory candidate vvould be bro·ught for·ward, he thought it best to 
inform his sup_porters as soon as possible that he could not P,imself' 
stand, and thus they would be able to seek for another Whig in 
good time to replace him. He said that he would not be sorry to 
leave Parliament, politics being so unsatisfactory, that there were 
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many places on the Continent which he wished to see, and that-
only the critical state o~ the country and 'the disorganising 
projects of some individuals' had made it seem his duty to be in 
constant attendance at the House of Commons. Earl Grey stated 
\ 
that he could not support Howick, but would do nothing to oppose 
him. Cold comfort this ! He desired to see Howick postpone an 
in~ediate decision as to whether to announce that he would stand 
or not,. hoping that no Opposition candidate would be brought 
forward, and that Howick, unopposed, would be automatically re-
elected. He promised to think over what had been aaid before 
coming ·to a decision as to what steps to take. ( 24) 
On June 1st, Howick received from a certain Donaldson Selby, 
one of his Northumbrian supporters, a letter which did not give a 
very encouraging view of the state of affairs in the north. 
According to this, the farmers. were apathetic about the latest 
Government measures, except for that concerning corn; they con-
sidered the idea o~ opening the trade in corn 'quite monstrous'. 
Few supporters would be had for any changes in the Corn Laws. The 
only encouragement this letter had to give to Hawick was that so 
far no second To_ry candidate had been bl .. ought forward. ( 25 ) 
Three days later Howick had a further conversation with his· 
father. It was decided that Howick would stand as a candidate, 
taking a chance that he_ would not be opposed. Earl Grey still 
refused to do anything positive in the way of suppol"'ting his son's 
( 24) Journal, May 26th, 18L~l. 
(25) Journal, June 1st, 1841. 
election, but did make one concession; if George Grey wished to 
help his brother, Earl Grey would make no objection.< 26 ) 
On Friday, June 25th, Howick left for Northumberland, leaving 
his Journal in the hands of Maria, who five days' later ominously 
noted that she had heard that Lord Ossulston - Howick's fellow 
member for the Northern Division and a Tory - was going to a meeting. 
the aim of which was to concert an opposition to her husband. 
On July 1st, Maria had some disagreeable moments with George Grey, 
upon whose support Howick so much relied; his absence would mean 
Earl Grey's disapprobabion, and would be so interpreted by friends 
and. foes alike. George Grey, ·possessed with all his father's 
prejudices, did nothing but sneer at Howick's association wit_h 
the present Government. Maria, however, got him to agree that 
Howick ought at least to go to the poll. 
I 
On July 3rd, Maria received her first letter from her husbsnd. 
The news it contained was discouraging. The Tories had brought 
forward A.J. Baker Cresswell as an opponent against Howick. bn 
July 1st; Maria immediately wrote to Earl Grey giving him this 
information, and in l"'eply Earl Grey stated that he too had received 
a letter from his son, urging that George Grey should go directly 
to Northumberland, and that he regretted that there was to be a 
contest, first, because he disapproved of Howick's pplitics, and 
secondly because he could not afford money to match such an ample 
purse as Baker Cresswell's. Maria in the next few days was to 
prove herself a detel"'mined upholder of her husban"d' s interests. 
(26) Journal, June 4th, 1841. 
She promptly v11rote to Lords Minto and Duncannon, Mr Bulteel 
(another of Howick's brothers-in-law), and Sir George Grey, to 
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solicit their.:support. Duncannon promised to write to Earl Grey 
on the matter, and Bulteel came and made protestations o~ support 
for Howick, so that Maria·was convinced he meant promptly to start 
for the north to aid in the canvass; the next day she was dis-
illusioned on this point. Mr Bigge, whom ·we have already met as 
one of Howick's supporters in 1826, had told Howick that if he 
incurred a defeat, the fault would be with Earl Grey, for the 
Tories had learn of his disapproval of his. son's politics, and 
this had encouraged them to bring forward another candidate.·(27) 
Earl Grey had to a certain extent relented, and though he 
continued to be strongly opposed to the idealogy of free trade, 
he not only allowed, George Grey to go down to Northumberland, but 
sent. ~ive hundred pounds with him to help pay election expenses. 
George Grey arrived at Howick Hall on July 4th, and his brother 
promptly wrote to express his gratitude for the money, which he 
valued as a sign that his father took an interest in his success. 
He confirmed the report that the Tories were making capital out 
of the political differences between father and son, and that the 
Duke of Northumberland was exerting all possible in~luence against 
him. He was, however, in favour of allowing himself to be nomin-
ated, and if he had the show of hands to leave it to his opponents 
to demand a poll. ·rf by then the canvassing returns had sho\m no 
probability of success, he could give way upon being challenged 
(27) Journal, July 3rd, 1841. 
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by his opponents to a contested election. After stating that the . 
tmrms were the plac;:es where he hoped to secure most votes, he 
announced that at least one former supporter - Clavering of Callaly -
·would not aid him because he had opposed the Government on Stanley's 
bill.< 28 ). 
On July 5th, Maria received a further letter, describing how 
Earl Grey's name was used against his son, and of ho\1 the Duke of 
N ol .. thumberland' s influence was also used against him. Maria 
passed the information on to Earl Grey, and in the evening all the 
Grey family paid her a visit and 'were all zeal and kindBess'; 
the damage had, however, been done. It must have pleased Maria 
to see the way people rallied to her husband's support. Lord 
Duncannon offered her five hundred pounds collected from friends 
whom he was not allowed to mention, Lord Grey told her that Sir 
Willoughby Gordon had offered two hundred pounds as 'a proof of 
. . 
respect', 'lryhilst a Mr Denison had offered to stand security for 
raising money. ( 29 ) She herself continued to be indefatigable on 
her husband's behalf; ~earing that the people at Widdrington on 
Lord Vernon's estates had not given much support to Hawick, she 
contacted Lord Vernon's solicitors. After consulting Lord Grey, 
she made arrangements for sending off to Northumberland those 
people who were residing in London yet had a vote in the county. 
She also canvassed personally.(30) 
·(28) Hawick to Earl Grey, July 4th, 1841. 
(29) Journal, July 5th, 1841. 
(30) Journ~l, July 6th-7th, 1841. 
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Meanwhile the accounts from Northumbe~land did not seem very 
encouraging. At the nomination, the High.iSheriff, Sir Matthew 
White Ridley, declared the show of hands to be against Hawick, 
though he and his supporters thought otherwise and they refused 
to move a vote of thanks to the Sheriff or to stay t·o hear one 
moved. Despite this setback it was decided to accept Baker Cress-
well's challenge, and to poll the county. Along with this decision 
went one to economize as far as possible upon expenses!: Instead 
Instead of hiring various public houses for election purposes 
as was the general practice, Hawick decided simply to issue dinner 
tickets to those who polled for him, entitling them to obtain at 
any public house dinner up to a certain value. For the conveyance 
of voters he was relying mainly upon the exertions of private 
friends, for instance a certain Nairne was to transport the Holy 
Island voters in his own steamer. A subscription had been started, 
and by July 5th, four or five hundred pounds had come in. Mean-
while General Grey, Hawick's uncle, had contributed five hundred 
pounds, and more money was forthcoming from other quarters; ·eight 
hundred .pound.s was sent from Newcastle, and Sir John Swinburne had 
offered to lend £1,~00 or more if needed. ( 3l) 
7 
All was in vain. On the night of Friday,. June 9th, Hawick 
announced his defeat to pe almost certain. Many farmers of hostile 
landlords had broken promises made to his agents, and the Opposi·tion 
had been very successful in prevailing upon electors riot to give 
plumpers but to split their votes betvveen the two Tories. Voters 
at Wark who had previously promised to split their votes, giving 
(3l)Howick to Earl July 5th. Journal July 9th, 1841. 
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Howick one, had been harangued by Lord Ossulston, and had been 
·obliged by the consequences of a refusal to do as he wished, to re-
tract their promis·es; Ossulston had told them that as the purpose 
was ·to turn Howick out, votes split with him would not fulfil that 
object, and that he, Ossulston, could not accept them. Nevertheless 
Howick was pleased at the zeal his friends had sho~m, and at the 
way expenses had been kept within reasonable bounds, being within 
the amount subscribed. 
T.he poll was concluded on Monday, July 12th.; At ten-thirty in 
the morning, Sir Matthew White Ridley declared the result. 
~ Ossulston polled 1,216 votes, Creswell 1,163 and Howick 1,101. The ,. 
Northern Division of' Northumberland 'v"ia·s now represented by two 
Tories, and Howick was without a seat in Parliament. His votes 
against the Whig Government, his economic theories, the fact that 
he did not have his father's support initially, all these no 
doubt contri.buted to the result, but his was by no means an isolated 
Whig defeat. That party lost heavily, and it was evident that 
the country as a whole desired a change of Government. 
c·. The search for a seat; Sunderland. 
Hawick's first reaction to his defeat was to make arrangements 
for a Continental tour. He had even got as far as fixing a date 
for their departure, when he received in July 29th, a letter from 
his brother George, which made him hesitate as to the course he 
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ought to pursue. There was a possibility that Liddell, the Tory 
member for North Durham, would be offered an appointmen_t when the 
new government was formed, and that in that case Howick would be 
asked to stand for the vacant seat. Howick thereupon wrote to his 
father asking his advice. He stated that he would be glad to get. 
back into the House of Commons, but that there were several 
objections to standing for this particular seat. For one thing 
it would bring down much abuse. on Louisa Lamb ton's head, Louisa 
being his sister and wife of the late Earl of Durham. 
Her son, Hedworth Lambton, already held one of the seats, and 
if so close a relation st·ood fo1., the vacant one, she would be held 
to be trying to gain both seats for herself, whether she played 
any part in the election or not. In addition it would be said that 
Howick stood for a county with which he had no connection. A 
contest would also cost much money, certainly not less than £2,000, 
and where was the moriey going to come from ? He could hardly 
ask Egrl Grey to contribute more, and all his ovm savings from his 
salary whilst in office had been absorbed by the late· election: 
of course he could incur debts, but he was very reluctant to do so. 
There was also a chance that Ossulston would receive a household 
appointment, in which case there would be a re-election in his old 
constituency. Not that he thought that he would be any more 
successful if he stood for it again. He believed that, given due 
notice and time for preparation, the Whigs were strong enough to 
·carry one seat in this division at a general election, but that 
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the Tories were so much the more powerf'ul that in a single election 
any Whig who stood would be defeated. He announced that he was 
still inclined to leave for the Continent, but would await his 
father.' s advice. ( 32) 
Earl Grey was not in favour of Hawick standing for North 
~urham, unless the people invited him to stand as a spontaneous 
gesture, and bore all the expense themse+ves. He, however, differed 
from his son as to the probable result of a contest in the event 
of Ossulston .vacating his seat, and thought that Howiclc should 
lose no opportunity of cultivating and improving his interest in 
the county. Therefore he wished to see· Hawick spend the \Vinter 
in Northumberland. His letter ended vd th further abuse of Russell, 
who had destroyed the Whig party and sacrificed Hawick to the 
Tories - it did not occur to him that his attitude had played a 
part in the last debacle. As for money, Earl Grey's answer was 
conclusive: 'I really have not a shilling. 1 (33) 
Hawick went ahead with preparations for his departure to 
Antwerp, but mn August 5th he received a letter from one of his 
supporters in Northumberland saying how pleased all his friends 
would be if he came north, and announcing that when all the election 
expenses were paid there would b~ a surplus of about £1,100 which 
his friends were going to keep in reserve for the next struggle. 
This letter caused Hawick to change his mind about an immediate 
(32) Journal July 29th. Hawick to Earl Grey July 29th. 
(33). Earl Grey to Hawick, August 1st, 1841. 
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holiday abroad; he did not wish to offend his supporters, and 
if there were a vacancy in North Northumberland at least the 
problem of finding most of the money to fight it had been solve~ 
Therefore, he determined to forfeit his passage money and to go 
to Northumberland. ( 34) 
North Durham and North Northumberland were not the only places 
for which Howick considered offering himself as a candidate. 
There were rumours that Hodgson Hinde, Tory M.P. for Newcastle, 
would vacate his seat, and Howick was prepared in that case to 
put himself forward as a candidate. Wood also wrote to inform 
him that there would probably be a vacancy at Aberdeen.(35) 
On Thursday, September 9th, Howick and Sir George Grey went to 
see how the construction of a new harbour at the mouth of the 
Coquet was progressing. On their return in the evening, they 
found three gentlemen from Sunderland waiting in the library to 
see Howick. They were a deputation sent by the Whigs ·of Sunderland 
to as1c Hov1ick to become a catldidate for· a seat which Alderman 
Thompson had just vacated in order to come in for Westmorland in 
the place of Lord Lowther, who had been called to the Lords. 
They brought a requisition asl\:ing Howick to stand signed by 'many 
of the leaders of the liberal party in the town. • The deputation 
assured Howiclt that there was a fair chance of success; that his 
views as to ballot and other related matters would be no impedi-
ment, and that, most important of all, the expense would not be very 
( 34) Journal, August 5th. 
(35) Journal, August, 12th, 25th, 26th, 28th, 
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great, probably not more than eight hundred pounds. Howick con-
sulted his father: he announced that the residue of the money he, 
Earl Grey, and General Grey had provided for the Northumberland 
Election could be used to fight this one, and that the balance 
due to the other subscribers could be restored. Earl Grey agreed, 
and advised Howick to accept the offer. T.hel ... efore, at about 10 a.m. 
on the Friday, he found himself in Sunderland. Af'ter stating to 
his suppol .. ters that his expenses must be confined to those which 
were strictly legal and necessary, he began to canvass and so 
continued till 6.30. Howick had an initial advantage over his 
opponents, for the Tories were late in fixing upon someone to 
represent them; at first they canvassed for Lord Dungannon, but 
on the Friday evening he withdrew, and Wolverley Attwood, a man 
connected with the shipping interest, was brought forward. On 
the Saturday it was a11other tale of canvassing: Howick was now 
assisted by Sir George Grey, who had come to Sunderland bringing 
Maria with him. On Sunday Howick wrote to his father to·give him 
an idea as to his prospects; he calculated that the cont~st would 
be a very close one, Attwood as a commercial man being f~r more 
formidable than Lord Dungannon. Howick feared that his opponents 
would have recourse to direct bribery; they were already being 
lavish in hiring bands and sending their colours to public houses. 
There was on the part of his friends a disposition to follow the 
example set by his opponents:-
'I have been very much annoyed at hearing this evening from· 
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George Grey that Williamson had told him ••• that he had reason 
to believe that my friends determined not to lose the election if 
they cab help it and finding that Attwood is spending money, had 
followed his example, and spent last night £100 in treating. He 
said he believed they meant to pay this themselves and never to 
let me know it, but I have no confidence in their not throwing the 
expense upon me ••• I cannot say how annoyed I should be at its 
appearing that I had carried the election by such means •••• having 
often in the H. of C. expressed a strong opinion against all kinds 
of corruption. I should much prefer losing the election to 
gaining it by such ~eans.'(36) 
On the M'onday, he was canvassing again :rrom 8 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. 
At his committee roqm he condemned the bribery t,o which the other 
side appeared to be resorting. He also privately warned some of 
his supporters not to participate in proceedings partaking of the 
nature of bribery or treating. Tuesday brought an account of 
how Willis, a steward of one of Attwood's steamers, had attempted 
to induce the Sunderland Chartists to put a certain Colonel 
Thompson in nomination and to demand a poll for him, with the 
object of dividing the loyalties of Hawick's supporters; Willis 
had offered a Mr Binns, the leader of the .Sunderland Chartists; 
£125 as a bribe and to meet the expenses of going to the poll, 
and this Binns had rejected with great indignation. On Wednesday, 
15th, the nomination took place; Binns who spolce for Colonel 
Thompson took the opportunity to reveal the offer made to him by· 
(36) Hawick to Earl Grey, September 12th, 1841. 
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Mr Willis, steward of the 'Ocean', a ship of the Steam Navigation 
Company, of which Attwood was the Chairman. Hawick praised the 
talent the Chartist leader showed. The show~ of hands was in 
favour of Colonel Thompson, but only Hawick and Attwood were to 
fight it ·out at the poll. On Friday the poll closed; the result 
was a victory for Hawick. He polled 750 votes to Attwood's 463. 
Hawick was, however, prevented from speaking from the hustings 
after the result was declared by a group of men hired by Attwood 
to prevent anyone speaking but himself; Binns too failed to get 
a hearing. The victor was paraded about the tovm in an open 
carriage lined with blue. and buff silk, being followed by more 
carriages, 'there was an immense display of flags_ in th~ procession 
and a prodigious concourse of people.' Shortly before the 
procession came to a close a man named Liddle, owner of the 
Reform Tavern (whom Howick declared they had refused to bribe by 
hiring a band he had), togeth~r with some drunken friends pelted 
the carriages with stones, and Liddle fired a gun _at the carriage 
which contained Maria. Fortunately, the gun was only loaded with 
paper, but the story was sensational:.tzed by the papers into an 
attempted assassination of Sunderland's new member of Parliament. 
The crowd immediately rushed to the Reform Tavern arid destroyed 
every article it contained. Liddle was fortunate enough to be 
seized by a party of constables who protected him from the crcrvid~ 37 ) 
(37) Journal, October 2nd •. Letters to E~rl Grey S~ptember lOth, 
12th, 13th, 15th, 16th and -18th. 
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On October 7th, Howick heard that a petition was to be presented 
in the Commons against his election, on the ground of bribery. 
He was rather sceptical about the whole story. That winter, 
hearing of the death of Louisa Lambton at Genoa, and how her 
children were there, Howick and Maria left for Italy to take 
charge of th;em; it was not until March 2nd, that he was back in 
London. to take his seat in the House of Commons. It was not until 
·May 22nd that the question of an enquiry into the Sunderlmld 
election again raised its head; on that da.y he received from a 
Mr Moore o'f Sundel,land a letter containing information of a clear 
act of bribery committed by one of Howick's agents. A week later 
he heard that the other side were determined to press forward 
with a petition against his election, mainly on the ground of 
treating, and that witnesses were being summoned and counsel 
retained. Howick decided to go and see Joseph Parkes, the main 
agent f'or the Whig party; from Parkes on May 30th, he learnt 
facts which one of his supporters had disclosed to Parkes but not 
to himself, that the actual cost of the election was four thousand 
pounds Ol" thereabouts, and that there had been an immense amount 
of treating. The position looked serious, but there was still one 
hope. In many cases of this nature ·the tvvo parties unofficially 
and illegally compromised, that is to say that the Whigs would 
withdraw a petition against a Tory member, if the Tories would 
withdraw a similar petition against the return of a Whig. Parkes 
decided to go and see his opposite number in the Tory party to 
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make some such arrangement. On June 3rd, he was able to report to 
Howick that the Tories had agreed to withdraw their petitio~ 
agE;in.st the Sunderland election, and would announce this in the 
House that same evening: they required in return that a petition 
against an election at Brighton be dropped, and Parkes agreed to 
place in the hands of the Tory agents a lettel" withdrawing this 
petition, but which was not to be used until the following week to 
avoid the suspicion of compromise.(38 ) 
D. Free Trade. 
1841, and the Tories were once more in power. 1841, and a weal{ 
~Vhig ministry had been replaced, so it seemed, by a stronger, more 
talented, and stable one under Sir Robert Peel. Yet within five 
years the whole Tory party was to brealt asunder on the Corn Laws 9 
the main target.of those who demanded free trade. In fact the 
cry. for free trade formed one of the predominant political factors 
in these years of Conservative rule, and the tragedy, from the 
Tory point of view, was that their o~m Prime Minister in reality 
accepted this intellectual dogma of the nineteenth century. The. 
story of t"he conversion of Peel to give practical direction to 
free trade theories, and its consequent result, are well lrnovm. 
What we are concerned \!Vi th is Howiclt' s position vvi th regard to the 
struggle for free trade, for it was this topic which dominated 
his public utterances and much of his private·thought in these 
years. 
(38) Journa·l Oct. 7th, 1841. May 22nd, 29th, 30th, 
June 3rd, 1842. 
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'A doctrin~', 'a complete Cobdenite' are terms which have 
been widely employed to describe Howick's views on free trade; 
Palmerston described these as 'ultra Free Trade Doctrines'.(39) 
Questions of the principles of economics, of trade, of currency, 
were intellectual food and drink as far as Howick was concerned; 
throughout his correspondence with his father there is evidence 
of how much he enjoyed discussing rival theories in such matters 
and propounding his own solutions. Just as some of his contempor-
aries delighted in the thrills of the turf, so Ho~·11ick had similar 
enjoyment in this, what to most would seem, more forbidding field. 
As has: been briefly stated elsewhere Howick' s economic theories 
were those of the most advanced of his contemporaries; certainly 
they went far beyond the extent to which more ·orthodox Whig 
aristocrats like Russell were for the moment· prepared to go, and 
were utterly detestable to the older generation like Earl Grey 
and Lord Lansdowne. T.hese are vague generalities, hO\Ivever, and 
we must now turn to give some more concrete illustration of what 
Hawick's doctrines involved, in so far as they referred to free 
trade, the Corn Laws, and the whole system of preferential duties 
for British colonies. 
And what better way than to convict a man through his o\nm testi-
mony? Take. for example Hawick's speech in the Commons on March 
9th, 1842. Here he asserts his belief· in 'the natural and un-
checked operation of trade,' P~y attempt to interfere with this 
( 39) Later Corresnondence of Lord John Russell. 
(ed. Gooch) i925. Vol. 1. p. 74. 
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for example Parliament might attempt to fix prices, an act of 
Parliament might endeavour to prevent fluctuations in the price of 
corn - would be, to use a favourite Hawick phrase 'worse than 
useless.' This was a cardinal belief of all prominent economists 
since the days of Adam Smith, as was a kindred idea that Parlia~ 
mentary attempts to determine wages was harmful and useless in; that 
.,.. 
it hindered the working of the free contact between employer and 
.. 
employee; needless to say Hawick held this latter view also. 
Could not 'the natural and uncheclted ope rat ion of trade 1 be found 
disadvantageous in some respects? Did it·not give free rein to 
self-interest ? Did not this and its sister theory of a free 
,. 
contact between employer and employee exalt the strong and unscrup-
A 
ulcus and depress the weak ? In this argument of complete liberty 
in commerce and in~ustry versus various systems of control, Hawick's 
position was clear, and he thus naively expresses 'it:-
' ••• experience has shown that the natural system, when allowed 
to do so, worlts with a regularity and beauty which it is impossible 
sufficiently to admire. In the whole order of creation there is 
nothing more marvellous or more striking than the manner in which, 
by the combined operation of a number of individuals, none of whom, 
probably. bestows a thought upon the public good - each seeking only 
to promote his o\m private individual interest - the supply of ~ood 
to a great community is regulated •••• the more one considers this 
beautiful mechanism of society, the more must one be convinced 
that it is the appointment of unerring wisdom, and infinite 
(40) 
benevolence ••• r 
(40) Hansard Third Series, Vol. 61. pp. 311-39. 
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Many of the aristocratic ruling class believed that protection 
against foreign foodstuffs was essential for the agricultural 
interest, to which they of course belonged, and which was consid~red 
as the backbone of the country. Howick believed in only one form 
of protection, 'that which secures to every man the enjoyment of 
the fruits of his ovm honest industry - which guards him against 
being deprived by others directly or indirectly of the produce of 
his labour.' Protection was artificial, not part. of the natural 
operation of commerce, and, therefore, wrong; to How.ick it simply 
implied that people were to be forced to pay higher prices .for 
perhaps inferior articles, which, if there were no protection, 
could be procured more advantageously elsewhere. He rejected 
all arguments that protection could be for the ultimate good of 
the country as a whole. 
Nevertheless, in the case of the Corn Laws, Howick was in part 
prepared to depart from a strict adherence to the principle of 
free trade, and he thus occupied a somewhat different position 
from Charles Villiers and other free traders and supporters of the 
·. An:ti C.orn Law League. Howick favoured a small fixed duty on the 
importation of foreign corn. His reasons for favouring such an 
infringement on the key doctrine of free 'trade were, apart from 
the need for caution and moderation in attacking such an institution 
cherished by many, a consideration that total repeal might react 
unfavourably on the public revenue as a whole, whilst he did 
r·ecognize that .agriculture was a rather unusual case, there being 
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'peculiar burdens that weigh upon land.' To sum it all up, Howick 
believed that a small fixed duty was advantageous and the fairest 
-compromise between conflicting opinions, and for these reasons was 
prepared to depart from the strict letter of free trade. Yet if 
a choice lay between maintaining the sliding scale of duties on 
corn, and the total repeal of all duties, there was never a doubt 
that Howick would give his support to the latter. Only when the 
pressure for tota~ repeal became so strong did Howick abandon his 
compromise scheme. 
Another important aspect of the free trade issue had regard 
not only to duties against goods from abroad in general, but was 
concerned with the whole idea of differential duties, which 
allowed the importation into this country of much colonial produce 
on more favourable terms than identical produce from countries 
outsi·de the British Empir·e. This had been a supremely important 
doctrine in the old ideas of Empire dominant in the eighteenth 
century, but came under ever increasing attack as a result of the 
new conceptions of nineteenth century individuals interested in 
colonial affairs. The whole subject was of great concern to 
Howick, and was to assume vast importance when he entered the 
Colonial Office as Secretary of State. 
T.he whole system of differential duties was artificial, and 
hence in Howick' s eyes obnoxious, and ip the free trade debates. 
in the early 1840's he made it quite clear that if ever he gained 
contl .. ol of the Colonial Office this cardinal feature of the old 
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alis ""-
colonigati~ would be swept away. In the past England had bene-
fited from the conceptions of a commercial theory of a closed 
Empire, pl .. oducing goods which would be of advantage to the Mother 
Country, and most of whose tl .. ade vvas conducted through and under 
the control of the Mother Country. In return for restrictions on 
colonial trade imposed by the mercantilist theories, and to obviate 
the argument that colonies existed exclusively for_ the advantage 
of England, colonies derived certain advantages themselves from 
the system; bounties were paid to encourage the production of 
desired crops, safe markets in England were guaranteed for certain. 
products, and colonial goods could often be imported into England 
at a lower rate of duties, than those placed on identical goods 
from foreign lands. By 1840 the Navigation Acts were outmoded, the 
theory of which they were the embodiment was dying if not dead, 
and growing opposition was being aroused against differential 
duties as a whole. The colonies clung to the latter; the West 
Indies had suffered a decline in sugar production through the loss 
of cheap labour resulting from emancipation, the planters were, 
therefore, all the more determined to maintain the system of 
differential duties which, so they believed, not only gave them 
an assured market but alone enabled them to compete with slave-
grovm sugar from other lands. Othel .. colonial interests which: 
derived advantages from differential duties were similarly determined, 
Colonial interests were not as strongly represented in the 
Imperial Parliament as they had been in former times, and English. 
politicians grew ever more concerned about the needs of the 
consumer at home rather than say the Jamaican planter. This 
concern grew with the spread of free trade.doctrines. Important 
duties on say foodstuffs damaged the consumer most, by artificially 
raising prices; differential duties further damaged the consumer 
by restricting the amount of food imported from abroad, so as to 
benefit interests in various British colonies. So thought the 
free traders, and so thought Howick. Restraints on imports meant 
corresponding restraints on exports since commerce to flourish 
needed a free system of exchange of goods. Therefore all tariff 
barriers were legitimate targets of attack, and in the process of 
demolishing these, differential duties would be swept away~ 
On May 13th, 1842, Howick moved the following Resolution:-
~ That in making a new arrangement of the customs duties, it 
is not- expedient to impose different rates of duty upon the same 
articles when imported from foreign countries' or from British 
possessions, in any case where no such difference now exists; and 
that in those cases in which such a difference exists, it is not 
expedient that it should be increased." ( 4l) 
He justified his opposition to differential duties on the grounds 
that like all import duties they imposed an unnecessary burden 
on the consumer, whilst at the same time they deprived the 
Treasury of a substantial source of income, through being rated 
lower than identical goods from outside the Empire; he also con-
tended that the supposed advantages for the colonies from the 
system were in reality an illusion. He spoke of colonial capital 
(41) Hansard Third Series, Vol. 63, pp. 512-20. 
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and industry being diverted from their natural cpannels, of an 
uncertain reliance upon an artificial .system of commerce which might 
be shattered by a change in Britain's commercial policy; if the 
Mother Country gave favourable terms to colonial produce above all 
0thers, it was obvious that the advantage ought to work in the 
other direction too, and that British goods should enjoy favours 
in colonial markets, yet th1s would restrict the general trade 
of the colonies. Howick suggested as the correct policy the 
following:-
'··· to give the colonies the freedom to buy wherever they 
could buy cheapest, and to seal where they could get the best 
pri~e; that they should have free access to our market£, but 
no superior advantages. If we pursued this policy, and abstained 
from vexatious interference in the internal government of the 
colonies - if we allowed them, as far as was consistent, to manage 
their o·wn affairs in their own way, so far from such a policy 
weakening the connexion between the mother-country and the colonies, 
it would contribute to render it permanent and mutually benefic~al.' 
No clearer indication could have been asked for on the principles 
on which Howick would formulate a colonial policy• At the same 
time, as in the case of corn, he was not prepared to abolish holus 
bolus a long-established system of interes:Os ;- the first steps as 
he saw it in 1842 was to ensure that no further interests were 
created by an extension of the system of differential _duties. 
The whole subject of free trade versus protection assumed 
increasing importance during Peel's ·Min is try, and dominated 
Parliamentary debates long before the 'tour de force' of the repeal 
of the Corn Laws. In such debates Howick took a prominent and 
leading part, as we might expect from a knowledge of his interes~ 
in the subject and his character; in fact such a leading part 
that he aroused some suspicion among fellow Whigs that-he was 
aiming at, to quote Palmerston, 'setting up business upon his ovm 
account as leader of a small party, Charles Buller and Hawes being 
his two Generals of Division.' (42) 
Peel's conversion to the principles of full free trade was too 
slov·~ for Howick. In 1842 he was disappointed at Peel's new scale 
of duties; this Budg~t, which shov~ed a definite move towards free 
trade principles, according to Howick carried 'to an absurd extreme 
the system of Colonial protection.' As we have seen he moved an 
amendment against the creation of new differential duties, which' 
was defeated by 281 to 108. Howick could not count on the support 
of the full body of Whigs, many by no means subscribed to his free 
trade theories, and looked upon him as an extremist in such matter& 
So strong was the unwillingness to support him on this occasion, 
arid so many were the VVhigs who decided not to vote, that at one 
time Howick came near to abandoning any idea of dividing.C43) 
On June 13th of that year Howick moved another Resolution calling 
for the reduction of the proposed duty on foreign coffee, and in 
the preceding month made a similar motion with respect to foreign 
butter. 
(42) 'Later Correspondence of Lol"d John ·Russell' ( ed. Gooch) 
( 43 ) 1925. Vol. 1. P• 74. Journal, May 18th 1843. 
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In 1843 Hawick was again eager to press the free trade attack 
home; the growing interest and agitation on the subject_ made 
pressing it in Parliament a matter of practical politics. Hawick-
favoured opening the attack with an amendment on the Address 
referring to the Corn Laws.(44) As it was he was given the task 
by Russell of giving notice of a motion on the· distress of the 
country; on February 13th, he moved for a committee to consider 
the distressed state of the country, whilst at the same time he 
propounded his ovm remedy for that distress:-
' ••• the natural field for the employment of capital and 
labour is narrowed, cramped and confined by artificial restrictions 
and barriers, which it is in your power to remove ••• It is 
notorious that if these laws (the Corn Laws) were repealed or 
modified tomorrow, there would be a large increase in the import-
ation from foreign countries of various commodities. and especially 
of that article which forms the staple-food of the people. •(45) 
T.he rna) ori ty against this motion was 115. 
In May 1843, though still in favour of a small fixed duty, he 
supported Charles Villiers' motion for 'ac-committee of the whole 
House to consider the duties on the importation of cern with a 
view to their immediate repeal'. Hawick recorded that most of the 
front bench Whigs were against the motion and it was defeated by 
381 votes to 125. Later that same month there was a division -on 
the pr~ference given by the Government to Canadian corn, and again 
(44) Journal, January 11th, 1843. 
(45) Hansard Third Series, Vol. 66, p. 470. 
many .of the Whigs voted against Hawick. (46) 
In January 1845, Hawick produced a paper concerning the distressed 
state of the country, and believing free trade to be the only 
remedy for this, drew up a set of resolutions for carrying this 
into effect. These papers he sent with a letter to Lord John 
Russell. In this letter Hawick expressed the hope that Russell 
would adhere to a determination he had expressed in the former 
session of moving for a Committee to enquire into the state of 
the working 6lasses. The condition of these classes, Hawick 
believed, could only be bettered by 'the sweeping away of all 
restriction~ upon the freedom of trade except those duties which 
are imposed simply and exclusively with a view to revenue.' He 
realized that Russell hitherto had not been prepared to go so far, 
but he believed that the condi t::i.on of the country justified a 
bold onslaught against the principle of protective duties •. As it 
was Ashley and others in Parliament were tackling the problem, 
not realizing where the solution lay, in an ineffective and often 
'useless or worse than useless' manner. Hawick acknowledged that 
by acting on his vie'liV'S the Whig party would lose some of its 
adherent, but believed that this would be more than counterbalanced 
by the s·wing of public opinion in their fava·ur. (L~7) 
The paper on the state of the working classes, and the draft 
of the proposed Resolutions further illustrate Hawick's free trade 
( L~6) Journal, !•/iay 9th and May 22nd, 18L~3· 
( 47) Howicl{. to Russell, January 18th, l8L~5. 
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theories. In fact the Resolutions are in the main nothing but 
an exposition of Howick' s general economic theories. Russell 
agreed with much of what Howick said; he was by this time not 
averse to the entire removal of duties on foreigTJ corn, provided 
it was done gradually, and accompanied by 'a diminution of the 
burthens on the occupiers of land.' Russell announced that he 
favoured a small fixed a.u,:ty as a preparatol"'Y measure. (L,.B) 
Howick was pleased with Russell's speech on the day of the 
meeting of Parliament. He began to hope that he was converting 
the.leaders of the Whig party to his vie111s, though it is probable 
that Russell being a i"Vily and practical politic ian saw that the 
tide was turning. in favour of free trade in the ·country, and 
resolved to take advantage of the fact. Whatever the reason for 
Russell's 'volte face',: probably a mixture of genuine c~nversion 
and party tactics - Howick could note in his Jqurnal on February· 4th:-
' the part about free trade except that it was very inconsistent 
with his former doctrines was very good. I think the papers I 
sent him have had something to do with what was certainly a very 
decided move forward. ' 
Nevertheless Russell was by no means an entil•e convert to 
Hawick's views. In February of that year there was a debate on 
a resolution by Milner Gibson for equalizing the duties on f'oreign 
and colonial sugar; among the prominent Whigs who voted against 
Howick on this ·question were Russell, Baring, Labouchere and 
Hob house. 
(48) Russell to Howick, January 24th, 1845. 
In November, 1845, while Parliament was further prorogued, news 
of a split in Peel's C~binet, over his proposal to end the Corn 
Laws as soon as possible, spread about the country. T.he Tories 
were disunited. Russell, ever an opportunist, seeing the tide 
setting strongly in favour of' abolition, in a lett.er to his consti t-
uents from Edinburgh, dated November 22nd, announced his conversion 
to the principle of entire abolition; he stated that he had origin-
ally been in favour of a compromise solution such as the imposition 
of a moderate fixed duty, but in a _typical party at tack blamed 
Peel for not acceding to this, and now the time was past when a 
fixed duty, unless it were to be speedily abolished, would satisfy 
the free traders; it would merely prolong a harmful controversy.(49) 
Howick - now the third Earl Grey~ since the death of his father in 
July 1845, and hereafter l"'eferred to by that title - ·was delighted 
with Russell's statement; he had no strong objection to Russell's 
declaration for total repeal as the crisis justified the step, 
but he disliked the declaration in that it scented too much of 
party tactics, and cUsliked the references to Peel -in that they 
came from some one 'personally interested in discrediting a 
political rival. 1 (50) 
Peel's Cabinet broke up on the Corn Law question, and Russell 
vilas sent for by the Queen. On December 13th, Grey, residing in 
Northumberland, received a summons to tewn from his leader. 
(49) Press cutting affixed in Grey's Journal for Nov. 1845· 
(50). Journal, November 28th, 1845. 
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Russell was about to attempt to form a government, and repeal the 
Corn Laws. But how many of his party would agree to this step, 
and would not this attempt dislocate the Whigs, as Peel's proposal 
had the Tories ? The stage was all set for the importa~t events 
of December, 1845, but before going on to deal with these, in 
which Grey played a paramount and controversial part, let us 
briefly glance at another topic which captured his interests in 
those years when he was out of office. 
E. Railways and a proposed Company. 
Howick was always a child of his age. Naturally, therefore, 
he was interested in railways. So passionately was he interested 
in this latest form of transport, that once, as a joke, Maria 
gave him on his birthda~r, a Pail way timetable ~ 
T.he first mention in Hm.vick's Journal of a Northumberland 
Railway occurs in June, 184h. From that date this project of' 
carrying a line of railway north from Newcastle was to absorb 
much of his energy, and when not taking part in free trade debates 
he seems to have spent the remainder of' his time in Parliament 
in attending committees or debates on anything to do with railways.' 
Howick was one of the foremost, if not the foremost, person 
who began to concern themselves with establishing a Company to 
carry out this particular project. He wrote soliciting support 
from Northumbrian landowners, induced Ricardo to become one of the 
directors of the proposed company, and whenever those interested 
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met it was nearly always at his house in tovm. On July 29th, 1844, 
he noted:-
'our prospects are I trust very good of forming a very powerful 
company and getting all the money we want.' Among those associated 
with him were Brunel, the engineer, a certain De Custro described 
by Howick as 'one of the monied men that have been induced to join 
us,' and various prominent Northumbrians. 
In part Howick's interest in this project seems to stem from 
the fact that Hudson, 'the Railway King', had already envisaged 
a line nort~ of Newcastle, and was desirous of placing such a line 
east of Howick Hall. It would thus be between th~ Hall and the 
sea, and to this the second Earl Grey objected strenuously. The 
plan fo1 ... a company to rival Hudson's seems to have aris.en partly 
as a result of this. On August 2nd, 1844, Howick received from 
Hudson a letter offering to carry his line 'at a considerable 
expense' west of Howick Hall, and asking for support. Howick 
replied that such an offer now came too late, and sent his letter 
to be forwarded, together with a prospectus from his o~m company. 
Hudson resolved to persevere with his plans, and there were thus 
two companies seeking to gain parliamentary approval for laying 
the line. Hawick continued to be pleased by the turn of events; 
on August 24th, he learnt that he could count on the support of 
the Duke of Northumberland, and that Lambert, his agent, had 
already received 551 applications for shares. On October 2nd, he 
learnt from Wilkinson, Chairman of the Croydon Railway, and who 
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for £500 a year had joined Hawick's Company as Vice-Chairman, that 
Brunel was able to reduce his estimates to £800,000 for the main 
line, including two bridges, and £200,000 for a branch line to Kelso:-
'he says "we have very nearly enough shares taken, and more 
than enough money paid up to go to Parl t 11 • ' 
On December 4th, Howick heard that the plans of his own railway 
company, together with those of their opponents, had been deposited 
at the Board of Trade. At this time the Railway Department of . 
the Board of. Trade, had the task of making a ·preliminary report 
to Parliam~nt, recommending acceptance of one company's offer 
rather than its rivals: its report was not final, however, it 
being expressly stated that it was to be regarded in no other way 
'than as intended to afford aid to Parliament in the elucidationJ 
of facts and recommendations.' ( 5l) 
On January 20th, 1845, Howick went up with a deputation from 
the Directors of the Northumberland Railway to the Board of Trade 
to state their case. At the same time, to avoid all the expense 
of a parliamentary contest, it was decided to attempt a compromise 
with Hudson, and Howiclc was given by his colleagues the task of 
writing to propose a union of the Companies for the purpose of 
carrying into execution whichever line was sanctioned by the Board 
of Trade. On Saturday, January 25th, Bowick learnt that the Board 
of Trade had reported against his line an~ in favour of Hudson's 
railway from Newcastle to Berwick. 
(51) 'Mr Gladstone at the Board of Trade'. F. Hyde, 1934. 
Chapters 6 and 7• 
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On February 5th, Hm;:.rick in ~he Commons requested further .time 
for the introduction of railway bills in order to give an opportunity 
to companies against which the Board of Trade had reported unfavour-
ably of determining after seeing these reports whether to go on 
with their bills or not. His request was granted, and he also 
obtained an admission that the reports of the Board of Trade were 
not to be considered as final. Two days later the Directors of 
the Northumberland Railway decided to fight for their Bill, and 
leave Parliament to decide between them and Hudson. As for the 
report of the Railway Department of the Board of Trade against 
Howick's project, he noted that 'nothing can be weaker.' 
On Tuesday, March 4th, 1845, nowick presented a petition for 
leave to bring in the Northumberland Railway Bill. At the same 
time there was a controversy in circles interested in railways as 
to the comparative virtues of the ordinary steam engine and the 
atmospheric engine, a variety in which the steam is admitted only 
to the under side of the piston. Bowick, who had seen an atmos-
pheric engine, working on a line near Dublin in March, favoured 
this val"iety, ~;ilhich he hoped to see used by his own company. T.he 
H.ouse of Commons Committee investigating the offers of the two 
rival companies wer~ not so impressed by the merits of atmospheric 
engines, and on May 2l.j.th, Howick noted:-
'··· our railway bill will be lost, on the two points of the 
impossibility by the atmospheric of moving heavy trains, and of 
the insufficiency of a single line.' 
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His forecast proved correct, fort wo days later he heard that the 
preamble of Hudson's bi'll vvas voted pl .. oved. 
Hawick still refused to abandon all hope. He urged his 
associates to fight Hudson's bill in the Lords, whilst at the same 
time he endeavoured to stir up opposition to it in Northumberland. 
On May 30th the Journal contains the following:-
'Busy all the morning v~iting the draft of a petition.I mean 
to get signed at Alnwick for a reduction of the tolls in Hudson's 
railway bill.' 
And on June 4th:-
... busy all morning writing a petition for Chester le Street 
against Hudson's railway bill.' 
Another scheme was to attempt to postpone the Lords' Committee 
on the Horthumbel"'land Pailway bill until after a conclusive 
experiment on the atmospheric system had been made on a specially 
·constructed line at Cl"'oydon, but this was abandoned because the 
people at Croydon were unable to give a date as to when the line 
would be completed and the experiment take place. 
The Lords' Committee on the Newcastle and Berwick railway, 
confirmed the decision of the Commons in favour of Hudson's project 
and against Howiclc' s; the latter noted in disgust:-
'I suppose in the annals of Parliamentary Committees there 
never was a more flagrant violation of decency and justice. ,(52) 
The only thing_ that remamned to be done was to try and derive as 
much advantage from Hudson's scheme as possible. Learning that; 
(52) Journal, June 28th, 1845. 
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one of the latter's agents had offered E~rl Grey £30,000 ~or 
permission to carFy the railway east of Howick Hall, Howick wrote 
advising acceptance of the offer. Further reflection, however, 
convinced him that he 'could not with credit take a large sum of 
.money from Hudson for a consent to the alteration of his line.' 
'How I have mismanaged the whole business,' he now lamented, 'if 
I was to form a rival company I ought to have talcen more care to 
carry it which I believe I might have done had I in the first 
instance got the best assistance in Newcastle - but it wd have 
been wiser in me to. have avoided mixing myself up v:ri th any rna tters 
of the kind and to have made the best terms I could with Hudson.' (53) 
Hudson proved to be the new member f01~ Sunderland, vvhen on 
the death:. of his father, Viscount Howick moved to the Lords. He 
was not left entirely without any benefits by the success of 
Hudson's line; in the pecuniary field, he noted on October 13th:-
'I think ••• I shall have a very good price for the land 
required from me by Hudson.' 
So ended Grey's active participation in projecting railway· 
lines and in company promoting. He was now to be offered a chance 
of playing a more positive part in his chosen vocation, in short 
the chance of becoming a minister in a Whig government. 
F. The Crisis of Decemb~l845. 
December, 1845, was a crucial date in the history of this 
country. Peel had failed to obtain the support of a united Cabinet 
(53) Journal, July 3rd-4th, 7th. 
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for a suspension of the Corn Laws and for measures which would have 
led eventually to their total repeal; he, therefore, resigned, 
and gave the Whigs an opportunity of settling the question an·d 
gaining popularity for their party. But the Whigs failed to form 
a Government, Peel was obliged to return to office, and the result 
was the destruction of the strong party which he had built up in 
long years of opposition. With the downfall of the Tories the 
country \<'las ·fated to endure years of weak Governments, .and splinter· 
groups, not one of which could on its own. command a large subserv-
ient majority in Parliament. The reasons why the vlfhigs handed 
back the 'poisoned chalice' to Peel must now be examined. 
Earl GreY was at Howick Hall when on Saturday, December 13th, 
he received a letter from Lord John Russell informing him that the 
latter had been commissioned to form a Government and desil .. ing 
Grey's presence in tovm. With Grey at the time was Edward Ellice, 
his uncle by mar.riage, and an influential person in Whig circles. 
They decided to set out for London the following day. On December 
13th, Ellice· wrote as follows to Russell:-
'Howick is r~ght enough in essentials - will be difficult about 
some arrangements at the Foreign Office, and looks to either the 
Home or Colonial Office, if an administration is formed.'(54) 
On the Sunday they set out, staying the night at Derby, and 
travelling on\rvards next day, when for the last part of their journey. 
into London they were joined by George Grey. Needless to say the 
(54) 'Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell' ( ed. Gooch) Vol. 1. p. 88. · 
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one topic of conversation amongst the three vVhig politicians was 
the present interesting political situation. Grey records in 
his Journal:-
'Ellice wild as need be - amongst other matters there arose 
a doubt as to C. Wood'-s being in the cabinet upon which I had a 
violent altercation with Ellice ••• ' 
Another topic discussed in that railway carriage as the train; 
rumbled southwards was the probable return of Lord Palrnerston to 
the Foreign Office. Grey~.:~vas no close friend of Palmers ton's; 
he disliked the man's manner and even more so his fo~eign policy, 
which Grey considered as one of needless meddling in the affairs 
of other countries, a policy which at different times had threat-
ened to bring the country into war or near war. Vfuilst serving 
in Ivielbourne' s Ministry Grey had on more than one occasion been 
a critic of Palmerston's policy in the Cabinet; entries in his 
diary referring.to Palmerston are always in the same vein:-
( 55 ') 'Palmerston spoke as usual with unblushing impudence.' 
As late as 1844, Charles Wood had to intervene to. prevent Grey 
from resolving to contradict Palmerston in the Commons on foreign 
affairs; two of the Whig front bench engaged in altercation would 
undoubtedly have been an unseemly spectacle and not one malcing 
for party unity. (56) Significantly enough the person who had 
encouraged Grey on that ·occasion had been Edward Elli-ce, who was 
(55) Journal, March 9th, 1843. 
(56) Wood to Howicl(, April 6th, 1844. 
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also no great friend of Palmerston's. Looking at some of Ellice's 
activities it seems he was what is commonly known as a 'busybody'. 
Disliking Palmerston himself, on that train journey he fostered 
Grey's apprehensions concerning the former's return to the Foreign 
Office; Ellice 'vas willing that the odium of making an ob·ject ion 
to Palmerston should fall upon Grey. If the objection was success-
ful, all well and good; what Ellice does not appear to have 
realized was that he was instilling firmly into G~ey a notion 
that was abruptly to end all chances of forming a Whig ministry. 
After the episode was over, Grey was very bitter as to Ellice's 
conduct, and c~st most of the blame for his ovm actions on him. 
Ellice had hinted to him whilst travelling to London that Palmerston 
cocld be persuaded to take the Colonial Office, whilst there were 
reasons that made his return to the Foreign Office 'insurmount~~i~.' 
Looking to the state of public affairs, to the strained relations 
existing between this country and France and the United States, 
Palmerston's return to take control of foreign affairs might have 
exQ.c-e.t"'L,,_fc..J these relations. 
On arriving in London that Monday they went to see Lord. John. 
Russell was immersed in the problem of how he and his minority 
0 
party were to carry out such a momentus policy as a change in the A . 
Corn Laws; to achieve success he needed support from Peel and his 
followers. He was convinced, however, that Peel would not favour 
immediate repeal, and had framed a plan which would avoid this. 
(57) Grey to Ellice, December 27th, 1845, in the 
Grey-Russell Correspondence. 
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This plan aimed at opening the ports at once for s orne months., then 
re-establishing for some time modified protection, such as the 
imposition of a duty whenever the price fell under a certain figure 
such as 52 shillings. Grey was opposed to such a plan, and 
announced he never would agree to it, and that if the general 
meeting of the prominent men in the party, called for the following 
day, was merely 'to consider this, then there would be no use in 
his attending it. Russell stated that neither Lansdo\me nor 
Palmerston, not to mention others, would consent to immediate 
repeal: Ellice supported Russell's view of the matter. 
On Tuesday, December 16th, Grey wrote to Russell suggesting 
a little more communication with his friends before deciding to 
submit his plan to the meeting. Shortly after eleven o'clock 
that morning Grey was summoned by Russell •. With Russell was 
Labouchere. Russell showed them two letters, one from Peel. 
declining to have Russ.ell' s plan submitted to him, the other from 
. the Duke of Bedford saying that if the Corn Laws were to be 
abolished ultimately, the farmers had no des ire to be 'let down 
gently', and that any scheme such as the one suggested would.not 
reconcile them to the measure. Grey and Labouchere pointed out 
how the necessity of opening the ports to foreign grain took away 
any pretence there could be for making the measure gradual; to 
place a duty on corn after opening the ports, would be to re-impose 
protection, not to continue it for a limited time. Nearly all· 
those who came to the meeting agreed with this point of view. 
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By 1.30 p.m. the meeting was ready to begin. Russell had first 
some private conversation with Palmers ton, then with Lansdowne; 
~e then announced that if he formed a Government at all it would 
have to be one pledged to the total repeal of the Corn Laws. The 
majority accepted this decision. The meeting had then to decide 
whether Russell should accept the commission to form a Government; 
hi~herto he had informed Her Majesty that he needed to consult 
his friends first before coming to a decision on this matter. Grey 
and Cla1endon thought that before he accepted, some further 
explanation of Peel's intentions should be so.ught. !t was decided 
that Russell should write to Her Majesty stating that he could Dot 
undertake the Government unless he could carry a measure of total 
repeal, but he understood that Peel and Graham did not favour this; 
if they had no 'insuperable objection' to total repeal, then 
Russell would accept a commissfon to form a Government. A sketch· 
of such a letter was drawn up, to which the meeting gave its assent. 
When Grey returned home from this meeting he wrote a letter to 
Russell giving the conditions on which alone he would consent to 
take office. This letter he posted the following morning, and an 
it much controversy was to rage. Grey began by emphasizing what 
a 'severe and doubtful battle' a Government under Russell would 
have on 1 ts hands, ~d that it was thus essential not to lose any 
strength by not filling offices to the best advantage. The letter 
continues:-
'You therefore really owe it to the cause, to your.self, and to 
~--· 
' 
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your friends, to allow no deference for t~e personal objects of 
others to interfere with your making the arrangement best calculated 
to secure for your government the largest possible measure .of public 
confidence and support ••• It is for yo.u, and you only, to deter-
·mine how the parts are to be cast, and it is only when you have dane 
. so that those whom you ask to yoin you will have the right of 
desiring to know the whole arrangement and of considering whether 
it is one in which they can concur.' 
Grey subsequently claimed that this part of his letter was obviously 
a reference to Palmerston's personal preference for the Foreign 
Office, and was written as plainly as could be dane with propriety. 
Russell claimed - and truly - that the reference was not obvious, 
that it was ambiguous, and that no personal preference dictated 
Palmerston's appointment to the Foreign Office, it was because 
Russell thought him the best man qualified for the post. To 
Russell, who was worried about his wife's health, about whether a 
measure on the Corn Laws could reckon on sufficient support, and 
by possible reactions in his own party against total repeal, such 
phraseology was not clear. In any case who was there with suffic-
ient knowledge to take the Foreign Office if not Palmerston ? The 
sole loophole by which Grey could justify his later action lay in 
the last sentence of the extract quoted. 
Grey went on to declare that Russell would confer upon him 
a real favour if he could dispeBse with his services. 'The exper-
ience I have had of official life renders me most unwilling to enter 
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Upon its toils and anxieties, more especially naw, when a great 
deal af occupation of ano·ther kind has devolved upon me to which 
I could much more agreeably, and I believe not less usefully 
devote myself.' Grey's experiences in Melbourne's Ministry, many 
of whose members were still in the Whig ranks, and the attraction 
of his new estates, now made him unenthusiastic about office. 
Nevertheless, if Russell wanted him in the proposed Government he 
would not refuse 'provided, in the first place, that the admin-
istration was constituted upon the principle I have endeavoured 
to describe as regards the assignment of office to different 
in di vi duals. ' 
He also made two further stipulations. The first that a Whig 
Government would boldly avow 'that the whole principle of what 
is called protection is essentially vicious and unjust ••• that 
it will be our object to get rid of all customhouse duties except 
those imposed excl~sively with a view to revenue. Not of course 
that I would recommend having anything said that would pledge us 
to an immediate change of a great number of existing duties, but 
I would distinctly recognize the practical as well as the theoret-· 
·ical truth of the maxims of free trade.' The other point he made 
was the necessity of establishing complete .religious equality 
in Ireland. (5B) 
' 
On Wednesday, December 17th, Grey's views on Palmerston received 
f~rther confirmation by a conversation he had in the Travellers 
(58) 'Notes on the Greville Memoirs' by~ E.H.R. Vole 1. 
1886, PP• 124-5• 
with Sydney Herbert, one of Peel's close supporters. Unprompted 
by Grey, Herbert had said 'look sharp after your foreign policy,' 
and had then related how the foreign ·diplomatic representatives 
were horrified at the thought of Palm.erston' s possible return to 
the Foreign Office. 
On the morning of Thursday, December 18th, Grey had a note 
from Cobden requesting to see him. Grey informed Cobden that if 
a Government were formed it would carry total repeal, 'but that 
it probably wd be necessary to add some pecuniary concession to 
the landed interest in local taxation, etc. to which as involving 
no concession of principle I thought they ought to assen.t.' 
Cobden demurred at this, but finally promised to make no more 
public utterances against such an arrangement. 
Leaving Cobden, Grey went to a meeting at Russell's ·which was 
held at noon. There Peel's answer to Russell's letter was read; 
this was as satisfactory as could have been expected, and it 
implied that Peel had no 'insuperable objection' to total repeal. 
The meeting then dUided on whether Russell should accept the 
Queen's commission or not. In favour of acceptance were Cottel'&ham, 
Morpe.th, Palmerston, .Macaulay, F. Baring,. Labouchere, Ellice, 
Hobhouse, Russell, George Grey, and Eal'l Grey. Against were 
.,. 
Lansdowne, Monteagle, ClaYendon, Auckland and the Duke of Bedford. 
Before this decision had been arrived at, there had been much 
desultory conversation. Grey gives one example of this, a proposal 
from Russell that as the party was very weak in the Lords they 
---------~ 
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should add Brougham to the Whig bench there; this is greeted by 
three exclamation marks in Grey's Journal, which then continues:-
'upon this I really cd not contain myself and·said at once that 
he might do as he pleased about this but that for my own part no 
consideration on earth shd ever induce me to enter into any 
political connection with him so long as I shd live -Macaulay 
declared that he entirely agreed with me, and nobody supporting 
the proposition it dropped; as we came away Macaulay said to me, 
"well you have done a great service by putting an extinguisher 
upon Brougham if you never shd do another." 
Grey left the meeting. in company with George Grey, Labouchere 
and Macaulay. They talked about likely arrangements•-
'and particularly about Palmerston the notion of replacing whom 
in the F.o. everybody dislikes though as usual the whole odium 
of mak·ing the objection will I· see be left to me.' 
Macaulay suggested that Palmerston should have the Colonial Office 
with the lead in the Lords, being made a British peer. Grey 
thought the suggestion was a good one, but later reflection showed 
that the three Secretaries of State (Clarendon being the onl7 
possible person for the Foreign Office), would all be in the Lords. 
This would have been an impossible s i t·uation. Grey regarded 
himself as th~ third Secretary of State, 'I have no notion of being 
in offi~e as anything else. ' 
Just before dinner on that same day he received an unsatisfactory 
reply from Russell in answer to his letter; to this he set about 
draftin~ an answer. Russell's letter was as follows:-
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'My opinion on the points you ment·ion is that free trade Qmnot 
be carried at once into all branches, and should be applied by 
degrees. But especially as regards sugar I would not expose the 
West Indies to equal competition with Cuba. I think 50 per cent 
advantage very fair while the one has slave labour and the other. 
free labour. 
As regards Ireland I would make the religions equal by levying 
a tax on Irish lands for the Catholic Church. Until they are 
themselves willing to accept it, I would propose no measure on the 
subject and resist all motions in the House of Commons.'(59) 
On Friday, December 19th, Grey was visited by Ellice and George 
Grey. After Ellice had departed, George Grey was shown the pro-
posed draft of the letter to Russell which he approved. At twelve 
o'clock there was a small meeting at Russell's. Previous to this 
meet-ing Russell had taken an important step, which he. described 
as follows:-
'I saw Lord Palmerston at half-past eleven in the morning. He -
told me he did n_ot feel any wish to come into office, as his habits 
were altered by leading a private life. But that the only.office 
in which he would be useful was the Foreign Office, and if he came 
into the Ministry he would take no other ••• ! then told him that he 
knew as well as I did the impression that had been made against 
him as a warlike politician; that I did not agree in that impression 
(59) 'Notes on the Greville Memoirs' by 6. E.H.R. 
- Vol. 1. 1886. PP• 125-6. 
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and tho tight it unjust; that if he had thought it should so far 
be yielded to that he should take the Colonial Office. I was 
ready to agree. He said he thought that would be admitting the 
justice of t'he impression. 
Off; c. e. 
the Foreign and no other. 
" 
I· said in that· case I would offer him 
He agreed to accept it.' (60) 
The meeting at R~ssell's had gathered to consider a·paper 
sebmi tte.d by Lord Lansdowne. This required as a condition of 
his taking office a pledge that a million pounds should be .given 
for the relief of occupiers of land from local taxation. Grey 
noted that 'after much conversation in a modified way this was 
agreed to. 1 
Russell then saw members of his prospect-ive government i-ndivid-
ually. When it came to Grey's turn, Russell asked him if .he had 
been satisfied by his letter. Grey replied that he had written 
an answer to it, and then gave him verbally the gist of that answer:-
' saying if with this explanation he thought it indispensable 
that· I ~hd be in I was ready to be so but thought he wd do much 
better for his Govt by excusing me. He said that he wished me to 
be in and I acquiesced provided the arrangements proposed were 
satisfactory. 1 
They then came t·o the arrangements which .Russell detailed. Grey 
was to have the Colonial Office:-
' t·o which of course I said I cd not object though I was rather 
afraid to undertake it·.' 
(60) 'Late Correspondence of Lord. John Rus·sell' (ed. Gooch) 
Vo~. 1. PP• 102-7. 
Cotterham was te be Chancellor, Auckland was to have the Admiralty, 
George qrey to be Chancellor.of the Exchequer, Baring to have the 
Home Office, and P.almerst·on the Foreign Office. He later mentioned 
Wood for the Mint, without the Cabinet. Grey said that to one of 
these appointments there was a very strong objection.· Russell 
knew he meant Palmerston's appointment to the Foreign Office, said 
that he had already failed to get the latter to take the Colonial 
Office, and as it was a choice of him having the Foreign Office 
or none at all, Russell was determined not to give him up. Grey 
intimated his refusal to join a ministry with Palmerston in that 
position. Russell inquired whether Charles Wood would come in 
without his brother-in-law; Grey said that he certainly would not 
unless given a Cabinet post, to which Russell said that being as 
Grey was out there could be no objection to this, and that Wood 
could be President of the Board of Trade. So the conversat1ion 
ended, with Grey under the impression that he was now not to be 
in the Government, but that Russell would construct one withoqt hi~ 
According to Russell's own account of the crisis, immediately 
after seeing Grey he cailed in Lord Auckland and asked 'if they 
could go on in the House of Lords without Lord Grey. He said he 
I ( 61 ) R 11 E thought not. usse then sent for llice, and told him to 
go and speak to Lord Grey, and to tell him that he would not 
attempt to form a Government without· him. Ellice's part in this 
affair is most disingenuous. He had been aware of Grey's·object 
ions to PalmerstoD, had deliberately fostered them, but had not 
( 61) 'La,ter Correspondence of Lord JohD Russell' ( ed. Gooch) 
Vol. 1. PP• 102-7. 
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apparently informed Russell as to how fixed Grey's determination 
was. Now he went to see Grey, and asked whether his decision was 
final. The Journal continues:-
'I said yes to which he answered then the whole thing must be 
given up "but I don't tell you you are wrong".' 
Ellice apparently made no attempt to persuade Grey to alter his 
decision; after al-l he himself objected to Palmers ton but profess-
ed to abide by Russell's decision, aDd he could have used the 
arguments which-persuaded him to take this line to sway Grey. 
He also, apart from that casual remai'k just quoted, failed to show 
Grey that Russell was in earnest when he threatened to abandon the 
commission to form the Government if Grey did not· join _him. 
Ellice in a later letter to Russell showed that- he too was among 
the Whigs who were relieved when the attempt to form a government 
failed; he seems to have deliberately refi'ained from acting as 
an efficient' vehicle of communication between Grey and Russell, 
a rat'her strange _fact when it is recalled that hitherto Ellice 
had acted as an efficient go~between among the Whig leaders for 
many years.< 62 ) A less likely explanation is that Ellice aDd 
Russell decided that the time was not opportune for fol'IIling a 
Whig Government, and deliberately used Grey's obstinacy over 
Palmerston to make Grey the scapegoat for covering up this decision. 
When later that ... --da:y George Grey came and t·old his kinsman ·that 
Russell had in fact given up the attempt to form a government, 
Earl Grey was taken completely unawares:-
(62) 'Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell' (ed. Gooch) 
Vol. 1. P• 98. 
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'the decision came upon me so by surprise and bewildered me so 
completely that I did not think of doing·what I shd have done if 
it had but occurred to me, i.e. I shd have sent to Ld John to say 
t-hat this was a result I had not contemplated as likely to follow 
from my refusal to take office, and if so very serious a coEseq-
uence was to follow, rather than take upon myself the responsib-
ility I was willing to refer the question as to whether P's going 
to the F.o. wd Deally weaken the new administration or not to those 
who were to belong to it - if they wd say upon their honour they 
thought not I wd submit my judgment to theirs, but in return I 
thought I had a right to ask that if they concurred with me 
Palmerston shd also declare his readiness to yield to their judg-
ment and accept another office. ' 
Unfortunately he did not do this, but wrote a letter, with the 
one he had previously drafted enclosed, to Russell explaining the 
grounds of his objection to Palmerston. 
The letter which he had drafted in reply to Russell's answe~ed 
the points raised by the latter. Grey referred to his former 
letter to prove that he did not desire that a great number of 
protective duties should be changed immediately. 
'With regard to the sugar duties I differ from you as to what 
o,.,"t t"., 
mi~t be done. I last year spoke and voted for their being 
immediately equalised. I still think this would be the right 
thing to d9, and if I have to express any opinion at all upon the 
subject it must be this; but in the House of Lords these subjects 
390. 
are seldom discussed and not being in any office immediately 
connected with trade and finance ••• I should have no difficulty 
if the cabinet should so decide, in acquiescing for the present 
at least, in making a less complete alteration of the sugar duties 
than I think would be wise in itself.' 
He felt more difficulty with respect to Ireland; the religio~s 
question was there in such a state that he, -if he were an Irishman, 
would never submit to it. Grey had long favoured applying the 
property of the Established-Church for purposes of general 
instruction, and in the Melbourne period of office had been the 
last to acquiesce in dropping this policy in the face of determined 
opposition by the Lords.( 63) 
The letter written to Russell on the Friday night after .::· : 
Russell had thrown up his commission is the only one of Grey's 
letters to his political chief to mention Lord Palmers ton 
specifically:-
'There were other parts of your proposed arrangement which 
certainly did not, in my opinion, entirely fulfil the condition 
of being framed without regard to personal considerations •••• but 
to these I did not advert, and it-was undoubtedly on the proposed 
appointment of Lord Palmerston to the foreign office that my 
objection rested.' 
Grey was careful to stress that there were no personal objections 
involved, but he stated that 'justly or unjustly, both friends and 
(63) 'Notes on the Greville Memoirs' by 11 E.H.R. Vol. 1. 
P• 126-7. 
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opponents regarded with considerable apprehension t"Q.e pro.spect of 
his return to- the foreign office •••• ' He believed that Palmerston's 
appointment, and the bitter feelings which existed between him 
and leading foreign diplomats, might have increased the danger of 
war. Therefo~e he wished to see Palmerston accept an office of 
equal rank, the Colonial Office, which Grey would have surrendered 
to him, though he would not possibly have had or desired the 
Foreign Office in exchange. He concluded:-
'! believe there is not one of those who were to have been our 
colleagues, Who does not think that his taking a different office 
would have been a very great advantage.' 
The debate then turned upon Russell's c.ontention that Grey 
had only informed him at the last minute of his insurmountable 
objection to Palmerston, and that his letter of tne 16th did not 
make this objection clear. Grey'Jin return contended that the 
tenor of' his lett:er of the 16th was obvious, and that in any case 
Ellice, who had been in close touch with Russell, was perfect.ly 
aware of Grey's views.( 64) 
That Grey must bear the greatest blame·f'or What happened is 
clear. If others who disliked Palmers ton's return to the Foreign 
Office were yet prepared not to object, w~ should Grey have taken 
it upon himself to go a s~ep further ? After his experiences_ iD 
Melbourne's Ministry over the dismissal of Glenelg, the trans-
ference of Normanby to the Home Office, and the like, one would 
have thought he would have been more cautious in acting a similar 
(64) 'Notes on the Greville Memoirs' byLl E.H.R. Vol. 1. 
1886, pp. 129-131 
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part again. His resignation in 1839 had given rise to strained 
relationships with some of the Whigs, and fresh currency to talk of 
his i1rnate impracticability; the two themes occurred again as a 
result of his action in this matter. Again there is much validity 
in Russell's charge that Grey was late in making his objection 
·against Palmersto.n known; Grey's letter of the 16th was not asu~­
ambiguous as he claimed it was, though true he had always insisted 
as a condition of his acceptance of office approving the- other 
arrangements made. He certainly never intended to wreck Russell's 
chances of forming a Government; ·he never for a moment believed 
that Russell would refuse to go on without him or else he would 
have modified his outlook, but the fact remains that. by his 
unfortunate conduct he was the occasion for the failure of the 
Whig attempt and upon him fell the odium. 
We have already shown in what way part of the blame falls on 
Edward Ellice. Russell too is not entirely free from blame. Was 
Grey so indispensable that· a Whig Ministry could not be formed 
without him ? At the end of his interview with Grey on the 19th 
Russe++ gave him the impression that he could form a ministry 
without him; according to Russell's account this view was changed 
by what Auckland said. Russell and Grey had never returned, 
and were never quite to return, to ¥that cordial friendship existing 
between them at the start of the Melbourr:~e Ministry; the circum-
stances leading to Grey's resignation in 1839, Grey's opposition 
in 1840 and 1841 to the Whig Ministry, his campaign for free trade 
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in company with noted Radicals, plus Grey's suspicions of Russell 
wishing to do everything himself and to engross power for himself 
and a group of subservient friends, had created a certain amount 
of distrust between the two, and this distrust played its part 
in Russell's decision to surrender his commission; for example, 
.writing to Lord Lansdowne, Russell stated:-
Grey was 'the only one besides Cotterham in your House who 
was zealous for taking office. Out of office he would have 
excited or supported the Opposition, as he did in regard to Lord 
Melbourne's Ministry in 1840, when he carried the second reading 
of Stanley's Irish Bisfranchisement Bil·l. Thus it became hopeless 
to go on.•( 65) 
Russell was at the time also distracted by personal private worries; 
Morpeth attributed Russell's precipitate· action in throwing up 
his commission 'a good deai to his being in a st~te .of great 
nervousness and anxiety about Lady John from whom he had received 
on friday a letter in a very melancholy tone about he~self. He 
was so overcome on that evening in talking to Morpeth about her 
and about what had just happened that he burst into tears. •< 66 ) 
Russell, however, seems too easily to have surrendered to the 
difficulties that beset him; he consulted only Lansdowne, who had 
never liked the idea of repealing the Corn Laws, before deciding 
(65) 'Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell' (ed.Gooch) 
Vol. 1. PP• 98-9. 
(66) Journal, December 20th, 1845. 
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to give up the attempt to form a government. In the first sen-
tence of the extract of a letter sent to Lansdowne and already 
ClUoted, a more potent reason than any yet mentioned for abandoning 
the attempt is given. Many of the \~igs were lukewarm about the 
prospect of taking office while yet a minority and meddling with 
the Corn Laws; after all it was not certain that the Whig Party 
itself would not split upon the issue. If there was to be a shatt-
ering of party unity let it be the Tories who were to suffer. .In 
the published correspondence of Russell there are a series of 
letters addressed to him at this time from Elliq_e, Minto, the 
Duke of Bedford, Lansdowne and Fox Maule, and all express themselves 
as relieved· that no \~ig Government was formed, whilst at the same 
time reviling Grey as the cause of the failure. 
Charles Wood was another who was not surry that the attempt 
had failed. He did not reach London from Yorkshire until Satur-
day, December 20th. Had he been in London all along it is con-
ceivable that he could have persuaded Grey to abandon his untenable 
posi t_;J.oli arid adopt a more conciliatory attitude. As 1 t was he 
thought Grey was clearly in the wrong; indeed he had by letter 
attempted to dissuade Grey from making any objection to Palmettston. 
To Wood, Russell complained of Grey's conduct:-
'As for Howick he must be Pttime Ministett or nothing, apd even 
then I should not like to be his colleague. But I do justice to 
his honest intentions; he has been mistaken. Mistrusting me, 
as he evidently did, he ought to have told me so at once, and then 
I could have considered without his pttesence whether it were 
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possible to go on. To raise one difficulty-after another, and 
then at the last moment to produce one which was insurmountable, 
was not fair treatment. ,( 67) 
Grey was ·in the deepest disgrace with his political associates. 
He. had a mite of comfort from a dinner with Baring, who wa~ glad 
the attempt had failed9 though not of the way it was brought about. 
His impression of the meeting on the Friday as a preview of future 
cabinets had like Grey's been unfavourable, and he complained: 
about not being consulted on seve~al points because he was not 
'one of J.R's men•( 6B) On December 24th, Grey returned to Howick:-
'I found Maria in terrible low spirits about all that has 
happened, apprehending from it the alienation of private friends 
whom we shd be particularly sorry to lose.' 
Reports from London were not encouraging; a letter from Ricardo 
spoke of the strong feeling against him in Brook~s's and in the 
party generally, whilst Macaulay wrote a public letter in Which he 
bluntly stated:-
'All our plans were frustrated by Lord Grey. I hope that the 
.public interest will not suffer •••• On my own share in these 
transactions I reflect with unmixed satisfaction ••• I told Lord 
John ••• that he should never be disturbed by any personal pre-
tensions or jealousies on my part. If everybody else had acted 
thus·, there would now have been a Liberal Ministry.' 
(67) 'Later Correspondence-of Lord John Russell' (ed. Gooch) 
Vol. 1. P• 102. 
(68) Journal, December 22nd, 1845• 
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Wood attempted to console his brother-in-law who now feared 
that private friendships would not survive the incident. Wood 
told him that eventually all would be forgotten, but till 'the 
smart of the past is worn off' Grey would be advised to stay out 
of town. ~Vhen Parliament met, and the Whigs had been acting 
·together in opposition, Grey would automatically eventually find 
himself back in the fold. At the same time he warned Grey. that 
more weight had been given by the episode to 'the imputations of 
impracticability, which, has before been made on your conduct 
in council.' He also noted:-
'I am afraid that you deceive yourself in thinking that even 
those who agree with you in the objection to Palmerston at the 
F.O. also agree with you in the length to which you carried the 
objection.' 
He also had to combat in Grey a legacy from the latter's father, 
the idea that a man divorced from pol'i tical party, an independent, 
could play an effective part in Parliament. In this crisis of his 
career Grey was toying With the idea of trying the role of the 
independent, unbiased statesman, taking no office but exercising 
an influence over public opinion in Parliament. Wood pointed out 
this would have evil results with regard to Grey's 'utility to 
the public', and his 'comfort in going thro~ life.' He emphasized 
.. 
that no one in English history had achieved enimence by such 
conduct:-
' It is in this country the condi tioD of a man 1 s taking a 
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prominent place in parliament that he should be ready to take 
office and act with others, if required •••• A representative Govt 
is essentially a Govt of party ••• and if you will insulate yourself 
permanently from any party, you are destroying your own influence 
on the public, your own power of doing good, and are, I fear, affect-
ing injuriously your comfart· in the society of those whom you would 
be most happy in being with •••• All experience shows how impossible 
it is for any persan permanent in politics, and taking an active 
part not to be, occasionally at least, in very dangerous opposition~ 
if he is not in the Govt; and we also know by experience ·what 
a dangerous thing ·to a Govt an opposition 9n the flank is. It 
is needless to point out how infinitely your sphere of usefulness 
is enlarged by the possession of power. Do you suppose that all' 
you ever woul~ be able to do for the benefit .of our colonies 
by your scheme of exercisi:cg an influence on public .opinion would 
be equal to what you might have done by your power as Colonial-
Secretary in a single year ?' (69) 
This was extremely sound advice; it was only when Grey neglected 
this after 1852 that he sank int·o political impotence. If he 
had followed Wood's advice throughout his political career he may 
have· been ·more widely known by future generations than in fact 
he is. 
In January, 1846, Grey was back in town, and on the 23rd of that 
month noted that he had called at Brooks's, 
'the first time I have ventured to shew my face there.' The breach 
was in process of being healed. 
(69) Wood ~o Howick, Dec• 27th, 1845, and Jan 2nd. 1846. 
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January 1846, saw Earl Grey back in Parliament, this time in 
the House of Lords, of which he did not have so h-igh an opinion. 
Compared to the Commons they were 'much less intelligent an 
audience'. { 70) Their debates were also far short·er in point of 
time, and their Lordsh-ips rarely t9ok the business of politics · 
so seriously as·did the other house; a proposal to adjourn over 
the day of the Derby was objected to by Grey as 'indecent', yet it 
was carried overwhelmingly. 
·-· Relations with other Wh~gs gradually became as :before-.,December, 
1845, much to Grey's.relief. On May 3rd, he met Palmerston for 
the first time, and had an amicable conversation on trivialities 
with him. On May 16th he noted:-
• ••• went to Ly Palmerston~s- in spite of very heavy rain wh wd 
have prevented my going to any other house.' 
Yet there still existed a degree of coolness between Grey and Russell. 
In the 1830's Grey had at times observed in his Journal how 
much better a liberal ministry would be under Sir Robert Peel, than 
any one which could be constructed under Russell. Grey had long 
believed that of the two Peel was the superior statesman, and his 
opinion of Russell had suffered a continuous decline since the 
close of the 1830's. He, therefore, agreed with an article in the 
'Spectator' of May 24th, which pointed out Peel's superior qualif-
ications for the headship of a liberal government:-
'It put into my head manr visions as to the advantage of a Peel 
{70) Journal, January 26th, 1846. 
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liberal Govt, in Wh Ld J. shd be· offered a place but which on 
his refusing (as he wd do) a good many of us might join ••• ' 
On June 2nd, whilst talking to Wood, Grey discussed the probable 
composition of a Whig ministry, it being obvious that Peel's would 
not long survive. Such a ministry he believed would be 'sadly 
wanting in weight and consideration in the country'. On this 
account he was tempted 'to try and set in motion some means for 
bringing about what I think the really desirable consummation of 
a coalition govt with Peel- at its head.' Grey had no·t learnt 
his lesson ! Scarcely was he once more within the good graces 
of his Whig friends than he contemplated a move which would have 
produced further alienation and bitterness. Fortunately for 
Grey's private friendships he never attempted at this time to put 
his idea into practice. 
At the same time he was considering his own political prospects. 
Charles Wood had a rather rosy vision of these:-
'he thought it very likely I might in 3 or 4 years be called 
upon to form a Govt myself - this is not impossible. but most 
earnestly to be deprecated as I know how little I shd be equal 
to the ta~k - I might indeed by possibility be of __ .use in forming 
some kind of' coalition govt headed by e·i ther Peel or Lord John, 
my being at the head myself wd never do.' ( 7l) 
It was fortunate that he so realized his limitations, for the 
chance of being Prime Minister was never to come his way. From 
(71) Journal, June 3rd, 1846. 
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what has already been said about Grey, it will be realized that he 
would never have had sufficient tact for that post; self-Will 
and obstinacy may be very well for times of crisis, but not fer 
the day to day running of an administration in times of calm. 
On the night of June 25th there was a majority against the Irish 
Coercion Bill in the Commons. The expected had occurred; Peel 
had fallen. The only other choice, leaving the as~de the protect-
ionist Tories, was a Russell Government·. The Whigs were a minority 
party in this Parliament, but with the support of Peel's part of 
the former Tory.party they would be able to maintain themselves, 
even if their.position was deplorably weak. Grey had no expect-
ations of being offered a post in the new Government, and was, 
therefore, surprised to receive a visit from Russell on the morning 
of June 27th. It was soon clear, however, that Russell brought 
no offer with him. Speaking of the difficulties that lay before 
him, Russell said he hoped to form a Government ··'which wd probably 
stand till the beginning of the next session'; he then stated 
that he agreed to a great extend with Grey's sentiments on policy 
as expressed in his letters of December last, but thought that 
they ought to be accomplished more gradually than Grey ·apparently 
envisaged. Referring to Grey's personal position, he reverted 
to December and showed that then the latter had spoken of certain 
'difficulties' which made him non-enthusiastic about office; 
Russell believed that these difficulties had been increased by 
recent events, he did not think it impossible that he and Grey 
• 
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shoul!i ever be in office together again, but thought that it was 
better that they should not be for the present, for one thing 
after the recent objection to Palmerston, it might seem strange 
that they now became two of' the Secretaries of' State. Grey iE 
his Journal thus commented on Russell's observations:-
'This was sai"d with many pauses ••• I wd not help him in any way 
by saying a word or giving the slightest sign of assent or dissent 
while he was speaking, _but waited in silence till he had concluded, 
when I said very shortly that I agreed with him in thinking it 
better I shd not come into office, and that it wd be much more 
agreeable to me to spend the winter in I·taly as I had intended.' 
The awkward part of' the conversation over, Russell proceeded to 
discuss some of his arrangements. He remarked that Baring had 
de~lined taking any office and had recommended Wood as Chancellor 
of the Exchequer; on this point Russell asked Greyis opinion. 
Grey stated that Wood was the next best choice to Baring, but 
that nobody could really take the latter's place. Russell agreed 
as to Baring's talents, but stated that he did not easily ag~ee 
to any proposed modifications of his measu~es. At this point 
Grey's suspicions of Russell again came to the fore:-
'which I construed (perhaps unjustly} to mean that Ld John did 
not wish him to come in because he had found him too independent 
in his opinions and conduct.' 
Finally Russell spoke of the necessity of persuading some of Peel's 
supporters to join the Government. 
4Q2. 
Nevertheless Russell had not placed a final veto on Grey. The 
latter might not be an easy-colleague to work with, but he 
possessed undeniable talents, and was the acknowledged expert on 
colonial affairs. Then there was the old bogey as to what Grey 
migat do if left out; in the Lords, where the Whigs were numer-
ically weak, he was a prominent figure, and could cause damage 
to the prospective Government if ever he opposed it. The Whigs 
were so saozot of talented men that it was not polit-ic to leave 
any of these out of the Government. 
Yet Russ.ell had had experience of working with Grey befozoe, and 
it was by no means a pleasant remembrance; since that time Grey 
had done nothing to endear himself in Russell's eyes. Russell's 
dilemma is neatly summed up.in a memorandum of Prince Albert's, 
w:ritten after seeing Russel1 at Osborne House:-(72) 
'Lord Grey was still a difficulty in or out of office he seemed 
to be made a difficulty~ It would be desirable to have him in 
the Cabinet if he could waive his opinions upon the. Irish Chu:rch. 
-His speech in t~e House of Lords (on the 23rd March, Grey had 
contrasted the poverty of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland 
with the affluence of the Established one there) at the beginn-ing 
of the session had done much harm, had been very extreme, and 
Lord John was decidedly against him in that. Lord Grey knew th~t 
everybody blamed it, but said eve:rybody would be of those opinions 
(72) 'The Letters of Queen Victoria' (ed.Benson & Viscount 
Esher) 1907. Vol. II •. P• 98. 
ten years hence, and theroefore he might just as well hold them now. 
Mr Wood, having great influence with him might keep him quiet, 
and so would the Colonial seats, as he would get work enough. 
About Lord Palmerston, he is satisfied, and would no more make 
any dif'fic ul ty. 1 
Charles Wood was pressing for Grey's inclusion in the Government. 
Russell informed Wood ·that he personally was not opposed to ~rey 
coming in, but that he feared there would be difficulties in Grey's 
relations with other members of the Government; second thoughts 
convinced Russell that perhaps such difficulties were capable of 
being overcome. He, therefore, allowed Wood to sound Grey as to 
whether he would accept office if it were offered him. This 
Wood did;· he also acquainted Grey with the fact that Russell had 
already communicated with Peel on the possibility of some oft the 
Peeli tea joining the Government. This in according with Grey's 
opinions of the necessity of a coalition between Whigs and P'eeli tea 
rather than a weak Whig Government being in power, was calculated 
materially to induce him to accept office. He believed that the 
only thing remaining for Russell to do to ensure as strong a 
Government as he could possibly form, was to off'.er Cobden a 
Cabinet post; he was decidedly in favour of this, but was pre-
pared to acquiesce in the view of Wood and others that such BD 
offer was impossible. As for the Irish Church, Grey could not 
press for a measure for which public opinion was not yet prepared, 
more espec~ally as there was no question of a c_oercion bill being 
applied to Ireland. He no longer held any objection to Palmerston 
as Foreign Secretary. (73) 
That same day Wood wrote to Russell to· inform him as t~ the 
results of his talk: with· his brother-in-law:-
' I •• said that there was no use in his coming in unless he 
meant to make things go smoothly, and that if matters were to be 
as they were towards the end of his time with Lord Melbourne, he 
had better stay out ••••• he felt the necessity of making. the 
machine work easily if he came in. He felt the separation from 
all his fr-iends very much if he was not· included. He and George 
Grey are coming to dine here today quie~_l.y;' . and I think that 
you mayo reckon on its being extremel;v pl'obable t·h.a:t he will take 
the Colonial Office if offered.' {74) 
The dinner at Wood's ended in Earl Grey authorizing the former 
to. say that if an offer were made to him he should be prepared 
to accept it·. Grey's reasons given in his Joul"Dal for this 
decision were the belief that he might do some good in office, 
· that if he remained out something might arise which would cause 
coolness between himself and his friends, and the fact that the 
differences with the United States had been settled so that there 
was· no longer the danger of a war over this question (this latter 
reason seems to have been added as an afterthought, Grey had 
learnt by tQis time the hopelessness of objecting to Palmerston 
being at the Foreign Office.) 
{73) Journal, June 30th, 1846. 
(74) 'Later Correspondence of' Lord John Russell' (ed. Gooch) Vol. 1. P• 108. 
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On July 2nd, Wood called and desired that Grey wouid be ava-ilable 
at 12.30 p.m. that day, and afterwards summoned Grey to·him a 
little before that time. Wood then informed him that he had been 
summoned by Russell,. and that if he so Wished he could bring Grey 
with him. Wood thought it be·st that he should go alfme at f'irst; 
he soan returned with the news that Russell would see Grey at 
2 o'clock. At that time Grey, _accompanied by Wood, had his in·ter-
view with Russell:-
'the interview between us was awkward enough and not much was 
said, however enough to make it distinctly understood that I 
accepted the Colonial Of'f'ice ••• • 
That night he was summoned to his first Cabinet, where the of'f'ers 
to the Peelites and their refusal was discusse~, and the.question 
of' whether Cobden should be of'f'ered the Cabinet'. At the end of' 
·the day Grey was satisfied with his position, being especially 
pleased by the way in which people had received news of' his 
appointment. 
On July 4th, he settled the question as to who was to be 
his Under-S~cretary at the Colonial Of'f'ice. The post lay between 
Buller and Hawes, and the latter was appointed. Grey would have 
preferred Charles Buller, but the latter became Judge Advocate, 
with an understanding that he was to assist in colonial matters. 
On July 6th, the new ministers received the seals, and Grey 
devoted that evening to his f'irst box of' ·colonial papers. 
On the same day Prince Albert .recordeli how the Ministry was 
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by no means united; the differences he listed did not augur well 
for a strong Government, or for the future:-
'M:r Wood and Lord Clarendon take the greatest credit in havfng. 
induced Lord Grey to join the Govei'Ilment, and are responsible 
to Lord John to keep him quiet, Which they think they will be able 
to do, as he has been convinced of the folly of his former line 
of conduct. Still, they say Lord Lansdowne will have the lead 
' 
only nominally, that Lord Grey is to take it really in the House 
of Lords. There is the Grey Party, consisting of Lord Grey, Lord 
Clarendon, Sir George Grey and Mr Wood; they are against Lord 
Lansdowne, Lord Minto and Lord Auckland and Sir John Hobhouse·, . 
stigmatising them as old women. Lord John leans ent·irely to the 
last-named gentlemen. There is no cordiality between Lord John 
and Lord Palmerston, who if he had to make a choice, would even 
forget what pass~~ on J?ecember last, and join the Grey Party 
in preference to Lord John personally.•(75) 
{75) 'The Letters of Queen Victoria' {ed. Benson & Viscount 
Esher). Vol. II. P• 101 •. 
Chapter 5· Grey at the Colonial Office (1846-52) 
A. Posi tio:n in the Cabinet and his relation 
with colleagues. 
'."When ~rey became .. Colonial Secretar~ ~e had reached the zenith 
of his political career. If he is remembered at all today it is 
for his ... colonial policy, to which whole books have been· devoted • 
. He was probably the most prominent man to hold that post in the 
nineteenth century until it was given to Joseph Chamberlain. 
Buring his stay there, colonial bUsiness swelled, B8came more 
before the eye of Parliament and public, and assumed a greater 
prominence than· ever before. 
. . 
When Russell informed Prince Albert that if Grey took the 
Colonial Office he would have 'work enough' he proved correct in 
his forecast. Entries in the Journal like the following are typical:-
'A very busy day at home and at the Colonial Office.' 
'Got home rather late for dinner and almost immediately after 
it set to work again and finished my box at li.' 
'••• to the Colonial Office as usual where my business is rather 
running into arrear.' 
'Maria went to see Rachel in Phedre ••• I staid at home working 
through a heavy c.o. box.'(l) 
There were constitutions to be drafted for the Australian and New 
zealand colonies, and for Soeth Africa. Questions of free trade, 
transportation, emigration were endless. He was badgered by various 
(1) Joernal July 25th, 27th, August 11th-12th, 1846. 
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bodies eager for colonization or for prote~tion of aborigines. 
Each colony or group of colonies had their owri specialist problems; 
the West Ipdies were worried about cultivation, markets for their 
produce, and a chronic lack of labour; in Canada he introduced 
responsible government and anxiously watched it at work; native 
wars and frontier problems confronted him in New Zealand and South 
Africa, whilst in the latter there was the additional problem of 
the Boer trekkers. A revolt in Ceylon, another in the Ionian 
Islands, piracy off the coast of Labuan, obstruction of the 
Government in British Guiana, all these varied problems, and many 
more, av1ai ted Grey's attent·ion. Then he was also Secretary of 
State for War, and all the problems of disposal and organization 
of the armed force, and of defence, were theoretically supposed 
to be in his province. 
One sure indication of the weight of work under which Grey 
laboured is to be seen in his Journal, the entries for which 
become increasingly cryptic and less regular. Entries like the 
following' are by no means infrequent:-
'••• during this last fortnight I have had so much to do that 
I have not been able to attempt keeping up this journal.'( 2) 
. .. ..... 
· Finally entries cease on May 2nd, 1851, ·and are not rese:iited again 
until Ma~ch 6th, 1852, when Grey gives·a brief retrospective 
glance at the missing period and its events. The miracle is that 
with so much work confronting him he managed to keep up his journal 
for so long as he did. The contrast with the 1830's is striking. 
(2) Journal, February 27th, 1847• 
Then Grey made himself acquainted with the gener~l business of 
Government, drafted measures outside War Office business, and took 
a prominent part in Cabinets; then his Journal was a wealth of 
detail on Cabinets and on his colleagues. The 1830's were stormy 
years for Grey; the more active he was the more did he come into 
conflict with his colleagues, and·the more unpopular he became. 
In Russell's first ministry the tale is different. Grey immersed 
in Colonial Office work had practically no time for subjects 
divorced from that, and was often unaware of what was happening 
in other departments of the Government. So far from being in 
,J 
active Ltte7ance at Cabinets, he now grew reluctant to attend many 
as they might draw him away from work. In additio~, he had 
inherited a certain amount of caution based on experience in the 
1830's, and refrained from interfering in the policies of other 
Departments. The result is that his relations with his Cabinet 
colleagues were calmer, and his Journal ·is not· spattered with 
adverse opinions on them. It was altogether a happier, more 
fruitful period of office than his tenure of the Secretaryship at 
War had been. It was only towards the close of the Ministry's 
period of office, that the old note of discontent became more 
prominent, and his opinion of Lord John Russell drastically alters 
for the worse. The main thing that concerned Grey was how to 
find sufficient time to complete his multifarious tasks, one result 
of which was a determination to waste less time dressing in a 
morning, and for a while the Journal is abounding in entries like 
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'up at_8.10 not dressed till 9.33 !!!' 
Though references to Cabinet disputes, and _9pi~_.ions of' his. 
fellow ministers, are few, the six years do witness a growing 
deterioration in his relat-ions with Russell, and also a cont:i,Jt'qing 
preoccupation with Palmerston's activities at the Foreign Office. 
When Grey entered the Government he resolved, re~embering Dece~ber, 
1845, to avoid the subject of' Palmerston's management of' foreign 
affairs, but Palmerston had a knack of' ensuring that this resolve 
was not kept, though often Grey's absence from Cabinet led him 
to be ignorant of recent hair-raising activities into which 
Palmerston had plunged. 
On February 12th, 1847, Grey looking at the 'Morning Chronicle' 
came across an article giving an account of' a rupture ~etween 
Normanby, the British ambassador to France, and Guigot. In the 
article was an extract from a dispatch by Palmerston which had 
only been written the previous day; this proved to Grey that the 
'Morning Chronicle' was undeniably connected with the Foreign 
. . . 
Office, and that, ~onsidering the tone of' its articles, such a 
connection was injurious to the Government, and even more so to 
the country as a whole. Grey believed that ·it was not impossible 
that a feud between Palmerston and Guizot would drag both countries 
into war, and his entry for that day concludes ominously:-
'! begin to think I must interfere.' 
However, the storm passed, and Grey did not interfere, though 
he heard from Wood fresh tales of Palmerston's activities:-
' ••• Palmerston ••• h~s got into another foolish mess in Portuga~~ 
4ll. 
hav_ing written to say that he wd direct Sir w. Parker to make 
reprisals if' two horses that had been taken possession of f'or .the 
war by the Portuguese aut~orities though they had been ·previous_ (sic) 
bought by the agent of some Englishman we.re not restored ! ' ( 3) 
·In November, 1847, Grey in conversation with Russell and 
Palmerston cautiously expressed himself' against the policy being 
pursued in Spain, 'but'.,;: as he wrote, 'Palmerston though it is 
clear no one member ·of' the Cabinet likes it is obviously determined 
to persevere in it.' (4) Grey's doubts as to t:he wisdom of' our 
Spanish policy came to a head in the spring of 1848, when Bulwer, 
the British ambassador, presented a dispatch to the Spanish 
Government, 'recommending in the most insolent manner a change of' 
_policy,' to which the Spaniards returned a most contemptuous answer. 
Palmerston was attacked in the Lords by Stanley over this affair. 
GreY found himself' in agreement with Stanley's cens_ure. Whilst 
attending this debate he took the opportunity of' reading the 
whole correspondence connected with the incident, and was 'perfectly' 
disgusted' with Palmerston's dispatches, the last of which he 
discovered had been sent ·against Russell's desire. This ·last 
piece of' information he learnt from Russell himself':-
'I expres~ed to him my opinion - though not half so strongly 
as I feel it that he shd not allow such things to be done - I 
must say it is a very lamentable weakness on his part - had P. 
(3) Journal,· March 2nd, 1847. 
(4) Journal, November 5th, l847a 
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played sUch a prank in my father's administration he wd have been 
dismissed without ceremony, nor can I conceive any prime minister 
submitting to such conduct without requi·ring it to be so pcnisk~!_' 
Grey was rather surprised that the incident did not lead to the 
destructi.on of the Government or to the retirement of Palmers ton; 
the latter would have given him 'infinite satisfaction'. As it 
was, he felt compelled to write to Russell on the subject, warning 
him that if a motion of censure.was made in the Lords against the 
Government over this matter, he would not be able to defend 
Palmers ton's condu·ct. He was convinced t'hat Russell ·did not 
understand how serious the incident was:-
'If this line of policy ••• had been approved by the Cabinet, 
it wd of course have been the duty of every member ••• including 
those who might have differe~ ••• but had acquiesced ••• to have 
now supported what has been done. But ••• the subject never was 
brought before the Cabinet, ••• I and most of the members of it, 
first saw the objectionable despatches in the newspapers • • • if · 
the question had been submitted to us we shd most of us (I believe 
including yourself) have entirely disapproved of the adoption of 
such a tone towards an independent Govt ••• it has been obvious 
to me for many months (and I have repeatedly expressed the opinion 
I entertained to you and entreated your interference) that he 
(Bulwer) has been acting in a manner wh I consider altogether 
unbefitting the character of the minister representing a foreign 
( 5) ~ournal, April 27th and May 5th, 1848. 
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Govt in an independent country.' ( 6) 
The year 1848 closed with Grey vigorously protesting against 
a scheme of Palmerston's for blockading the Brazilian ports to 
force the country to execute her anti-slavery treaties.(?) The 
opening month of the new year saw a further serious indiscretion 
committed by Palmers ton. In September, 1848, one of the Ordnance 
contractors applied to the Ordnance Office to ·have returned to him 
some large cannons he had just cast for them, as he could get a 
large price for them from the provisional Sicilian government; 
when Palmerston heard of this, he gave permission for the guns to 
be returned. The 'Times' then came out with an article saying 
that the Sicilians had been assisted to obtain arms. When Grey 
asked a question about this at a Cabinet, Palmerston asserted 
that the story was entirely false. On January 15th, he learnt 
from Russell What had in fact occurred, whilst he soon found .that 
a regular official letter from the Foreign Office sanctioned the 
whole business. On January 18th, Grey wrote a long letter to 
Russell, which was in effect an appeal to dismiss Palmerstan 
from the Foreign Office. He pointed out how injurious it was to 
the character of this country that whilst attempting to act as a 
mediator between Naples and Sicily Britain should be supplying .arms· 
to the latter, all without the knowledge of either Prime Minister 
or Cabinet. As Grey saw it, Russell had two alternatives, either 
(~) Grey to Russell, May 27th, 1848. 
(7) Journal, December 7th, 1848. 
to defend the policy adopted by Palmerston (in which case he 
ought first to seek the assent of the full Cabinet) or to disown 
that·policy, and as a concomitant to this dismiss .Palmerston. 
At the same time he explicitly stated that ~e himself did not 
mean to take any steps in the matter:-
'It will of course be utterly out of my power to take any part 
in defending these proceedings in the H. of Lords if they shd 
there come under discussion, but beyond abstaining from do~ng so 
I do not mean to interfere at present. When, after much doubt 
as to what I ought to do, I decided upon accepting your offer 
and joining your administration as it is now constituted, notwi th-
standing what had occurred six months before, I did so with the 
determination that ! wd not be the person to originate resistance 
in the Cabinet to the foreign policy ••• if I cd possibly help it, 
and that I wd bear much, rather tharo leave the Govt on account of 
what mig~t be done in this department. 
It appeared to me that what had previously taken place wd 
have made my acceptance of office improper ha~ not this been my 
resolution ••• I wish you distinctly to understand that in writing 
this letter I do not mean to take upon myself the responsibility 
of bringing before the Cabinet any question as to the manner in 
wh the foreign Department has been conducted ••• any step that 
you may take must be grounded upon your own judgement not upon 
my suggestion. I make this ob_servation because I cannot forget 
that just 10 years ago a very painful responsibility wh did not 
I think fairly belong to me was thrown upon me by the coQrse wh 
led to Ld Glenelg's retirement from Ld Melbourne's administratio~~~ 
At ·a Cabinet meeting on January 23rd, Russell propounded his 
solution to the problem; he undertook to treat the whole thing 
as an 'inadvertence' ! To this Palmerston agreed. Not so Grey:-
'There was then some vague discussion in wh I was to the last 
degree disgu~ted by the ap~arent insensibility of the Cabinet to 
the gravity of the case and to'the disgraceful figure the Govt 
will make in· pleading "inadvertence• • • • I endeavo_ured to treat 
the matter somewhat more seriously, and to show how bad a position 
we shd be placed in, but nobody backed me.' 
After the Cabinet was over Grey sent for Ge~rge Grey and Wood and 
said that in consequence of the latest decision, he could not 
remain in the Government. George Grey and Wood attempted to dis-
suade him, as did Hawes when he was informed. At last Grey con-
cluded that his resignation was a step 1 wh might at least be 
deferred.' In the evening he wrote a long letter to Russell; 
this he deferred sending until the following day. Wood was against 
sending it, but the least Grey would do was to modify its tone. 
On the 25th he had some conversation with Russell, as a result of 
which Grey announced hi·s acquiescence in the course determilled 
upon, rather than perhaps to take upon himself the responsibility 
for the breaking up of the Government, but he was far from happy 
(8) Jqurnal January 15th and 17th, 1849. 
Grey to Russell, January 18th, 1849. 
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about the whole business. In an audience with the Queen on the 
31st he expressed his disapprobation of the whole episode. Yet 
the parliamentary opposition failed to take advantage of the 
weakness of the Government's case, and the incident was a further 
example of Palmerston's luck. 
Grey's own department took up so much of his own 'time and energy 
that he did not play any important part in subsequent disputes· 
between Russell and Palmerston. He de~cribes how it was with 
'great surprise' that he heard, whilst out of town, of the final 
rupture with Paimerston.(9) By the time Grey returned to London 
Palmerston was _out of office. Of course there were no regrets 
on Gr_ey' s. part that· Palmers ton had finally been dismissed. He 
might have been ·less pleased if he had knovm of some ef the 
arrangements Russell had contemplated when Queen Victoria an~ 
Prince Albert had pressed upon him the necessity of dismissing 
the Foreign Secretary. In March, 1850, Russell had mooted the 
dismissal of Palmerston, and his replacement at ~he Foreign Office 
by his own father-in-law, Lord Minto - this seems to give some 
substance to .Grey's charges about Russell favouring a clique who 
held themselves entirely subservient to him .- a choice which 
surprised the Queen, who had been expecting that Lord Clarendon 
would succeed Palmerston. Among the re-shuffle of offices that 
would take place at the same time, Grey was to get the minor 
(9) Journal, March 6th, 1852. 
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and sinecure post of Privy Seal.(lO) 
Grey's relations with Russell were more complicated. He 
simply disliked Palmerston; with Russell he verged from dislike 
to friendship, passing through a variety of stages. As we have 
seen, however, his friendship with his political leader had suffered 
several severe jolts ~Y 1846, and for these, as we have seen, both 
were in some respects to blame. 
The first mention of difference with Russell occurs in the early 
months of 1848 when Grey refused to agree to a plan -brought for-
ward by Lord John for the organization of the militia. Further 
sniping against Russell followed in subsequent entries in the 
Journal; for example, Grey was very doubtful as to the necessity 
of Russell going out of town, simply because he had a bad cold.(ll) 
In April there were arguments as to the best ways of conciliating 
Ireland, the 'Grey party' supporting Wood's view of the matter, 
and Lansdowne- and Palmerston backing Russell. (l2) By August of 
that year the Government's affairs were not going well, and 
Charles Wood for one was eager to leave office, 'thinking and I am 
sure.with reason that we are not equal to the extreme difficulties 
th h h t t d th . . 1 f lt- b. . . fJ-3 ) ' wi w we -ave o con en , · e pr1nc1pa au e1ng 1n our cu.1e:f'. 
( 10) 'The Letters of Queen Victoria' (ed. Benson & Viscount 
.Esher) Vol. II, p. 279· 
(11) Journal, March 4th, 1848. 
( 12) Journal, April 9th, 1848. 
(13) Journal, August 15th, 1848. 
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Witnessing the debate in the.House o~ Commons on Baillie's motion 
~or a Committee o~ Enquiry on the ·crown Colonies, Grey was dis-
gusted by Russell's conduct.:-
'Ld John showed the most utterwant o~ the conduct o~ a leader 
I 
that I ever beheld I cannot say how struck I was with his· want 
o~ presence o~ mind and decision •••• ' 
From Charles Wood the f'ollowin_g day, February 21st, he learnt 
that this was how Russell usually managed the House of Commons, 
JaA.l 
and Grey concluded that he 'wonder~ully altered ~or the worse as 
1\ 
leader' since he had last been in the House o~ Commons unde~ him. 
When Russell brought ~orward his scheme. ~or an extension o~ the 
~ranchise at a cabinet in November 1850, Grey_,was one o~ those who 
opposed it. 
One o~ Grey's major concerns had been to see the Government 
.. 
placed upon a stronger and firmer ~ooting, and it was in attempts 
to achieve that aim that Grey's opinion o~ Russell was lowered. 
Grey continued to press ~or the inclusion of' Cobden within the 
Cabinet; in October, 1847 he pressed upon Russell the advantage 
.. ,. 
there was in offering the Chie~ Commissionship of the Poor Law 
" 
as a Cabinet post to Cobden; Russell, however, in~ormed him that 
the Queen and Lord Lansdowne, both objected to such an arrangement~ 14) 
The ~allowing April, he heard that Russell, to conciliate the 
Irish Catholics, was contemplating taking Shiel, one o~ th~ Irish 
Radicals, into the Cabinet; this was greeted in the Journal by 
( 14) Journal, October 13th, 1847. 
three exclamation marks, and described as an 'insane project' 
which if realized wo~ld lead to Grey's resignation.(l5) An otfer 
by Russell to Graham of the Admiralty in January, 1849, a move 
this time approved by Grey, was refus.ed by the Peeli te. 
By 1850 the Government was growi~g-weaker, and was sustaining a 
number of defeats in the House of Lords. An expected defeat on 
the »om Pacifico incident was transformed into a triumph largely 
as a result of Palmerston's great speech; Grey, however, could 
not help wishing that Stanley with the Peelites could have formed 
a Government, which would have left the vi tal question of re-:-.imposing 
protection an open one in the Cabinet. As it was the Russell 
Government was being forced to consider the p~ition of the House 
of Lords; a Cabinet in August 1850, discussed whether life 
peerages ought not to be created, and Grey remarked in his Journal:-
'My belief is that ·the actual condi t·ion of the House of Lords 
is becoming a most serious evil and one that will require a far 
more decided remedy.' (16) 
This was a conviction he had held in the.l830~s and is but one 
·more example of the tenacity of Grey's opinions. 
Up to the beginning of 1851 Grey's relations with Russell, 
apart from the critical comments above mentioned (in many friend-
ships a normal state of affairs), had run pretty smoothly, but in 
that year they began to deteriorate. On the night of February 20th, 
(15) Journal, April 27th, 1848 
(16) Journal, August 15th, 1850. 
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the Gove~ment was defeated on Locke King's motion for extending 
the right of voting in c.ounties to ten pound househalders .• 
Russell announced his intention of resigning. Stanley was reluct-
ant to attempt the formation of an alternative Governmen.t until 
other attempts had been made. Russell, therefore, attempted to 
form a new Government with the help of the Peelites, but failed, 
and eventually Stanley set about the task. When it seemed as 
though Stanley's attempt would fail, Grey wrote a paper on the 
means which Russell ought to take to strengthen his administration 
if re-established. The aim of this paper was to show that it was 
useless to look to establishing a junction with Sir James Graham 
and his friends and that the support of the Radicals was not to 
be relied on; the alternative was to conciliate the more moder-
ate of the agricultural party who were without leaders in the 
. ..,. 
House of Commons whom they could trust. The support of the coun\Y 
gentlemen would give the Government what it most needed, more votes. 
1"-By a policy aimed at conciliating the county gentlemen, eventually 
• 
a new party would be created headed by Russell, opposed to which 
would be a 'decided democratic party led by Mr Cobden (evidently 
Grey's views on Cobden had changed) and probably Sir James Graham.' 
,_ 
The way to win over the county gentlemen was·to modify the 
" 
Government's financial proposals, especially by a reduction of 
income tax. Russell thought that this· particular paper contained 
much that was valuable, but that its precepts were not practicable 
at present. Grey urged his plan at a meet-ing of the Whig leaders 
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on March 3rd, but nothing c.ame of it, and the Government, its 
composition as before, returned to power.(l7) 
The next time when a change in the composition of the Government 
was raised was upon the dismissal of Palmerston. Grey suggest-ed 
that it would be desirable to offer the vacant office to a House 
of Commons man, but could only think of Graham, and the proposal 
was 'universally scouted.' He was afterwards annoyed that he 
had not thought of saying that the post ought to be offered to 
those whose support it might be necessary in the future to apply. 
In his retrospective view of the situation he noted:-
'It is obvious now that a very great mistake was made in 
filling up this office so hastily and that ••• Ld John ought to 
have communicated with Sir J. Graham and Ld Aberdeen on the 
principle of entirely reconstructing the Govt.' (18) 
Grey, out of office, looking back at the past-, detailed other 
attempts to strengthen tne Government at the end of 1851 and the 
beginning of 185·2. Russell applied to the Duke of Newcastle 
and his friends,- including Gladstone, 'but this was not done very 
well,' and Russell, in Grey's opin~on, 'sadly mismanaged the 
negociation.' The entry in the Journal continues:-
' At this time he had sundry strange schemes about strengthening 
the Govt. Amongst others he wrote a letter to Ld L. (Lansdowne) 
(17) Paper of Greys (Copy of one sent to Russell on 
February 27th) March 3rd, 1851. Russell to Grey 
February 28th. 
( 18) Journal, March 6th, 1852. 
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which he desired him to show me saying that though my colonial 
policy had been what he called excellent still in consequence 
of the run made against me it might be desirable that I shd be 
moved to another office, that G.Grey on account of his health had 
better go out for the present, and he therefore suggested that I 
shd take the H.O. and Labouchere (!!) the c.o. Ld L. showed me 
this letter ••• and I found it rather hard to keep my countenance 
however I only said that I was quite ready to go out altogether 
but. that I did not think it was possible for me to change to 
another office on the ground of the run against my colon-ial policy 
since that wd involve an admission that the censure was just. I:n 
this letter a good deal was said about Ld Lansdowne's own retire-
ment Ld John ••• rather acquiescing more than I thought wise in 
Ld L.'s wish on this subject. About this time Ld John wrote to 
G. Grey ••• (in answer to a letter he· had received in wh G.Grey 
with reference to the desire to strengthen the Govt had said as 
we all had that Ld John was at full liberty to dispose of our 
offices) saying that while he was very sorry to lose his assist-
ance he thought that on account of his health it might be advis-
able for G.G. to retire for the present and that this wd have the 
advantage of making "a Grey less in the cabinet 11 - This was not 
a very gracious way of writing to a person from whom Ld John has 
' (19) received the assistance he has from G.Grey. 
One can imagine the annoyance ~rl Grey felt on reading the last 
undiplomatic phrase of Russell's just quoted. 
(19) Journal, March 6th, 1852. 
- ---------- .._ __ ·---· ------- ~ - -- ---
In January 1852 Grey strongly pressed upon Russell that the 
need for reconstructing the ministry was urgent, and that .ne 
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ought to consider with G'aham in what manner the strongest possible 
I 
administration could be formed without respect to existing arrange- . 
. I 
ments. Most of the Cabinet agreed with this view, and to this 
Lord John ev~ntually consented 'reluctantly enough.' According 
to Grey Russell conducted this latest negociation in a manner 
that could 'obviously lead to no result. I Immediately before 
Parliament re-assembled the Cabinet were informed that Maule 
was to succeed Hobhouse, now Lord Broughton, at the India Boa~d, 
and that the War Office had been offered to Cardwell, which offer, 
being the only one made, was declined by the Peelite. Eventually 
Vernon Smith, who had 'declined the War Office without the 
Cabinet, accepted it with Cabinet rank. This measure Grey 
believed to be 'injudicious' and 'justly offensive' to Hobhouse, 
who had consented to his office being offered to Graham or to 
other outsiders for the purpose of strengthening the Government, 
'but it was a very different thing to take it from him for the 
purpose of conferring it upon a person so much junior to himself 
in office as Maule, and who was already in the cabinet. The 
first information too wh Hobhouse received that this was contem-
plated was in a letter from Ld Joha telling him that the Queen 
had approved of Maule's appointment to th~ I.Bd. and that he had 
accepted it.' The result, according to Grey, was as· follows:-
'••• we met Parlt with the administration greatly weakened 
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instead of' being s·trengthened, a result partly owing to the great 
mismanagement of' Ld John but more· to his determination to engross· 
all real power to himself' and t·o resist any changes which slid 
bring into the cabinet any persons on whose entire subservience 
he cd not reckon. In this unwise course he was much encouraged 
by Minto ••• it is quite clear that Ld John's jealousy of sharing 
his authority with others was at the bottom of' the diff'icult:ies 
opposed to any substantive change. I warped him that the conseq-
uences certainly would be the overthrow of' the administration.' 
Another topic on which Grey and Russell differed towards the 
close of' the Ministry was the subject of' reform. Grey always held 
that the 1832 Reform B·ill ought to be considered in the main as. 
a final sett;lement of' that vexed question; that is what his father 
had always impressed upon him, and that is what he stood out f'or 
in the 1830's. By 1851 he was prepared f'or modifications in the 
• provisions of' the 1832 Bill but not for its virtual abandonment 
in favour of' a new Bill. His feelings on the subject are well 
expressed in a letter which he wrote, but did not send, to Wood 
on November 7th, 1851. In this he stated that he would oppose 
any Government which brought forward a new reform bi.ll relying 
f'or allies upon such people as Cobden and Bright, yet without 
their support such a measure would be. impracticable. Russell by 
pledging himself' on the subject had created .a dilemma; instead of' 
taking Grey's advice and attempting to strengthen himself from the 
.,. 
conservative ranks of' the county gentlemen, he had brought forward 
o\ 
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'that abortion of a reform bill.' Grey announced that in the 
present state of the country he would be no party to a new reform 
bill; he had consented to Russell's attempt a:t reform becallse, 
to Grey's regret, Russell had committed himself·on the subject in 
the House of Commons, and because he had always considered the 
existing state of the representation to be open to serious object-· 
. . 
ions, which would have been diminished if the measure proposed 
had been carried, 'which without distllrbing the balance of parties 
and the distribution of political power among various classes of 
the community wd have obtained the object of giving their fair 
share of power to different class:es by means less anomalous and 
irregular than those by which this is now done.' .But Russell's 
bill had aroused no strong support. The alternativE~~ now present 
were to be content with the present system, or to carry some 
extensive change after a struggle on the scale of 1832, and of 
course Grey was in favour of the :farmer. In the then temper.of' 
men's minds he believed that any reform would be for the worse:-
'What people ar~ looking to are changes _by which the :franchise 
wd be extended - small boroughs disfranchised and additional 
members given to large towns and counties. Now such measures as 
these, taken by themselves, wd_be a mere·advance o:f a few steps 
in the road towards making the House o:f Commons a representation 
o:f the population according to numbers, than which I can conceive 
nothing more dangerous, or more misctiev~ous ••• the House of 
Commons ·is now a representation o:f all classes in the community • • • 
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The result is arrived at by irregular and objectionable means but 
it is the right result. If the views of our present radical 
reformers were carried into effect the whole House of Commons wd 
be practically returned by one class.' 
Although Grey could not see it, these were identical arguments 
used by the opponents of the Whigs in 1832, and which that party 
had then decried. 
February, 1852, brought about the demise of the G:Overnment·. On 
February 20th, Palmerston carried an amendment concerning the 
Government's militia bill; Russell at once iutimated to the 
Commons his intention of resigning. Grey was severely critical 
as. to Russell's conduct in this matter:-
' ••• I think Ld John was wrong in so hastily announcing his 
intended resignation without giving his colleagues an opportunity 
of expressing an opinion on the subject; he was still more obviously 
wrong in allowing a division to take place at t past 8 in a thin 
house when I have. myself no doubt that had the debate been kept 
up for a couple of hours longer and proper pains been taken to ·bring 
down our friends a majority might have been secu.red.' 
Grey was further annoyed that the ~overnment had resigned before 
a scheduled deba:te on South Africa had taken place, in which he had 
hoped to have his policy vindic~te4, 'otherwise,' he wrote, 'matters 
have been so mismanaged and the government I am bound to say con-
ducted so feebly and inefficiently that it was high time we were 
turned out. ' He cited the disputed militia bill as an example of. 
this last contention; it was in 'a most crude and indigested state,' 
the ieads of the bill had never been submitted in print to the 
Cabinet, which had only heard them hastily read over, .the measure 
was 'a very bad and useless one,' and no one understood it {least 
of all Russell.) 
In the process of surrendering t~e seals of office, Grey_ had 
a long conversation with the Queen, in which he intimated very 
freely his opinion of Russell. Grey thought that Russell instead 
of spending Christmas at Woburn ought to have digested his measu~es 9 
and he announced that he would never again have the same confidence 
in Russell as heretofore. 
Thus Russell's first ministry came to an inglorious termination, 
with Grey's opinion of the Whig leader at zero, and a determination 
on Grey's part that he would never have the wish to hold office 
in .such a ministry again, more especially if it flirted with those 
elements which desired more political reform in the direction of 
the dreaded democracy. 
B. Re-organization in the Colonial Office. 
Grey's tenure of the Colonial Office is noted for important 
legislation affecting the colonies, but like all good administrators 
Grey was also concerned with putting his ow.n house in order, in-
short he was constantly seeking for ways to make the overworked 
Colonial Office a more efficient body. In December, 1846,. he was 
already discussing the state of the Office with Stephen and Hawes, 
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and for the next three years part of his time was occupied by 
considering various schemes of' reorganization.( 2l) 
The need for such reorganization became more imperative in the 
autumn of 1847 when Stephen, surely one of the best known and 
ablest civil s.ervants to grace the n.ineteenth century, desired to 
retire from his post as Under-Secretary because of illness. 
Thereafter Grey was concerned with two things, how to secure a 
r~compense to Stephen for his long years of devoted service over 
and above· the pension assigned to him, and how to employ him in 
a capacity which·would ensure that his knowledge of colonial 
affairs would still be available for the assistance of the Secretary 
of State. Stephen - made a Privy Councillor and knighted - was 
eager for further employment; he disliked the prospect of being 
idle and of no further use in public affairs and moreover found 
himself in financial difficulties. Much of the correspondence 
between the two men after 1847 is concerned w:i th schemes for 
securing some form of re-employment with a reasonable salary for 
Stephen, whose worth as we already know Grey readily recognized. 
At the end of October, 1847, Stephen placed his resignation 
in Grey's hands. Grey announced that he would not accept.it 
immediately, but would give Stephen leave of absence for six 
months," appointing for that time an Assistant Under-Secretary to 
take his place. If Stephen's health did not improve suf'f'ic~ently 
to enable him to return to his old post, Grey would attempt to 
(21) Journal, December 1st, 1846. 
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find other employment for him, for example on the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council. ( 22) This led to a misunderstanding 
between the two men in 1848; Stephen saying that he had only 
resigned on condition that he had something in addition to his 
pension aa Under-Secretary of State, Grey saying that Stephen had 
resigned solely ori the ground of ill health, and that whilst· he 
had attempted to secure further employment for Stephen, he had by 
no means guaranteed to be successful in.this. However, this mis-
understanding was not allowed to shatter the fri-endship between 
the two, and relations were soon back to normal. 
Htr""'&"\. The man recommended by Stephen to succeed himself was emeP 
Merivale, Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, Who in that' 
capacity had delivered a series of lectures on colonization. 
Grey had thought of offering the vacant post to James Spedding, 
who had already had experience of working within the Colonial 
Office; Russell, however, doubted whether Spedding would answer, 
and it was in fact Merivale who succeeded Stephen.(23) In 
November of that year Grey made T.F. Elliot, the Chairman of the 
Colonial Land and Emigration Board, an addi t"ional Assistant Under-
Secretary, and T.W.C. Murdoch, Elliot's successor. Buller's 
cousin, Strachey, was at the same time made precis-writer. 
When ·Stephen was sworn in as a Privy Councillor at the end of 
October 1847, he and Grey had discussed a more fundamental reorgan-
ization of the Colonial Office than a mere change of places; 
(22) Grey to Stephen, October 30th, 1847. 
(23) Russell to Grey, October 17th, 1847. 
Grey thought some of Stephen's ideas were admirable. ( 24) T.b 
assist the Secretary of State in coming to decisions and to take 
some of the work off his own shoulders (which with Stephen's 
retirement, would no doubt vastly increase, at least antil the 
new men became more experienced), it was decided that a Colonial 
Commission, with the p_eople at the Land and E_migration Board 
being the ordinary officials, but having the po,ver to summ·on 
Privy Councillors or men with specialist knowledge whenever they 
deemed it convenient, should be established. This step, whicb 
Stephen had in fact suggested to Russell seven years previously, 
Stephen believed would be by the press ascribed to the extinction 
of his own 'sinister influence' in the Colonial Office.(25) Grey's 
. 
main reason for deciding to adopt some of the provisions of 
Stephen's plan was to bring able men into the Colonial Office 
without having to call them Clerks of the First Class, for wuch 
were jealous of the introduction of new men who had not risen 
regularly, as Murdoch, who had been away in Canada and then made 
a _Clerk of the First Class, had but· too much reason to know, as · 
none of these over whom he was supposed to be placed would submi:t 
to being under his authority; if there was a well selected body 
of Clerks in the Office equal to the duties: they had to perform, 
Grey would not have adopted the sugge~tion of a Colonial Commi~~~6n~ 
.( 24) 
(25) 
( 26) 
Journal, October 30th, 1847. 
Stephen to Grey, November lOth, 1847. 
Gre~ to,Russell, November 7th, 1847. 
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Russell refused to agree to this suggestion; the Board he thought 
would merely perform the tasks the chief clerks ought to do, and· 
if' the latter were inefficient the cle.arest reme:ay~~was to dismiss. 
them. He had no objection to Grey having two Assistant Under-
Secretaries and five chief' clerks but not a Colonial Commission. 
As f'or a suggestion that reports on the state of th~ colonies 
should be submitted to Parliament, he believed that the whole 
w9rkings of an of'f'ice cannot with benefit to the public be sub-
mi_tted to the eyes and ears of' the whole public of Europe, Asia, 
Africa and America.(27) Some months later, Grey did in fact take 
some steps to secure a more efficient body of clerks for the office, 
by introducing the procedure adopted in the War Of'f'ice, that 
clerks were to be appointed at first only on trial, their appoint-
ment being confirmed after receipt of a favourable written report 
from the senior of'f'i·cial under whom they had been placed,. and 
also from the permanent Under Secretary, showing that they had 
the requisite industry and intelligence to be good senior clerks 
when they rose to that positian.(28) With Russell, Wood and 
Charles Buller opposed to the idea of a Colonial Commission, and 
with Hawes doubtful, Grey dropped the whole scheme. 
In March, 1848, Stephen suggested reviving the Committee of' 
the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations as a consultative 
body on colonial affairs. Grey accepted the suggestion, and 
(27) Russell to Grey, November 13th, 1847. 
(28) Grey to Russell, January 25th, 1848. 
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decided to refer a f'ew particular cases to it in the first. instance, 
and then if' the experiment was successful, refer colonial quest·ions 
to it at his pleasure; unfortunately it would be difficult to 
secure to Stephen any financial remuneration for services he 
might render on that body, but Grey promised to attempt such at 
a favourable moment.( 29) This suggestion was acted upon in April, 
1848, when the Committee for Trade and Plantations was revived. 
The death of Charles Buller in November, 1848, was a further 
loss to Grey. Buller, one of' the 'colonial reformers' and a 
believer in the latest theories of' colonization, was a link 
between Grey and that body of' men, and his knowledge of' colonia1 
problems made him an invaluable assistant to some of' the work of' 
the Colonial Office. 
·In 1849 Stephen suggested a further degree of reorganization 
which would enable the Colonial Secretary to derive further 
assistance in. his work. The Committee for Trade and Plantations 
was in effect a branch of the Board of Trade; Stephen suggested 
making it virtually a separate body with its own records, and with 
a President o·f' its -own when neither the Presi·dent nor the Wice-
President of' the Board of Trade were able to attend its sittings. 
The man suggested for the Presidency was Sir Edward Ryan, a lawyer 
and a Commissioner of' Railways. The power of co-opting Privy 
Cotmcillors and non-Privy Councillors (Assessors) on special 
( 29) Grey to Stephen, March lst, and 4th, 1848. 
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occasions was to belong to the new body.(30) Grey would have 
..,. 
prefered Stephen as a President, but realized that this was im-
" 
practical because of 'the unjust odium' which was attached-to his 
name; in fact the whole idea was chiefly valuable to Grey as-a 
means of securing Stephen's services, which 'would be of more real 
use than the whole of the rest of the arrangements.' Stephen as 
a member of the proposed body would remain disengaged from other 
avocations (his colleagues having other work to perform), and 
would in ~onsideration of a remuneration digest the results of 
the. deliberations of the Committee and produce draft reports; if 
Stephen had no fixed position on the Cornmi ttee he would not be 
able to give his assistance more than occas~onally when it was 
convenient for him,·nor would it be right to expect him to do 
otherwise.(3l) 
Russell was not enthusiastic about the plan. It was adopted 
partly by Grey to avoid the imputation that he was solely respon-
sible for the legislation concerning the colonies (Grey had been 
attacked severely on several occasions by both Tories and colonial 
reformers), but Russell believed that there was no way of sharing 
responsibility:-
' ••• Labouchere told me that in the committee on the Australian 
Constitution, the Members felt bound to waive their opinions, 
when they differed from yours. Such must in fact be the position 
(30) 
(31) 
Memo. by Stephen, October 12th, 1849. 
Grey's Remarks on Stephen's Memo of Oct. 12th, 1849, 
and 'Draft of a Paper to Lords of Committee for Trade 
and Plantations,' Memoranda on _Colonial Office, 
Colonial Papers. 
of the Secretary of State.' 
Nevertheless he was prepared to adopt the plan without Stephen 
which of' course in Grey's eyes was equivalent to destroying it 
altogether. According to Russell the House of Commons would be 
reluctant to see Stephen maintain any further influence over 
colonial affairs.( 32 ) 
Grey complained bitterly about Russell's unfavourable verdict: 
with regard to Stephen. He pointed out how severely impaired the 
Committee for Trade and Plantations was when Stephen was not present , 
and ai ted an example to prove this; there were then (December 1849) 
two subjects concerning South Africa before the Committee, and bot~ 
needed to be discussed and the measures to be taken decided upon 
before Parliament met. Yet when Grey had wished to call the 
Committee for this purpose, Labouchere could not come, and there 
were present a.nly Ryan, Lord Campbell and Hawes (who was not a 
member of· the Committee). This was not sufficiently attended to 
be of much use, and because of. the commitments of members there 
~as no opportunity of' another meet~ng until very near the meeting 
of Parliament. Nevertheless the two topics had been discussed 
-
and agreement reached as to the general purport of two draft reports· 
which were to be drawn up. But Grey could find no one willing or 
able to undergo the labour of drafting such reports. Sir Edward 
Ryan would only undertake to draw up something on the strictly legal 
part of the question of the Orange River Sovereignty. The result 
(32) Russell to Grey, September 22nd, 1849, October 20th, 
and December 12th. 
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was that Grey was lef't· the task of' drawing u~ both reports, one 
on the ~orm o~ representative government to be given to the Cape, 
the other on the Orange River Sovereignty; as f'ar as he was con-
cerned the Committee in this respect was 'perfectly useless,' and 
he contrasted the state of' affairs with what had happened the pre-
ceding year when Stephen had taken part in discussions on the 
Australian constitutions. On that occasion Stephen wrote the draft 
report, and it was an admirable performance. If' Grey had to 
write a similar report on the Cape, to do it properly it would 
take him at least two or three whole days doing nothing else, and 
of' course he had such a mass of' current business to deal with 
that such was impossible. He thought that the objections to 
Stephen carried little weight; he was willing that_the appointment 
of' Stephen in some permanent capacity on the Committee should be 
considered as a charge upon the Colonial Of'f'ice; it would be well 
•. 
worth paying £500 a year to secure the aid of his knowledge and 
ability, and in any case Stephen was miserably provided f'or by 
his pension considering the number of' years of' his service. Grey 
concluded:-
'I must ••• remonstrate against your decision as one injurious 
to the public and unfair by me.•(33) 
The response from Russell was ·an acid one:-
'.-•• -when we gave you three Under Secretaries instead of' two, 
I was in hopes that you would have had one of' them capable of' 
(33) GreY to Russell, December 14th, 1849. 
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assisting you in such cases. If Mr Merivale cannot I should think 
he ·and Fred Elliot together might • • • Stephen is n·ot immortal •• •·( 34) 
Grey replied that both his Under-Secretaries were fully occupied, 
and that drafting the report on the creation of a constitution at 
the Cape was a subject 'somewhat foreign' to their special lines.(35) 
Russell remained firm in his decision, and Grey had perforce 
to acquiesce, though he believed that the loss for much of' the 
time of' Stephen's services from the Committee detracted greatly 
from the uses of that body. · He continued, however, to consult it 
from time to time, though later Colonial Secretaries discontinued 
the practice. 
c. General Principles behind Grey's Colonial Policy. 
Grey's .tenure of' the Colonial Office witnessed the final demise 
of' the old conceptio~s of' Empire yet existing in parliamentary 
statutes. The final vestiges of the Navigation Acts were swept 
away, and the concept of' a closed Empire based on reciprocal 
commercial advantages was at an end. 
This fact of the destruction of' the old commercial policy 
necessitated in Grey's view a complete change in colonial policy. 
·The object of having colonies f'or the purpose of' benefiting by a 
commercial monopoly was at an end. Previously Britain had levied 
a tribute on the industry of' the colonies, in return providing them 
(34) Russell to Grey, December l~th, 1849. 
(35) Grey to Russell, December 20th, 1849. 
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with protection; . to secure this same monopoly Britain had exer-
cised a certain amount of control over the internal government of 
the col·onies.· 
With the end of the old imperial system various public figures, 
both protectionist and free trader, had argued that as the old 
advantages of possessing colonies had gone, and that as the colonies 
had freedom of trade, and (in the case of the more important ones) 
a great deal of freedom in.the management of their internal affairs, 
Britain had no further use for colonies. Such people argued that 
this country could derive equal or greater trade benefits from 
the colonies if they were· independent, whilst being saved the 
expense of maintaining naval and military establishments on a 
global scale. 
Grey had some very potent arguments with which to answer such 
critics. For instance he believed that Britain still derived 
great advantages from the possession of colonies; much of her 
power and influence amongst other nation~ derived from her having 
world wide colonies:-
'·It would surely be considered to add greatly to the strength 
of·any nation to possess a number of steady and faithful allies 
in various quarters. But no alliance between independent States 
can be so close and intimate as the connection which unites the 
Colonies to the British Empire as subjects of a Common Sovereign.•< 36 ) 
• ••• I conceive that the power which this country possesses 
( 36) Printed Memo on 'Colonial Policy and the State of 
our Colonies', January 7th, 1850. 
Colonial Papers. 
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carries with it a responsibility of the highest kind, which we are 
not at liberty to throw off. T.he authority of the British Crown 
is at this moment the most powerful instrument under Providence 
of maintaining peace and order in many extensive regions of the 
earth, and thereby assists in diffusing amongst many thousands or 
rather millions of the human race, the blessings of Christianity 
and civilization.' 
He painted a doleful picture of what would happen in various parts 
of the world if Britain were to abrogate this responsibility. In 
the West Indies strife would result between the whites and the 
coloured peoples; in Ceylon the native population would not submit 
to the rule of a handful of whites not backed by the power of the 
British Empire; there would be wars in South Africa and New 
Zealand between settlers and natives without the presence of the 
restraining influence of the British G:overnment·; on the west coast 
of Africa the slave trade would once more revive. Judged from a 
more selfish aspect would not the saving of expense by the with-
drawal of British rule bring about the destruction of British 
property and 'the annhilation of lucrative branches of our commerce: 
if, as he envisaged, bloodshed and anarchy were in some areas to 
follow once British officials and troops had withdrawn ? At that 
moment those peoples who under British tutelage were emerging from 
barbarism provided a market for many British goods, but such 
markets would disappear and barbarism would again be prevalent if 
settler and native were .left to fight and squabble over the land. 
Nor would difficulties exist merely in those areas with a large 
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native population; it was quite possible that the Australian 
colonies would get into difficulties with each other (perhaps Grey 
envisaged the erection of tariff barriers between state and state, 
or disputes about their extent and the possession of tracts of land). 
The colonies too gained by the continuance of British rule. 
While they were yet weak and small communities in possible danger 
of being swallowed up by an ambitious foreign power or destroyed 
by the native races, they were protected by one of the greatest 
powers in the world. They had all the advantages of being British 
subjects, in such capacity being everywhere entitled to the pro-
tection of the Mother Country. British rule was mainly for the 
benefit of the colonies themselves not for that of the Mother 
Country; Britain only sparingly exercised an influence in the 
internal affairs of the colonies, and on~y then for such purposes 
as preventing any one colony from adopting measures injurious to 
another, moderating internal differences and assisting the colonies 
eventually to govern themselves, and gu~ding a population too 
j,gnorant and unenlightened to manage its own affairs. 
-He ridiculed the charge of the colonial reformers that the 
Empire was ruled from Downing Street, and challenged them to 
produce something more than vapid criticisms:-
••• it would be very desirable that those who so loudly assert 
the necessity of Colonial Reform would point out upon what other 
principles they think that power should have been used; a clear 
explanation of their views upon this point, and of the real nature 
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of the system they would establish, seems to me to be greated 
wanted. I should be glad to know in what respects that system 
would differ from really making. the Colonies independent, and at 
the same time leaving to this country the responsibility of 
protecting them.' 
There were two main ways by which the authority of the Home 
Government was exercised, stated Grey. One was by the appointment 
of Governors, which was the most important way, since it largely 
depended upon the Governor's ability, as to whether a colonial 
administration failed or succeeded. The great care Grey took in 
the appointment of Governors can be seen in his correspondence 
with Russell (who exercised a more active supervision over all 
departments of his government, except perhaps the Foreign Office, 
than Lord Melbourne had ever done), where the claims and abilities 
of various men desiring to become Governors were discussed in 
detail. On the whole Grey had a great deal of success with his 
appointments in this respect; if he chose a Torrington (who was 
in any case not first choice for the governorship of Ceylon), he 
also chose an Elgin and a Barkly. No political differences were 
allowed to stand in the way of getting the best man for such an 
important post. Lord Elgin's political affiliations certainly 
did not incline him towards the Whigs, and Barkly, eventually 
Governor-- of British Guiana, was one of the foremost opponents in 
the Commons of the G.'overnment' s West Indian policy. If he appointed 
Conservatives; he was also not afraid where the occasion seemed to 
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require it, to appoint men of a ~adical background, witness the 
appointment of H.G. Ward to be Governor of the Ionian Isles (one 
of Grey's less successful appointments). 
It was the duty of the Colonial Office to exercise a more 
vigilant supervision over Governors in those colonies where those 
officials were not checked by any Representative Assemblies. This 
did not sanction a policy of 'vexatious interference.' The 
Governors of Crown Colonies were to be· supported as long as they 
maintained the confidence of the Colonial Secretary, and recalled 
as soon as they lost that confidence; it was the duty of the 
Colonial Secretary to prescribe for such Governors the general 
lines .of policy to be pursued, leaving to them the details of that 
policy. The Colonial Secretary also had to attend to.complaints 
made against Crown Colony Governors and their measures. One of 
the main objects to be pursued in all Crown Colonies was that· of 
gradually preparing the colonists for eventual self-government. 
In those countries with large civilized populations and 
Representative institutions, little interference on the part of the 
Home. Government· was required. The function of the Colonial Office 
should in such cases be r~stricted merely to giving advice, or 
(very rarely indeed) disallowing 'ill-considered and hasty measures,' 
whilst maintaining a supervision over imperial interests as distinct 
from the internal self-government of the colonies:-
'••• Since I have had charge of the Colonial Office, the policy 
which has been acted upon has been that of giving the very utmost 
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' liberty to Colonial Legislatives in matters affecting only their 
internal interests, so much so, that laws which have appeared to 
me highly injudicious have been left to their operation ••• ' 
This power of sanctioning or disallowing measures, and occasionally 
prescribing measures for adoption, is the second way in which the 
Colonial Office has influence in the colonies. The great thing 
about this power, however, was the way in which it was sparingly 
exercised. Efen in the West_Indies, where racial antagonisms led 
the Governors and the Colonial Office to play more active parts 
than in other colonies enjoying representative institutions, the 
proportion of measures eventually disallowed was exceedingly small. 
An old charge, still repeated in some quarters, was that.the 
colonies were retained for purposes of patronage. This Grey denied 
by showing that the Colonial Office had little say in the disposal 
of patronage, as practically all offices were disposed of by the 
Governor to residents in the particular colony. The chief patronage 
of the Home Government lay in the appointment of Governors:-
'which is rather a source of embarrassment than otherwise, since 
the advantages of these appointments are not such as to make it 
easy to induce those whose services would be most desirable to 
accept them, and those who are unequal to the duties· are frequently 
recommended in a manner which it is difficult to resist.' 
As for the expenses of military protection, Grey announced it 
to be his aim gradually to establish the principle that colonies· 
could only look to the Mother Country for help when faced by dangers 
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from foreign powers. In such places as Malta or Bermuda, where 
the fortifications and military establishments were more important 
for imperial_interests rather than the interests of those 
particular colonies, it was right that the Home Government should 
bear the burden of maintaining them. Elsewhere, however, the local 
authorities ought to make provision for the accommodation of 
Imperial troops, and provide for their own police forces and for 
forces necessary for maintaining internal tranquillity. This 
principle could-only be enforc~d gradually, and adjusted according 
as to whether the colonies could bear a larger share of providing 
for their own military protection.(37) 
What a modern ring has much of the preceding theory ! How 
different from the views of Colonial Secretaries of.the earlier 
part of the century, and how different from those of Stanley with 
his fears of introducing responsible government in Canada. Russell 
was far less 'modern' in his conception of the position of British 
Colonies. Grey, however, believed in educating the colonies in 
the principles of self-government. Nor did he fear, as did many 
of his contemporaries, that the slackening of British control in 
the colonies would necessarily mean a slackening in the ties which 
bound them to the Mother Country. There was also the feeling 
which is by no means dead today, a benevolent unselfish paternalism, 
which maintained that the British in cert-ain areas of the world 
(37) Printed Memo on 'Colonial Policy and the State of 
our Colonies'. January 7th, 1850. 
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had a duty towards more primitive peoples, a duty which sought to 
f'it these peoples f'or Western civilization and all the advantages 
which to Grey-seemed to accruef'rom that, a duty not to abandon 
them to the unscrupulous policy of' colonial assemblies. The 
Colonial Of'f'ice in Grey's time may not always have realized his 
ideals, but the intention was there, and though he aroused opposit-
ion f'rom colonial reformers and colonists who wanted to be rid of 
all the trammels of' the Colonial Of'f'ice, even if the result should 
be chaotic, Grey never swerved f'rom his ideals. His views on the 
lands he administered were f'ar lof'tier, f'ar more human, than those 
of' the Cobdenites who sought to reduce every question to the common 
denominator of' pounds, shillings and pence. 
D. The North American Colonies. 
In a work of this scope it is obviously impossible to deal in 
great detai~ with Grey's policy with regard to each colony; that 
has been done f'ar more thoroughly in the book by W.P. Morrell, 
'Colonial Policy of Peel and Russell', and in Grey's own book, 
'The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration.' 
Nevertheless the maiD outlines of' that policy as it concerned each 
colony or related groups of' colonies can and ought. to be given. 
We have seen some of' Grey's theories on colonial policy, now let 
us look at the practice. 
One of' the oldest and by far the most important group of' our 
J • 
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colonies were those in North America; these comprised Canada, New 
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prmnce Edward's Island, and occupying a 
rather isolated position on its own, Newfoundland. Grey was to be 
responsible for encouraging the foundations of another, British 
Columbia, when he gave the Hudson's Bay Company a Charter for the 
settlement of Vancouver Island though that.area remained very thinly 
settled until the gold rushes of 1858 led there hordR~of fortune-
seekers.(~8) 
Of these North American possessions the largest and most 
important was Canada (the old provinces of Upper and Lower Canada). 
It was also the colony where political institutions were developed 
at their highest. Prominent men in Canada were advocating the 
adoption of party, that is 'responsible' government; that is to 
say that the Governor was to take his ministers from the dominant 
party in the Assembly, as did the King in Britain itself. The 
Conservative Administration of Peel had attempted to resist this 
doctrine. If responsible Government were adopted in Canada, that 
country, so it seemed, would be to all intents and purposes an 
independent one in which British influence would shrink to nothing. 
Imbued with the ideas of an outmoded colonial policy the Conservat-
i ves shrank with horror from the thought of responsible government. 
Their Governors-General, B~got and Metcalfe, were instructed to 
resist the demand; on no account were they, if the dominant party 
(38) 'Colonial Policy of Peel and Russell'. W.P. Morrell. 
1930. Chapter XVII, PP• 444-6. 
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in the Assembly were the French one and its allies, to accept the 
princi-ple that they must choose their ministers from it, the 
Government believing that-those who were the least loyal to the 
British connection were to be found in that party; what it did 
:-.. 
not realize was that stubborn resistance ·to Canadian demands would 
create that disloyalty which it so feared. Both Bagot and 
it" 
Metcalfe found ~ extremely difficult to carry out the demands of 
the Home Government; Metcalfe had had to assemble an Executive 
Council which did not possess the necessary influence in th~ country, 
.... 
and to have recourse to a dissolution when as a dying man he·=·left 
Canada, his place being taken in the meantime by Lord Cathcart. 
It was at this juncture that Grey took over the Colonial Office. 
Unlike his predecessor, Grey had no prejudices in the case of 
Canada against responsible gove~ment. Indeed as we have seen he 
regarded the goal of all colonies to be self-government, and what 
better way to achieve this than to allow the party system to be 
adopted in Canada ? Nor did he have any great fears that the 
result would be a weakening in t~e British connexion, ultimately 
resulting from the separation of Canada from Britain and the Empire. 
Grey was convinced that the majority of Canadians did not desire 
such a separation, even if they did, how could a whole population 
be coerced to follow a different line of pol-icy save by the 
negative and destructive employment of milit~ry force, which 
solved no problems and was not even sure to succeed. The Canadians 
through the wishes of a majority of their representatives had 
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requested party government and Grey thought it wise and just to 
concede this request. It was his conciliation policy of the 1830'.s 
adopted to changed circumstances and based on less disputable 
grounds. 
·A good Governor was required to put this momentous change of 
policy into operation, and fortunately fo!-' G~ey the man was at 
hand. On hearing of the defeat of his political associates Lord 
Elgin placed his Governorship of Jamaica at the disposal of the 
new Government, though Grey was desirous that he should retain it. 
On July 21st, 1846, Elgin pai·d Grey a visit; Grey's impressions 
from this are briefly recorded in his Journal:-
' ••• I had a long visit from Lord Elgin whose conversation 
struck me very much. I am sure he is a very able man indeed.' 
By August 3rd, he had obtained Russell's permission for offering 
the Governorship of Canada to Elgin-, who accepted it. Before the 
end of that year, Elgin - having married Mary ~ambton, Durham's 
daughter - was ready to set out. From that time onwards until 'the 
close of the Whig Ministry the most ideal relationship and co-
aperation existed between Elgin and Grey. Grey had chosen his 
Governor and had prescribed the general lines of policy the 
Governar was to pursue, he now wisely gave his entire ~onfidence 
and support to Elgin, and was ready to take the opinions of the 
man an the spot even when sometimes they conflicted with his own. 
The story of Canadian affa~rs is thereafter dominated by the figure 
of Elgin, but let us not forget the man who originally chose· him 
and who gave him free rein, and who defended him and his policy 
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against calumniations in and out of Parliament. Ironically enough 
it was. to be a Conservative Ministry which was far less whole-
hearted in supporting Elgin's measures and general policy. 
Even before Elgin had left for Canada having been informed of 
Grey's views on responsible government, those same views had already 
been made known in a despatch addressed to Sir John Harvey, Governor 
of Nova Scotia, and dated November 3rd, 1846. It was not long before 
they were put into practice; the election of December 1847 left 
Elgin's conservative ministers in a minority, so he had recourse 
to Baldwin and La Fontaine, those leaders of' the now dominant· 
party in the Assembly whom Metcalfe had stigmatized as disloyal to 
the British connexion. Grey was even prepared to see Papilteau 
included in the new ministry, if the leaders of the dominant party 
in the Assembly should insist on this. Responsible government had 
been introduced into Canada, and as the years passed the fears of 
some who .had opposed its intDoduction were shown to be groundless. 
Not all of' Grey's colleagues were so confident about the future 
of Canada and about the goodwill of the French (the rebels of 1837) 
towards a continuing British conne:xion as he was. At the end of 
1846 Grey h,ad decided to withdraw two regiments from Canada, and 
the reduction of the force there had been carried out. In 1848, · 
Russell wished to see a further regiment sent to Canada; he feared 
that with the close of the United States' war with Mexico, and the 
est'ablishment of a republic in France, there might be 'an outbreak 
of ·the disloyal French against British rule.'(39) Grey replied 
( 39) " Russell to Grey, March~l848. 
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. that he was against· such a step, and that· he was hopeful not 
despondent as to Canada's future; the only purpose more troops . 
. . 
could serve would be if war were declared against the United_States, 
or to coerce the Canadian people, which was 'utterly impracticable 
if we wished it.' Loyalty to Britain could not be bought by 
bayonets, it came from the goodwill of a· contented people.(40) 
Russell was not easily convinced, he still believed in a loyalist 
party who needed the hearten'ing backing of British kYonets to 
swing the population to a determination not to sever their relations 
with Britain:-
'People argue, and you a~ong many others, as if a million and 
a half of people were like one man, who wished for British rule, 
or were against it. But the truth is that if a million are for 
British and a half million for American connexion, the half million 
will soon get the majority on their side if they are active, com-· 
bined, and zealous, while the opposite party are discouraged by the 
apathy, coldness, and indifference of the Home G·ovt. Whereas if 
the Home Govt shew themselves friendly and determined the half 
million may in a short time be reduced to 100,000. 
It· was the fault of Stephen that instead of being ~der Sec. for 
the Colonies, he was more Under Sec. against the Colonies. If we 
cry stinking fish, it is no wonder our customers are few.'(4l) 
It is difficult to see what Russell hoped to accomplish by his 
(40) Grey to Russell, March 14th, 1848. 
(41) Russell to Grey, March 16th, 1848. 
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proposal; there were rumours o~ a war with the United States, but 
relations with that country had momentarily inproved. In any case 
his ~ears proved groundless, and history has shown that Grey took 
a less exaggerated, more rational view of the position. 
In a printed memorandum of February, 1849 (intended for circul-
ation among the Cabinet), Grey outlined the instructions given to 
Elgin as to how responsible government was to operate:-
'It was to be his object to govern ••• the province in the 
strictest conformity with the constitutional principles which we 
are accustomed to respect in this country; he was to act generally 
upon the advice of his Executive Council, and to receive as members 
of that body those persons who might be pointed out to him as 
entitled to be so by their possessing the confidence of the Assembly.· 
But he was not in any way to identify himself with the party from 
the ranks o~ which the actual Council was drawn, but was to make 
it generally understood that if public opinion required it he was 
equally ready to accept their opponents as advisers; and that 
with a complete oblivion o~ all past contentions he would act with 
perfect impartiality towards the various individuals who took an 
active share in public af~airs, without regard to their national 
origin or party, uninfluenced by any personal preferences or 
objections~ This policy Lord Elgin has acted upon with the 
gre~test ability and success.' 
f- . 
The memorandum then refered to the policy of responsible government 
~ 
with regard to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, where 'the practical 
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exercise of the power of self-government so far as regards their 
internal affairs seems to have had a most happy effect in rendering 
British connections more generally valued by the population. ,(42) 
The same memorandum then castigated 'a certain class of politicians' 
who stated that the North American colonies were a mere incumbrance 
and charge to this country. Grey pointed out .how calamitous it 
would be if Canada were to be. swallowed by the United States:-
'Looking to the natural resources of these provinces, to the 
wealth they are so fast accumulating, and especially to the 
harbours they possess, and their commanding position in case of 
a naval war, I should regard it as most seriously endangering ~ur 
security as a nation, if this great accession of power were to be 
obtained by the United States.at our expense; and I presume no 
one doubts that if at the present time these provinces were to be 
separated from the British Empire, they would be necessarily 
swallowed up in the Union. Hence I think_some credit may fairly 
be claimed by the present Administration for our improved position 
in British Americ~ ·and for the increased strength which has been 
given to the connexion between these provinces and the Empire.•(43) 
Altogether the picture painted by this memorandum both with 
regard to the mainland and Newfoundland was a rosy one. Yet it was 
in that very year, 1849, that there was a crisis in Canadian affairs. 
(42) Memo on Colonial Policy January 7th, 1850. 
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(43) Ibid. 
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The Canadian Ministers introduced a Bill .compensating the inhabit-
ants. of Lower Canada, except those convicted of high treason, for 
unjust or wanton damage suffered in the 1837 rebellion. When 
Elgin assented to the Bill, the extreme right wing (the old party 
to which Stanley had directed his Governors as the greatest 
supporters of the British connexion, and which at times Russell 
was inclined to think was a true position}, participated in riots 
in Montreal, which resulted in the burning of the Houses of Parlia-
ment. If the·British Ministry had refused to assent to the Bill-
and many politicians in this country disliked it - a serious state 
of affairs would have arisen in Canada, and a blow would have been 
given to the idea of responsible government, but Grey was determined 
to see that Elgin was supported. The resul-t was that hostile 
motions in Commons and Lords were defeated, by 291 votes to 150 in 
the former, and by 99 to 96 in the latter. 
There was one more disturbing incident at the close of that 
year, before Canadian affairs returned to flow in a more tranquil 
channel. This was ·a movement calling for annexation to the United 
States, brought about by temporary commercial-distress, in part 
owing to the carrying out of free trade policies by the Mother 
Country. This movement never commanded widespread support, and 
by the spring of the following year was practically defunct. The 
Ministry at home was not to be diverted from its free trade policy -
on this point Grey was adamant, we have already seen how whole-
heartedly he accepted free trade doctrines - but Grey did attempt 
to con_ciliate Canadian opinion in other ways, one of which was the 
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attempted negociation of a reciprocity treaty with the United 
States. This was not brought to a successful conclusion till 1854, 
by which time Grey was out of office, but the credit for the initial 
discussions must rest with him for urging them upon his Cabinet 
colleagues.(44) 
Another way in which Grey proved conciliatory was over the 
-#' 
subject of' military chaDges. Though it was a settled object of' 
the British Government to make those colonies which were able to, 
to bear a greater saare of' the expense in maintaining troops for 
their defence, in consequence of the temporary commercial difficult-
ies, Grey was willing to defer the time when Canada should be asked 
to do this. When it became necessary to build barracks at Montreal 
for £12,000, to replace a temporary building which had become unfit 
for the reception of troops, GreY was.willing that the Mother 
Country should take the charge upon itself, much to Charles Wood's 
disgust. · At the same time he was hopeful that the object of 
reducing defence·, expenditure would ultimately be -gained:-
••• with free navigation and under the more vigorous system 
of internal administration •••• Canada will soon be again in a 
state of prosperity, and with returning prosperity we may increase 
our demands upon her ••• ' (45) 
At the same time Grey was thinking of improvements in the organs 
of the Canadian legislature. Shades of the 1830's were revived 
when Grey tentatively suggested that it would be better to replace 
(44) Morrell. Chapter X. PP• 223-231. 
(45) Grey to Russell, April 18th, 1849. 
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a nominated Legislative Council with an elected one. All the ideas 
he had then held were revived; an elective body composed of those 
who had held certain offices in the province, and -the representation 
of' all interests by the system of' election. Having outlined these 
proposals to Russell, Grey remarked:-
'These are mere speculations at present, but it appears to me 
very clear that it will be necessary some day_ to adopt same such 
scheme in order to give greater weight to the L. Council in the 
constitution, and there is no harm in looking forward and thinking 
how this might be done.' (46) 
This last phrase is a sufficient camment as to how the direction 
rt..,,s 
af colanial affairs had changed since the days af' Glenelg. ~Grey's 
belief·- held ever since he had been Under~Secretary to Goderich-
that such changes as he had proposed should never be brought into 
being, but, in accordance with his views of granting powers of 
self-government, by the local authorities themselves. ~erefore 
he suggested to Russell that the power should be given to the 
Canadian Legislature of making any changes they might think fit in 
their ald Constitution; such a provision he had inserted in his 
Bill concerning the Austra~ian Constitu~ions, which had been post-
poned. A proviso could be added that no such acts for effecting 
constitutional changes should be valid until confirmed by the Queen 
after being laid before both Houses of Parliament. This was, 
however, too much of' a revolutionary concept far Russell; he was 
still oppressed by the bogey of potential French rebels who might 
(46) Grey to Russell, -July 31st, 1849. 
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·U$e this power to bring about the 'total discomf'i tu:tte' of' the 
'Brit-ish or Tory party'. In f'act he thought that the Aust:ttalian 
Bill ought to be amended so as to reserve the power of' altering 
the constitution to the Imperial Government.(47) 
In his p:ttinted memorandum for the Cabinet dated January 7th, 1850, 
Grey reviewing the preceding year's events had to admit that the 
affairs· of the North American Colonies were not in such a satis-
factory position as in 1848, owing to commercial· distress and the 
annexationist movement, but he stressed that these were local and 
temporary phenomena:-
'In other respects, Canada is very prosperous ••• A· large and 
successful immigration; ••• ·the new canals, affording an easy 
passage for sea-going ships of 300 oi' 400 tons, from Quebec to the 
western lakes, are in successful operation; and there is every 
prospect that, with the facilities afforded by the repeal of' the 
Navigation Laws, this line of internal navigation will carry off 
.. ,.. 
a very large proportion of the trade between the sea bo~d and the 
Western States• of the Union·.' (48) 
Grey was always concerned to create a larger unit of' .the North 
.American Colonies, as he was f'or example in Australia or New Zealand. 
A federation seemed to him the ideal solution; it would as a unit 
be in a stronger position to resist United States' ambitions than 
would a single colony, and it could also legislate on matters of' 
(47) Russell to Grey, October 13th, 1849. 
(48) Me~o on Colonial Policy January 7th, 1850. 
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common concern to .all colonies, such as a land policy or a common 
commercial policy with no tariff barriers between colony and colony. 
Even if it elected to sever the British connexion a federation 
would be strong enough to stand on its own feet without necessarily 
being absorbed in the United States.(49) At the same time he 
realized that without improved means of communication between the 
provinces, the idea of a federation was a mere chimera. This 
realization and the necessity of pouring more capital~ into 
Canada (British investors were reluctant to put money into Canadian 
venture·s fearing that Canada might at some time join the United 
States and repudiate her debts) led Grey to be an ardent advocate 
for a system of railway communication between the provinces, and 
in particular the Halifax-Quebec railway, a project which had been 
recommended by Durham. By the end of 1848 he had worked out a 
scheme for facilitating the construction of the latter line; this 
involved the loan of £5,000,000 by the Imperial Government for the 
construction of the railway by Irish emigrant labour, the interest 
on the loan being secured by an .increase in the duty on colonial 
timber to the level of duty on foreign timber. The colonial 
Assemblies concerned, those of Canada, New Brunswick an.d Nova Scotia, 
expressed themselves as favourable to the project, but it had for 
the moment to bemelved because of political differences in Great 
Britain. Grey stated these difficulties, in a letter to Sir Edmund 
Head, Governor of New Brunswick, to be the.state of the British 
(49) Grey to Russell, November 18th, 1850. 
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finances and the indisposition of' the House of' Commons and general 
~ublic f'oF incurring increased expense in connection with the 
colonies. Grey was reluctant to abandon all hope of the constFuction 
of' the line, and in_No~ember, 1850, we find him urging upon Russell 
its construction, and showing the harm that the non influx of 
BFitish capital into the country was doing, warning Russell that 
it might lead to the gFowth of' a movement in favouF of'. joining 
the United States, the increased strength of' which nation with its 
~unscrupulous ·and insatiable ambition' would then be a great danger 
to Britain. The construction of the Halifax-Quebec line would 
not only dFaw the colonies closer together; it would also by 
creating greater mobility, enable the BFitish forces in Canada to 
be reduced, and the cost of' the project would be amply compensated 
by the political and commercial advantages which would accrue from 
its construction.(50) Negociations for building the line were 
still proceeding when GFey left office; his successor refused to 
guaFantee the line by a loan, and the opportunity was unfoFtunately 
lost. · Grey realized the importance of better communications as 
the first step to a federal union, his successor did not. Writing 
to Head, Grey stated:-
'MY impression is strongly in favour.of a federal union of' the 
BFitish Provinces in North AmeFica, but ••• till the railway is 
constructed, or at all events fairly commenced, it appears to me 
-that any attempt at such a measuFe ·would be prematuFe. ,(5l) 
(50) Grey to Russell, NovembeF 18th, 1850. 
(51) Quoted in MoFrell, Chapter XVII, PP• 443-4. 
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The project of an Intercolonial Railway was a great inducement 
to the Maritime Provinces to agree to the idea of a federal union 
when propounded at the Quebec Conference of 1865.(52) 
One other important question, of long standing, which Grey had 
hoped to solve, but which had to wait until he had left office, 
concerned the Clergy Reserves, the proceeds of which were then 
distributed among the different religious bodies by authority of 
an Imperial Act. In 1850 the Canadian Legislative ~ssembly passed 
an Address asking for the repeal of the Imperial Act in order to 
enable the Canadian Parliament to dispose of the Reserves. Grey 
announced that he agreed with the Address; had he not attempted 
to tackle the subject of the Clergy Reserves whilst Under Secretary ? 
The only snag was that the Whig Ministry was. too weak to carry 
the repeal through the session of 1851; Grey believed that there 
might be unrest in Canada if no attempt was made to repeal the Act, 
or if such an attempt was made too late in the Session so that it 
was obvious that the Government had only brought it forward knowing 
full well that it would have to be abandoned. Rather than such 
policies being adopted, risking defeat in the House of Lords might 
prove safer~(53) On the defeat of the Whig Ministry in the early 
part of 1852 over Russell's Militia Bill, Pakington, the new 
Col~nial Secretary, refused to agree to the repeai of the Act. The 
Duke of Newcastle, his successor, conceded the Canadian demand in 185~ 
(52) For fuller account of Halifax-Quebec Railway 
s·ee Morrell, chapter XVII, PP• 436-443• 
(53) GreY to Russel·l, May 15th, 1851. · 
When he left office Grey had reason to be satisfied with the 
state of the ·British North Amel'"ican Colonies. The important 
principle of responsible government had been introduced, Canada 
had the ablest of Governors, the disturbances of 1849 had been 
weathered, and .the colonies were experiencing reviving prosperity. 
The North American colonies were among the stablest of British 
colonies possessions; now let us look at one which could not 
make that claim. 
E. South Africa • 
. When Grey assumed office in 1846 the situation in Canada and 
the introduction of responsible government required delicate 
handling; but the problems there pale before those which confronted 
the Colonial Office in South Africa. In that region complexities 
were greater; not only were numerous native races, with all the 
attendant.problems they posed (relation with the settlers, land 
and cattle disputes, frontier incidents and wars, missionaries 
and attempts at civilization, Government policy towards them) 
present, but there were also differences between Boer and Briton, 
and the problem of what to do about the trekkers who had gone 
beyond the official frontier. Add to these, the fact that an 
attempt had to be made to give South Africa more of a represent-
ative form of government than she then enjoyed, and it can be seen 
that Grey had a collection of severe problems to face. That his 
pol·icy in this respect was less successful than that devised for 
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North America is little wonder; Grey did not find a solution to 
the racial problem, but South Africa is still groping fo~ one today. 
Native policy,_relations with the Boers, these were the thorniest 
problems which had confronted successive Governors at the Cape since 
we last took cogili~ance of South African affairs at the time of 
Glenelg and D'Urban's Kaffir War. The by no means peaceful years 
between D'Urban's withdrawal from the colony in 1838 and Sir 
Peregrine Maitland's assumption of the Governorship in 1844 had 
failed to find any solutions. Were the Boers to be allowed to 
roam at will beyond ..... _the colonial boundaries, setting up their 
own states, perhaps with slavery a~ an established institution, 
certainly with a harsher native policy than· the Colonial Office 
was prepared to accept ? Were they to embroil themselves with the 
native:· powers bey~~d the Orange and the Vaal, with all the resultant 
bloodshed·as had occurred in the campaigns against the Zulus in 
Natal ? Or was the Imperial Government to hurry along in their 
wake northward, extending an already overlong colonial boundary, 
with all the disadvantages that were involved in the assumption of 
greater responsibilities, of' fresh difficult-ies with new races of 
primitives, of' expense in providing organs of' Government plus 
troops, when communication with the capital and seat of Government 
would be far more difficult than at present ? Communication 
between the frontier an~Cape Town already presented formidable 
difficulties. 
After much hesitation and changing of' policy Natal was annexed 
as a district of the C~pe in August 1845; 
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between ·that the eastern 
A 
colonial frontier lay Kaffirland and the Ceded Territory. The 
story of this Whole area was one of unrest. Nor were things more 
tranquil north of the. Orange River; there Boers had moved into 
lands held by the Griquas (a people of mixed race, partly Hottentot, 
largely Europeanized, and with their own missionaries), and fresh 
tribes of Bantu. If' left to their own devices nothing would keep 
these peoples at peace, and the old dismal theme of bloodshed, 
waste and war would once again be repeated. It was this realiz-
ation that led Maitland to convene a conference of' Transorangian 
chiefs in 1845; he then proposed that all l~nds should be divided 
into two pa~ts, one to be kept as a reserve for .the native peoples 
and one to be leased out to European settlements, with a Br"i tish 
Resident to control the Europeans. Though this scheme did not 
evoke much support Maitland went ahead and appointed Major Warden 
as Resident at Bloenf'ontein. One again Britain was tentatively, 
half-heartedly extending its ~mperial responsibilities. Further 
to the north lay Boer trekker communities located around Winbur9. 
and Potchefstroom. 
Meanwhile on the eastern frontier yet another Kaffir War was in 
the making. In a further attempt to find a satisfactory frontier 
policy Maitland proclaimed the Ceded Territory as the colonial 
boundary, which tribes were only to occupy on sufferance, and in 
which patrols were to move and f'ortications to be erected. The 
reaffirs beyond the Ceded Territory were alarmed at this example of 
a 'forward' policy, and when ~ frontier incident on March, 1846, 
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led to a British force _pursuing some Xaffir murderers into Jaffir-
land, most of the tribes, who had allied with one another for a 
defensive war, flew to arms. Thus began the War of the ~e.(54) 
This briefly was the South African scene when Grey entered the 
Colonial Office. Grey's description of the state of affairs at 
the Cape as 'most wretched' was certainly no eXaggeration, though 
his assertion that it had arisen 'mainly owing to mismanagement' 
is rather more doubtful, and too simple an explanation.< 55 ) One 
of his first tasks was to supercede Maitland, and to replace him, 
on Russeli's recommendation, by Sir Henry Pottinger, an East India 
Company man, who only took the appointment as a temporary one whilst 
waiting a vacancy in India. Pottinger was succeeded in December, 
1847, by Sir Harry Smith, one of the more talented of· British Army 
Commanders with a record of distinguished service in India, and 
with previous experience of South African warfare. With this latter 
appointment Grey believed he had found another Elgin, but in this 
proved to be mistaken. Smith was a very talented man, but did not 
possess Elgin's political acumen, being more at home on the battle-
field than as head of the civilian administration. Yet when that 
has been said, he did face a set of tricky problems which woula 
have been ample tests for the ability of any man, and his final 
recall was somewhat unfortunate, it being based ironically enough 
on his military operations. Smith was not merely Governor of the 
Cape and Commander-in-Chief, he was High Commissioner 'for. the 
(54) 'A History of Southern Africa' E.A. Walker, 1957. 
PP• 222-8. 
(55) Journal, December 6th, 1846. 
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settling and adjustment of the affairs of the territories ••• 
adjacent or contiguous to the ••• frontier.' Pottinger had held 
this office, but Smith was the first to use the powers granted by 
it; it was a further .recognition of Imperial responsibilities. 
Smith's opening gambits were marked by energy and boldness. 
d.-e. 
The Kaffirs were forAmoment subdued. A new frontier policy had to 
be found. Smith, supported by Grey, annexed the Ceded Terr~tory, 
renaming it the District of Victoria East. The land between the 
mNL 
Ke iSkaiS'a and the Kei was annexed as ~ri t ish Kaff;{ruia. The 
tribes, on reserves, were still allowed a large measure of autonomy, 
but British magistrates were introduced, and where necessary had 
powers to set aside ju~ents made by the ruling powers among the 
~affirs. The pol~cy of leaving the Kaffir tribes as independent 
peoples under their own rulers, making treaties with those rulers, 
and laying on t~em the entire onus of controlling their own people 
and preventing frontier incidents, had failed; instead a certain 
measure of British control was to be introduced, in the hope that 
it would bring a more permanent peace and bring theKaffirs more 
readily to a state of civilization. Meanwhile the Imperial author-
ities footed the bill of £1,000,000 for the War of the Axe. 
In February, 1848, Smith proclaimed British sovereignty over all 
white, black and coloured peoples between the Orange and Vaal rivers, 
and the Drakensberg. Thus was created the Orange River Sovereignty. 
When some of the Boers declined to submit to British rule and took 
up arms, they were defeated at Boomplaats; the only independent 
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·-Boer communit1ies were now those to the north of' the Vaal. The 
Imperial Government was rather reluctant to uphold the creation 
of' the· Orgpge River Sovereignty, it dreaded a further increase of' 
its responsibilities, particularly when there was an active move-
ment at home increasingly hostile to expenditure on the colonies, 
but Smith·. assured them that the assumption of' control was the 
surest way to bring peace to that disturbed area. 
By the time that the f'irst of' the two printed memoranda already 
referred to on Colonial policy was produced, in February, 1849, 
Grey was able to take an o~timistic view of' native policy and the 
problem of' the Boer trekkers. When reading these memoranda it 
must be remembered that Grey was justifying his policy to his 
Cabinet colleagues, and was, therefore, concerned.to make the 
situation appear in as good a light as pos·sible; whether on com-
. posing these memoranda he had doubts as to whether this optimism 
was· quite dustif'ied cannot be known. According to this memoran·dum 
of' 1849, the Kaf'f'irs had been quelled and:~ 
'placed under a system of' government which af'f'ords every reason 
to hope that security will in f'uture be ef'f'ectually maintained, 
partly by the aid of' these. veryKaf'f'irs themselves, some hundreds 
of' whom have been f'ormed into a very valuable police _.f'orce. A 
A great ~art of' the large military f'orce has been withdrawn (on 
Grey's query whether it would be saf'e to reduce the number of' 
troops in South Af'rica, Sir Harry Smith in his usual mood of' brash 
optimism had answered in the af'f'irmative), and by allowing a 
considerable number of' the soldiers belonging to the regiments Who 
have been brought home to obtain their discharge, and by settling 
them in villages on the frontier, much has been dane for the safety 
of the colony.without incurring any expense, as the cost of forming 
these_ military settlements has actually proved less than that of 
the return passages of these men ••• ' 
Less than two years were to prove how wrong were these hopeful 
signs of a reign of peace on the frontier; when the next Kaffir 
.War broke out, the Kaffir police were to desert to the enemy, some 
of the military settlements were to be 'eaten up' (to use the 
picturesque, though by no means literal, Kaffir idiom) and fresh 
troops had to be hurried out from Britain. 
Also mistaken were the views the memorandum expressed as to 
the region north of the Orange River:-
'The Emigrant Boers beyond our frontier, instead of being left 
in their former lawless state have been subjected to a system of 
government which is to be mainly administered by themselves,_ and 
which though rude and simple, will, as I believe, suffice to main-
t~in a tolerable degree of security for the persons and propert'ies 
of both the Europeans and native inhabitants of the remote region.' 
By 1852 the decisi.on had been taken to abandon the Orange River 
Sovereignty and leave both Boer and native to their own devices. 
All this fresh catalogue of disaster was in the future, however, 
and with frontier troubles seemingly over by 1849, Grey could 
direct his thoughts towards the problem of a Constitution for the 
Cape of Good Hope. 
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The then constitution of the Cape comprised an Executive Council 
consisting of the Governor and leading officials, and ,a Legislat-
ive Council of the same leading officials plus a number of nominated 
citizens. This was obviously unsuitable for the needs and desires 
·' 
·of a growing community. Things might be in a chaotic state.on the 
frontiers, but in the more settled regions life was taking on a 
more complex tone, .the sure s,ign of growing prosperity and civil-
ization. Various bodies had already desired parliamentary instit-
utions; Grey thought it as well to grant them before a clamour 
for such arose, besides the condition of South Africa in his opinion 
justified the grant of a greater portion of self-government. 
In response to Grey's queries, Smith in July, 1848, forwarded 
a report on the proposed grant of pmiiamentary institutions, based 
on the separate reports of members of his Executive Council and 
Judges of the Supreme Court. Most of those consulted favoured an 
elected Assembly plus an Upper Chamber of life nominees. Porter, 
the Attorney General, also suggested that officials should be 
eligible for seat.s in the Assembly. 
While discussions as to the nature of the proposed constitution 
were taking place in London, a serious disturbance at the Cape 
created a fresh d1fficulty. Two important needs of the colony 
were roads and a labour force; Grey believed these could be met 
most cheaply by the employment of convict labour. In August, 1848, 
he wrote to en~uire from Smith whether a supply of ticket-of-leave 
men of good,character would be acceptable to the colonists. 
Without waiting for a reply, Grey sent the 'Neptune' with Irish 
peasants recently convicted of agrarian crimes to the Cape. News 
that convicts were on their way created a ferment of popular 
opposition at the Cape; some of Smit~'s Council resigned, and he 
was oblige.d to announce that he would not allow any convicts to 
land without first asking for further i~structions from home. The 
'Neptune' arrived at the Cape in September, 1849; the news of 
anti-convict riots had, however, convinced Grey that despatching 
convicts to the Cape did not fall within the realm of practical 
politics, and in February, 1850, the 'Neptune' again sailed, carry-
ing her human cargo to Van Diemen's Land. Grey had acted r~ther 
precipitately in this matte_r, and had suffered in consequence. 
Meanwhile the nature of the Cape constitution continued to be 
debated in London. One problem was where the proposed Parliament 
was to be located. Was it to be at Cape Town or at Grahamstow.n, 
where it would be more in touch with the situation on the eastern 
frontier ? The possibility of two legislatures, one in Cape 
Town, and one for the eastern regi9ns, had also been mooted. Grey 
agreed with Sir Harry Smith that ·one legislature located at Cape 
Town was the wisest policy, leaving the municipal bqdies as much 
control over local a~fairs as possible.(56) He also desired that 
the Legislature should consist of two Chambers of which the Assembly 
was to be elected for a term of five years. As for the Legislative 
(56) 'Heads of Proposed Report respecting Representative 
Institutions at the Cape' (undated) 
Colonial Papers. 
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Council we have seen that Grey believed throughout his political 
career that a nominated one carried little weight in a colony, 
with the result that colonial opinion would not see it in the role 
of a balance to the Assembly, whilst it also tended to become a· 
close and irresponsible body. Therefore, Grey proposed that the 
Legislative Council should also be an elect.ed body, 'but in such a 
manner as to be less easily moved by transient popular feeling;' 
he proposed that the Legislative Council should be elected for 
life or until they resigned, and of course the electors were to 
be those 'who have held situations of trust in the Colony.' Also 
inevitable was Grey's scheme for ensuring that every interest in 
the Colony would be represented in the Legislative Council. The 
proviso that the Governor should have power to dissolve both 
branches of the legislature if asked to do so by an address of two-
thirds of the Assembly is also familiar. Referring to Porter's 
suggestion about seats in the Assembly for officials, Grey remarked:-
'This seems inconsistent with any system of conducting the 
affairs of the Colony except that now established in the N.American 
Colonies under the name of "responsible" (which is in fact "partyu) 
govt. The Colonial Secretary (the Secretary for the colony) .being 
a member of Assembly and voting habitually in the minority would 
be in a position which would be altogether untenable. The probab-
ility of this could not be guarded against amidst the frequent 
changes of a popular Assembly unless the person holding the office 
changed when no longer in the majority. This system appears quite 
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unsuited to the existing circumstances of the Cape therefore 
recommend that the public servants should not become members of 
the Legislature.' 
One reason why responsible government was yet unsuited to the 
Cape was that the native problem created a difficulty; Grey felt 
it to be an Imp.erial responsibility and not one which should be. 
left to the management of the settlers themselves; the money for 
.the management of the border tribes plus a permanent Civil List 
was not to be subject to alteration by the Assembly except at 
Her Majesty's pleasure. Grey was also willing to allow the Legis-
lature to amend from time to time the Constitution subject to the 
condition that no such Act would be confirmed unless by consent 
of Her Majesty in Council. He suggested that an Order in Council 
along these lines be passed, and the existing Legi'slature at the 
Cape left to fill in such details as the defining of electoral 
districts. (57) 
Russell had no objection to an elective Legislative Council, 
but he did not approve of Grey's suggestion:-
'If members of the existing Assembly are to have power to elect 
their ow.n friends as members of a Council for life ••• an oligarchy 
of an exclusive and dangerous nature may be established.' He also 
doubted the wisdom of excluding officials from a seat in the 
r\~ 
Assembly, preferring the provision of French Charter which had 
" 
(57) 'Heads of Proposed Report respecting Representative 
Institutions at the Cape'. (undated) 
Colonial papers. 
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lasted till 1848 and which had allowed officials to be members of 
either Chamber, but without the power of voting.(5B) 
Grey on the first point still retained his former opinion:-
••• to give this body real weight and authority it must be 
independent both of the Crown and the People - to be ~ndependent 
of the Crown it must be in some shape or other elective - to be 
independent of the People the members .must hold their seats for 
life subject only to the contingency of a dissolution ••• 
If elected even for ten years there would always be a feeling 
of its being necessary for the members if they desired to secure 
their .position to avoid too strong a resistance to any clamour of 
the day.' 
s,. .. ,l/ 
The members of the Assembly would be a very~part of the number of 
01'"$ elect~·for the Legislative Council, municipal office holders, 
magistrates, field cornets and others would be among the body of 
electors. He did not greatly object to the second of Russell's 
objections.< 59 ) 
Russell asked that the question of the form of the Legislative 
Council be referred to the Committee of Trade and Plantations 
for its opinion.(GO) Stephen was not present at the discussions of 
the Committee on .the C&P.e consli tution, and Grey felt the loss of 
his talents. At the meeting on January 15th, 1850, at which were 
(58) Memo by Russell December 9th, 1849, Colonial Papers, 
Cape of Good Hope. 
(59) Memo, December lOth, 1849. Colonial Papers, 
Cape of Good Hope. 
(60) Russell to Grey, December 12th, 1849• 
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present Grey, Russell, George Grey, Labouchere, and Lord Campbell. 
Grey was overruled and Russell's proposals were ·adopted; the 
members of the Legislative Council were to be elected for a period 
of t·en years, one half of their number being renewed every five 
years. Grey thought this plan far less satisfactory,_ but acknow-
ledged that it was one more likely to please the colonists. The 
report on the Cape const"itution he had drawn up over Christmas, 
c:: 
was finally agreed to by the Committee on January 19th, 'but 
considerably damaged. ,(6l) 
The beginnings of parliamentary government at the Cape were 
delayed as a result of the ill-will created by t~e 'Neptune' 
incident. The Privy Council in February, 1850, sent the results 
of the deliberations on the constitution to Smith, who was to see 
that the details were filled in locally. To do this he desired 
that his Council should carry more weight in the colony, so he 
invited the municipal councils and divisional road board to put 
forward names for his consideration, and he then chose -the four 
highest on the lists, adding a fifth to equalize the balance betweem 
East and West. The four Popular Members were not, however, 
satisfied with the proposed constitution, largely as a result of 
the distrust of the Colonial Office created by the agitation 
against the-conv~cts. They wanted the qualifications necessary 
for a seat in the Upper House lowered, and wished to see the 
Assembly have full control of finance. When these demands were 
(61) Journal, January 15th, 1850. 
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n·ot met they wi thd.rew :from the Council. Cape Town municipality · 
asked them to draft a rival constitution and this John Fairbairn 
took to London.- Grey refused to see him other than as a private 
individual. Russell seemed to hesitate on the decision already 
made by the Government at this fresh development, much to Grey'.s 
. . 
annoyance, but it was finally decided to draft Orahances ·which 
A 
Smith's Council w.ould enact (these being based on a draft Order 
in Council of Porter, the Attorney General at the Cape, who had 
incorporated the recommendations of the Committee of Trade and 
Plantations, supplementing them with the necessary local details), 
and such a draft was sent out to the Cape in September, 1851. 
Further delay was caused by the fall of the Whig Government, but 
an Order in Council, based on the draft of September 1851, of 
March 11th, 1853, finally gave the Cape its constitution, with 
an elected Legislative Council for the term of ten years. The 
first Cape Parliament met in June, 1854. 
Whilst the constitutional question was yet u~settled, news 
reached Britain of a further .'Kaffir War, showing how mistaken was 
Smith's optfmism (as expressed in· his despatches) that he had 
settled that recurrent problem .once and for all. The new Kaffir 
policy had been gradually to bring those within the colonial 
borders under British rule, in the hope that eventually they 
would become by degrees more civilized, and be able to take their 
place alongside the settlers. Previous policies of more or less 
leaving them to their own devices, their own rulers and laws, and 
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treating them as independent states, had failed. It could not be 
expected that the new policy would at once succeed. The new ways 
bewildered the K~.af'f'irs; long established customs such- as witch-
hunting and 'lobola' (the purchase of w;ives by payment of cattle) 
were now stigmatized as wrong, and the entity of the tribe was 
being lost as the chiefs lost authority over their people. 
Beyond theKei river were the independent tribes, still in 
possession of their ancestral customs, and free from white 
magistrates ruling by martial law. 
Smith does not appear to have realized how.unsettled was the 
state of that area.. He believed that he could overawe the 
murmurs of discontent by a policy of strength; when Sa~dile, 
the GQjka chieftain, refused to meet Smith, the latter deposed 
him, and at first established the Resident, Charles Brownlee, 
as chief in his stead. This act was too much for the Gaikas, 
and when troops were sent a~ter the outlawed Sa~ile, they were 
attacked on Christmas Eve 1850, whilst the GQikas wiped out three 
of Smith's military villages. This was the signal for the other 
tribes to spring to arms. Some Hottentots joined the tribesmen 
as did some of the coloured Cape Mounted Riflemen, and Smith's 
much vaunted~affir police deserted 'en masse•.(62) 
Once again native policy was in the melting pot. Grey in 
a memorandum of February, 1852, found it necessary to defend the 
policy which had been adopted; this policy he defined as 
(62) 'A History of Southern Africa'. E.A. Walker, 1957. 
PP• 250-1 •. 
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abstaining 'from entering into treaties with the frontier Kafirs, 
whic~ experience has clearly demonstrated to be perfectly useless, 
and instead of doing so to insist upon the obedience of these 
people within a certain district to British officers stationed 
among them, and supported by a military force, and forts erected 
at certain important points, at the same time governing them 
principally through their chiefs.' The memorandum continued:-
'It was believed that if by these means order could be en-
forced and security for persons and property maintained-for a 
few years, the civilizing influences of commerce and missionary 
labours would alter the character of the Kafirs and place the 
frontier in a condition of permanent safety.' 
Grey emphasized that such a policy had the backing of such 
former Governors as D'Urban, Pottinger, Napier and Maitland. He 
attributed the failure of this policy to the following reasons:-
'A too speedy reduction of the military force maintained in 
the frontier, a neglect to take sufficient pains to reconcile the 
chiefs to the new state of things by maintaining their social 
position; and a want of judgment on the part of some of the 
. . 
Executive officers employed, who allowed themselves to be deceived 
as to the hostile intentions of the Kafirs, notwithstanding the 
warnings-of the frontier farmers.' 
Grey announced that for the reduction of the British forces 
in the frontier region he was willing to take as much blame as 
could be fairly laid on him, at the same time showing that he 
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was entirely influenced on this point by the optimism of Sir 
Harry Smith. Grey had expressed a strong desire to reduce the 
troops as far as it was safe to do so, but left it to Smith to 
decide what numbers of troops were necessary for maintaining 
peace and order. Smith, on the 23rd of December, 1847, and the 
4th of January 1848, reported that he had ordered four regiments 
of infantry and one of cavalry to return to Britain; he described 
the troops who remained as 'fully ample for eve·ry purpose' , 
adding that 'a recurrence of war is out of the question.' He 
withdrew yet another regiment from Kaffraria during the course 
of 1848. 
The outbreak of war found Sir Harry Smith and his officials 
totally unprepared, and with insufficient troops at their dis-
posal to bring it to a speedy conclusion. Even then Smith 
continued his series of optimistic despatches in which he under-
estimated the difficulties ahead of him, and did not request more 
reinforcements. The result was that all through 1851 warfare 
dragged on inconclusively; the colonial boundary was too long 
to patrol effectively, and Kaffir raids on land held by European 
farmers continued. Cleared from .one fastness the rebels retired 
to another, then, when pursued by the troops, fell back to the 
former one. ( 63 ) 
The Home Government was alarmed, as can be seen by the 
determination of both Grey and Russell that Smith was not to 
( 63) Printed Paper. 'The Kafir War'. February 18th, 1852. 
Colonial Papers. 
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treat the Kaffirs leniently; they were both con_vinced that Smith 
was doing this, and ascribed it to the effect of the censures 
which had fallen upon two other colonial governors, Torrington 
and Ward, for the vigorous suppression of rebeliions.(64) In 
October, 1851, Russell cautioned Grey to leave out reproaches of 
lenity in the draft of a despatch, but that the warning against 
communicating personally with Kaffir chiefs or showing them any 
civility should stana.(65) In part this reaction of the Imperial 
Government was owing to the disillusionment brought about the 
failure of their native policy, but also in part to increasing 
alarm at the extent of the war and its probable expense. Already 
there were outcries in the newspapers, some like the 'Times' 
urging that the South Africans should be given responsible 
government and then they could pay for their own native wars, 
and use their own troops to put down such. In these circumstances, 
subjected on all sides to criticism and unaware of the difficult-
ies of terain and communication which Smith's forces were having. 
to overcome, the progress of the war appeared to be intolerably 
slow, and for this Smith began to be blamed by his political 
superiors. The reaction of Charles Wood to the news from the 
Cape was typical of the feeling among members of the Government:-
'Your C~pe dispatches seem to me to be as unsatisfactory as 
possible. The patrols march up the hill and down again, see 
Caffres who evade them and cattle which they cannot catch, and 
{64) Russell to·Grey, September 13th, 185lo 
(65) Russell to Grey, October 21st, 1851. 
·.·· 
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nobody seems to be for them. N!o progress towards a termination 
appears to have been made: and though the expenditure is not 
so heavy as we might have expected, we see no end of it.' (66) 
In such circumstances it i.s hardly surprising that Grey began 
to press for the recall of Sir Harry Smith. On the evening of 
December 12th, 1851, Grey received the Cape mail; in this were 
some private letters (some from Major w.s. Hogge, one of two 
Commissioners who had· been sent to deal with situation north of 
the Orange), very critical of Smith. Sending these to Russell, 
Grey declared:-
'You will perceive that these letters are in the highest 
degree unsatisfactory and what is most serious is that they 
entirely· destroy the slight remains of confidence I·had in Sir 
H. Smith. The direct charge brought against him by Major Hogge 
of not giving us full and accurate intelligence of what has been 
going on is so strongly supported by the internal evidence of 
his despatches, and th·e contrast between the promises he has been 
making to us month after month and the results that I cannot 
help giving them entire credit. It seems to me therefore absol-
utely necessary that Sir H. Smith should be recalled if we can 
find a proper person to succeed him.' 
The only difficulty was to find someone to succeed him; the 
General Officers were, sad commentary on the British Army, almost 
all too old to command in such a war, and in addition had no 
capacity for being at the same time the governor of a colony. 
(66) Wood to Grey, August 25th, 1851. 
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Of the youngest General Officers, Grey thought Major General G. 
Cathcart the likeliest. Then there were the difficulties which 
would be experienced with the Horse Guards when a demand was 
made for the recall of Smith. Hogge had also advised the sending 
out .of more troops, and though Grey believed 1 there are troops 
enough already in the Colony,' he was prepared to send more. (67) 
Russell was dubious about recalling Smith. Where were they 
to find a man with the ability to win the war1, make peace, and 
put in force the new Constitution ? In consequence Grey decided 
not to press for this at the moment. He decided to write 
privately to Smith expressing his dissatisfaction, so that the 
latter would not be completely surprised if it were decided to 
remove him. At the same time Grey warned Russell that the 
matter in all probability would have to come before the Cabinet.< 68 ) 
Russell replied:-
'It is a great relief to me to find that you have ceased to 
urge the recall of Sir H. Smith at the present moment. 1 
He found a strange consolation in the fact that though the end of 
the war was not near, not many more British troops had been 
killed than civilian fatalities as a result of railway accidents 
in Great Bri t·ain : ( 69) 
Grey ·had contacted the Duke of Wellington and had found·him 
averse to recalling Smith.(70) 
(67) Grey to Russell December 12th 1851. 
(68) Grey to Russell, December 14th 1851. 
(69) Russell to Grey, December 15th, 1851. 
(70) Grey to Russell, December 16th, 1851. 
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The beginning of January brought another Cape Mail. This 
~ecided Grey. Comparing Smith's favourable reports in his letters 
and dispatches with other more detailed reports he had submitted 
plus newspaper accounts, Grey determined to recall him. He 
brought the subject before the Cabinet, and secured their agree-
ment. At first Grey thought of selecting Sir Gaspard Le Marchant, 
Govern.or of Newfoundland, as his successor, but realized that 
the appointment of a civilian Governor would arouse the hostility 
of the Horse Guards. Wellington protested against the recall 
of Smith, but concurred in the appointment of Cathcart to take 
his place. Grey chose as Lieutenant Governor, a civilian, 
Darling, then Governor of St. Lucia.(7l) 
Grey had been dissatisfied with Smith's ·civil administration 
and his want of foresight about the probability of war with the 
Kaffirs, but once that war.had started he expected quick results 
such as Smith had given him in the Orange River Sovereignty not 
three years before. What Grey did not realize was that this was 
an entirely different type of warfare, fought in very difficult 
country every step of which was known to the foe but not to the 
. troops, against scattered bodies of men who often avoided pitched 
battles and concentrated on hit an~ run raids. The only criticism 
that Weilington was prepared to make of Smith was that he had 
committed a 'capital error' in neglecting to make roads through 
( 71) Journal, Marc'tl 6th, 1852. 
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certain fastnesses which he then had to attack three or four 
times before ousting rebels who resorted to them; Grey realized 
that ·smith had not possessed the means to build roads, but then 
stated:-
'But if roads could not be made, and the positions held, when 
ca~ried, it seems to me that it was a useless waste of valuable 
lives to attack them • • • I (72) 
How else, however, could the rebels be subdued if they were per-
mitted to linger in such fastnesses from which they could mount 
raids into the colony ? Nevertheless, perhaps there is some 
justification in Grey's belief that.Smith's health and strength 
had failed and that he needed a rest. Certainly his successor, 
Cathcart, brought a fresh eye to the problem, and solved the 
difficulty of keeping cleared areas free from rebels by building 
inexpensive fortifications there around which bodies of troop~ 
could be grouped. Under Cathcart's direction the war was 
virtually over by October, 1852, having cost the British taxpayer 
£2,000,000; at its close there were more than 2,200 regular 
troops in Cape Colony itself, and nearly 2,500 in British Kaffraria. 
There remains the problem of the Orange River Sovereignty. 
In great part the trouble there arose through the activities of 
the Resident, Major Warden. There was one great native power in 
-
the area, the Basutos, and at their head was a very able chieftain, 
Moshesh. He had become involved in disputes with a group of Bantu, 
(72) Printed Paper 'The Kafir War'. February 18th, 
1852~ 
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half-breed and Hottentot clans who, under the guidance of 
Wesleyan missionaries, had originally entered the territory and 
encamped on Basuto land under his sufferance. When Warden set 
about the def'ini t"ion of' boundaries, these broken clans, backed 
by their missionaries (partly because the mis,_sionaries with the, 
Basutos were Roman Catholics), claimed-extravagantly large 
str.etches of land. Warden recognized these petty chiefs as 
independent rulers, upheld their claims, and threatened Moshesh 
with,chastisement if he opposed them. Moshesh reluctantly 
consented to the loss of some of his best corn lands.. Moshesh 
was being harried by rival native powers and w~s losing cattle; 
the Basutos retaliated on some of the disciples of' the mission-
aries. Disregarding the advice of friendly Boers in the S9ver-
eig~~ Warden decided to intervene in these native squabbles, 
and aligned himself' against the greatest native power, the 
Basutos. The Boer farmers had no wish for the sake of' broken 
clans guided by Wesleyans to expose themselves to Basuto wrath, 
and, therefore, did not give Warden much support. The result was 
that Warden suffered a defeat in June, 1851.(73) 
Coming on top of the news of' the Eighth Kaffir War, the 
reports from the Sovereignty came as a great blow to the Imperial 
Government. It had never been enthusiastic about assuming so 
many new responsibilities and extending its domain in Africa; Sir 
Harry Smith had promised that the acquisition ~f' the Sovereignty 
( 73) 'A History of Southern Africa'. E.A. Walker, 
1957. PP• 245-53• 
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would not bring burdensome expense, and now here was the· tale of 
another native war in the making. Grey had already warned Smith 
that if the Boers would not support the G'overnment in the Sover-
eignty, that it would have to be abandoned, and had the Boers 
s.upported Warden ? The fact that Warden's policy had been fool-
hardy does not seem to have occurred to the British Government. 
The abandonment of the Sovereignty had been mooted in 1849, and 
Russell had opposed such a step.(74) The Committee of the Privy 
Council in 1850 had recommended an Act of Parliament to make 
absolutely legal the acquisition of the Sovereignty, but the 
difficulties of framing such led Grey to call for its postpone-
ment.(75) All signs point to the fact that the authorities at 
home were doubtful as to the expediency of retaining the Sever-
eignty. 
The clamour in the British press about the expense of the 
Ka:ffir War was an important fac·tor in determining the ministers 
~"' "'·,.. 
not to further expenses, north of the Orange River. Another 
factor leading to this same conclusion was that an agreement was 
eventually signed with Pretorious, the leader of the independent 
Boers north of the Vaal. This was the SaDd River Convention of 
January, 1852. Both parties agreed to facilitate trade and the 
extradition of criminals; the Transvaalers undertook not to 
establish slavery, and the Imperial Government agreed not to 
(74) 
( 75) 
.,., 
Memo ~ Russell, December 7th, 1849· Colonial Papers, 
Cape of Good Hope. 
Gre:Y. t-o Ru.ssell, May 17th, 1850. Russell to Grey, May 
22nd, 1850. 
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make any alliances with any coloured nations north of the Vaal. 
When Pretorious first made overtures for such an ag~_eement, 
Grey informed Russell that if this were 'judiciously made use of: 
Britain would be enabled'to withdraw from that most inconveniently 
remote position.•< 76~his was contra~y to the advice of the two 
Commissioners, Major w.s. Hogge and C.M. Owen, who had been sent 
to investigate the situation in the Sovereignty. T.he Connnission-
ers condemned Warden's activities, promised the Basutos a new 
boundary, and eventually Warden was dismissed. -All to no avail. 
When Grey left office he was determined to abandon the Sover-
eignty, and his successors were of the s~~~ opinion. By the 
Bloemfontein Convention of February, 1854, the Orange Free State 
was established. 
This was the situation in South Africa when Grey left office. 
It was by no means a satisfactory one. The one measure of 
positive value which was to be successful was the new Constitution 
which was about to be introduced, and this was a very important 
measure indeed. The vexed problems of native policy and Boer 
trekkers were st·ill unsolved. Britain had run away from respon-
sibili ty north of the Orange, and for this Grey must bear much 
of the blame, but when the tone of the British press and the 
utterances of politicians are taken into account, perhaps this 
could not be avoided. The abrogation of responsibility in that 
area was in the long run only to involve the Imperial authorities 
(76) Grey to Russell, December 12th, 1851. 
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in greater difficulties. As for the Kaffirs, Grey had·supported 
a new attempt to ensure that .white and black lived peaceably; 
that it did not at once bring immediate results is hardly sur-
prising. Grey's worst blunder lay with the 'Neptune' incident, 
but there again this act was a well intentioned one; his main 
reason for sending out the convicts was not only to rid this 
country of them, but he genuinely believed that the colonists 
would be grateful for a cheap, much needed supply of labour. 
After all the particular convicts concerned were not hardened 
criminals but poverty-stricken Irish. He ought, however, to 
have ascertained what the reaction of the colonists would be, 
before sending the 'Neptune'. As for Smith, his popularity 
with the colonists has tended to obscure the·legitimate complaints 
Grey had against him; in~·the realm of civil administration 
Smith cannot claim to be a first class governor, military men 
rarely are. His perpetual self-confidence and underestimation 
of difficulties were an annoyance to a Colonial Secretary who 
wanted facts, even if unpalatable, to lay before Cabinet colleag-
ues and Parliament. Over the conduct of the Kaffir War, Grey 
did not realize how difficult such a war was to fight, and did 
less than credit to Smith's operations, yet the latter in his 
letters and dispatches misled Grey by his confidence. and it is 
true that Cathcart, entirely new to the scene, had, as is often 
the case, clearer ideas as to the course to be pursued. All in 
all then, considering the difficulties of the South African 
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situation, Grey's policy la:n.gely stands up - and did stand up in 
Parliament - to criticism. He did not achieve the success of 
his North American policy there, but it would have been very 
surprising if he had done so. Colonial policy is an empirical 
business, one of trial and error, it never fits into theories and 
dogmas; even Wakefield and his supporters were to discover that. 
F. Austral:f,.a. 
Wakefield had at one time believed that Australia was to be 
the country in which his full theory was to be carried into 
practice, but when Grey took over the Colonial Office, the former 
had already thrown all his energies into the settlement of New 
Zealand. Australia as we have seen was the first area to 
witness the putting into practice of Wakefield's dictums about 
land and its price, yet the problems c~nected with the disposal 
of land had by no means been solved by this fact. It was the 
land problem which was the first to occupy Grey's thoughts in 
1846 when he turned his attention to the Australian colonies. 
The foremost industry in New South Wales, oldest and most; 
imp or tan t of the Australian colonies, was the pastt:?ral one. By 
1845, 24,000,000 pounds of wool were being shipped to Britain 
each year. The richest and most influential class in the colony 
were the squatters, pastoralists who had moved int.o vacant lands 
on the frontier and beyond with their flocks. To them the 
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Wakefield doctrine about land was a pernicious one, and inapplic-
able to the conditions in Australia. Sheep required large 
pastures, and the poorer the grazing facilities afforded by the 
land, the more land was needed. How could rearing sheep be a 
paying proposition if a price like a pound per acre were charged 
for. land ? Sometimes three acres were needed to suppor.t a 
single sheep. 
Lord Stanley,Grey's predecessor, had by no means satisfied 
colonial opinion on this matter. In 1842 he had been responsib~e 
for the Land Sales Act, which declared that lands were to be sold 
aft~r a survey at a minimum upset price of one pound per acre 
(upset price is the lowest sum for Which property exposed to 
auction will be sold). This price was in existence in all the 
Australian colonies except Van Diemen's Land and the older parts 
of New South Wales. How completely had Wakefield~s waste lands 
theory been absorbed by the Co·lonial Office : 
New South Wales was allowed to grant pastoral licenses, but these 
were to run for not more than one year at a time. At least half 
the gross proceeds from land sales were to be applied to ·el!lig.;. 
ration from the United Kingdom.(77) 
For obvious reasons the Land Sales Act failed to satisfy the 
squatters. They desired longer tenure, the right of pre-emption 
if. their runs were put up for sale, and compensation for improve-
ments should they surrender their licenses. 
This was the position when Grey turned his attention to the 
(77) · Morrell, chapter IV, P• 85-6. 
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problem. Stanley had already realized that annual leases were 
not the solut-ion, and had been working on an alternative policy 
when he fell from office. As early as _July 1846, Grey was seeing 
a deputation·representing the demands of the squatters, and 
outlining his scheme to them.(?B)An Order in Council of March 9th 
1847, settled the question. In unsettled districts leases were 
to be for fourteen years, at a rental according to the carrying 
capacity of the run. When the lease expired .the lessee had the 
option of purchase at a price not less than one pound per acre. 
In intermediate districts leases were shorter (for a term of 
eight years with a liability to sales at the end of every year), 
whilst in settled districts leases were to be yearly only. In 
some quarters Grey was acc·used of surrendering to the squatters, 
but on the whole it was a sensible solution of a difficult pro-
blem; the waste lands would not for many years .be wanted for 
settlement, and if one group was prepared t~ exploit them in 
the meantime and not only enric h themselves but the colony as 
-
well; it was only fair that they should have some more reasonable 
security than annual leases. 
The other really important measure of Grey's with respect 
to the Australi~ colonies was the Australian Colonies G·overnment 
Act (~3 &'14 ~ict.,cap 59). -that is leaving aside for the 
moment the transportation question. In 1846 ·the government of 
New South Wales was according to the provisions of the New South 
(78) Journal, July 23rd, 1846. 
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Wales Government Act of 1842, which made arrangements for 
establishing a Legislative Council a· third of which consisted of 
Crown nominees, the remainder being elected; a civil list was 
set aside,. and bills affecting the constitution of the Legislat-
ive Council, the salaries of the principal officers, or customs 
duties, were to be reserved for the British authorities. The 
\Lt" 
colonial legislat~e was not to interfere with the sale or 
appropriation of Crown Lands, or with the revenue derived from 
these. Hardly a 'liberal' constitution, but to compensate for 
this there were elective district councils empowere·d to legis-
late on local matters, and with the sparse population of.New 
South Wales these would take on many of the tasks that a central 
constitutional body normally would have assumed. As for the other 
colonies, Van Diemen's Land was a penal colony. Western Australia 
was too small to merit representative government, whilst South 
Australia, though promised more representative institutions by 
the South Australian Act of 1842, had been told by Stanley that 
such would not be provided until the resources of the colony 
could be used to meet its own expenditure, and a civil list had 
been set aside.(79) At the same time the prosper~us Port Philip 
district, which had been coloni.zed mainly from Van Diemen's Land 
and Britain :1. t'self, was demanding separation from New South Wales, 
on the ground that it was too far away from Sydney to be 
effectively represented there. 
In the summer of 1847 Grey, writing to the Governor of New 
(79) Morrell, chapter IV, PP• 83-5 and 99. 
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South Wales outlined his proposed measures. Representative 
government. would be granted to all colonies, though not· immed-
iately to Western Australia. The Port Philip district would be 
separated from New South Wales. The most interesting of these 
proposals was that a central body ought to be created to deal 
with the common problems of all the colonies; again Grey was 
concerned to create a fed~ration of colonies with one central 
authority dealing with such problems as a common tariff policy 
and a common land policy. Nothing could be more harmful, Grey 
believed, than tariff barriers between one colony and another. 
Yet if Grey saw the need for adequate communications between 
colony and colony in N.orth America before a federal body was 
established, surely he ought to have realized that the same was 
true in Australia. The Governor of New South Wales was to sound 
local opinion on these proposals. There was no strong reaction 
in Australia in favour of a central legislature for all the 
colonies. ( 80) 
In the spring of 1849 the Committee of the Privy Council 
examined the problem; its report mainly echoed the views of 
Grey and Stephen. Though colonial opinion was averse to a 
federal body, so important did it seem to Grey to avoid the 
possible embarrassments of tariff barriers between the Australian 
colonies, that he persisted with the idea. The representative 
institutions granted to the Australian colonies would be those 
then enjoyed by New South Wales; a greater degree of represent-
ative government was not tQ be introduced in that colony. One 
r-\ot\1\EL.L pp ~ '«,.-6 . (80) Jeijrnal, M;arefl: 2md, S~h:, and 13th, 1850.-
490. 
of the ~overnors was to become Governor-General, with a power 
to call together a General Assembly of elected delegates from all 
the colonies to deal with.matters of common concern to all~ It 
can be seen how important Grey,~th his free trade theories, 
thought the tariff question, when it is seen that in these pro-
posals Parliament was to enact a uniform tariff for Australia. 
A Bill based on this Report was introduced in June, 1849• Fierce 
opposition was directed against the Bill, the Colonial Reformers 
claiming to represent the colonists themselves; that part of the 
Bill against which criticism was most directed was the general 
tariff and the federal scheme. In the course of events the 
general tariff had to be jettisoned, and on July 17th, 1849, 
Russell informed the Commons that the Bill would be withdrawm 
for the session. Grey explained the reason for its withdrawal 
as 'the want of sufficient time for the discussion of so import-
ant a measure,•( 8l) but a more potent reason was the likelihood 
' 
that the Bill would not have been passed. 
The Bill was re-introduced in February, 1850. Modifications 
had been made in it in the hope that it would secure greater 
support. The federal clauses were now only to apply t·o colonies 
that presented Addresses asking for the establishment of a General 
Assembly; the tariff was to be left to the colonial legislatures 
to determin~, though there was an express bar against discrim.in-
ating tar~f'fs. 
Grey attempted by personal contacts to secure greater support 
(81) Memo on Colonial Policy, January 7th, 1850. 
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for his Bill. On March 2nd, he saw Sir Robert Peel, who gave 
him some helpful advice, and..a further conversation with Peel on 
' the same subject is recorded for March 13th. On th~ 5th of t~at 
month Grey had a discussion with Roebuck on the same subject, 
and 'found him to know singularly little about it considering the 
part he has taken in discussing colonial matters.•(B~) 
The bill again encountered strong opposition from Tories an·d 
Colonial Reformers, but the majority for the third reading was 
226 to 128. It then went to the Lords where as we know the 
Government was exceedingly weak; here opposition was again con-
centrated on the clauses concerning a federal assembly. On 
June 14th, Grey noted in his Journal:-
'Stanley moved the omission of the clauses relating to the 
general Assembly which we only carrled by ~ and defects were 
pointed out Which I fear Will c-ompel::me to abandon them. 1 
On June 28th, Grey announced that the clauses relating to a 
federal Assembly would be abandoned. The mutilated Bill then 
became th~ Australian Colonies Government Act; the Port Philip 
region became the colony of Victoria; Legislative Councils an 
the New South Wales pattern were established for V'ictoria, Van 
Diemen 's Land and South Australia; West·ern Australia could possess 
one if it made provision out of its own ~evenue for expenses at 
that time defrayed by parliamentary grants, and upon petition of 
a third of the householders; lands and land revenues were reserved 
for the Crown, which was also to initiate money votes. 
(82) Journal, March 2nd, 5th and 13th, 1850. 
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Grey was reluctant to abandon all his grandiose schemes of 
federation. In 1851 the Governor of·New South Wales was given 
the additional title of Governor-General, and was instructed to . 
encourage an atmosphere favourable to federation; he was also 
charged with keeping a watch over the proceedings of other · 
colonies which might concern their neighbours. This plan was 
not a success. 
Grey's· federation scheme was premature. For once he had 
not hearkened to colonial opinion, but had adopted that paternal 
Colonial Office outlook which critics said predominated in 
colonial affairs of knowing.what was best for the colonists, 
whether the latter thought so or not. The result was failure. 
What the majority of residents of New South Wales wanted was not 
federation but a greater degree of representative government. 
The possibilities of a closer union between the Australian colonies 
were, as -f'ar as practical politics went'· far in the future. It 
was in 1851 that an event occurred which was to· attach more 
importance to the Australian colonies, the discovery of' gold in 
Victoria and New South Wales; with thei:ra wealth and :rapidly-. 
growing population a type of government more su·i t·ed to the state 
of' the colonies could not be delayed, and by August, 1853, the 
Duke of Newcastle was. talking of responsible government for N'eW 
South Wales. By 1855 new consti tuti.ons were established in all 
the colonies, and the Land Sales Act was repealed, the colonies 
gaining control over their own land policy, f'or which the~ had 
~--
~93o 
contended ever more strongly since the passing of that Act and 
since Grey's settlement of' the squatter question had yet in the 
main upheld the provisions of' that Act. 
As far as external and internal security went, the Australian 
colonies were more :fortunate in that respect than any areas under 
British rule elsewhere. They were not bordered by a powerful 
and potentially hostile country like the United States, and they 
had no large native population to create problems. Convicts by 
1852 were less of' a problem, more care in selection being taken 
when they went as additional labour to colonies which yet received 
them, and the rush of' gold-diggers had merely begun. Therefore, 
the Imperial Government was able to reduce some of' its military 
exp~nditure by cutting down its force in Australia. In 1848 
troops had been sent :from New South Wales to New Zealand on the 
orders of' the Imperial Government, and at the end of' 1849 the 
Governor of New South Wales was informed that the only forces 
whi.ch were to be maintained were to be garrisons f'or Sydney and 
Melbourne, and that the colony must undertake the charge of 
providing, maintaining and repai-ring quarters for Imperial troops. 
If' more troops were required in future, New South Wales was to 
pay f'or them.< 83) 
It now remains to deal with the problem of transportation in 
so f'ar as it af'f'ected the Australian colonies. This forms one 
of' the least satisfactory aspects of' Grey's Australian policy. 
Transportation to New South Wales had ceased by Order in Council 
(83) ·Morrell, chapter XIX, p 475 and 490. 
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in 1840; Van Diemen.'s Land was now the main penal colony, but 
ther~ were a growing number of free settlers in the island, and 
sooner or later these would begin ·to resent the criminal assoc-
iation of their new homeland. Stanley's measures with respect 
to Van Diemen' s Land accelerated this process; they resulted 
in an over-accumulation of convicts, a lack of demand for their 
services, and corruption through the close contact of convict 
with convict. Gladstone, who had a short spell as head of the 
Colonial Office, after Stanley, proposed to suspend the intro-
duction of convicts to Van Diemen's Land for a period of two 
years. A possible alternative destination for convicts lay in 
a proposal to found a new penal colony in North Australia. T.his 
was the position when Grey became head of the Colonial Office 
in 1846. 
Grey confirmed Gladstone's decision about Van Diemen's Land. 
On November 15th, 1846, he instructed Sir c. Fitzroy to abstain 
from forming any penal settlement in North Australia. 1847 saw 
the tentative trial of a new system. In accordance with the· 
latest theories on punishing and reforming criminals, convicts 
were first to undergo a period of separate imprisonment in Great 
Britain; this was to be followed by a period of labour on the 
public works either at home or at Gibraltar or Bermuda, to be 
followed by exile to the colonies, to which the men _would go 
individually not collectively. T.he Government faced much criticism 
on this last proposal, and it was modified slightly. On the 
495·· 
Ji 
eXpir:ation of' half' their sentence convicts were to be sent to 
the colonies as ticket of' leave men; this would enable the 
Government to exercise a greater degree of' supervision over 
them by assigning to each man the area in Which he was to live. 
T.o earn their conditional pardons, as evide~ce of' their industry, 
convicts were to pay back the cost of' their passages to-the 
colonies. 
T.icket of' leave men, however, would have to go to a penal 
colony, and that in reality only left Van Diemen 's Land. Yet 
· there seemed a limit to the number of' convicts that this island 
could absorb. On August 7th, 1848, Grey addressed a circular 
to the Governors of various colonies making enquiries as to the 
practicability of' introducing convicts. The colonies so addressed 
were New South Wales, New Zealand, the Cape, Western Austral~a, 
Ceylon and Mauritius. We have already seen what happened at the 
Cape when, before receiving the answer to his circular, Grey 
despatched convicts there. Ceylon and Mauritius returned unfavour-
able .replies; in the former the lack of demand for skilled 
labour plus the climate, and in the latter the climate, differences 
of race, and language, and the facilities for obtaining ardent 
spirits, were put forward as objections. New Zealand represBnted 
the danger of possible collisions with the Maoris. There remained 
·western Australia and New South Wales. 
•.. . 
The Legislative Council of' New South Wales was guilty of 
swift changes of' mind on this question. In August, 1848, the 
Legislative Council were in favour of recei~ing convict labour, 
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but among their stipulations was one that free emigrants had to 
be sent to counterbalance the number of convicts. Meanwhile 
various people connected with New South Wales had been repres.ent-
ing to Grey the urgent need of that colony for labour; therefore, 
he rather unwisely decided to despatch a moderate number of 
ticket of leave men without a corresponding batch of free emig-
rants. The result of this was extensive anti-convict agitation 
in New South Wales, the colonists being sensitive at the thought 
that the former penal nature of the colony might be re-asserted, 
and the convict element swamp or spread corruption among the 
free settlers. A new Council refused to agree to Grey's pro-
posals. Grey was slow to recognize the serious nature of the 
agitation in New South Wales, and was reluctant to give up his 
hopes of the colony becoming a recetptacle for convicts. 
In Western Australia his proposals met with more success, 
chi~fly because that colony was in a very poor and struggling 
condition. The colony was made a penal settlement by an Order 
in Council of May 1st, 1849; ticket of leave men were sent there, 
and a limited number without tickets of leave, these latter for 
the purpose of labouring on the public works. The condition of 
the colony was vastly improved by this influx of cheap labour. 
Grey pointed out the difference between the creation of Western 
Australia as a penal colony and the proposed settlement in 
Northern Austr~lia, which he had rejected. In Northern Australia 
there had been no settlers, resources, or a Government establish-
ment; all these existed in Western Australia, where convicts 
497· 
would not be kept to themselves but diffused among the community 
of free settlers, whilst care would be taken to add to the number 
of free settlers according to the rate at which convicts entered 
the colony. 
In some remarks on a paper drawn up by Elliot and Murdoch 
on the subject of transportation, Grey, in 1850, was still confid-
ent that as a means of punishment and as a method of advantage 
to both Great Britain and the colonies concerned, transportation 
still had its uses:-
' ••• I do not share in Mr Elliot's apprehensions that more 
convicts will require to be sent to Van Diemen 's Land and VVes·tern 
Australia than these two colonies will absorb with safety. 
Provided due care is taken in the industrial as well as the mora·l 
training of convicts during their peri~d of preliminary punish-
ment ••• I believe that their cheap labour will attract ~apitalists 
to take advantage of the great natural resources of these colonies •• 
Wealth will accumulate there very rapidly, and afford yearly inceas-
ed means of employment ••• 
But in order that the policy may prove successful, it is in 
my opinion absolutely necessary that Parliament should deal 
liberally with those colonies to which convicts are s:en·t; the 
expenses of police, rendered necessary by the presence of convicts, 
must be paid by the mother-country; and above all; free emigrants 
(chiefly females) must be sent to these co~onies in equal numbers 
with the convicts. If this course is pursued, I am persuaded 
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that New South Wales will again very soon desire to have convicts 
sent at least to the northern district, where there is so 
enormous an extent of country available for their employment; and· 
I need hardly add that this is most desirable, since the more the 
convicts can be dispersed the better.•( 84) 
-These remarks show how much Grey failed to perceive the storm 
which was blowing up in the c·olonies against transportation. His 
assertion about New South Wales was certainly not to be realized. 
Van Diemen's Land, which had so far been rather taken for granted 
in the question of a dumping ground for convicts (vastly increased 
m numbers as a result of the disturbances in Britain, especially 
Ireland, in 1848), was also becoming indisposed to admit mQre. 
With the number of free settlers growing, and with memories of 
the depression in the island at the time when Stanley wa~ sending 
large numbers of convicts there, 'the Tasmanians', to use Morrell's 
vivid phrase, 'were determined to.endure no longer the opprobrium 
of being the refuse-heap of the whole Empire, and no assurance 
that the refuse had been scientifically treated could shake their 
determination.' ( 85 ) In 1849, an Anti-Transportation League, the 
members of which were pledged to employ no convicts, was formed 
in Van Diemen's Land. Attacks on transportation were led by 
Adderley and Molesworth in the House of Commons, and in the course 
of 1850 Anti-Transportation Associations came into being in every 
(84) Printed Paper 'Transportation and Emigration', Lord Grey's 
Remarks on this. Colonial Papers. Transportation. 
(85) Morrell, chapter XVI, p. 425. 
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Aust~alian colony bar Western Australia. These were welded 
together into an Australasian League for the Abolition of Trans-
portation in 1851. Grey left office still refusing to acknowledge 
that transport·ation as a system whereby cheap labour could be used 
to build the developed institutions of a colony was played out, 
except in Western Australia. His successors were not so slow 
in realizing this, and in 1853 Van Diemen's ·Land became a free 
colony:, though transportation to Western Australia did not cease 
"till 1868. 
Grey at the time of his fall from office was not very popular 
in the Australian colonies, largely as a result of his transport-
ation .policy. That he had striven to plBse the colonists as 
much as possible could not be denied, but on several important 
occasions he had gone farther in ignor~ng or remaining ignorant 
of that colonial opinion which it was his e~ressed aim in most' 
cases to follow. His adherence as far as possible .to Wakefield 
theories of land sale- dissatisfied pastoralists and non-pastoralists, 
his ~roposals for a federation fell on deaf ears and yet were 
persisted in, and his policy on the disposal of convicts did not 
keep pace with Australian public opinion on that question. 
G·. New Zea]_.and. 
Looking back to the recent events which had taken place in 
New Zealand Grey m.ight have expected that this area would have 
proved one of his biggest headaches. If in fact Grey believed this 
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he was to. be agreeably surprised. New Zealand like all colonies 
had its own peculiar pr.oblems, but during Grey's tenure of the 
Colonial Office the country was at peace and prospered. 
The early 1840's had witnessed a breac~ between the Imperial 
Government and the New Zealand C.ompany, partly over the land 
claims of the latter. The authorities contested the claims of 
the Company to a vast amount of land supposedly purchased 'from 
the natives; to recognize these claims would anger the Maoris, 
-
and as they were yet the dominant race in North Island, and as 
there were no forces of British troops sufficiently large to over-
awe them, to do this would be suicidal. Moreover the Treaty of 
\V.S.itargi of 1840, made with the Maori, had rec:ognized the latter 
as owners of the land, from whom only the governing body in 
New Zealand could purchase land. 
South Island was only thinly populated by Maoris, but· it was 
there that the 'first great clash between them and the Company 
occurred. This was the so-called W'airau 'massacre', in which 
twenty-two settlers were killed. vVhen news of this reached 
Britain confidence in the infant colony declined, and eventually 
the New Zealand Company was forced to request 'financial assist-
ance from the Government, which was refused. The Company then 
appealed to Parliament and in 1844 a Select Committee, the 
chairman. of which was Howick, considered the question. By a 
majority o~ one Howick's views on the subject were adopted in 
the Committee's report. Howick identifie.d himself with the 
New z·ealand Company. Like· them he denounced the Treaty· of 
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Waita~gi as a mistake; the Crown should have been recognized as 
the owner of the land, and reserves of land should be retained 
for the natives, who, whenever their improvement permitted, should 
be employed in the civil service on an equal footing with the 
whites. Hawick's verdict was completely unrealistic; the Manris 
were the dominant race in North Island, were warlike and well-
armed, the power of the authorities in the island was deplorably 
weak. How then could any other course be adopted than to 
recognize the natives as owners of the land ? To talk of placing 
them on reservations ignored the whole balance of power in the 
North Island. More sensible were suggestions that an armed 
steamer be placed at the disposal of the Governor, and a militia 
plus a permanent native force organized. 
Under the Governorship of Admiral Robert Fitzroy the condition 
of New Zealand deteriorated. One of his steps was to abandon 
the Government monopoly of land purchase; now any settler could 
buy from the Maoris, and inevitably disputes arose as to whether 
certain Maoris had in fact sold a part~cular stretch of land, 
whether they had a right to do so, whether the white claimants 
had paid for it, and the like. With no power behind him the 
rnovernor was forced to rely solely on conciliation, and this 
.. 
evident weakness aroused Maor-i contempt for the whites. Finally 
Fitzroy issued paper money on his own responsibility. The 
Government recalled him. 
Before Fitzroy left there was open war in the north between 
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white and Maori, the immediate occasion for w~ich was the famous 
incident of the flagstaff which the Maori persisted in cutting 
down. There were also conflicts further south where the Company's 
settlers were located. The first task of the new Governor, Captain 
Grey (eventually Sir George Grey), who in the autumn of 1845 had 
been removed from South Australia and directed to New Zealand, was 
to finish the war, which he accomplished with the aid of more 
troops and money. The Government monopoly of land purchase was 
re-assumed, and peace eventu~lly made.( 86) 
In Britain, the quarrels between the New Zealand Company and 
the Government over land claims and financial assistance had 
reached their heights when Stanley was at the Colonial Office. 
Indeed his handling of New Zealand affairs has been more criticized 
than any other aspect of his colonial policy. These claims and 
quarrels were yet unsettled when Grey entered office. Meanwhile 
had...,.,. •"v tl&c. M .. o,.i. 
in New Zealand the firm yet tactful rule of his namesake~ Governor 
Grey - no relation of the third Earl Grey - \Vas, like Elgin, in 
the front rank of colonial governors, and it is to his credit that 
Lord Grey listened and deferred to the. advice of this man, even 
though many of his opinions expressed in the Committee of 1844 
were not held by the Governor. The story of New Zealand whilst 
Grey was at the Colonial Office is in the main the story of the 
activities of the Governor, who was given ample discretionary powers 
and was loyally supported by the ~Imperial Government. 
'There were, however, se~eral questions in which Earl Grey 
(86) 'The Long White Clou·d'. Pember Reeves, 1924. PP• 155-170. 
played a more prominent part. Nobody had more hopes f'r·om G,rey's 
accession to the C.'olonial Office than did the Directors of' the 
New Zealand Company; in November, 1845, they had offered him 
~he Governorship of the Company, stating that it was indispen-
sable 'to acquire f'or the Company the presidency of' a person of 
the highest political station.' Among the Directors who made 
this offer were E.G. Wakefield and Charles Buller. Grey refused 
to accept the ~overnorship, and replied that he would do more 
good for New Zealand by remaining unconnected with the Company, 
and by expressing an unfettered judgment.< 87) 
Despite this refusal the Directors hoped much from Grey. 
He had championed their views in 1844. There was now, however, 
the counteracting influence of' Governor Sir George Grey, who was 
concerned to build a lasting peace with the Maoris, and who was 
rather dubious as to some of the Company's activities. 
In August, 1846, there is ·a note in the Journal mentioning 
a visit Grey paid to Charles Buller's, there by appointment to 
meet Edward Gibbon Wakefield. What transpired at this meeting 
is not recorded, but Grey's personal· contacts with the leaders 
of the New Zealand Company was in great contrast to Stanley's 
brusque dealings wi~h them.(BB) 
The eventual settlement with the Company was favourable to dit. 
Stanley had at the last promised material aid; Grey passed Acts 
(87) Harington to Grey, November 18th, 1845. Grey to 
Harington, November 22nd, 1845· Colonial Papers. 
(88) Journal, August 5th, 1846. 
of Parliament making this a reality. The Government agreed to 
advance a sum to meet the Company's creditors; the Company was to 
be given the exclusive use of' Crown land# in South Island, was 
to pay for it and dispose of' it, though the Governor was to retain 
in his hands all negociations with the natives. This arrangement 
was to be for an experimental period of three years, and if it 
failed the Government agreed to accept responsibility and to 
recognize the Company's liabilities. The standard Wakefield 
formula of a pound per acre for the land, and the eXpenditure of' 
part of' the land fund on immigration, was included in the agree-
ment. 
In 1850 this ·three years' term was drawing to a close; from 
the Company's point of view it had not been a complete success, 
and in that year it called for further financial assistance. It 
had succeeded in selling hardly any land; this was partly its 
own fault, as it had itself' glutted the market by compensating 
its settlers in land for previous delay and difficulties. The 
result was that purchasers found that they could obtain land 
at a cheaper price from pr:i,vate owners than :from the Company. 
This time, however, Grey was not so receptive to their demands. 
Perhaps some of Governor Sir George Grey's arguments had some-
thing to do with this, for the Governor disliked the division of 
authority in South Island. According to him the Governor had ·all 
the responsibility of acquiring lands but the New Zealand Com-
pany not the authorities derived all the advantage from them 
when acquired. 
' t. When Earl Grey negatived the Company s sugges 1ons, 
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the latter decided to surrender its eharter. In the meantime 
Wakefield in 1848 had transferred his affcetions to the Canterbury 
Association. In 1852 the Company was wound up. By Act of 
Parliament its debt to the Imperial Government was forgiven, and 
the first lean raised by a New Zealand Parliament was used to 
(89) 
satisfy the outstanding claims of the Company. 
]ndicati ve of the growing prosperity of New Z'ealand were the 
colonization during Grey's tenure ot the C~lonial Office of two 
new settlements in South Island. In 1848 the Scottish Free Kirk 
Presbyterians founded Otago, and in 1850 the Canterbury Association 
\~l";ts f;,sY'sc.H1c.ts1 
worked in close conjunction with the New Z'ealand Company, and 
1\ 
proposed to adminster its lands on the Wakefield system. Wakefield 
had hopes that at last all his views on the ideal-colonial society 
were to be realized, but again he was to be disappointed. 
In the two Memoranda on Colonial Policy found in Grey's 
private miscellaneous colonial papers, the state of N~·ew Zealand 
is described in glow-ing travel brochure tertns. ::: 'nhe 1849 paper 
tll!l.l;lts of two years bringing 'marvellous progress', with expanding 
trade and industry, and contented natives rapidly advancing along 
the road to civilization. The 185.0 memorandum talks of further 
advances in prosperity. 
With such prosperity some form of' representative government 
seemed to be required, and for this settlers were clamouring when 
Grey left office. If Grey had had his way representative 
(89) Morrell, chapter XIII, PP• 326-7. 
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institutions would have been granted to N.ew Z:ealand when he first 
came into office. 
When Stanley was in the Colonial Office, Stephen had drafte.d 
a consitiution for New Zealand. This was largely adopted by Grey. 
This set up a threefold system of municipal,provincial and general 
government. Municipalities were to be combined into Provinces 
each with their own Governor and L~gislative Council; there was 
to be a General Assembly to legislate on matters of common concern 
to all Provinces. The franchise was to be almost unive~sal, 
though all electors were to read and write English (this effect-
ively excluded the Maori). In 1846, Grey informed the Governor 
of the nature of the proposed constitution; Governor Grey per-
suaded the Colonial Secretary to allow the Royal Instructions of 
B ecember, 1846, to become a Head letter, and to delay the putting 
into operation of the constitution for a few years in the ·North, 
until the natives were in a better position to take a share in the 
G·overnment, and the numeric~l ·disparity between the two races in 
North Island was less marked~ Earl G:rey, therefore, decided to 
suspend any provision for representative government in any part 
of New Zealand for five years. After 1847 he left G.overnor Grey 
virtually a free hand. Earl Grey was preparing a bill dealing 
with the constitution of N~w Zealand when he left office.(go) 
~his elaborate constitutional machinery and the progress of 
colonization all tended to obscuPe the real problems of N·ew Zealand. 
(90) Morrell, chapter XIII, PP• 335-7~. 
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~he main one was the Maori. Bangerous when in a numerical majority, 
they might still be dangerous when confronted by increased waves 
of white settlers all eager for Maori land. The fact that Governor 
Grey postponed the establishment of representative institutions 
contrary to the wish of the Secretary of State shows that conditions 
in that country were by no means as rosy as Grey's memoranda for 
the cabinet tended to make them. The fact that Governor Grey 
asked for more troops is another sign in the same direction. 
Finally the correspondence between Grey and the Duke of Wellington 
brings out clearly this other side of the N~w Zealand question. 
T.here is a very interesting memorandum, one of several, by 
the Duke of Wel-lington on the military situation in New Zealand 
which shows how precarious a situation could possibly exist in 
North Island should Governor Grey. be unsuccessful in his efforts 
to conciliate the Maori. Wellington pointed out how little in-
formation there was on New Zealand. No roads ran through the 
country, much of which was covered with forest (all these remarks 
refer mainly to the North Island). As for the natives, they were 
warlike, knew the use of firearms, some had already had experience 
of' fighting the whites, and their fortified vi·llages were in good 
military positions. Wellington recommended fortifying the chief 
tawns against possible attaak; he urged that every colonist in 
the hinterland should ·be compelled to make a road connecting his 
dwe·lling with the· nearest military post or town, or should at 
least clear the ground for such a road to be built. The necessity 
of having full control over all maritime communications was 
stressed; guncraft of shallow draft, and steam tugs to move them 
with celerity were advocated, as was an acc:urate knowledge of all 
harbours and waterways leading into the interior. 
Governor Gl'ey had asked for 2,500 men. .Earl Grey proposed to 
withdraw troops from New South Wales for service in New Zealand. 
Wellington stress:ed the necess·i ty of having some troops that 
would be under the Ordnance, such as Artillery and Engineers, 
Sappers and Miners. He stressed the necessity of finding good 
·accommodation for the· t'roops, of placing all military stores in 
secure places protected from the weather, and of procuring a Field 
Train of Art·illery drawn by horses or bullocks. Light wheel 
carriages with iron .axJle trees for the purpose of carrying pro-
visions and camp equipage, plus mules for the Commissariat, were 
further recommendations made by the Duke (we must remember that 
,.., ..,.,,.. 
Grey was Secretary of State~and the Colonies and in·theory was 
the main minister connected with the Army and its a~fairs).(9l) 
The removal of troops from New South Wales, Which was carried 
out, only formed about a third ·of the number for which G.overnor 
Grey had asked. Grey proposed to make up the numbers by .. military 
pensioners, who would serve for a certain number of days in the 
year and at other times maintain themselves by their own labour. 
He hoped that ·in the areas dominated by the·New Zealand Company, 
the latter would help with providing work, land and accommodation 
( 91). Memo on Defence of New Zealand, November 5th, 1846. 
Colonial Papers. New Zealand. 
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for the proposed military pensioners.< 92) 
On October 30th, 1846, Grey secured Russell's assent to his 
proposal for sending out five hundred of these military settlers, 
but there occurred a hitch in his plans in trying to secure 
material support from the New Zealand Company. Eventually, however, 
bodies of military pensioners were sent out. The idea was that 
by sending such men, not only could the regular forces be reduced 
-·in number, but that the pensioners could support themselves and 
contribute to the prosperity of New Zealand at the same time; in 
time New Zealand would in this way be able to provide for her own 
defence and no regular troops wouid be needed.· G·overnor Sir George 
Grey always maintained that these military settlements were 
succ-essful. ( 93) 
Thus-one of the best things that Earl Grey did for New Zealand 
was to give Governor Grey his utmost confidence and the widest 
latitude of powers, even on subjects on which Earl Grey would 
normally have taken a different line. The more contentious. 
aspects of the dispute between the New Zealand Company and the 
Imperial Government were settled by Earl Grey, and very favourable 
terms were given to what was New Zealand's first and foremost 
colonizing body. But the Company had in reality outlived its 
usefulness, and when it dissolved itself no great harm was done. 
The constitution devised by Stephen_ and Grey seems to be a very 
(92) Meme. October 28th, 1846. Colonial Papers. 
New Zealand. 
(93) Morrell. chapter XIX, P• 476. 
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over-elaborate one for the as yet small settlements in New Zealand, 
but its machinery was never tested whilst Grey was in the Colonial 
Office and Sir George Gr~y was Governor .of New Zealand. As for 
the Maoris, under Sir George Grey's rule they flou~ished, and 
seemed to be on -·the point of assimilation with the white community. 
New Zealand was not, however, destined to avoid further clashes; 
the Maoris were yet the greatest landholders in North Island and 
as the number of white settlers increased and cast covetous eyes 
on Maori land, the inevitable happened. The Maori King movement 
and the prolonged war of the 1860's marked the decisive clash of 
the two races. \'hat country ha~ been able to avoid that last 
unhappy struggle between the primitive original possessors of the 
land and the thrustful White usurpers ? Wellington's memoranda 
on defence and Grey's preoccupation on military settlements in 
New Zealand were then seen to have their practical value. 
H. T.l,le West Indies. 
T.he West Indies continued to be an area which caused great 
concern to the Imperial authorities. Wrangles over slavery and the 
actions of colonial legislatures in the Chartered Colonies, 
especially Jamaica, were the norm in the earlier years of the 
nineteenth century; colonial assemblies and race relations contin-
ued to be problems which confronted the Colonial Office, but in 
the late 1840's there was added another, the effects of free trade 
policies upon the West Indian staple crop, sugar. 
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~he emancipation of the slaves was a blow to the colonial 
planters in that it threatened to deprive them of a guaranteed 
labour supply, and such was needed - in the absence of machinery -
for the continued cultivation of sugar. Their fears were not un-
founded. When the negroes finally became free, except in the 
small and-densely populated islands, there was no necessity to work 
in the sugar plantations; they _could derive subsistence from their 
own provision grounds. Cajoleries and threats could not make them 
into a reliable labour force· for the sugar planters. Thus Grey's 
fears, expressed when Under Secretary, were realized; whether his 
idea of a land tax would have made the problem a less exacting one 
is another matter. Planters' crops diminished, and many planters 
went out of business; sugar plantations contracted in size. 
Attempts to secure an alternative source of labour to the 
negroes were tried. Madeira, Great Britain, and parts of Europe, 
In dian coolies, Africans, to all these, various West Indian colonies 
and Mauritius (which being_ a sugar colony can be conveniently 
classed with them) had resort at various times. Lack of continuous 
labour was the reason assigned for falling sugar prices and for 
the depression in the industry, when a parliamen·tary Committee 
under "3".8. Pakington (Grey's successor at the Colonial Office) 
examined the problems of the West Indies in 1842. The majority 
of the Committee sided with the planters' view that the best hope 
of a change for the better lay in ensuring increased immigration 
(despite the abuses and confusion which inevitably arose from the 
immigration of different races, and which were denounced by various 
sections of the community in this country). A minority of the 
Committee headed by Howick believed that increased immigration 
was not the only answer to the problem; Howick believed that one 
main source of the depression was the ease with which land could 
be acquired, thus encouraging planters to try and cultivate too 
large and uneconomical an area, and that reduced expenditure, 
more economical cultivation, and experiments with new products 
instead of relying upon the one item of sugar, were some of the 
remedies. 
The planters were not interested, however, in experimenting 
with new crops. They still continued to seek a solution to their 
labour problem by encouraging immigration; if a large labour force 
could be guaranteed they believed a return might be made to the 
palmy days before emancipation, and all talk of economy or more 
reliance upon machinery passed them by.(94) 
As well as a guaranteed labour force, the planters also 
sought a guaranteed market. Their sugar was admitted into Britain 
at a lower rate of duty than sugar from elsewhere, such as Cuba. 
The planters had long-been accustomed to this preference~ and 
stated that wi-th emancipation such a preference was more than ever 
necessary. They pointed out, with justice, that British West 
Indian sugar had to compete with slave-grown sugar from elsewhere, 
and of course the latter was cheaper. The West Indian planters 
believed protection was their only hope against losing the English 
(94) Morrell. chapter VII. PP• 156-8. 
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market to their competitors; only a higher rate of duty against; 
slave-grown sugar would make up for its cheaper production. 
The planters, therefore, viewed with alarm the growth of the 
free trade movement in Britain. T.he West Indian interest in the 
eighteenth century, and the old conception of a self--sufficient: 
Imperial unit had lost acceptance with the rise of new theories 
as to colonies and empire. Buy in the cheapest market and sell 
in the dearest, give the consumer reduced prices by putting the 
lowest-priced goods within his reaih, these were becoming the 
slogans of' many politicians in the 1840's. Why should the consumer 
be pe~alized by having to pay high prices f'or his sugar, when 
cheaper sugar could be ·imported if' the s~stem of' preferential duties 
were abolished ? Was it not. merely to protect a f'ew West Indian 
proprietors ? Bid it not give a premium to inefficiency, to the 
uneconomical running of' plantations, to over-emphasis on the 
cultivailion of' one particular crop ? llid not the preferential duty 
system merely subsidize inefficiency ? These were some of' the 
questions which were asked with increasin~ frequency. Glone were 
the days when statesmen could seriously debate whether it was 
better to acquire a couple of' sugar islands than the whole of' 
Canada. When the Corn Laws, the keystone of' the preferential duty 
system, were abolished, it could only be a matter of' time before 
the sugar duties in favour of' the British West Indies were swept 
away. The commercial arguments for protection no longer had 
validity, the West Indies were no longer such an important Imperial 
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possession, and even the mor~l and religious argument: could be 
overcome by pointing out that Britain already sanctioned the 
importation of slave-grown coffee, tobacco and cotton. 
The arrival of Grey and his party to office spelt the doom of 
preferential duties. As early as July 3rd, 1846, a Cabinet 
Committee, comprising Russell, Grey, Wood and C.larendon, was 
considering the question, and on July 20th, Russell outlined the 
proposed measure to the House of Commons. The preferential duties 
were to be abolished gradually, colonial sugar enjoying a pro-
gressively smaller advantage over that of its rivals, until by 
the summer of 1851 the duty on colonial and foreign sugar stood 
equal at fourteen shillings a hundredweight (this was for muscovado 
sugar; the duties on other varieties were dealt with in the same 
way). Some of the West Indian body realized that the preferential 
duty system had had its day, and that the admission of slave-grown 
sugar was inevitable, and voted with the G:overnment; among them 
was Barkly, of whom we shall·hear later. 
In 1847 prices of West Indian sugar began to fall alarmingly 
low. On November 12th, 1847, an entry in the Journal states:-
'A meeting today at Ld John's about the sugar duties and the 
distress of the W.I. colonies - we decided that the arrangement 
with regard to the sugar duties must be maintained, and that we 
must do what we can to relieve the colonies in other ways •••' 
Later information was not re-assuring:-
'••• the state of theW. India colonies is becoming more and 
more deplorable and it is quite obvious that a great run will be 
made not only on .the G:o~ generally but persqnally against myself' 
on account of their calamities.(95) 
T.he financial panic in Great Britain in 1848 had its :repercussion 
in the West Indies; various of their mercantile houses went 
bankrupt, credit became unobtainable. The G'overnmen t made various 
monetary advances to some colonies, but the West Indian propriet-
ors reverted to the idea of protection, at least until they had 
an adequate labour supply. 
When Lord George Bentinck moved for a Sleet Committee of the 
House of Commons to enquire into the whole question, the Government 
found it prudent not to oppose the motion. .f\:11 planters called 
before the Committee wanted some form of protection. The majority 
of the Committee reported again.st any claim to permanent protection, 
but recommended a protective duty in favour of colonial sugar 
for six years, in order to give time for other measures of' relief 
to take effect• 
'l'.he Government decided that some con.cession had to be made 
on the matter of sugar in view of the exceptional crisis in West 
Indian affairs. Russell announced to the Commons on June 16th, 
1848, that the duty on colonial sugar would be lowered by annual 
stages until the duty stood at ten shillings a hundredweight, 
whilst the equalization of duty on colonial and foreign sugar 
would be pospponed until 1854· At the same time a loan of 
(95) Journal, December, 31st, ·1847. 
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£500,000 was promised to encourage immigration. 
It was on this day that the first mention was made by Bentinck 
of a charge that Grey had intentionally withqeld from the Committee 
a dispatch from the Gbvernor of· Jamaica in favour of protection. 
Grey described Bentinck·' s charge as 'a most violent and ungentle-
manlike attack.' ( 96 ) The failure to bring the dispatch before 
the Committee was not an intentional act on Grey's part, but it 
gave a hurdle to his enemies, and Bentinck, leading the Pro-
tectionists, was not slow to take advantage of the fact. Bentinck. 
even carried his attack a stage further some days later:-
'Lord George Bentinck ••• made most violent attack upon me 
for having in fact falsified the papers relating to the condition 
of thew. Indies laid before Parlt ••• I was just reading the 
account ••• when Ld John himself came in, and talked to me about 
it. I told him that on monday I shd give notice of my intention 
to make a statement on this subject the next day in the Lords wh. 
he quite approved. This business so disturbed me that I could 
hardly settle to anything all day ••• We thought 2 or 3 days we 
' (97) 
••• were sure to be beat and go out 
Bentinck continued to press his attacks in the Commons. Grey had 
as solace kind words from the Queen before he made his statement 
in the House of Lords, where Stanley violently attacked him 
though ~eceiving no encouragement from the majority present. Grey 
(96) Journal, June 17th, 1848. 
(97) Journal, June 24th, 1848. 
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had also to face violent attacks from newspapers such as 'The 
Times' and the 'Morning Chronicle' on this question. However the 
Sugar Bill, t-o Grey's astonishment, did pass the Commons. ( 98) 
It was not receivedwith satisfaction in the West Indies. The 
immediate reaction of the Combined Court in British Guiana was to 
refuse to vote money for the Government of the c·olony. The other 
q,S. 
West Indian colonies looked upon the 
quate as a measure of relief. •(99) 
measure' 'altogether inade-,.. 
In Jamaica the Assembly 
passed a bill lowering the salaries of all the Executive from the 
Governor downwards. When· the Council refused to accept this, 
supplies partially stopped, and the Assembly refused to exercise 
its legislative functions. The Governor res.orted to a new Assembly, 
and the West Indian body in England did not encourage its 
supporters in Jamaica to go to extremes, so that by the end of 
1849 there was a relaxation of tension in that colony. 
Grey's conviction of the soundness of the policy adopted with 
respect to the West Indian colonies remained· unshaken. He regarded 
the distress existing in the West Indies as 'a subject with which 
departmentally the Colonial Office· has nothing to do. ,(lOd) 
. . 
Nevertheless as the West Indians were desperately in need of 
labour, Grey did all he could to meet that need, by suggesting 
(98) Journal, June 27th, 29th-30th; July 11th, 1848. 
( 99) Journal, August 22nd, 1:848. 
(100) Memo on Colonial Policy, February 8th, 1849. 
Colonial P apers. 
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schemes to bring back the negroes to the plantations. (including 
his old idea of a tax on land), and by encouraging-immigration. 
The flow of coolies to most of the West Indian colonies was 
revived, and gradually the condition in these islands improved. 
Let us examine in more detail the conditions in one of the 
West Indian colonies (though a sugar col~y, strictly speaking 
not in the West Indies at all), British Guiana. It was that 
region which with Jamaica afforded Grey the most concern in these 
critical years, and the whole subject excited considerable 
discussion in Parliament. 
The Executive Government of British Guiana was vested in a 
Court of Policy composed of the Governor and four officials, and 
five unofficial members indirectly elected. The legislative 
organ was a Combined Court in which all members of the Court of 
Policy, with the exception of the Governor, sat; along with them 
were six Financial Representatives elected on a narrow franchise. 
The Combined Court dealt primarily with the raising of taxes. 
The reason why a greater degree of representative government was 
not entrusted to the colony was well explained in a despatch from 
Grey to Walker the Secretary, then acting Governor, on September, 
1848:-
'In these times, it is for the interest of every government •• 
to devolve responsibility upon local legislatures ••• If H.M. Govt 
forbears, in this case, to delegate the uncontrolled management 
of the affairs. of a colony to local bodies, it is from the fear 
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that it might thereby fail to acquit itself of the duty which it 
owes to the colonial community at large, and especially to those 
classes of its inhabitants which, from want of instruction, are 
incapable of securing for themse~_"~es, by the intelligent exercise 
of political franchises, a real representation of their interests 
in the colonial legislatures •. , ( lOl) 
Fn 1841 a Civil List had been voted by the Combined Court, 
and this was not due to expire until 1854. If any of the offices 
charged upon that List became vacant,· the Combined Court had the 
power of requesting that a reduction should be made in the 
emolument accruing to that office, and before an appointment was 
made the request would be considered. Vihen Sir H. Light 
relinJuished the Governorship of the colony in 1848, the Combined 
C:ourt - the planters being exasperated at what they considered to 
be inadequate measures for dealing with the commercial distress -
proposed a reduction in the G:overnor's salary, and at once pro-
ceeded to strike off the amount from the estimate. When the 
Lieutenant-G:overnor refused to agree to this, the C:ombined Court 
refused to vote the annual taxes. A:n important constitutional 
.. 
question was thus raised. The present salaries of the Executive 
officers, including the judges, had been guaranteed until the 
Civil List expired in _1854; in 1848, therefore, the Combined 
Court was arrogating to itself a power which it did not poss:ess. 
If this usurpation were to pass unchallenged the-Executive would 
( 101) 'British Colonial Policy' Select Documents. 
Bell & Morrell, 1928. P• 113. 
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be entirely at its mercy. On·S@ptember 30th, the Combined Court 
allowed the Tax Ordinance to expire, and from that date the whole 
revenue of the colony, apart from small sums derived from per-
manent taxes, ceased.(l02) 
~rey's first task was to find an able man to take over the 
G·overnorship of the colony at this critical period. His choice 
was a good and bold one. Acting on a suggestion from Charles 
Wood he offered the G'overnorship to one of the ablest of the 
West Indian proprietors in Britain, Henry Barkly, who himself 
possessed estates in British Guiana. B~rkly was an opponent of 
the Whig ~overnment, though a moderate one. Again, as in the 
case of Elgin, the appointment of a man of different political 
principles to himself paid dividends to Grey. Not every Colonial 
Secretary would have been so imaginatively unorthodox. Barkly 
accepted the offer on November 22nd, 1848. 
Upon his arrival Barkly found that he had the means of paying 
the salaries charged on the Civil List, but had no money for any 
other purpose. Meanwhile early in 1849 the planter party and 
their English support-ers:had secured a Select Connnittee of the 
House of Commons to enquire into the state of Guiana. At one 
time Grey was in hopes that the Committee woold recommend that 
the Imperial Parliament should enact legislation to solve the 
financial difficulties of the colony, and that in such an event 
the colonists could be palliated by an increase of power to the 
( 10:2) Memo on Colonial Policy, February 8th, 1849. 
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inhabitants.(l03) On June 1st, 1849, however, Grey WDote to 
Barkly stating that there was no chance of obtaining such assist-
ance from Parliament, and that in a friendly talk with Peel, the 
latter had expressed the inexpediency of any' app~ication to 
Parliament for additional powers, as in the then state of the 
c·ommons Peel was sure that such would not be granted. Therefore,. 
the whole problem rested vrlth Barkly to resolve. 
Fortunately Barkly was helped by the final Report of the Select 
Committee, which stated that the C:ombined Court had no right, 
considering the agreement which bound it, to set about the revisien 
of the Civil List. Tche extreme party among the planters, despite 
the Report, still resolved te persevere in opposition. Eventually 
finding they were losing support, they resigned their seats in 
the Combined Court. Barkly thereupon carried through the Court 
of Policy an ordinance altering the franchise. Even before the 
Select Committee had reported that more power should be given to 
the colonists with respect to the administration of their own 
internal affairs, Barkly (Grey having recommended it to him 
previous to his departure) decided to wideri the franchise, and 
thus to split the alliance between the extreme wing of the planters 
and a colonial Liberal movement. The new Franc~ise Bill admitted 
'just so much popular influence as will neutralise but not over-
whelm the Plantercracy which has hitherto been paramount.•(l04) 
(103) Grey to Barkly, April 16th, 1849. Private Correspondence. 
(104) Barkly to Grey, Sept. 4th, 1849. Private Correspondence. 
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Until a new Combined Court could be formed under the new law, 
Barkly succeeded - partly by judicious re~tions in salaries 
and expenditure, of which.G.rey was very doubtful- in getting the 
taxes renewed, Grey expressing the hope that the Combined Court 
would restore some of the votes to their former amount.(l05) 
The last serious challenge the Government had to face in the 
House of Commons to its Guiana policy came from a motion by Joseph 
Hume - that 'bugbear' of all Colonial G~overnors and the Colonial 
Office - advocating that British Guiana be given responsible 
government. This was defeated. The opposition party among the 
planters led by Peter Rose attempted to continue their alliance 
with the 'movement' party to make their opposition to the Executive 
Government more effective, realizing that they were safe in 
agitating for changes in that no low rate of suffrage such as the 
'movement' party desired would be granted by the Imperial Govern-
ment.(l06) 
In the autumn of 1850 Barkly was worried by the fact that the 
Combined Court might again stop the supplies, this time in calling 
for a more liberal constitution. Again Barkly, like the wise 
statesman he was, resolved to act first;- he realized that the 
Government would be strengthened if it could prove that a reason-
able offer of representative government had been made, only to be 
rejected by the extremists. Theref'.ore, he guardedly hinted at the 
(105) Grey to Barkly, August lst, 1849• and Aug. 14th, 1849. 
(106) Barkly to Grey, April 18th, 1850. 
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addition of the Mayor of Georgetown to the Court of Policy and 
the addition of four members to the C:ombined Court. This had 
the effect of shaking unanimity in the Reform Association 'as 
many of the Planters were very desirous of a compromise, being 
afraid of the effects of the continued agitation ••• on their 
Laborers' minds.•(l07) 
~t this time the sugar crop was short because of bad weather. 
As a result discontent was on the increase, and as usual the 
planters were calling for increased immigration. This demand 
Grey did his best to comply with. No greater evidence can show 
how completely Grey trusted these Governors whose abilities he 
was sure of to act at their discretion, than the remarks he made 
to Barkly, when the latter had criticized one of Grey's plans 
on how such immigration was to be conducted:-
'! shall be very glad to receive from you officially any 
further remarks which you may think necessary on the subject of 
indentures and they shall be very carefully considered. I can 
assure you my only object is to come to the conclusion which is 
really best for all the parties ••• and if' I have fallen into any 
misapprehension on the subject I shall be very glad to be set 
right. ' ( 108) 
Again fortune favoured Barkly and Grey. ~he West Indian 
proprietors in Great Britain did not align themselves with the 
Guiana Reform Association; and themselves submitted moderate 
(107) 
(108) 
Barkly to Grey, September 27th, 1850. 
Grey to Barkly, February 28th, 1851. 
proposals for constitutional changes not greatly differing from 
Barkly's. These G·reY advised Barkly to adopt. On June 26, 1851, 
Barkly could report that he had succeeded in persuading the Court 
of Policy to pledge itself to legislate on the basis of these 
constitutional changes submitted from homt. He was also at the 
same time able to report that the Reform Association was tottering 
to its fall, and that the planters were enjoying increased pros-
perity:-
'the retention of the great bulk of the aoolies has put an 
end to all fears of a rise in Wages, which could alone retard 
the restoration of prosperity. •(109) 
As Barkly stated to Grey:-
'the Sugar Market _is our Barometer whose continuous fall as 
surely portends a storm, as its rise indicates sunshine •••• ' 
So long as the planters enjoyed prosperity Peter Rose and the 
politically-minded did not obtain great support in the colony:-
' ••• the Colonists ••• except when excited by pecuniary 
losses ••• seldom look closely at Politics ••• ' (llO) 
This rising prosperity Barkly believed to be threatened by the 
inability of planters to learn from the lessons of the past; once 
more there was a tendency to over-extend cultivation and by 
competing for labourers to force wages up to an uneconomical level. 
·This in its turn led to calls for increased immigration, and 
(109) 
(110) 
Grey to Barkly Apr~l 15th, 1851. Barkly to Grey, 
June 26th, 1851. 
Barkly to Grey, December 28th and July 12th, .1851. 
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abuse of the Government when sifficient immigrants were not forth-
coming. Yet despite this disturbing tendenc~ Barkly was on the 
whole confident of the future. There was a growing interest in 
machinery to take the place of much manual labour, attention was 
being at last paid to such subjects as drainage, and British 
capital was again being attracted into the colony.(lll) 
Finally the retirement through ill-health at the end of 1851 
of Peter Rose removed Barkly's most formidable antagonist:-
'Few but Mr Rose indeed, could have kept discontented Planters, 
intriguing Missionaries, ambitioDSMen of Color, and Bermudan 
Republicans, in anything like the resemblance of a Party •• '(ll2) 
Thus when Grey left office the crisis in the affairs of 
British Guiana - as in Jamaica - had been surmounted, largely 
thanks to the Governor Grey had chosen, and the colony's affairs 
were running in more normal channels. Guiana in fact prospered; 
the subsequent history of Jamaica, largely because of the activities 
of its age-old Assembly (it can be little wonder that Grey was 
chary of granting more representative institutions to the West 
Indian colonies with the example of the Jamaica Assembly before 
him) was more sombre. Given Grey's ~iews on free trade it cannot 
be expected that during his tenure of the Colon.ial Office West 
Indian politics would be tranquil, but free trade as against 
(111) Barkly to Grey, October 12th, 1851. Copy of Official 
Despatch no. 160. Nov. 12th, 1851. 
(112) Barkly to Grey, December 28th, 1851. 
0 
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protection was to be the dominant motif' of' the later nineteenth 
century. Most of' the West India colonies realized this and, 
despite hardship and crises such as the ones just described, re-
adjusted themselves to this fact. On the wh9le they continued 
to compete successfully with foreign sugar in the British market, 
until the close of the century when the production of sugar from 
beetroot dealt them a c~uel blow. 
J. Ceylon. 
Of' all the colonies with which Earl Grey had to concern 
himself', Ceylon was to cause him more worry and trying moments 
than anywhere else. Ceylon also provided the most dramatic episode 
in the period of his administration. For his appointment of a 
Governor and for that Governor's actions Grey was to be criticized 
severely in Parliament and Press, and a Select Committee over two 
sessions of Parliament was to probe deeply into Ceylon affairs. 
For these reasons and also the fact that the Ceylon story has 
only·been briefly told elsewhere it is perhaps possible to justify 
a larger amount of' space devoted to the story of that island than 
at first glance it would appear to justify. 
At the outse.t Earl Grey regarded Ceylon 'as the best Colonial 
Government there is.' (ll3) The information sent to the Colonial 
Office from the island g~ve no cause for anxiety, indeed the 
reverse. In 1846 the Governorship of Ceylon fell vacant, and the 
(113) Grey to Torrington, January 22nd, 1847. 
question arose as to who was to be appointed. The Colonial 
Secretary in Ceylon was Sir James Emerson Te••ent, formerly a 
member of Parliament who in his later political career had been 
a follower of Sir Robert Peel. Te~•ent was an Irishman, a 
political opponent, an able man but known to be exceedingly 
ambitious, with a reputation for intrigue and the ar.ts of 
'management' and for being quarrelsome; for these reasons Russell 
and Grey both agreed that he could not have the vacant Governor-
ship, though he requested it. Grey would have liked to have 
given Charles Hay Cameron, a jurist and a man who was intimately 
acquainted with Ceylon (being appointed in 1823 as a Commissioner 
of Enquiry to the island) the appointment, but Russell had other 
ideas. The names of Cameron, Charles Villiers, Stanley (probably 
'Beau' Stanley), Parker, and John Lefevre, were all mentioned 
before the name of Lord Torrington appeared in the correspondence 
of Grey and Russell. ( 114) 
Torrington appears to have been a private friend of Grey's, 
probably being acquainted with him through the latter's brother, 
, Charles, who like T.orrington had held a position in the Royal 
Household. The seventh Viscount Torrington was a. descendant of 
that Byng who had been shot 'pour encourager les autres,' and in 
his blackest moments when he saw disgrace before him he was wont-
to compare himself with his unfortunate ancestor. From being in 
(114) Russell to Grey, November 9th, December 8th, 29th, 1846. 
January 1st and 6th, 1847. 
Grey to Russell, November 9th, 1846. 
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the·Royal Household, Torrington became the manager of the South-
Eastern Rail Road, and this too gave him a further point in common 
with Earl Grey. Torrington's thoughts dwelt, however, on a 
colonial governorship, and with Grey at the head of the Colonial 
Office the moment seemed opportune for obtaiping one. It was not 
necessarily an error to appoint to a Governorship a man who had 
served no apprenticeship in colonial administration previously, 
but obviously unless that man was very talented and able it was 
not a wise step to take. However, Torrington. was offered the 
governorship of Ceylon and accepted it. Russell was at first 
. ( 115) 
rather dubious over the appointment, but gave his consent to 1t. 
Tprrington arrivea in Ceylon towards the end of May, 1847. 
It was not long before he and Grey both received something of a 
shock. They had conceived that Ceylon was one of the most pros-
perous of all colonies, and that there was a substantial surplus 
between revenue and expenditure; all that needed to be done was, 
in line with sound free trade theories, further to develop Ceylon's 
main industries, of which coffee-growing was the chief, by repeal-
ing export duties or at least reducing them, and remodelling the 
entire customs tariff. To make up for any loss of revenue through 
this,_resort could be ~ad to direct taxation, and Grey had recourse 
to his favourite remedy of a land tax which he recommended to 
Torrington to attempt. Torrington found the financial situation 
was alarming, and that there was in the previous year an excess 
(115) Russell to Grey, January 27th, i847. 
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of expenditure over revenue. The amount of silver in the island 
was small, as was the surplus between expenditure and revenue• 
there was not sufficient money for commercial purposes, and the 
condition of the Banks was not satisfactory. As for the roads 
which were necessary ·to open up the island, to exploit economically 
good land in the interior, and to transport the planters' crops 
to the coast, not one of those which the Colonial Office had. 
believed to be in existence was properly finished or useable.(llG) 
Towards the end of 1847 Torrington outlined his proposals 
for remedying the financial situation, and also for carrying out 
Grey'!s free trade ideas. All export duties were to be abolished, 
except that on cinnamon which was drastically reduced. This 
would result in a loss to the revenue of £25,000 per annum. T.'o 
remedy this, Torrington proposed some new direct taxes - the 
imposition of a land tax without an adequate survey having been 
found to be impracticable - which included licensing firearms,~ 
dog tax, and a shop tax. At the same time a Road Ordinance was 
to be framed providing for· six days' continuous labour on the 
roads for all able-bodied men, European and native, unless they 
paid three shillings for the commutation of their services. The 
colonial government in the present state of its finances, could 
not embark on great expenditure on roads. At the same time 
Torrington wanted to see the £24,000 contributed by the colony 
to the British Treasury for the support of the military stationed 
in the island abolished. 
(116) Torrington to Grey, June 6th and June 9th, 1847• 
Grey approved of T.orrington' s new taxes and the proposed 
Road Ordinance. Indeed he proposed carrying the latter a state 
further:-
• • • to impose a poll tax of 10/- a year the penalty for 
default being the exaction of labour reckoned at such a price as 
to make it clearly the interest of the people to prefer the money 
payment. T.his would create a fund not only for the improvement 
of the roads but for other local purposes, especially education 
and relief to the sick and infirm.' (117) 
As for the £24,000 paid into the Military Chest, Grey had remon-
strated with the Treasury, Russell and Wood, but all to no avail. 
The economy campaign in Britain was too strong to risk a cession 
of claims against Ceylon for help in supporting the military 
established there. 
At the time Torrington was introducing his new taxes, another 
set of important problems lay.yet unresolved. These concerned 
more especially Kandy, the central district in Ceylon, once a 
Kingdom, and the last area to come under British rule. Kandy 
had been rather remote from the main lines of development of the 
colony as a whole, but this isolation was coming to an end. New 
roads were being_opened up into the interior, and coffee planters 
sought lands for their crops in the ancient Kingdom. The influx 
of planters of course immediately created discord between them 
and the Kandians, but the main problem was not this but the fate 
of the Buddhist religion. 
(117) Grey to Torrington, May 19th, 1848. 
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Clause Five of the Convention of March 2nd, 1815, made after 
the close of the second Kandyan War, stated:-
'The Religion of Boodhoo (Buddha) ••• is declared inviolable, 
and its Rites, Ministers, and Places of worship are to be main-
tained and 'protected'.(ll8) This meant that the British author-
ities took over from the dethroned Kings of Kandy the appointment 
of managers for temple lands, and the task of giving formal 
acknowledgment to elected priests. They also took responsibility 
for the custody of Buddha's Tooth (a relic of great veneration, 
supposed to be one of the actual teeth of the Buddha, and brought 
from India in the third century), the tradition having grown up 
that whoever possessed the Tooth was the lawful ruler of the 
island. 
In 1844 Stanley, determined not to give encouragement to a 
non-Christian religion, withdrew the Government's responsibility 
for the appointment of priests and managers of temple lands; there 
was to be no subsidy or any grant to the Buddhist Church, and 
the Tooth was entrusted to the care of the priests~ Thus the 
British Government was withdrawing from its undertakings given 
in the treaty of 1815.· What authority was now to give validity 
to the appointment of managers of temple lands and priests ? 
Earl Grey believed that Stanley's decision was a proper one, but 
his new Governor took a more realistic view of the question. 
(118) 'Ceylon'. S.D. Bailey, Hutchin$on's University 
Library, 1952. P• 84. 
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Torrington pointed out that previously the British Government had 
appointed stewards of Temple lands to manage these properties, 
enforce their rights and collect dues:-
'We now withdraw from all interference and the question arises 
amongst themselves who is to replace that power which we vacate 
particularly in the nomination of persons to manage their lands 
without some law nobody will pay their dues to them. The G.overn-
ment here has already told them they must elect their own offic~ ••• 
who are the parties who have a right to vote, and who to decide 
on the validity of that Election. It will not do for me to say 
settle it amongst yourselves, that would only cause mur~er and 
bloodshed.' (ll9) 
This uncertainty was causing dissatisfaction, as was the fact that 
the sacred relic, the Tooth, was no longer kept safely by the 
governing power, to whom by long tradi·tion it belonged. T.he Tooth 
was vulnerable to the attempts of adventurers to possess it and 
thereby declare themselves the legal authority. 
On July 5th, 1848, Torrington reported that there had been 
some disturbance in Kandy 'regarding these new measures' (the 
new direct taxes):-
'In endeavouring to obtain a census ••• a report was about that 
30 new taxes were to be put on, and women and children were to be 
taxed and the women's breasts measured ••• the whole of the dis-
turbance was caused by a Rascally Malabar (who says he is to be King) • 
•• the Buddhist Priests are dissatisfied at their affairs not being 
(119) Torrington to Grey, August 18"th, 1847. 
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settled and have assisted the Malabar Pretender •• ' 
These disturbances flared up into a revolt on July 28th. The 
revolt was confined to Kandy. According to Torrington the plans 
for it had long been laid, and its origins lay ~n religious 
grievances. Torrington reacted with vigour. There was no time 
to re-assemble the dispersed Executive Council, so after consulting 
with what few advisers he could find, he put Kandy under martial 
law, and immediately despatched there more troop reinforcements; 
the Execut·i ve Council sub$equently gave their full approval to 
these measures. The revolt was soon quelled, and then began the 
punishment of the guilty. The Pretender, after being flogged 
publicly, was transported for life; a Buddhist priest was executed 
in the full canonical robes of his order; an~ by the time martial 
law had been lifted in October, eighteen had been condemned to 
death, twenty-eight to transportation, and sixty-six to other 
punishments, usually of fifty lashes and a period of imprisonment: 
with hard labour.< 120 ) 
T.he punishments ap·pear rather drastic, probably as a result 
of the fears aroused by the totally unexpected revolt. Torrington's 
reaction was typical of the Ceylon officials: .... 
• • • we can place no reliance on them, their treachery to us 
is of the. deepest dye. ,(121) 
Yet one must remember that the system of punishment in vogue in 
(120) 'Ceylon'. S.D. Bailey. Hutchinson's University Library. 
1952. P• 108. 
( 121) Torrington to Grey, August 11th, 1848.· 
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in Britain was by no means mild, witness the number or trans-
portations during the Chartist demonstrations, and the !'act that 
!'logging was still a recognized punishment in the armed f'orces. 
What the revolt does reveal was how poor was the intelligence 
system, and how out of touch Ceylon officials were with native 
opinion. Torrington's measures to crush the revolt undoubtedly 
saved the cof'fee estates from destruction, and with them the 
invested capital of the planters. How far, however, were the 
·Governor's measures the cause of the revolt ? Torrington 
reported to Gr.ey that an attempt was being made by certain groups 
in Ceylon to blame the new taxes for the outbreak; doubtless, 
he stated, the same attempt ~uld be made in Britain. He declared 
that the new taxes had nothing whatever to do with the rebellion. 
Yet the first disturbances on July 5th, had, as we have seen, 
been ascribed to the result· of the new measures. by Torrington 
himself. The main cause of the revolt was·in the ~overnor's view 
to be ascribed to the religious qu~stion:-
' ••• !'rom the first moment which the British G:overnment 
violated the Treaty of 1815 ••• a blow was then struck at Budhism 
which each year has been more severely felt. Temples were without 
Head Priests, those who~ cannot loyally enforce their rights 
and are cheated of' their dues. The Temples for want of these 
means are falling into decay. This is felt equally by the Chiefs 
who are a sort of lay Priest~ ••• They took over the T:ooth from us 
with evident dislike, in our hands the prized Treasure was aafe, 
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and possibly our custody of it increased its value in the eyes 
of the mass of the people. They cannot trust one another and 
' there is the greatest danger of the Tooth being carried off.' 
.! 
Other reasons for the revolt given by Torrington were that Dr. 
Elliott, editor of the Colombo ~Observer' had been inflaming the 
natives by talk of political rights, that the Kandians had dis-
liked the coffee estates on land where they were wont to pasture 
their bullocks, and that this had led to endless feuds between 
planters and Kandians, that the character o:f the planters them-
selves, their habits (particularly with the Kandian women) had 
disgusted the Kandians, so that with the latter the term Coffee 
Planter had become one of reproach, and that the roads opening 
up the province to Europeans and European influence were disliked 
by the native authorities.(l22) 
Grey was impressed by the promptitude with which Torrington 
had crushed the rebellion, and announced that he would give the 
latter full support. His private letter continued:-
'! see no reason to believe that your new taxes were the real 
cause of the insurection or that I ought to retract the opinion 
I have expressed in favour of these measures. If as I believe 
the measures are right it is clear that theybought to-be strenu-
·-
ously maintained, and that to give them up in consequence of the 
·rebellion would only create an impression of feebleness and lower 
the authority of the G.ovt without in the siightest degree 
appfeasing discontent.•(l23) 
(122) Torrington to Grey, August 11th, 1848. 
(123) Grey to Torrington, October 5th, 1848. 
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Russell, whilst praising Torrington's action in putting down the 
rebellion, was more dubious about the part the new taxes had 
played in causing it; he was in.clined to think them 'foolish', but 
had only the suggestion of reducing salaries and employments -
not a very effective mode of gaining efficiency in a Government -
to offer as to means for replacing the loss of revenue. Grey 
defended the Governor's measures, ~d stated his opinion that 
Torrington, unless he was recalled, ·had a right to a decided 
support from the Imperial G:overnmen-t. ( 124) 
From all the evidence it seems that the new taxes did play 
some part in sparking off the insurection, though more fundamental 
questions such as the religious one were no doubt more important 
underlying causes. Tor1 .. ington himself denied any connexion between 
new taxes and rebellion; Grey in -Britain defended this thesis in 
Parliament and in correspondence with Russell. The next act of 
Torrington's, therefore, can only be described as the grossest 
of blunders, for he repealed some of the new taxes, and thus 
virtually admitted the connexion between the two subjects. Grey 
was annoyed, and we can understand why:-
'•·• it appears to me in the highest degree impolitic and 
injudicious, and ••• it will have a very bad effect indeed in the 
parliamentary discussions I anticipate both on your position and 
on mine. 
(124) 
The decided approval I had given to your measures will 
Russell to Grey, October 6th, 9th, 21st, 1848. 
Grey to Russell, October 21st,- 1848. 
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now of course be turned against me, and the pains I had taken to 
show them to be sound will now only afford to our opponents the 
means of representing my judgment upon the whole affair to have 
been ludicrously erroneous. In spite of all arguments to prove 
the taxes, unconnected with the rebellion, it will now be said 
that you have yourself practically confessed the truth to be 
otherwise ••• In matters of finance, it is always very dangerous 
to be unsteady in your policy - to lay a tax on one day and take 
it off the next, necessarily leads to the conclusion that you have 
either in the first instance acted hastily and inconsiderately 
or that you have afterwards yielded to clamour against your judg-
ment and this tends to destroy confidence in your Govt, but to do 
this when the new taxes are said to have been the cause of 
insu~ction is to give your opponents plausible grounds for 
" 
imputing the bloodshed which has taken place to your want of 
ordinary prudence ••• I do not see how I shall be able to avoid for 
my own justification expressing my disapprobation in somewhat 
severe terms in my official Dispatch, as the whole correspondence 
must be laid before Parlt.•(l25) 
Torrington's defence of his conduct in this respect was by 
no means a good one •. He claimed that he thought that it was 
impossible that the new taxes and the revolt could have been 
associated in peoples' minds, thus contradicting his own statement 
in the lett:er of August 11th, when he stated that no doubt people 
(125) Grey to Torrington, December 22nd, 1848. 
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in Britain would attempt to show a connexion between the two. He 
claimed that the discussions in Parliament on the taxes had partly 
brought about their repeal, by giving the people a notion that 
Parliament did not wish them to pay such; yet repealing them was 
precisely the way to arouse contempt of Torrington's Government 
amongst the native inhabitants, and to encourage them to further 
critic isms and acts of disobe.d.ience to procure the withdrawal of 
other measures. The repeal would also encourage the opposition 
amongst the European inhabitants to arouse criticism at home and 
in Ceylon, since the G:overnment of the island had shown itself 
s·o amenable to critic ism. Torrington also claimed that the new 
taxes had .been abandoned because they were not a financial succes·s; 
he gave reasons as to why this was so, but these reasons (for 
example that the people would rather have destroyed their guns than 
pay taxes on them) should have been foreseen before the taxes were 
levied. His claim, therefore, that he could not admit to any 
error of judgment seems very wide of the mark.(l26) 
Torrington's conduc.t in suppressing the rebellion, had been 
severely criticized by the British Press, which accused him of 
undue severity. These accusations led H.J. Baillie, M.P. for 
10\ Inverness, backed by that indefatigable Joseph Hupe, M.P. for 
Montrose, who was ready to see coionial oppressions in every land 
under British rule, to demand a Select Committee to investigate 
the affairs of British ~uiana and Ceylon. The Committee was duly 
granted, though Grey had wanted the call for it to be resisted if 
(126) Torrington to Grey, February 18th, 1849.· 
it were practical politics. It was not practical; Peel's speech 
was very effective in swinging opinion round in the House to 
favour the enquiry. In particular the execution of a Buddhist 
priest in his religious dress came in for great criticism. The 
defenders of the Government were, in Grey's opinion, not very 
impressive, and he was appalled by Russell's feeble answer to the 
critics from the Tory and Radical ranks. It was one of the least 
agreeable evenings Grey had ever spent in the House of Commons, 
for he had gone there especially to listen to the debate.< 127) 
Torrington was not a man who could quietly endure misrepresent-
ation and criticism. Perhaps he was haunted by the spectre of 
Admiral Byng. His letters to Grey became increasingly concerned 
with justifications of his own conduct and abuse of his opponents 
both in the island and in Britain. At times these letters have 
an hysterical flavour about them. Torrington's sensitivity to 
criticism led him ~nto further errors of judgment. One of his 
most persistent critics was Dr Elliott of the Colombo 'Observer'; 
in September, 1849, Torrington wrote to inform G:·rey t_hat he had 
struck a blow against this man by allowing a rival local newspaper 
to have a copy of a despatch of Sir Colin Campbell's (the last 
Governor) containing the information that Dr Elliott had offered 
to sell himself and his paper to Government, but that Campbell had 
declined to purchase him. This news the paper was ordered to 
publish as if it had been received from Britain. When an 
(127) Grey to Torrington, February 21st, 1849. 
Journal, February, 17th and 20th, 1849. 
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indignant Dr Elliott enquired from Grey as to the source of the 
information, Grey was. obliged to state that neither he nor the 
Colonial Office were responsible for the insertion of the despatch 
in the paper. T.orrington, therefore, stood convicted of underhand 
aealings; Grey would have had no objection to a publication of 
the despatch if the Governor had acted openly in the matter 
instead of trying to conceal his participation and instead of 
·attempting to give a misleading impression of the source tram 
whence the despatch came. -~rey was inclined to blame another 
rather than Torrington for this measure, this 9ther being TeB~ent, 
to whose advice Grey believed-Torrington to be too favourably in-
clined. <128 ) 
Perhaps there was more justification in the point made by 
Torrington that critic ism in Ceylon· and Britain was harmful to 
the former. Enclosed in one of the Governor's private letters to 
Grey is one from the Singhalese head of police at Kandy. This 
shows what effect the whole process of Parliamentary Committees 
of Enquiry could have on an Eastern population:-
'They (the people of Kandy) think any gentleman in the Civil 
Service who is not abused, more influential and better than the 
Governor and Colonial Secretary whom they see constantly abused. •• 
They think if these things were false the Governor and Colonial 
Secretary would punish the people who tell such lies; - but as 
(128) Torrington to Grey, September lOth, 1849. 
Grey to Torrington, November 19th, 1849. 
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they see no punishment and no stop put to it, they think the 
Governor and Colonial Secretary bad people ••• and they are not 
respected in consequence. 
In Kandian King's time ••• if people in authority fell the 
first symptom of it was that common people spoke ill of them and 
were not punished ••• These people say, t.he taxes were repealed 
because they were not satisfied with them, and because they rose 
and opposed them ••• •(l29) 
Meanwhile the·committee of Enquiry in Britain was pursuing 
its investigation. Torrington had hoped that favourable evidence 
as to his Government and the suppression of the revolt would have 
been supplied by Wodehouse, the Government Agent of the Western 
Province, who had gone home on leave. Tcbrringt:on' s opinion of 
this gentleman, like his opinion of Tennent, quite frequently 
varied, but at the time of Wodehouse t:s departure, it was a very 
high one in the latter's favour. Wodehouse was Tennent's personal 
enemy; he had a grievance in that he considered that TeBflent 
had been made Colonial Secretary by Stanley over his own head. 
Perhaps the fact that Tennent and the G:overnor appeared to be on 
friendly terms, led Wodehouse to the step of giving evidence to 
the Committee in a sense direct~y contrary to the advice he had 
given as a member of the Executive and Legislative Coqncils 9 at 
the time to the Governor. T'orrington was of course Slrpr-ised and 
indignant at this latest development. He claimed that Wodehouse 
had approved of the new taxes and martial law, though he now told 
( 129) Torrington to Grey August 11th, 1849¢ enclosing 
a letter from Loka Banda. 
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the Committee that the first were the cause of the revolt and 
that the latter was unnecessary. Now Wodehouse in the G:over.nor' s 
eyes was a man to be avoided'as one does a pestilence,' and he 
began to probe into the scandal of Wodehouse 's debts to natives 
in the colony and to charges of corruption in his administration 
• 
of his office.(l30) 
T.o G:rey Torrington appeared to be becoming mare involved in 
personal disputes than appeared to be wise. Complaining letters 
continued to reach Grey, and Torrington even addressed one to 
Russell, who was angry at its tenor. Grey thought it prudent to 
give some advice to Torrington as to how to conduct himself:-
'If we were equally thin-skinned what would become of us ? 
As for me there are 3 or 4 newsp~pers whose principal busines.s ·it 
.ur 
seems to be to make ~ that there is no meanness or dishonesty I 
am not constantly committing. Only keep yourself cool, play your 
game cautiously ••• and I have ·no doubt the Committee will end in ••• 
your triumph. But I must say that while you storm at your enemies 
you do not avail yourself as you ought of their blunders ••• I 
wish you would always remember that a Gov. of a Colony gains 
infinite strength ••• by conducting every correspondence with the 
most rigid attention to official forms, and with a judicial gravity 
and calrrmess. 1 ( 131) 
Ceylon affairs were now drawing ta a crisis with regard to the 
Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry, yet strangely enough the island 
(130) 
(131) 
Torrington to Grey, April 4th and October 9th, 1849. 
Grey to Torrington, November 24th, 1849. 
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itself had surmounted its financial difficulties, and was in a 
very prosperous condition, and - despite the fears of' the Governor -
the majority of its inhabitants remained settled and peaceful. 
At the end of' 1849 Tennent, also on leave, left for Britain. 
Torrington warmly recommended him in a letter to Grey, as being 
a firm friend and as having power to refute all statements made 
by Wodehouse and others to the Committee. Tennent's adherence 
to the ffiovernor's side could be further guaranteed if his personal 
ambition were satisfied and he was made a baronet instead of' a 
knight. When Grey still expressed distrust of' Tennent, Torrington 
again turned a verbal somersault and aseused his Colonial Secretary 
of causing nearly all the troubles which had befallen the 
G~overnor, spoke of Tennent t:s 'treachery' and stated that he had 
no desire for his return. Apart from the fact that Tennent was 
on bad terms with nearly everyone else in the Ceylon Civil Service 
the reason for the Governor's assertions is not apparent. 
Perhaps it is a mistake to look for consistenc¥ in Torrington's 
opinions of' individuals; he was a man who allowed himself' tq be 
too much influenced by the passion, prejudice or fear of' the 
moment.( 132) 
Not that Grey himself' was free from differing opinions an 
individuals. On the first perusal of' Wodehouse's evidence before 
the Committee Grey was at a loss to understand the attitude an 
this matter of' his G'overnor; a closer acquaintance, however, 
( 132) Torrington to Grey, Dec. 12th 1849 and March 2md, 1850. 
Grey to Torrington, January 23rd, 1850. 
convinced Grey that there was a degree crf inconsistency between 
Wodehouse 1 s actions in Ceylon and his evidence in Britain. At 
the same time he again cautioned T.orrington against making a 
'run' against Wodehouse and 'hunting up alleged improprieties in 
his conduct about money.' As for Tennent, he had given his 
evidence extremely well; according to Grey his mean fault was tha.t:-
'he is truly Irish in his notion of carrying on business by 
management and manoeuvre instead of by an open straight forward 
course. ' ( l33) 
The Wodehouse-Tennent question is the key to the denouement 
of the Ceylon ,.,:story. On May 20th, 1850, Grey informed Torrington 
that he had conclusive proof that Wodehouse and Selby, a law 
officer in Ceylon, were in league with Baillie and Hum~ against 
the Gbvernment, and that, if he found it practical, he would see 
that they were punished f'or this. While Grey was still considering 
means of carrying out his threat, the fates of Torrington, of' 
Wodehouse and Tennent were decided elsewhere. Wodehouse, goaded 
by the attacks on his character and financial affairs Torrington 
was making in Ceylon, and desirous of' destroying the alliance 
between his enemy Tennent and the Governor, laid some private 
letters of' T_orrington 's adaressed to himself before the Committee. 
These were written by Torrington at a time wh~n Tennent was in 
disfavour with the Governor and contained much abuse of the Civil 
Secretary.Tennent, who had been defending the Governor's policy 
before the Committee, was surprised and hurt when these were 
( 133) G-rey to Torrington, January 23rd and April 2!,th, 1850. 
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produced, yet endeavoured to excuse and explain away the G:overnor' s 
words. On the Committee the letters produced a great effect, one 
most unfavourable to Torrington. 
G:rey thought that Wodehouse had been guilty of a 'scandalous 
breach of confidence' and that the action of the Committee in 
calling for private letters was also most improper. Yet, like the 
Committee, Grey reacted to the contents of the letters in a way 
·unfavourable to Torrington. The a·overnor had committed his last -
the fatal - indiscretion. The members of the Committee, Lord John 
Russell and Grey himself, realized that after the revelation of 
these letters Torrington had to be recalled. A Governor had to 
stand above personal issues in a colony, not involve himself in 
them, far less write abusing the second most important civil 
servant to an inferior in the civil service. on July 24, 1850, 
G:rey wrote to Torrington to inform him that the Committee was 
over and that no censure had been passed against Torrington's 
public measures, yet that it was the opinion of the Committee, 
with which Grey agreed, that Torrington ought to be recalled:-
'while I think you are entitled to great credit for your 
public measures ••• still the fact of your having written such 
letters about the principal officer of your G:ovt without; communi-
cating to him what you thought of him renders ·it impractical for 
you to carry on the Govt ••• I cannot say how deeply I regret ••• 
that you should contrary to my repeated advice have taken up so 
bitterly an attack upon Wodehouse for his .eviden·ce of last year. 
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If you had not done this but had content~d you~self with sending 
home the pape~s necessa~y fo~ the explanation of you~ own conduct, 
not allowing Tennent to come ove~ and thus p~eventing all these 
pe~sonal matte~s f~om being brought fo~wa~d my conviction is that 
we should have closed the Committee 6 weeks ago with complete 
success.' 
Tb~rington was ~eplaced by Si~ George William Ande~son, 
Governo~ of Mau~itius, who among other things settled the Buddhist 
question on lines simila~ to those which Tor~ington had advocated. 
Wodehouse and Tennent were also ~emoved f~om Ceylon; Wodehouse had 
in the futu~e a long ca~ee~ as governo~ of B~itish Hondu~as, 
B~itish Guiana, Cape Colony and Bombay. Tennent in Decembe~, 1850 
was gazetted:; as Governo~ of St. Helena but neve~ took up the 
appointment; instead he ~eturned to Pa~liament, f~om which he 
~eti~ed in 1867, when he finally achieved his ambition of becoming 
a ba~onet. He also became an autho~, and gave a two-volume autho~­
atative account of Ceylon. To~~ington was neve~ employed again. 
As soon as he learnt of his dismissal To~~ington asked fo~ 
fo~the~ employment o~ some ma~k of favou~ f~om the G:ove~nment, and 
failing this a f~esh investigation with 'a fair and impa~tial 
Committee. 1 ·G~ey was obliged to ~eply that the e~~o~ of w~iting 
such a lette~ on Tennent which Wodehouse had shown the Committee 
was so se~ious that he could neve~ hold out the p~ospect of 
anothe~ colonial governo~ship, being given to To~~ington:-
'Fo~ a Gove~no~ w~i ting to a subordinate of the Colonial 
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G1overnment to express himself' in the terms you did of' the Colonial 
Secretary, was more wrong than I f'ear you quite understand, such 
accusations ought on no account to be made against any man, much 
more against one filling so important a post, by his chief' unless 
on the clearest evidence and if' there is a proof' that a public 
servant. deserves to be so spoken of', the charges ought to be 
made openly and every opportunity given to the acc:used to def'end 
himself'.' 
Towards the close of' 1852 Torrington was still writing to 
complain that he was the only one of' the three still without an 
appointment, and that he was ruined and given to brooding over 
the whole matter.(134) 
T.orrington, on the advice of' Grey, defended his conduct in 
the House of' Lords in the spring of' 1851. Despite the pleas of' 
Russell, Wood and George Grey, Earl Grey spoke in the debate this 
occasioned, but, as he himself' admitted, none too well. The 
G1overnment were f'earf'ul of' the result of' a threatened vote of' 
censure on the motion of' Baillie; when this was finally brought 
forward it was defeated by 282 to 202. 
Torrington in many respects was not a good appointment as 
~overnor of' Ceylon. His public policy was sound, he was quick 
to grasp the intricacies of' such problems as the financial and 
the Buddhist ones, and if' his suppression of' the Kandyan revolt 
(134) Torrington to Grey, September 18th, 1850 and November 30th, 
1852. Grey to Torrington, August 11th, 1851. 
The of'f'ending letter, see Torrington to Wodehouse, 
May 3rd, 184~. Colonial P apers, Ceylon. 
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was severe it yet had the approbation of most of the Europeans in 
the country plus that elf his superiors at home, and the revolt 
was soon extinguished and peace restored. The most debateable 
act of his Government was laying on the new taxes, and it is that 
aspect of his public policy which is most vulnerable to criticism; 
he ought to have realized the non-productive nature of these taxes 
before establishing them, and withdrawing them immediately after 
the rebellion was a serious error of judgment in that to most 
people it proved that the imposition of these new taxes was behind 
the revolt. I:t was as an individual that his greatest failings 
were revealed; he could grasp problems and carry out a definite 
line of policy to meet them, but unlike an Elgin or a Barkly 
he could not to the outside world present an air of calm detach-
ment in the face of bitter criticism- after all bitter criticism 
in many colonial societies was the norm, and the Home Government 
was also constantly exposed to it. Not knowing how, or unable 
to, regulate his conduct ae as to secure the greatest possible 
outside sympathy, and to conduct himself as the representative 
of the Queen and the foremost person in the island ought to do, 
he fell into one error after another. Alternatively abusing 
Tennent and Wodehouse, acting in the manner he did towards the 
editor of the Colombo 'Observer', he only succeeded in injuring 
himself and all those who attempted to support him. The 
confidential letter to Wodehouse was. the final mistake, and a 
G'overnor of a calmer, stabler temperament had to be found. Not 
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that Torrington and the man who appointed him and laid down the 
broad lines of policy he was to follow were the only ones to 
blame; Tennen.t, Wodehouse and those partizan members of the 
Committee of Enquiry such as Baillie and Hume, cannot be exoner-
ated. Torrington's successor, Anderson, proved to be above the 
personal squabbles of colonial society, and with the worstr 
trouble makers removed from the island, under his guidance Ceylon 
continued to increase in prosperity •• 
K. Labuan. 
Torrington, Barkly, Ward, these were some of the Governors 
who haQ. come under the close scrutiny of Joseph Hume. Sir James 
Brooke, one of the most talented and selfless of men which the 
nineteenth century produced, was yet another, and the experience 
was to be an extremely trying one; during Grey's period at the 
Colonial Office Brooke was as well-supported as was possible with 
a Government restricted by prevailing motives of economy and by 
prejudices against further responsibilities overseas, but a later 
G·overnment was to grant an enquiry for Which Hume had pressed 
pertinaciously though with little support from the House of 
Commons. 
In the course of travels in the Far East James Brooke, an 
Englishman of an extremely adventurous dispo~ion, became interested 
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in the island of Borneo. The northern part of that island formed 
the independent Sultanate of Brune. South-west of Brune, along 
the coast, lay the region of Sarawak, held on the flimsiest of 
feudal tenures from the Sultanate of Brune, the ·Raja of Saiawak 
being the uncle of the then reigning Sultan. Both the governments 
in Brune and Sarawak were deplorably weak, and to English eyes 
these countries seemed in a condition of near anarchy, where the 
weak were with impunity oppressed by the strong. 
Whilst visiting Sarawak in a strictly private capacity, Brooke, 
for giving the support of his own.vessel to the authorities in 
their efforts to suppress a rebellion, was offered the government 
of the country by its grateful Raja, Muda Hassim. Brooke decided 
to accept, and in 1841 became Raja of Sarawak. Under his 
energetic government peace and order·were restored, security 
for life and property ensured, and commerce began to revive. 
, .i~ 
Soon Sarawak was an independent country~ its own right, and 
though the overlordship of the Sultan of Brune might yet exist 
in theory, in practice it was no longer recognized. 
Like other able Englishmen before and since his time, Brooke 
was eager to see his own country derive some benefits from the 
area in which he now held so much influence. According to his 
view, Brune was in such a weak state that sooner or later it would 
fall into the hands of a European power. Two such powers were 
interested in the East Indies, Holland and Great Britain, and 
if the last remaining native state was to succumb Brooke of course 
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preferred the latter country to possess it; whilst at the same 
~ time either taking over, or giving a protectorate to, Sarawak. 
]b letters home to his friends, and_ in a Journal which was later 
published, he pointed out the advantages of vigorous action on 
Britain's part:-
'It (Borneo) produces everything ••• Coal alone, so rare a 
. . 
feature in these climates.; may be a formidable acquisition in the 
hands of a rival trading power ••• Borneo is centrical between 
Singapore, China, and Mallilla, and a steam line must extend to 
India on one side and Australia on the other.' 
In his Journal on March 31st, 1843, Brooke wrote:-
'The proper course for the British Government to pursue 
would be to obtain the monopoly of the Borneo coal, with the 
cession of the island of Labuan at the mouth of the Brun6 river ••• 
in the present state of Borneo Proper, the Rajas would cede any 
amount of territory provided there was a chance in the agreement 
promising British protection from the pirates.' (l35) 
All commerce in the area, whether trading vessels plying to 
the British trading outposts and Singapore or to tbe Dutch 
possessions or moving along the coast between river and river at 
Sarawak, was men~ced by a scourge which haunted these Eastern 
seas. That scourge was piracy. Piracy, with many of the peoples 
CLr eo.. 
in this was a profession, a highly regarded one, in some respects 
" 
(135) 'The Raja of Sarawak'. Gertrude L. Jacob, London. 
1876. 2 vols. Vol. 1. pp. 220•230. 
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looked upon by its devotees in a similar light to that in Which 
the Thugs, that semi-religious organization for highway robber.¥ 
and ·murder which the British found well-established in India on 
their arrival, regarded their actions. T.he mo~t wide-ranging 
pirates were from the Spanish Philippines, but the north-west 
coasts of Borneo and neighbouring areas had their own neEt of 
pirates," sea Dyaks led by Malays and located in the regions of the 
Sare bus and Sakafan rivers. 
. ,. 
.,. 
The Sarebus and Sakaran Dyaks were ,.. 
the terror of the western Borneon coast; they attacked vessels 
and the inland tribes of Dyaks indiscriminately, the ·Malays kept 
the plunder, the ~aks took the heads of their victims, and also 
their women and children when these were available. Not being 
well-armed they avoided conflict with British or Dutch men of 
war, .but did not hesitate to attack trading vessels engaged in 
commerce with British possessions. 
Brooke determined when he took over Sarawak to stamp ou~ 
p.iracy, only then could his people live in peace and cormnerce 
flourish. As a private individual he had not sufficient funds 
wherewith to procure a steamer for this purpose, and reasoning 
that the increase of commerce would not only benefit Sarawak but 
also British trade, he thought it not unreasonable that the Royal 
Navy should help him in the extirpation of piracy. In Captain 
the Honourable Henry Keppel, in command of H.M.S. 'Dido', he 
found a person of like views; Keppel determined on his own 
responsibility to put down piracy, and in 1843 the first expedition 
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in which Brooke and ships of the Royal Navy joined forces, 
attacked the Sarebus Byaks in their lair. Up to 1846 Brooke aided 
by the Royal Navy carried out intermittently but quite frequently 
attacks on the pirates both at sea and in their strongholds. 
From Brooke's point of view the only snag was the impermanency 
of the arrangement. The Royal Navy was liable to be called away 
unexpectedly to the coasts of China or elsewhere. 
The Raja of Sarawak had not ceased to hope that Britain, 
besides aiding in the suppression of piracy, would also play a 
more active role in the area along the line of his recommendations. 
His hopes rose when he received-, in February 1845, the notice of 
a temporary appointment as Confidential Agent in Borneo for the 
Queen. In this capacity he delivered a letter from the Queen 
promising aid in the suppression of piracy, after the Sultan had 
addressed a letter to the Queen on this subject. This was the 
position in which Brooke stood \!Vhen Grey assumed charge of colonial 
affairs. The extension of' British influence, the acquisition 
of the island of Labuan and its coalfields, the right to work coal 
in the Sultan's domains, the suppression of' piracy, these were 
the points for which Brooke contended. 
In December, 1848, the 'Iris' arrived at Sarawak with orders 
to take possession of the island of Labuan after consultation 
with Brooke, the Sultan of Brune having promised to give it up 
in return for assurances of protection against piracy. The orders 
were from Palmerston, the Foreign Secretary; they emanated from 
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the Foreign Office because the question of Britain's relations 
, 
with independent powers like the Dutch and the Sultan of Brune 
were involved. On Christmas Eve Labuan and the adjacent islets 
formally became part of the British Empire. 
In 1847 Brooke paid a visit to Britain where honours and 
attentions· were showered upon him. During his stay he met Earl 
Grey, and a lasting friendship sprang up between the two men. 
As is revealed in Grey'_s subsequent correspondence with Brooke, 
the Colonial-Secretary admired the ideals of administration which 
the latter set himself~ to raise the standards of living and 
intelligence, to introduce the C~istian ethic, among primitive 
peoples was well worthy of some effort in Grey's eyes. He was 
also convinced by Brooke's argument as to the importance qf 
Labuan as a strategic position in the East and as a sure source 
of coal. In the summer of 1847, Grey pressed upon the Cabinet 
and especially on the Prime Minister the necessity of establishing 
a settlement at Labuan, befo~e squatters took possessi9n of the 
land and coal. Bearing in mind that objections to· this would be 
raised on the ground of economy, Grey undertook to keep expense 
do,m to the lo'lvest possible amount. He also suggested that 
Brooke should be the first G·overnor of the colony. T.o G:rey' s 
proposals Russell agreed, and Brooke was appointed ffiovernor of 
Labuan and Consul-General of Borneo in ad4ition to his former 
. ( 136) honorary appo1ntment. 
( 136) July 14th, 1847, Grey to Russell. 
July k7th, 1847, Ru£;3s·ell to Grey. 
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Before the close of 1847 Grey was able to inform Brooke that 
he had received the Chancellor of the Exchequer's concurrence as 
to Brooke's proposal for the Establishment at Labuan, the only 
objection that Wood had made was to the salary of the Lieutenant 
Governor. In the same letter was news that Brooke had been made 
a Knight Commander of the Bath. Brooke, who throughout his life 
was never interested in money for its own sake, proposed that 
instead of diminishing the Lieutenant-G.overnor's salary the cuts 
should be made in his own or in both together; Grey considered 
his salary low enough already, and determined to get the Treasury 
to leave the Lieutenant-Governor's salary at Brooke's first 
figure. Relations between Colonial Secretary and Governor of 
Labuan we.re as cordial as they could be. ( 137) 
Though fully supported by Grey, Brooke must soon have realized 
that the former was only one in a Government continually harried 
in Parliament by those who criticized it on grounds of wasteful 
expenditure, amongst which was cited the island of Labuan. 
Critics like Cobden took a narrow financial view of the colonies; 
unless they paid their way they were merely an expensive burden 
to the Mother Country. Argument.s that if carefully fostered they 
would become of strategic and commercial importance in the future 
went unheeded. It is a remarkable fact that in, the age 'IIVhen 
Britain was most materially prosperous so was she most concerned 
to economize and to scrutin.ize minutely every little increase in 
(137) Dec. 10/47, Grey to Brooke. 
Dec. 16/ Grey to Brooke. 
Dec 11/ Brooke to Grey. 
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in expenditure. G!rey was careful to press upon Brooke the need 
f'or economy if' Labuan were not to be abandoned:-
' it aeems ••• rather ungracious when you are acting so 
economically already to press upon you the necessity of' the most 
rigid parsimony in your public expenditure, but I am sure you will 
excuse my doing so, as the f'act is owing to the prevailing distress 
the H. of' Commons has gone half' mad on the subject of' economy 
and there is a disposition to question every shilling of' expendi-
ture we propose. Having said this privately I shall not trouble 
you with any detailed suggestions in my public Be spa tches having 
thorough confidence both in your desire to save us dif'f'iculty ••• 
and in your being f'ar better able to judge than I can be, in 
what items money can be saved and what expenses can be safely 
postponed to better times.'(l38) 
]-n November, 1849, Grey warned Brooke to send him proposals as 
to the future of Labuan, giving him 83 favourable an acc:ount of the 
colony as he conscientiously could, as the co~ing session of' 
Parliament threatened to provide considerable opposition to the 
vote f'or maintaining the island.( 139) 
Brooke soon f'ound himself faced with a renewal of' the pirate 
threat, and with no naval f'orce to meet it. From the time that 
he had been aided by Keppel, Brooke had hoped that the navy would 
have disposable forces f'or a systematic war against piracy until 
its exponents were crushed a..T.Jd gave up their evil ways. The· 
(138) Grey to Brooke, August 23rd, 1848j 
(139) Grey to Brooke, November 17th, 1849· 
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agreement made with the Sultan of Brune seemed to make this 
certain. By steady pressure, Brooke hoped to eradicate the. 
pirate menance within a few years, but·without the Royal Navy 
that steady pressure could not be forthcoming. In March 1849, 
.,. 
the Sarebus and Sakaran Dyaks were again active, and a pirate 
A 
fleet estimated to number one hundred and thirty prahus (native 
boats) began to commit depredatiops along the coasts. The only 
force Brooke had to oppose it was a much smaller fleet of' native 
craft. In March, 1849, he wrote to Grey requesting that some 
naval force should be always available for just such. an emergency. 
On receipt of this letter Grey pressed upon Sir Francis Baring, 
the head.of the Admiralty, the need Brooke had of naval aid, and 
Baring sent out instructing for a force to be employed against the 
pirates. In March and again, in July of that year British forces 
asststed Brooke in his war against piracy. An article in the 
Singapore paper, 'The Straits Times' asked in reference to the 
-
first of these expeditions "whether it was creditable to our 
naval forces, to aid or to take part in cruel butcheries, and 
brutal murders of the helpless and defenceless." In Britain, 
the 'Daily News' of June 25th, 1849, quoted this article, a~d 
that day the paper was read by Joseph Hume, M.P. for Montrose. 
There was one man in Britain more personally interested in 
attacking Sir James Brooke's position than Hume. Joseph Hume at 
least believed he was acting in the country 11 s best interests, 
Henry Wise had no such illusions. Wise ~a~ formerly been Brooke's 
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financial agent in Britain; encouraged by his employer Wise had 
formed the Eastern Archi~elago Company, with himself as managing 
director, to work the coai of Labuan and any mineral wealth which 
Sarawak might possess. Wise was interested solely in profit 
potentialities. Instead of a Company which would be content to 
start modestly to_work the coal mines, he began to think more in 
speculative terms. If Brooke as Raja of Sarawak would by joining 
the Company lend it the prestige of his name, Wise was in hopes 
that the Company would realize substantial profits. Brooke refused 
to entangle himself in commercial speculations; his duty to the 
people of Sarawak forbade that he should take upon himself the 
character of a merchant. He suspected that Wise's schemes were 
a mere speculative 'bubble'. What he was interested in was the 
efficient working of the coal mines of the ~buan; on October 
lOth, 1848, he wrote to Grey:-
'I look forward with hope to the working of the Coal by the 
Eastern Archipelago Company which will give a great impulse to 
the place and yield a very considerable revenue for I. entertain 
no doubts that the coal may be very cheaply worked and that this 
Company if fairly and honestly conducted will be· successful: in 
their plans and supply coal not only to our ·men of war ••• ' 
By the spring of 1849, his suspicions of· the 'bona fide' nature 
of the Company had been increased.· ':D.hough it had agents in Labuan 
it had no machinery for the che_ap and extensive working of the 
coal mines, which were so necessary for the prosperity of Labuan, 
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and the main justification for its creation into a colony. In 
August of 1849 the position was no better; as far as Brooke could 
see the Eastern Archipelago Company had no funds, Vllhi-lst its 
agents were without local experience and entirely ignorant of 
the native language. Wise''s agency had already ceased at the 
end of 1848, the Raja not being satisfied with the way in which 
his financial affairs were handl~d and his name used.(l40) 
'lihe expeditions against pirates in 1849, the article in the 
Singapore newspaper and its republication in Britain, enabled 
Wise to counter-attack. Private pique at his dismissal and a 
desire to direct the Raja's attention from the questionable 
character of the Eastern Archipelago Company were no doubt his 
predominant motives. In November, 1849, he wrote to Russell 
about the 'recent dreadful proceedings against some ·of the Dyaks 
in Borneo.' ~hus for different reasons Wise and Hume were 
becoming the main leaders of an attack against Brooke which was 
to develop in the follo~ing year.(l4l) 
Grey's view of the matter was identical with that of Brooke's, 
the man after all best able to judge whether men were pirates or 
not. Writing to congratulate Brooke on the successful operations 
against the pirates, Grey wrote:-
'··· the sort of compassion which you say there is a tendency 
to in Singapore is indeed a most spurious humanity but I am sorry 
(140) 
(141) 
Brooke to Grey. Oct.. 10, 1848, May 21, and Aug. 29, 1849· 
Wise to Russell, Nov. 26, 1849. quoted in Jacob, Vol. II, 
P• g. 
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to say there is too much tendency to the same feeling here, for 
my part I consider that true humanity prescribes a good deal of 
vigour and severity in the measures taken against pirates, rebels 
and other disturbers of the public peace, and my pity is for those 
who are the victims of such criminals not for the criminals 
themselves.' 
No doubt when Grey wrote this he had in mind the criticism that 
had been made in connection with the suppression of revolts in 
. ( 142) C.eylon and the Ion1an Islands. 
By an Act passed in the reign of George IV prize-money was 
granted to the navy for the death and capture of pirates, at a 
rate of £20 and £5 respectively. £100,000 was allowed as prize-
money by Sir Christopher Rawlinson, Recorder of Singapore, for 
the actions of 1849. It was the insinuation of his enemies that 
Brooke benefited from prize-money, and that its rate of payment; 
encouraged severity in dealing with pirates. Only the navy was 
rewarded prize-money, none went to Brooke, but to overcome the 
other accusation which was more plausible, the Government in 1850 
introduced a bill to amend the former act; by the terms of this 
bill instead of a definite sum per head each action was to be 
decided on its general merits as to the amount of prize-money to 
be awarded. The decision was to be made· by the Admiralty in 
conjunction with the Treasury. The passing of this bill through 
Parliament gave Brooke's critics a further opportunity to be 
(142) Grey to Brooke. November 17th, 1849. 
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voc.al, Grey defending him in the House of Lor~. (l43) 
In March 1850, Hume moved for papers in connection wfth Borneo. 
In May, the Navy Estimates came up for discussion; under the 
head of 'miscellaneous services' the Government asked for £100,000 
bounty for the capture and destructi~n of pirates, slavers and 
vessels. Again Brooke ';s critics were active. Cobden .attempted to 
prove that the Dyak pirates were merely engaged in in.ter-tribal 
wars which did not concern Britain unless her own vessels were 
attacked. McGregor, the chairman of the Eastern Archipelago 
Company, opposed the vote. The opposition were defeated by 145 
to 20. In July, 1850, Hume demanded a Royal· Commission to 
' 
enquire into the question qf Borneo and piracy, and again was 
defeated by a large majority, only 29 members voting with him. 
The following year Hume could only muster 18 votes for the same 
proposal. 
In 1852, Brooke, once again on a visit to Britain, struck 
back at the Eastern Archipelago Company, which had not subscribed 
the amount of money prescribed by its Charter. Despite Grey's 
belief that Brooke would find it more advantageous to come to 
terms with the Company, excluding Henry Wise, Brooke became its 
prosecutor under a writ of 'scire faciQS.' In November 1852, the 
Court of Queen's Bench decided in favour of Brooke, and this 
decision wa~ affirmed a year later by the Exchequer Chamber.< 144) 
( 143) 
(144) 
Journal, April. 18, 1~50. GreY to Brooke, April 19, 1850 
Brooke to Grey, Feb. 13 and 16, 1852. Grey to 
Brooke, February 14th, 1852. 
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Thus when Grey left Office, Brooke had apparently survived 
the fate of a Torrington, thanks mainly to the support of Govern-
ment and public opinion. Unfortunately he was never to know such 
support as Grey gave him from subsequent Colonial or Foreign 
Secretaries. The Coalition Ministry of Lord Aberdeen, despite 
the votes in Brooke's favour ~ the House of Commons, and the 
small numbers of his enemies, determined upon a Commission of 
Enquiry. Brooke believed the instructions for this to be so 
unjust that he resigned all offices he held under Government. In 
addition there were no more naval ·expeditions against pirates; 
Brooke was left to cope with these marauders alone, without the 
assistance of one steamer. Labuan on which such high hopes had 
been placed languished, and it even seemed as though Sarawak itself 
would not be able to stand unsupported, and that as England was 
unwilling to extend her responsibilities, it must be incorporated 
in the possessions of Holland. All this came about because 
subsequent Governments were unwilling to go as far or fE'ther than 
the Russell Government in developing Labuan and in making the seas 
safe for commerce. Throughout these years Brooke found in Grey 
one of his most consistent supporters, but his influence out of 
office was not sufficient to cause the successive Qovernments to 
change their policy in the Eastern seas; Brooke's wider visions 
remained unfulfilled, and as the independent ruler of Sarawak 
he devoted his remaining energies to improving the conditions of 
his people. 
L. The Mediterranean Possessions. 
Strictly speaking the British possessions in the Mediterranean 
administered by the Colonial Office were not colonies at all. 
Gibraltar and Malta were important garrisons in the running of 
which the Horse Guards had considerable say; the Ionian Islands 
were on the other hand a protectorate acquired in 1815. 
· Grey was not satisfied with the conditions of Malta and his 
first step was to insist upon a Ci~il Governor. Of the two names 
originally suggested by Grey for this post one was apparently 
Cobden, for Russell, who rejected both suggestions, in reply 
stated:-
'! agree however in what you say generally of Cobden, and I 
shall be disposed to sound the Directors to see whether they will 
appoint him to Madras. He would be of great use in India, where 
there is really something of a grand commercial operation to carry 
into effect.' 
Eventually the Governorship was offered to More O'Ferrall, a 
moderate Irish M.P., a sound choice, especially when religious 
questions were causing a great ferment at Malta.(l45) 
By the time that Grey came to draft his first Memorandum on 
Colonial Policy in February, 1849, he could report that abuses 
of long standing had been corrected, reforms introduced, and 
plans made for the introduction of a system of representative 
(145) Russeh to Grey. Jan. 28, July 5, Aug. 10. Sept. 3, 
Sept. 15, 1847. 
Grey to Russell, July 6, July 14. 
government, whilst in 1850 he was able to add that the new 
constitution was in operation and that it appeared to give 
general satisfaction. 
A f'ar thornier problem was the Ionian Islands. At the out·set 
of' the .Napolecimic.:Wars these islands with their main body of' 
·.people of' Greek national_ity belonged to Venice, and the landowning 
class was in _the main Venetian in its origin. At the end of the 
wars Venice was no more, it had become an Austrian possession. 
At the same time the years of' warf'are had taught Britain the value 
of' the Ionian Islands, especially Corf'u, as a naval station f'or 
control of' the eastern Mediterr!3!Jean. Eventually by the Treaty 
of' November 5th, 1815, their status was defined. By Article One 
of this treaty made by the victorious Powers the seven islands 
were to form 'a single, f'ree and independent state, under the 
denomination of' the United States of' the Ionian Islands.' 
Article Two stipulated that the islands were to be placed 'under 
the immediate and exclusive protection of' His Majesty the King of' 
Great Britain. ' Thus Britain became a protectorate Power, and 
the problem arose as to how to reconcile this task with the 
stipulation that the Ionian Islands should enjoy some form of' 
constitutional privileges. (146) 
In 1817 a Constitution f'or the islands was established. Its 
facade attempted to disguise the fact that British authority was 
comparatively unrestricted. The islands were placed under a High 
( 146) ·'Cambridge History of the British Empire. ' Vol. II. 
Cambridge, 1940. P• 183 ff'. 
Commissioner with very wide discretionary powers. A Senate 
combined the functions of Executive and Legislative Councils; 
its President was nominated by the Crown, and the election of its 
•""" five other members by the Legislative from among its~ members 
t. 
was subject~ the Commissioner's veto. The Legislative Council' 
consisted of forty members elected under a high property franchise; 
it was to be chosen for five years during which period it would 
hold two sessions. The High Commissioner was to reside at Corfu, 
and be assisted by Residents in the other islands.(l47) 
Successive Commissioners devoted themselves to benefiting the 
conditions of the islands, relying more upon their own wide powers 
than the sham constitution. An incompatibility·in the British 
position, however, soon arose, Britain devot~d much money to 
making Corfu a first class naval base complete with all the 
necessary fortifications; this was the benefit she derived from 
possession of the islands, plus the fact that whilst she was the 
protectorate power, potential enemies such as Russia and France 
would not be able to make use of the facilities offered by the 
islands for extending their respective spheres of influence. In 
. return Britain at tempted to govern so as to benefit the inhabitants. 
With the establishment of a G.reek independent state, there arose 
a nationalist movemept in the islands calling for union with 
Greece. Britain was pledged to govern in accordance with the 
( 147) 'Cambridge History of the British Empire'. Vol. II. 
Cambridge, 1940. P• 183 ff. 
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wishes of the inhabitants, was pledged on the question of a 
constitution, but what was she to do when the nationalist cry 
calling for union with Greece threatened Britain with the loss 
of her bases, and the constructions upon which she had poured 
her money ? This problem was the crucial one which faced 
Imperial Governments and their representatives until it was solved 
by ceding the islands to Greece in 1864 and stipulating that the 
Corfiote fortifications should be razed. 
Both Russell and Grey considered this problem throughout the 
years of the former's first Administration. At the outset 
Russell inclined to adopt the Ionian view of the question. He 
-believed that the fact that Greece now possessed a constitution 
made the sham in the Ionian Islands offensive, and wrote to Grey:-
'I should like to give greater freedom and less garrisons to 
the Ionian Islands. It appears to me that the Treaty of Vienna 
meant us only to be Protecting Powers, whereas we have made those 
Islands a colony and spent enormous sums in fortifying them. 
Gibraltar and Malta are enough for us in the Mediterranean; Corfu 
is a strong position, which it is desirable but not necessary to 
keep out of the hands of foreign powers.•(l48) 
Grey was disposed to agree to Russell's first view of the 
problem, for he replied:-
' ••• I believe it would be a very wise course to inform the 
Ionians that if they like to be united with Greece we have not 
(148) Russell to Grey, March 16th, 1848. 
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the slightest objection and will consent to relieve them from 
our protection. The union would make Greece stronger and relieve 
us from a serious expense, one really strong garrison at Malta 
would make us safer in the Mediterranean than dividing our force: 
as we now do. I can see no one object we gain by retaining the 
Ionian Islands except exposing the force we have in all of them 
but Corfu to be cut off on the breaking out of a war, and sub-
jecting outselves to an additional and heavy demand for their 
defence.' (l49) 
Russell was now having second thoughts, perhaps as a result 
of consulting Palmerston. He found the duty of protection 
Power irksome, and wished that Austria would undertake it, leaving 
'Venice to the Venetians'. He agreed that the natural union of 
the islands would be with Greece, but, here was the crucial point, 
the Greek G:overnment was 'so very weak and so very faithless' 
that it might sell the islands to either France or Russia • In 
a later letter to the Colonial Secretary he broached the possibility 
of dividing the islands, perhaps giving the two large southern 
ones, Cephalonia and Zante, to Greece, whilst Britain retained 
Corfu or gave it to Austria. The plea for keeping Corfu was 
that its cession to Greece might be regarded as an unfriendly act 
by Turkey, as it lay so close to the Albanian coast, but probably 
the fact that it was so much more valuable than any;: of the other 
(149) Grey to Russell. May 9th, 1848. 
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islands or all of them combined, and that as a naval base in the 
wrong hands, it would be a danger to Britain had greater influence 
with the Prime Minister.(l50) 
By 1850 Russell was disposed not to give up the Ionian Islands 
'precipitately, and above all not to give them up to Russia 
which giving them to Greece would be.' He was determined to 
temporise, relying on Admiral Parker and his marines plus the 
British garrison to put down any insu~ction attempts by the 
disaffected populace. (l5l) 
In 1851 Grey returned to the question of the ultimate fate 
of the islands. He pointed out that the feeling of Greek nation-
ality was widespread, and reported that an experienced resident 
in the islands had told him 'that the people of property in 
Cephalonia admitted that the island would not be as well governed 
as a part of Greece as it is by us, but that they had rather be 
ill governed by themselves than well by strangers. ' \Yhat interest 
then had Britain in maintaining the protectorate ? As far as 
Grey could see, none whatever:-
' ••• they merely subj.ect us to ••• a very heavy expense for 
military protection, while it is clear if ever we are engaged in 
War we could not maintain our power in these islands for a 
moment with a hostile population ••• a mere inspection of the map 
makes it I think quite obvious that all the Southern Islands ought 
(150) Russell to Grey, May 9th and 15th, 1848. 
(151) Russell to Grey, April 3rd, 1850. 
to belong to Greece ••• I think we have now an obvious interest 
in giving additional strength and consideration to this petty 
state. No doubt Greece is at present very ill governed, but the 
best hope of effecting an improvement in its condition is to 
enlarge it and the addition of these considerable islands would 
strengthen popular power in the Parliament of Greece and render 
more difficult the maintenance of the existing corrupt system.' 
Grey was now convinced that it was necessary to maintain Corfu. 
The fortifications, on which Britain had 'foolishly thrown away 
so large a sum of money' would be of value to another rival great 
Power such as France. Grey proposed to separate Corfu and its 
minor dependencies from the rest of the islands; geographically 
there was a reason for doing this, plus the fact that feeling in 
favour of union with Greece was there less intense, partly 
because it had been so long the. seat of British Government. 
Grey's final decision was in favour of declaring Corfu a British 
colony and ceding the southern islands to Greece, and he pressed 
for a speedy decision on the question. (152) 
Russell's reply to· this suggestion ended all hopes of it being 
carried out. He stated:- . 
'I was at one time well inclined to such a proposal, but I 
am not so any longer.' 
He pointed out various objections to Grey's plan, such as that 
the geographical reason favoured Turkey as much as Greece, and that 
(152) Grey to Russell. -July 5th, 1851. 
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the expense incurred by Britain was mainly for Corfu which Grey 
proposed to keep, but the principal reason - one which he did not 
mention - seems to have been the fear that the islands would pass 
into the possession of, or under the influence of, Britain's 
enemies.,( l53) 
Surrender to the nationalists having been rejected, what course 
could Britain now pursue ? The simplest one would have been to 
abandon any attempt at constitutional government, since the 
nationalists only used representative institutions to further 
their own cause, and rule the islands as a military and naval base. 
Britain, however, considered herself bound by former pledges, 
and moreover such a ruthless change of policy was not in accordance 
with British tradition, even though it may have been more efficient. 
The impossible was then embarked upon, and Britain endeavoured 
by the grant of further reforms to satisfy any demand of the 
Ionian people short of union with Greece; the number of concessions 
made simply encouraged the nationalist party to continue their 
agitation, and enabled them to acquire greater influence. 
Lord Seaton was Commissioner in 1848, and he recommended to 
the Home Government the carrying out of various liberal measures, 
including the ballot and a free press. \Vhen his term of office 
'll'las over, the question arose as to who should succeed him. Grey 
at first favoured Charles Villiers, but when he declined, the 
post was offered to H.G. Ward, an advanced liberal, and Secretary 
(153) Russell to Grey, July 6th, 1851. 
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to the Admiralty in the Russell Administration. Ward accepted, 
and on his arrival found himself committed to carrying out the 
reforms promised by his predecessor. It did not take Ward long 
to find that these reforms were unwise and unworkable in the 
present temper of the Ionian people. 
In 1848 and 1849 there were nationalist risings in Cephalonia 
and elsewhere. Ward upon arrival proclaimed an amnesty for August 
1st, 1849, but towards the end of that month there was a serious 
uprising in Cephalonia, which was severely repressed by the High 
Commissioner. The suppression of the revolt aroused the usual 
outcries against brutality in the Imperial Parliament, but com-
pared with Torrington Ward escaped lightly, indeed Torrington's 
partizans were inclined to po~n~ out that the execution of priests 
for a part in a rebellion was carried out in the Ionian Islands 
as well as Ceylon, on a greater scale. 
Ward, though a good administrator, was not sympathetic to 
Ionian demands, indeed the very opposite. He had a very poor 
opinion of the people over whom he ruled; speaking of their 
'universal disingenuous and plausibility' he informed Hawes:-
' ••• when you can find an honest Greek, there is something 
peculiarly charming about him ••• I shou·ld find it difficult to 
lay my hand upon above two, in the country.' (l54) 
Ward's reports to his superiors were coloured by his impressions 
of the people, and may have had much to do with swinging round 
(154) Ward to Hawes, November lOth, 1850. 
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Russell's opinion as to the desirability of retaining the islands. 
He informed Russell that surrendering the islands to Greece would 
be 'discreditable' to Britain:-
'My conviction is, that it would be followed by a sbr.t of 
dissolution of all Society here; and that it would let loose 
the spendthrifts and cut:bhroats, not merely of the Islands them-
selves., but of the Continent, upon all, who have anything to lose; -
and that before a year was over, Russia would be called in, to 
arrest evils, which Greece in her present condition would have 
no power to check.' (155) 
Ward in the sunnner Of 1849 proposed certain modifications in 
Lord Seaton's plans. He believed that Lord Seaton's proposed 
changes were 'not to be worked by any human power,' whilst a full 
return to the old Constitution was impossible. The modifications 
he proposed, Lord Grey adopted, especially ensuring that the Senate 
would form a counterpoise to the democratic nature of the future 
Assembly. At the same time Ward had not yet lost his belief in 
a liberal solutio~ to the problem of the islands:-
'The Ionian Islands with a free press, a Legislative Assembly 
formed upon a popular basis, a low qualification, vote by ballot, 
good municipal institutions, complete control over the expenditure 
(excepting the Civil List) and enjoying these advantages under the 
(155) Ward to Russell, April 21, 1850. 
'Three Letters en the Ionian Islands 1850-~' -
William Miller, E.H.R. Vol. XLIII, 1928. 
PP• 240-6. 
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safeguard of the Protec~ing power etc may excite the envy of 
surrounding nations.' 
This, however, was before the August rebellion. Such views were 
cordially concurred in by Grey, who was anxious to see the Islands 
governed as far in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants 
as was practical. The August rebellion seems to have made Ward 
convinced that yet more changes were needed in Lord Seaton's 
reforms; he was now no longer confident that the Ionian Islands 
would benefit from more liberal institutions, or that the B~itish 
. L 
position would be made stro:cger by granting such.· . Grey considered 
the British Government to be committed to the experiment by Lord 
Seaton's measures; such measures as Ward now advocated, like 
cantrol~ of the press, Grey refused to agree to on account of the 
broken pledges to the Ionian people that this would involve. Liberal 
institutions in the Ionian Islands had to be given a fair trial·, 
had to be given a chance to work. 
Ward became increasingly concerned with the growing opposition 
to British rule; the agitation for union with Greece enjoyed 
the support of the Greek Government, and also pecuniary contrib-
utions from Russia. By the uncontrolled Press they were able to 
put .their views into print and to circulate the offending matter 
throughout remote villages. Ward had recourse to the High Police 
Power, 'undefined and .undefinable,' to put a stop to the agitation. 
Only by such an illiberal power could the High Commissioner, so 
Ward believed, maintain control. Yet the High Police Power was in 
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a way inconvenient, and Ward was quite prepared to abandon it if 
he could gain a more legal equivalent in its place:-
•.. the Queen's G.ovt will never get the credit that it 
deserves, for its most liberal policy in these Islands, so long 
as we persist in engrafting a little piece of Russian despotism 
upon a System in all other respects thoroughly constitutional.'(l56) 
Upon the whole Grey maintained his faith in liberal institutions 
for these islands longer than did his High Commissioner after his 
d'isillusioning experience of 1849. In 1852, when Grey was no 
longer in office, Hawes learnt that Ward seemed to be defending 
h::!.mself. and the lack of' success he was encountering in the admin-
istration of the islands by blaming his difficulties upon Grey. 
Hawes wrote to Ward defending his former chief; he stated how 
Grey had given the utmost consideration to Ward's views, had been 
ready to cast the blame for his difficulties upon Lord Seaton's 
measure.s, had never gone farther in his support of liberal measures 
than had Ward, and had only refused to carry out various recommend-
ations of his High Commissioner when these would have involved 
charges of broken faith. Ward himself admitted that to destroy 
constitutional powers would lead to appeals to the French and the 
Russians who would be able to protest in much the same manner as 
Britain had protested against the extinction of 'free and independ-
ent' Cracow. Ward, however, still continued to blame Grey for his 
difficulties, mainly because Grey had given his sanction originally 
to Lord Seaton's measures. Informing Russell that the Constitution 
,5", W~ttt o fo ({ ~SS£ LL .:l}.c.c.c.-b-e.t" ~0 ~I iS't. 
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only worked by its anomalies, the High Police Power and the Right 
of' Prorogation, Ward stated:-
' ••• Lord Grey was wrong. You cannot govern Greeks like 
.AngloSaxons, I told h~m so, in 1849. I repeat it !!.Q.! after trying 
the experiment f'or 3t years, during which the policy of' the Queen's 
Govt has been that of' unvarying concessions. .But concession, 
here, is weakness. You want the two elements of' the Representative 
System, - knowledge and principle. You want that mass of' Neutral 
Opinion, which, in England, restrains the passions of' political 
men, and forces them to give, at all events, the semblance of' 
Public interest to their quarrels.•(l57) 
Thus Grey left of'f'ice and no solution had been found to the 
Ionian problem. It was not f'or want of' concrete suggestions on 
his part; as we have seen he proposed acc:eding to the· request of' 
the Unionist party (as was ultimately done twelve years after he 
had left office), or alternatively creating Corfu into a British 
colony, an~ ceding the southern islands to Greece. Russell did 
neither; he decided instead to pursue a policy of expediency. 
A source of' expense and trouble to Britain, who already had two 
good bases in the Mediterranean, Russell yet dreaded to see the 
islands fall from Britain's grasp into that of a weak Greece under 
Russian influence. That being so, two alternatives lay open to 
the British; they could maintain full control or they could 
endeavour to satisfy the people by giving them a voice in their 
O\m government, in the hope that this would partially satisfy 
(157) Ward to Russell, Jan. 6th, 1953. E.H.R. Vol. XEIII. 
1928. 
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their politica~ aspirations. Grey, with his faith in representative 
institutions chose the latter course; it failed to work, but at 
least the experiment haa been made, and the nobler course of 
governing in accordance.with the wishes of the population had been 
tried. The other alternative of a military despotism was not one 
which Grey favoured, and its application would have been of 
doubtful value. The strategic value of the islands was now no 
longer as great as in Napoleonic times. Britain had an interest 
in strengthening an independent Greece, and strategic considerations 
would have been largely offset by the hostility of the local 
inhabitants. Hence the cession of the islands in 1864. 
M. General Remarks. 
We have briefly surveyed the most important and the most 
troublesome of the colonies with which Grey had to deal, their 
particular problems and how these affected the Colonial Office. 
More general topics also came within his range of duties; he 
had to attend to the question of ~migration (whether it should be 
aided by G'overnrnent funds or not), to free trade (the final link 
with the old colonial system, the Navigation Laws, were wholly 
abolished during his years of office), to the size, distribution 
and expense of the armed forces. For a conscientious Secretary 
of State - and Grey was certainly that - the work involved reached 
mammoth proportions. F·or many of his schemes he had to obtain the 
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consent of the Prime M-inister or one or more of' the other Depart-
ments, such as the Treasury and the Fofeign Office. Russell's 
Government was by no means one of Departments as Melbourne's had 
tended to be, and of course all this entailed extra work to 
convince-his colleagues that the· course he wished to adopt was 
the right one, or that the G~bvernor he wished to appoint was the 
man most sui ted to the task in hand. The difficulties of commun-
ication hampered the efficiency of the Colonial Office; Grey 
wisely believed in giving 'fu.is G:overnors wide discretionary powers, 
and contented himself with laying down the general principles on 
which they were to conduct their ~overnment - at least with those 
he had confidence in - but the Colonial Office had still to take 
a final decision on the course being-- pursued in a particular 
colony, and if that were as remote as say New Zealand, the Colonial 
Office decision when it reached that colony might no longer bear 
relation to the changed state of affairs there. 
It is little wonder then that from this multitude of business 
critics of' Colonial Office administration were able to find flaws, 
find subjects which had been overlooked, or material for party 
attacks in Parliament. Indeed part of Grey's time must have been 
taken up in preparing answers and searching for evidence to meet 
~arliamentary criticism. His critics were of different species. 
As far as is kno'm he had the general support of his Cabinet 
colleagues for his measures, though Wood was disposed to carp at 
any which he believed involved undue expense, and Russell's mind 
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was in a perpetual state of fluctuation on most subjects, the 
strength of feeling in Parliament being often the deciding factor. 
There were those who like Joseph Hume were convinced they were 
doing their duty as members of Parliament and as friends of the 
colonists or the native races; sincere men in the main, but 
hopelessly ignorant of the true state of affairs and liable to be 
influenced by more interested personages, such as agitators for a 
change of Governor, for more representative institutions and the 
like, or men such as Henry Wise with a personal grievance against 
the ruling, colonial powers. Then there were those politicians 
who saw in the difficulties encountered by the Colonial Office an 
opportunity of discrediting the Whig Government. They had their 
newspapers, so had the Colonial Reformers, whose articles could 
be devoted.to criticism of the Colonial Secretary and the Colonial 
Office generally. The Colonial Reformers also eventually became 
Grey'·s enemies; too often these men were hidebound by theories 
which when the Colonial Secretary did not slavishly adhere to them 
aroused their opposition. The Wakefield system of land sale, 
responsible government, these were panaceas to solve all··.: ills; 
arguments such as the fact that the Government had a duty towards 
other more primitive peoples were regarded by them as mere Colonial 
Office subterfuges to defraud colonists of their rights. Then 
there were people like Cobden and Bright who would have cheerfully 
abandoned one and all of the colonies, and aTl obl:i,.gations to 
settler or native inhabitants, if .by that means they could have 
saved a few more pounds, ~llings and pence. Frequently these 
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various groups of critics would combine for an attack upon the 
Colonial Secretary. There is no doubt that Grey came in for some 
very concentrated and severe criticism in these years; some of 
it was brought upon him by his own actions (for example antagon-
ising the South African colonists over the 'Neptune' incident), 
and some by actions over which he had no control (such as the 
manner of the suppression of the Ceylon rebellion). In general 
he bore this tide of criticism extremely well; we have already 
seen the wise words he·had to offer to Torrington on the subject. 
Nevertheless the criticism he had to endure certainly increased 
a growing distaste for the burdens of office. More liable to 
upset in such matters was his wife; on February 25th, 1849, at 
the time when Baillie was calling for a Committee to investigate 
the state of affairs in the Crown Colonies, Grey noted in his 
Journal:-
'Maria has worked herself up almost into a-fever about the 
absence of any proper answer to the attacks upon me, she got into 
a terrible way about it this afternoon.' 
GTey was in office just at that time when Colonial Office 
affairs were swelling in importance, and when the business of the 
Colonial Office was undergoing a vast increase. One has only to 
consider the amount of important legislation - constitutions 
drafted, a full free trade initiated - passed or projected by 
Grey to realize this. In addition he did not only look to pressing 
problems but attempted to take measures to satisfy the future needs 
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of' various colonies. If' the cri t·icisms were more severe, it was 
certainly a f'ar more f'ruitf'ul period of' of'f'ice than the similar 
period he had spent a~ Secretary at Wa~. Judged on this alone, 
his active lif'e as a politician is deserving of' recognition, and 
it is indeed as Colonial Secretary that much has been accorded him. 
If' his manner seemed forbidding and dictatorial to political 
opponents, newspaper editors, or f'ar away colonists, those· :Who had 
more opportunities to make a correct judgment, were of' a dif'f'erent 
opinion. '.D.his is what Henry Taylor, one of' the most talented 
of' the Colonial Of'f'ice staf'f', had to say of' him:-
'I have served under thirteen Secretaries of' State, and have 
thus had peculiar opportunities of' measuring their administrative 
powers, and Lord Grey is the one whom I should place f'irst • 
His unpopularity arises in a great degree f'rom his public spirit, 
which has taken little account of' the interest of' parties and 
individuals, and less of' his own 9 when oppoeed to public interest. 
He is ardent and tenacious in his opinions, but I think it is a 
great mistake to suppose that he is haughty and imperious in his 
temper of' mind. When public interests have permitted it, I have 
not known any man more caref'ul of' the interests and f'eelings of 
those serving under him in the colonies, or more truly liberal 
in his manner of' dealing with them.'(l5B) 
We have already noted the respect he paid to the opinions of' his 
G'overnors, and of' how he chose them irrespective of' party consid-
erations; they in return reciprocated his confidence. Elgin's 
(158) Quoted in Morrell, 'Colonial Policy of' Peel and Russell.' 
p ~OJ 
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view of their relationship is typical of the sentiments of many 
~ 
of his other Governors; when learnt that Grey was leaving the 
" Colonial Office, Elgin wrote :-
' ••• the intimation ••• that you are writing to me from the 
Colonial Office for the last time is received by me with the live-
liest regret ••• Having had th~ satisfaction of serving under you 
for upwards of five years, during the whole of which pe~iod I have 
been permitted to keep up such constant and familiar communication 
with you as has enabled me at once clearly to appreciate you·r 
yiews and sentiments, and fully to expound my own, and having 
moreover at all times received from you the most frank and genero.us 
support, it is difficult at first to realize the fact that this 
official relationship has absolutely come to an end. •• '(l59) 
Tb both Colonial Office staff and colonial officials then, Grey 
was not the hard-hearted, dogmatic Colonial Secretary the popular 
press occasionally made him out to be. 
Of all the Colonial Secretaries, until the age of imperialism 
at the close of the century again concentrated attention on the 
Colonial Office, of the nineteenth century, Grey is the most: 
outstanding, and the most knowledgeable on colonial affairs. Unlike 
such people as Pakington or St,anley, Grey was a specialist in this 
particular sphere; from his early political career he had been 
interested in colonial problems, and had already served a valuable 
apprenticeship as Under Secretary to Lord Goderich. By the time 
(159) Elgin to Grey, 19th March, 1852. 
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the Government had been defeated in 1852 Grey had left a definite 
imprint on the Colonial Office and the colonies·. Subsequent 
Whig or Coalition Governments were to be the poorer without 
his assistance in this particular office. 
CONCLUSION. 
When Grey left office in 1852 his constructive - though not 
his active - political ca.reer was over. He was as assiduous in 
his attendance in the House of Lords as eve~, his Journal continued 
to flourish, but the most important part of his political life 
was finished. "' In 1852 he was still a comparatively you man, he 
" 
had forty more years of life before him, and when we consider to 
what ag.e such people as Palmerston and Gladstone continued to 
hold office, it seems that Grey's career as a constructive states-
man was drastically shortened. From 1852 to his last appearance 
in the Lords, his role was that of the independent statesman bound 
not by party ties but by considerations of what he considered to 
be necessary for the public good; this was the position his 
father had wished him to assume, and which he had in earlier years 
nearly decided to follow. Such independence brought respect for 
his opinions and esteem for his character, but on the whole it 
was a barren position to adopt, and as isolated and ineffective 
a one to be in as placed on the top of a monument, or on a soli-
tary limb of a tree. Never a good party man, GTey by this attit-
ude of s_elf-isolation, deprived himself of the power of holding 
office again, and after all a constructive period of office is 
worth more than long barren years of lone criticism or suggestion. 
Only when in office can a politician's true worth be tested; 
eminent critics are quite common, good administrators comparatively 
rare. Considering his achievements as Colonial Secretary, it does 
seem a pity that GreY never held again a post in an administration. 
It was mainly his own fault that Grey never again found 
himself in a Government. As soon as Russell's first administration 
had resigned in 1852, G;rey had decided that he did not wish for 
office again. His main reason for this drastic step appears to 
have been his lack of confidence in Lord John Russell. H~s 
reasons for such lack of confidence in the former Prime Minister 
and once his close friend, he plainly stated to Sir George Grey 
in May, 1852:-
'I told G. Grey that it was quite true that I had expressed 
(and could not help doing so) my great regret at our having g·one 
out before the Cape debate, and my dissatisfaction with Ld John 
for having virtually decided the question of our resignation by 
his announcement in the H. of c. after the defeat on the Militia 
bill, I said it was very possible we might have come to the con-
clusion that our resignation was necessary, but no step ought to 
have been taken by him which in fact deprived the Cabinet of any 
voice in deciding upon so important a question - I added that the 
manner in which he had acted not upon this subject only, but upon 
others - the Durham letter (the original S·ource of our difficulties)-
the refusal to make any serious attempt to strengthen the govt in 
the winter - the militia bill (which he insisted upon bringing 
forward in spite of my earnest remonstrance before the cabinet 
had ever seen it in print) - and now in so rashly deciding on 
voting against the 2d reading of the militia bill had so destroyed 
my confidence in him that I did not think I could consent to join 
another administration under him, and as there clearly is no other 
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person who can lead- a whig govt, .I considered it to be impos~ible 
that I should again come into office.' (l) 
Various other questions in the succeeding years put a strain on 
friendly relations between the two men. In 1852 Russell corres-
ponded with Pakington, the new Colonial .Secretary, about the New 
Zealand Bill, after having consulted Ellice and Molesworth but 
not the ex Colonial Secretary:-
'! was not a little indignant', wrote Grey, 'at being told 
thus coolly that he had in this manner entirely passed me by, 
and aft.er consulting only about the very last men whose advice 
ought to be taken if it is desired to preserve our Colonial Empire, 
had formed so rash an opinion and communicated it to th_e present 
Secretary of State. Considering the assistance and support I had 
given him for so many years, this is rather too bad.'( 2) 
In.l860 there was yet another of these serious disagreemepts between 
the two men, in which Russell accused (but subsequently retracted), 
Grey of hoarding, while a member of Russell's first administration, 
accusations which could be used against the former a dozen years 
later. 
Apart from his distrust of Russell, and remembrances of the 
toil and critic ism associated with office, another reason for Grey 
to abstain from being in any government was the question of parlia-
mentary reform, to which both parties devoted attention in those 
years before the second Reform Act. Writing to Russell in December, 
(1) Journal, May 6th, 1852. 
(2) Journal, May 30th, 1852. 
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1852, explaining why he did not wish his name to be considered 
for a place in L0rd Aberdeen's Coalition Ministry, Grey put this 
reason as his chief one for not taking office - considering the 
person he was writing to he could do no other. He did not believe 
that it was wise, that the country should be agitated by a struggle 
for organic changes in the constitution, and that instead of such 
futile discussions the House of Connnons' time should be devoted 
'to the consideration of measures of practical improvement.' He 
pointed out that this was the opinion he had repeatedly expressed 
whilst a Cabinet colleague of Russell's, though he stated:-
'I acquiesced in your bringing forward the measure you proposed 
at the beginning of the year, I did so very reluctantly because 
by a declaration of opinion originally made by you in the House of 
Commons without any concert with your colleagues things had been 
brought to a state in which the choice lay between proposing some 
measure on this subject and breaking up the administration of 
which I could not take upon myself the responsibility. The measure 
too that was decided upon, would I believed, have done some good 
had it been accepted, while it was obvious that such a plan could 
not pass otherwise than by a pretty general assent of different 
parties, and it therefore could not provoke my dangerous struggle.' 
He doubted whether there was an urgent want for any such changes, 
believed that the House of Commons as present constructed was 'an 
efficient instrument for securing an administration of affairs in 
accordance with the judgment and wishes of the most enlightened 
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and intelligent part of the nation,' and that any measure carried 
would not be an improvement on the 1832 Reform Bi"ll but probably 
the reverse. In a later letter on the same subject, he informed 
Russell:-
••• if I had the power I would make far more extensive 
changes in the Act of 1832 than any I have seen proposed (unfortun-
ately he does not outline the changes he would make), and my 
objection to disturbing that arrangement nQ! is founded entirei¥ 
on my conviction that the public mind is not yet prepared for 
such a revision of our representative system as I should think 
desirable, that anything but a complete revision of it would do 
far more harm than good • • • '.< 3) 
These views on the question of parliamentary reform and his 
opinions that the Whigs should rely more upon the rank and file 
of the Conservatives rather than upon the Radicals, made him 
unpopular with the more liberal wing of the Whig party. 
These were his main reasons for rejecting future prefers of 
office. For a while his name was thought of for office by both 
parties. In 1855 when Lord Derby was asked to try and form a 
Government, he informed the Queen that there were but two suffic-
iently able men he could think of to hold the War Department, and 
Grey was one 'who would do it admirably,' but Derby disagreed 
with him as to general politics and on the propriety of the war 
with Russia, 'then came his peculiar views about the Amalgamation 
of Offices, in which he did not at all agree.' After Derby had 
(3) Grey to Russell, Dec. 23nd, 1852, and May 7th, 1860. 
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failed in his attempt, Russell and Palmerston were asked to form 
a government, they decided that 'Lord Grey could not be asked 
to join, his views on the Foreign P._olicy differed so much from 
theirs, and he had always been an intractable colleague.' Lord 
Derby in 1858 offered Grey a place in his Administration, but the 
offer was rejected partly because it would bring Grey into oppos-
ition with his closest friends.(4) 
Lord Granville writing to Lord Canning in 1858, described 
Grey's position in the following words:-
'Grey is the most important man on our (the Whig) side of 
the House, and stands high for character and independence but the 
liberals do not like him.' 
Lord Granville's biographer, mentioning the number of ex-ministers 
who stood outside the ranks of the regular Opposition at that 
time, has this to say of Grey:-
• • • Lord Grey, then in the zenith of his remarkable powers, 
which have left &o insufficient a mark on the page of English 
history, was commencing the persistent but barren course of critic-
ism in which, as Lord Granville once playfully observed, he dis-
played 'his infinite power and fertility in raising objections to 
any course which was not precisely that which he had shaped 
himself.' 
(4) 
( 5) 
( 5) 
Memo by Queen Victoria, Jan. 31st 1855, and Memo by 
Prince Albert Feb. 3rd 1855· Earl Derby to Queen 
Victoria, Feb. 21st 1858 -
'The Letters of Queen Victoria' Vol. III pp. 103, 115, 342. 
'Second Earl Granville' - Ld E.Fitzmaurice, London, 1905. 
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Thus in the late 1850's Grey was still a political figure of 
considerable importance, but absence from office, and the fact 
that he entirely confined himself to criticism - whether construct-
ive or otherwise - of policies adopted by both parties, was bound 
in the long run to lessen his importance, and to abrogate a career 
which from its start had been a very promising one. 
Grey's failure ·in politics was inherent in his character. 
His record as Secretary at War, considering all the prejudice 
and inertia he had to attempt to overcome, was very creditable. 
Even more so were the years in which he was Under-Secretary and 
Secretary of State -for the Colonial Department. He could not, 
however, maintain smooth relations with his fellow colleagues in 
party or government, if policies or measures he desired were not 
acquisced in by them. To most of those who served with him he 
appeared as dogmatic, overbearing, contemptuous of those who 
differed from him, and too tenacious of his own opinions. 
Palmerston too was not popular with his colleagues, but his 
perpetual cheerfulness and his adroit way of handling difficulties 
led him to be more successful than Grey, who appeared never to 
unbend, in avoiding awkward scrapes; in addition Palmerston had 
one supreme gift which Grey did not possess, if overruled by his 
colleagues he could appeal to Parliament and public opinion. 
Palmerston was a good public speaker and knew how to command 
himself and his policies to members of Parliament and the general 
public; he was a popular figure in public eyes. Grey did not 
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possess the art of appealing to a wider audience; his opposition 
to his colleagues over policy appeared ruder and harsher than 
Palmerston's ever was and he could not have it sanctioned by wider 
support. This partly explains why Palmerston could rise to 
greater heights than Grey and why the former was toupd to be 
indispensable to.the stability of various governments whereas 
Grey was not. 
icable person. 
There was also the charge that Grey was an impract-
This is to a certain extent true; that defect of 
character which could not see when it was reasonable to surrender 
to the views of others, led him into such acts as the incident 
inr' December, 1845 over Palmerston, and to entertain such views 
even then of performing more public service as an isolated and 
independent figure in Parliament. In part this uncompromising 
attitude stemmed from a devotion to principles and duty; with 
Grey there was no cant when he referred to these abstract qualities, 
he regulated his conduct by them. The fact that he held princ-. 
iples to be so sacred explains much of that intransigence he 
showed in key questions; after all principles were not to be 
compromised, and he had to stand by them, even though they caused 
ill-will between himself and colleagues. Thus on one side went 
great abilities, absolute devotion to what he considered to be the 
public good, a strict adherence to the sterling qualities of truth 
and justice; on" the other lay the fact that he could no-t work 
well in a team of colleagues, had no powers of ingratiating himself 
to party rank and file or to the public, and was inclined•"'". to be 
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dictatorial and intransigent or at least to appear to be so. 
Thus the picture became prevalent of a harsh, dogmatic individUal 
with but little of that 'milk of human kindness. ' 
Those who knew him better, his closest friends, his sub-
ordinates in office, the colonial governors who had won his trust 
and confidence, could paint a far truer and less rigid picture of 
the man. To all these people he was as steadfast and loyal as 
the public interest would permit. He was a man who could not 
make an outward idsplay of the more praiseworthy emotions yet 
who never lacked them for all that. Consider hoW' he concerned 
himself over the years in trying to obtain some fitting reward 
for the services of James Stephen out of gratitude for the way in 
which Stephen had assisted him when he first entered the Colonial 
Department under Lord Goderich; or what pains he took to rectify 
those abuses in tropical climates which destroyed the life and 
health of the British soldiery stationed there. With his colonial 
governors for the most part he worked admirably, encouraging them 
when depressed, giving full attention to their ideas, giving 
sound advice to them when he thought it necessary, and carrying 
on with many of them intimate private correspondence. To the 
ou~side world and to chance acquaintances or those whom he did 
not wholly trust he could not unbend, but to a smaller intimate 
circle he was a much more human creature, but of course such was 
not sufficient for the highest of political careers. As to dogmas 
Grey only had, strictly speaking, three; these were adherence 
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to free trade principles, to the principles of the new Poor Law, 
and the Wakefield land system, and even with these he was pre-
pared to consider sue~ modifications as a small fixed duty on 
corn, or the application of part of the land fund to other pur-
poses than that of emigration. 
Thus the failings of the individual marred the career of 
the political figure, but they were not really bad failings 
morally speaking, and Grey stands forth as a highly honourable 
man, who was in his short official career the originator of 
many important measures, some which gained the approbation of 
colleagues and some which did not, some which were not successful 
and others which were highly so. 
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